Irrigation development and its socioeconomic impact on rural communities in Malawi

Abstract

The ‘green revolution’ of the 1950s advocated irrigation schemes as one way of achieving food security globally. Evidence from the Likangala and Domasi irrigation schemes in Malawi suggests, however, that irrigation schemes that were developed after the pattern of the ‘green revolution’ had adverse effects on the socioeconomic status of Malawi's rural communities, disrupting local economies, exposing local farmers to water related diseases, and relocating communities away from their ancestral land without due compensation. The production of rice, expansion of rural sources of income, and growth of towns associated with irrigation schemes were limited in quality and quantity and benefited only a few privileged farmers on the schemes. This paper strongly recommends the recognition of local structures and systems, and minimal dependency on donor support, if irrigation farming is to improve the welfare of rural communities in Malawi.

Keywords:

• irrigation schemes
• green revolution
• land tenure
• Malawi

1. Introduction

Since the mid-1940s, interest has been growing globally in the promotion of irrigation farming (Adams, 1992; Postel, 1999; Shah et al., 2002). As an agricultural technology, irrigation is a lasting solution to the problem of achieving food security in the face of recurring droughts, rapid population growth and climatic changes (Cernea, 1985; Adams, 1992; Boelens & Davila, 1998). The ‘green revolution’ movement reaffirmed the significance of irrigation by advocating infrastructural investments in agriculture through the construction of irrigation schemes, along with the use of chemical fertilisers, pesticides and improved crop varieties such as paddy rice (Cleaver, 1972; Hazell & Ramasamy, 1991; Adams, 1992; Tribe, 1994; Conway, 1998). With funding from international, bilateral and multilateral donors, especially the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, irrigation technology after the green revolution was first implemented in Mexico, India and some African countries, including Malawi.

In Malawi, irrigation schemes were first developed by the colonial government between 1946 and 1960, but most schemes were established during the postcolonial period (Kishindo, 1996; Nkhoma, 2005). Between 1967 and 1982, 16 schemes were constructed along the shores of Lake Malawi (Karonga, Nkhata Bay and Nkhota Kota), the Lake Chilwa basin and the Lower Shire (Makato, 1984; Mphande, 1984; Kishindo, 1996; Cammarck & Chirwa, 1997; Chirwa, 2002; Mulwafu & Nkhoma, 2002). The schemes were designed to use undeveloped arable land, promote cash cropping, increase rice export, expand rural livelihoods, form nuclei for rural towns, and promote ethnic tolerance and nationhood (Government of Malawi [GoM], 2000). Until the late 1980s, the schemes were constructed and operated by the British and the Taiwanese Governments, operating as government enterprises, with local farmers working as ‘tenants’ (Cammarck & Chirwa, 1997; Mulwafu & Nkhoma, 2002; Chirwa, 2002). As ‘tenants’, the farmers were given credit in the form of farm inputs, to be deducted directly from sales at Admarc (Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation) depots which were located in all the schemes to buy the farmers' produce.

From the mid-1980s it began to be clear that ‘green revolution’ irrigation schemes were a failure, with the exception of a few cases in Asia and India (Cleaver, 1972; Barnett, 1997; Adams, 1990, 1992; Shiva, 1992; Timberlake, 1994; Postel, 1999; Shah et al., 2002). In many parts of Africa, irrigation development did little to improve the welfare of the peasants (Barnett, 1997; Cernea, 1985; Hogg, 1987). Most farmers resented the land alienation, community displacement and disruption of local economies and social systems that the schemes brought with them. Social injustice was rampant in the allocation of plots, sale of produce, water distribution and provision of farm inputs (Boelens & Davila, 1998). In Zimbabwe, the development of smallholder irrigation schemes benefited the white settlers rather than Africans (Manzungu & Van Zaag, 1996; Manzungu et al., 1999). Most of the schemes were in the hands of white farmers. Among the reasons for the failure of irrigation farming were the government's failure to take local circumstances into account, overdependence on donor funding, adoption of top-down approaches, lack of local ownership of resources, and over-politicisation of irrigation development. The ‘structural adjustments’ policies that were adopted in many third-world countries, as dictated by the IMF and the World Bank, were the last straw that led to the collapse of irrigation farming (Chilowa & Chirwa, 1997; Shah et al., 2002).

Using case studies of Likangala and Domasi, two of the largest irrigation schemes in the Lake Chilwa area of southern Malawi, the present paper examines the development of irrigation schemes within the framework of the ‘green revolution’ and the overall impact this development has had on socioeconomic status of rural communities in Malawi. The findings from the Lake Chilwa basin seem to confirm that irrigation schemes of this kind were a failure by the early 1980s. The schemes were poorly patronised, inadequately funded, poorly maintained, widely underutilised and highly politicised. There was growing resentment from the local farmers over the disruptions the schemes caused to pre-existing economies, the land dislocation without due compensation and the increase in water-related diseases such as cholera, malaria and bilharzia, while the purported benefits in terms of infrastructure, increased rice production and expanded rural income sources were limited in quality and quantity. Only a few privileged farmers benefited from the schemes.

Data for the study are drawn from Nkhoma (2005). Oral testimonies were obtained through interviews with local leaders, farmers, scheme officials and government officers from the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation Development. Field observations were made in order to understand the operation and impact of the irrigation schemes on the ground. The aim was to collect first-hand information about irrigation development and a local perspective on the impact of irrigation schemes. Government documents from the Malawi National Archives (MNA), irrigation schemes and government offices were also examined to discover the official view of the developments.

2. The making of the Likangala and Domasi irrigation schemes

Likangala and Domasi are two of the 16 irrigation schemes constructed in Malawi between 1967 and 1982. Likangala was initiated by the colonial government towards the end of the 1950s, whereas Domasi was of purely postcolonial origin and its construction was exclusively funded by the Government of Taiwan (Nkhoma, 2005). The existence of littoral floodplains and hydromorphic soils and the history of rudimentary forms of irrigation were among the factors that encouraged the Malawi Government to develop these two irrigation schemes in the Lake Chilwa basin. Archival sources also indicate that before the colonial government embarked on rice irrigation projects there were rice growers in the valleys of Limphasa, Lake Chilwa basin and the Lower Shire and the government wanted to promote these growers.1

During the construction of the schemes the government consulted the local leaders in the basin, who accepted the idea. The understanding was that the leaders would easily persuade their communities to follow suit. However, the communities were not in favour of the development. Most of them resented the presence of the Chinese who were associated with the schemes. Others felt that introducing irrigation schemes would result in loss of ancestral land and property (interview, S Phuliwa, Watchman, Likangala Scheme, 22 October 2003). However, the government managed to convince the villagers that the schemes would bring job opportunities to the area and increase rice production. Likangala was completed in 1972 with 430 hectares, of which 397 were irrigable, and Domasi in 1975 with 505 hectares, 475 of which were irrigable. Through gravity-fed systems, water from the Likangala and Domasi rivers was diverted into schemes through canals.2 The predominant crop cultivated was rice, though farmers were allowed to grow others such as maize, water melons, sweet potatoes, beans and pumpkins during the winter seasons.

Figure 1: Lake Chilwa basin and existing irrigation schemes

Farmers in the schemes were drawn from the villages surrounding the schemes and other parts of the districts where the schemes were located. Scheme officials, people from other districts, and graduates of the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP) were also given plots in the schemes. The MYP was an agricultural movement formed by the Malawi Government in 1963 to foster agricultural and rural development in Malawi (GoM, 1965). It operated training bases where primary school graduates received 10 months' basic training in discipline, civics, agriculture and community development. When the schemes were constructed, the government decided to settle the most enterprising Young Pioneers in the schemes to expand their income sources and to demonstrate modern farming methods to the peasants in the rural communities. On the schemes, they were under the supervision of the MYP Discipline Officer who was allocated to each of the irrigation schemes in Malawi. The Young Pioneers were given larger land holdings than the local farmers, occupying over 50% of the total land in most of the schemes.3 In justification, the government contended that the Young Pioneers had no other gardens outside the scheme to cultivate, and thus depended largely on the production of rice for their income.

To qualify to be allotted land in the scheme a local farmer had to demonstrate that he or she was hard working, over 18, of good social behaviour, cooperative and debt free. However, these conditions mostly applied to farmers from the villages surrounding the schemes whose character was well known in the area. Farmers from other parts of the country were in theory supposed to apply for plots through district commissioners from their districts, but in practice the plots were allocated by local committees which were initially made up of local leaders from the schemes.

Table 1: Settlement pattern, 1969–79

Season	Likangala			Domasi
	Local	MYP	Total	Local	MYP	Total
1969/70	197	82	279
1970/71	453	93	546
1971/72	447	89	536
1972/73	534	51	585	14	–	14
1973/74	581	89	670	500	73	573
1974/75	629	76	705	492	70	562
1975/76	737	58	795	780	75	855
1976/77	783	76	859	1374	116	1 490
1977/78	762	55	817	1280	144	1 424
1978/79	731	31	762	1279	104	1 383
Source: MNA GRS 600/1/13 Settlement Schemes, 1983; Nkhoma (2005:44).

3. Problems and challenges facing irrigation development in Malawi

The irrigation schemes were beset with problems from the start. The first was the poor response: local farmers were reluctant to work in the schemes, especially in the early days. There were several reasons for this. Most of the farmers were not prepared to abandon maize and turn to growing rice in the schemes. They considered scheme work more laborious, and archival sources indicate that they asked the government to do everything (prepare the land by digging, levelling and banding, and cart fertiliser and seedlings) before they would cultivate in the schemes. They complained that the average plot size of 0.5 acre was too small for them to make meaningful gains from the schemes. Consequently, most continued to depend on their traditional gardens to grow food crops outside the schemes, a practice which undermined their commitment to rice cultivation in the schemes. On 9 January 1973, the Director of Technical Services wrote to the Secretary for Agriculture informing him of the problems the farmers were causing on Likangala irrigation scheme. He complained that they were showing no interest in planting in the scheme.4

The second problem, related to poor response, was defaulting on credit repayment. When the schemes were constructed, a settlement credit fund was established to provide farmers with credit in the form of fertilisers, seeds and pesticides. Repayment was by direct deduction from sales at Admarc depots in the schemes. However, from the time the irrigation schemes were constructed most of the farmers did not want to repay the credit. Tables 2 and 3 attest to this. To avoid repayment, they avoided attending meetings organised on the schemes and refrained from selling crops through Admarc. Most of them resorted to selling rice to private traders at local markets around the schemes.5 Some secretly withdrew from the schemes without paying their debts. Members of local committees also began to avoid attending meetings for fear of being reminded of their credit.

Table 2: Settlement credit fund in Malawi kwacha (US$1 = MK2)

Year	Likangala			Domasi
	Credit issued	Credit paid	Credit balance	Credit issued	Credit paid	Credit balance
1972	8 316.5	6 257.10	2 059.40
1973	9 876.2	3 098.2	4 778
1974	8 971	Nil	8 971	6 717	3	6 714
1975	20 302	17 823	3 332	27 287	23 875	3 495
1976	9 458	Nil	9 458	11 696	Nil	11 696
1977	35 156.2	27 670	11 486.19	53 225.66	42 844.19	10 381.47
1978	32 109	Nil	3 109	48 125	12 290	35 835
Source: MNA, GRS 631/11 Settlement Aspects, 1981–83; Nkhoma (2005:58).

Table 3: Winter crop credit, 1980–81 (US$1= MK4)

Scheme	Amount	Recovered	Balance	% Recovery
Likangala	4 490.65	980.89	3 509.76	21%
Domasi	24 467.55	4 492.20	19 975.35	18%
Total	28 958.20	5 473.09	23 485.11	18%
Source: MNA, GRS 600/1/13 Settlement Schemes, 1983; Nkhoma (2005:59).

The third problem was over-politicisation of irrigation schemes. Evidence from the case studies shows that the government's motive for constructing the irrigation schemes was not just to modernise peasant agriculture in the rural communities but also to promote its political ideologies, especially during the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) regime. To achieve this, the government appointed party supporters to chair local committees in the schemes through the Regional Minister for the South, who was also Joint Commander of the MYP. The chairpersons were in turn asked to nominate the other members of the committees.6 Before the members took up their positions their names were sent to the President for further scrutiny and approval. Through this process, only those loyal to the MCP were chosen, to ensure that the committees operated within the political interests of the MCP regime (Cammack & Chirwa, 1997). The first allocation committee at Likangala was made up of the MCP area chairman and other party loyalists.7 This was also the case at Domasi, where a staunch supporter of the then ruling MCP was given the chairmanship.

Remaining a member of an allocation committee was also dependent on loyalty to the MCP regime. Members who became disloyal to the government were automatically dismissed. The first chairman of Likangala allocation committee, for example, lost his position immediately after he fell out of grace with the MCP in May 1970,8 despite being highly reputed and seen as cooperative, helpful and hardworking by all the members of the committee. In his memo of 18 December 1969, the Irrigation Engineer at Likangala commended him for being more cooperative than other members of the land allocation committee.9 His dismissal was followed by a reshuffle of the committee, and only those loyal to the MCP were kept on. The chairmanship was given to the Member of Parliament for Zomba East.10

The major source of political problems, however, was the presence of the Young Pioneers. Apart from helping with agricultural production, the Young Pioneers were strategically settled to fulfil other political functions in the schemes and the communities around the schemes (Cammack & Chirwa, 1997). They operated not only as farmers but also as party watchdogs who dealt with any person who undermined the ideologies of the MCP. Within the schemes, they forced the farmers to attend political rallies organised by the MCP and helped to sell party cards. Failure to purchase party cards disqualified farmers from cultivating in the schemes, selling their crops at the Admarc market and getting medical services from the health centres in the schemes. One group of farmers who suffered terribly were the Jehovah's Witnesses, who refused to purchase party cards or take part in the political affairs of the country. This did not go down well with the MCP regime, who decreed in 1972 that members of this religious group did not belong to the country. At the time, there were 16 of them cultivating at Likangala, and on 19 October 1972 their plots were declared vacant and immediately reallocated to other farmers. During this time, the Young Pioneers were at the forefront of chasing them away from the schemes.

It was due to this politics of terror that the farmers from Likangala and Domasi irrigation schemes demanded the immediate removal of the MYP from the schemes when the country adopted a multi-party system of government in 1994. Fearing that they might be ill treated by the ordinary farmers, the Young Pioneers thus found it necessary to withdraw from the schemes. However, a few of them remained in the villages around the schemes, including those who had got married in the area and those from the villages around the schemes who had been trained as Young Pioneers. But these ex-Young Pioneers now had to operate as ordinary farmers, and since their camps had been destroyed they were taken in by the communities in these villages.

The final problem had to do with inadequate funds with which to run the irrigation schemes effectively, especially from the late 1970s. There were two reasons for this. First, the country was undergoing a serious economic crisis as a result of huge debts incurred with international financing agencies, and second, the Taiwanese Government withdrew its support for the schemes from 1978. The Chinese had been given a contract to run and support the schemes they had constructed for one year only and after that to hand the schemes over to the government of Malawi.

To cope with this problem, the government sought financial support from the IMF, the World Bank and other donors, who demanded the adoption of structural adjustment programmes as a precondition for accessing their financial assistance (Chilowa & Chirwa, 1997). These programmes involved reducing public expenditure on government institutions by dismissing the groundsmen who had been contracted to maintain the schemes (Nkhoma & Mulwafu, 2004). As a result of these dismissals, from the early 1980s the existing irrigation structures became dilapidated and overgrown with grass. Since farmers considered the schemes to be government property, they were reluctant to help maintain them voluntarily.

After the establishment of a multiparty system of government in 1994, the government backed even further out of its commitment to irrigation schemes and largely revised its policies and legislation governing the management of the schemes. By 2000 a new irrigation policy had been adopted (Ministry of Agriculture & Irrigation Development, 2000), the objectives of which were to alleviate poverty among resource-poor farmers, create a spirit of business culture in the schemes, increase agricultural production, improve the management capacity of farmers in the schemes, extend cropping opportunities, encourage rural communities to manage irrigation projects, and enhance cost sharing and cost recovery principles. The most notable change was the idea of the government handing over the ownership of the schemes to water users or farmers working on the schemes (GoM, 2000), and the IMF and the World Bank encouraged this handover because it was consistent with the structural adjustment programmes imposed on the country from the early 1980s (Chilowa & Chirwa, 1997).

With support from the Food and Agriculture Organization and later the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the process of handing over the schemes to farmers started with a pilot project involving Lufira, Wovwe, Hara, Domasi, Nkhate and Bua. In these schemes, water user associations were formed and irrigation structures rehabilitated and farmers were trained in managing and maintaining the schemes, in readiness for the handover. At Domasi the process started in 2000 (GoM, 2000). However, as of 2004 none of the schemes had been handed over to farmers. Among the reasons for this delay were theft of rehabilitating materials, the farmers' tardiness in grasping the essence and benefits of the handover, and inadequate funding of the programme (personal communication, L Chilimbiro, Scheme Manager, Likangala, 20 November 2003).

4. The socioeconomic impact of irrigation schemes in Malawi

4.1 Customary vs public land tenure

The most immediate effect of scheme development was the disruption of land tenure in the Lake Chilwa basin. The land on which the schemes were established was declared public according to the Customary Land (Development) Act of 1967, which abolished the authority of the chiefs over this land and required the people in the area to settle elsewhere.11 According to oral sources, most of the people had to squeeze into the villages surrounding the schemes (interview, F Ramusi, Chairperson, Scheme Management Committee, Likangala, 21 October 2003). The problem was that the basin was already overpopulated and finding land to cultivate had become a serious problem. The allowance the farmers had been given to cultivate in the schemes meant that they had to depend on cultivating in the schemes for cash and subsistence. No compensation was given except to those who had permanent houses and fruit trees, who were given K18 to K100 (the exchange rate was then at K2 per US$1), in compensation for the loss of their property and not for the loss of their land. Since the local farmers were to be granted plots from the schemes, it was felt unnecessary to compensate them for the loss of land for cultivation. When the farmers demanded compensation for the loss of their land, they were told that the government would not pay them money because the schemes had been constructed for their benefit, and those who insisted would be arrested.

4.2 Rural towns and life

After the schemes had been constructed, the government worked hard to create rural growth centres in the places where they had been established, with the towns as development centres. Since the schemes were in remote parts of the country, plans were made to develop townships around them, to supply social and medical services and ensure a regular supply of goods for the newly settled irrigation farmers.12 The growing number of cases of water borne diseases such as bilharzia, cholera, malaria and typhoid that followed the creation of the schemes made clinics essential. The townships were to include shops, markets, bridges, churches, boreholes, taps, houses, schools, and the like. However, the plans were later abandoned because of insufficient land and finances. As of 1979, only the structures listed in Table 4 existed, and not much had been developed at the time of writing.

Table 4: The status of trading centres at Likangala and Domasi

Facility	Likangala	Domasi
Shops/markets	4	4
Clinics	1	1
Church	1	1
Boreholes	1	1
Taps	13	Nil
Houses	80	100
Schools	1	1
Source: MNA GRS 600/1/13 Settlement Schemes, 1983; Nkhoma (2005:91).

With time, it became clear that the infrastructural developments would not have any lasting impact on the schemes. Most of them were badly located and the grocery stores were poorly stocked and the health centres understaffed. Located near Domasi Bridge, the trading centre at Domasi scheme became vulnerable to annual floods from the Domasi River. In 1978 heavy floods destroyed most of the houses in the town and the plots in the schemes. Although a flood control band was constructed, the bridge continued to be swamped, making the scheme periodically inaccessible to the farmers from Zomba side. Furthermore, the clinics faced problems of understaffing and inadequate medicine and thus had no lasting effect on the welfare of the people in the basin. The roads were untarred and the bridges were made of poles, so that with time the roads became impassable in the rainy season and most of the bridges collapsed. The government had instituted no mechanism for the maintenance of roads and bridges but left it up to the Youth Week programmes. Youth Week was a week set aside annually by the government for the youth to engage in development activities such as clearing roads and constructing bridges, clinics, school blocks and teachers' houses. However, these activities became heavily politicised, so that by the mid-1990s most of the farmers were reluctant to participate in Youth Week. Figure 2 shows buildings constructed at Likangala scheme: the Likangala Health Centre, constructed principally to provide medical services to farmers working on the scheme, and office buildings for settlement staff and Admarc.

Figure 2: Likangala Health Centre (top) and office buildings for settlement staff and Admarc at Likangala scheme (bottom)

4.3 Rural class differentiations and conflicts

As the schemes became more established, the social homogeneity of the Lake Chilwa basin was crippled. A trend towards social differentiation began to appear, dividing the farmers of the basin into the privileged and the vulnerable. The privileged farmers included committee members, civil servants and the members of the Young Pioneers, and the schemes worked very much to their advantage. Most of the local farmers were reduced to aganyu or casual labourers for the privileged farmers.

One of the ways privileged farmers prospered was by acquiring more plots in the schemes, at the expense of the less privileged farmers. Mostly, they rented plots from those who were unable to cultivate them because they could not afford inputs or the labour costs of irrigation farming, or redeemed plots from farmers who failed to repay loans. There was a policy in the schemes that if a farmer failed to pay back loans then those who had money could pay the loans in exchange for plots. The members of the scheme management committee, who were local farmers responsible for operating and maintaining the schemes, also had the opportunity to access more plots and farm inputs. As the ones responsible for the reallocation of plots, they allocated more plots to themselves, acquiring them mostly by confiscating them from farmers who failed to cultivate them. In some cases, they took advantage of plots belonging to farmers who had died. When the children and relatives failed to come forward to claim the plots, they shared these plots among themselves. In this way, one chair of an allocation committee accumulated more than 20 plots at Domasi scheme.

This situation led to conflict. The local farmers complained that ‘foreigners’ or newcomers were the ones who were benefiting from the scheme rather than themselves. They began to resent the Young Pioneers, who were allocated larger holdings. Some tended to be less cooperative and reluctant to participate in development works around the schemes. When the government proposed to hand over the irrigation schemes from 2000, most of these underprivileged farmers were excited. Chiefs, for example, saw the handover of the schemes in the basin as an opportunity to get back the land they had lost to the government. Some villagers who were similarly affected by the construction of the schemes echoed these sentiments. For poor farmers, the handover promised an opportunity to access plots the privileged farmers had accumulated. Those relatively well off, on the contrary, were not in favour of the handover, which would entail reallocating their plots to others. It would be difficult to retain them after the handover. According to the new constitution, farmers would no longer be allowed to rent plots in or out.

4.4 A new agrarian culture and production

Despite their flaws, the irrigation schemes transformed agrarian practice in the basin, and this in turn helped increase the country's rice production and gave rural communities an alternative source of income. The inhabitants of the basin had to learn to practise commercial rather than subsistence farming, with maximum use of scientific technologies such as intensive crop production, the application of fertilisers and pesticides, and proper drying methods. They were required to grow crops twice every year, and instead of depending on residual moisture they used water supply from the rivers through gravity fed systems. The first block of each scheme was designated as a demonstration block from which farmers would learn new methods. No allowance was given for the farmers to cultivate crops other than rice, which they could sell directly to Admarc at the depots in the schemes.

The allocation of the Young Pioneers to the schemes helped considerably to modernise agricultural practices in the Lake Chilwa basin. Although they were there primarily to enhance their income sources and increase rice production for the nation, they also acted as models for demonstrating new methods of farming to the local farmers. From 1973, government staff on the schemes were also authorised to cultivate in the schemes,13 and although their purpose was to increase rice production and ensure that the best use was made of the schemes, as agricultural experts their involvement went a long way in modelling good agricultural practices for the local farmers.

Tables 5 and 6 show the overall contribution of the irrigation schemes to rice production from 1969 to 1999, steadily increasing over these years but particularly at Likangala from 1991. They also show that from 1969 Admarc was the main buyer of rice from the irrigation schemes; it was joined by NOIL (National Oil Industry Limited, now defunct) in 1990 and then the Rice Milling Company in 1997. However, it should be noted that the tables do not give the full picture of the amount of rice produced at these schemes, but show only how much was recorded at the offices of the schemes, and how much was purchased by Admarc, NOIL and the Rice Milling Company. The tables do not show how much rice was produced in the winter seasons, or how much the farmers kept for home consumption.

Table 5 also shows fluctuations in the production of rice at Likangala between 1970 and 1975. There were various reasons for this. One was the local farmers' unwillingness to participate fully in the production of rice in the scheme – as mentioned earlier, not many farmers from the surrounding villages registered as plot holders in Likangala – and another was the growing number of Young Pioneers leaving the scheme. Rice production began to increase from 1973, as a consequence of the visit by the Regional Minister (South) to encourage farmers to join the scheme and the permission he gave to government officials working in the scheme to start cultivating there.14

Table 5: Rice production at Likangala and Domasi irrigation schemes, 1969–78

Year	Likangala		Domasi
	Production in metric tons	Purchaser	Production in metric tons	Purchaser
1969	129	Admarc
1970	938	Admarc
1971	676	Admarc
1972	565	Admarc
1973	915	Admarc	330	Admarc
1974	759	Admarc	573	Admarc
1975	1 028	Admarc	997	Admarc
1976	1 123	Admarc	1 278	Admarc
1977	1 239	Admarc	1 316	Admarc
1978	888	Admarc	1 086	Admarc
Source: MNA GRS 13/105/4 Monthly Reports, Settlement Branch, 1969–78; Nkhoma (2005:86).

Table 6: Rice production at Likangala irrigation scheme, 1990–99

Year	Production in metric tons	Purchaser
1990	1 365	NOIL/Admarc
1991	1 584	NOIL/Admarc
1992	1 985	NOIL/Admarc
1993	1 697	NOIL/Admarc
1994	1 697	NOIL/Admarc
1995	1 628	NOIL/Admarc
1996	1 787	NOIL/Admarc
1997	1 787	NOIL/Admarc/Rice Milling
1998	1 906	NOIL/Admarc/Rice Milling
1999	1 787	NOIL/Admarc/Rice Milling
Source: Malawi Government, Likangala Irrigation Aspects, 1990–99; Nkhoma (2005:87).

It should be noted, however, that the increase in rice production and consequent expansion of rural incomes continued only until the early 1990s. From 1994, Admarc stopped providing input credits to farmers, and in 2000 it also stopped buying rice produce from the farmers. The government alleged that it had stopped providing loans because the farmers were not paying back the credits. On the matter of Admarc's ceasing to purchase produce from the schemes, the government alleged that it did not want the farmers to sell food crops at a time when recurrent drought had brought hunger to the country. However, when the drought ended Admarc failed to resume its practice of buying produce from farmers and providing them with credit. Oral sources suggest that farmers stopped repaying credit because they were told not to do so by those who took over government in 1994. These sources argued that the credit funds were collected from the party cards that were sold during the preceding regime, and therefore there was no need for them to pay back the credit. At the time of writing Admarc was still not buying produce or providing credit.

This change affected the farmers adversely. For example, they began to depend on private traders, who not only visited the schemes infrequently but also bought rice only in small quantities and at low prices. In the liberalised economy of the time, there was much haggling for prices and the terms of trade worked to the disadvantage of the farmers. As the number of buyers went down, farmers lost their bargaining power and resorted to selling crops at low prices, with the result that their financial gains did not compare favourably with the cost of the investment they made in producing the crops.

In order to secure inputs, farmers have now begun to obtain loans from those working with well-established companies, to be paid back when the rice is harvested. Rice sold through this process is priced at half the normal market price. Some farmers have resorted to renting out their plots to other farmers. Contract farming is also being used to cope with the lack of input loans. Through contract farming, farmers from the schemes are hired by wealthier individuals from urban centres to cultivate their plots. In this contract, the farmers are entitled to a regular payment. Money thus obtained is used to purchase farm inputs and meet labour costs for cultivating in the schemes. In seasons of drought and famine, the money is meant for the purchase of food.

In some cases the farmers from the schemes have begun to depend on a variety of sources to supplement their meagre farm incomes. For instance, they have developed livelihood strategies such as ganyu or casual labour, selling mandasi (a local variety of doughnut), renting out plots, and the like. Most of them have invested heavily in livestock farming and operate small businesses in the small towns that developed in the schemes. In some families, irrigation farming is left in the hands of wives and children while the husbands maintain permanent jobs in the urban centres or work as teachers in the rural communities.

However, these extra jobs have seriously undermined the success of farming in the irrigation schemes. Among other things, it means that farmers are not gaining much from the schemes. As they continue to depend on other economic activities to supplement meagre earnings from the schemes, their productivity is being heavily compromised. The absence of inputs, loans and markets raises questions about whether the farmers will be able to manage the irrigation schemes effectively once they are handed over to them.

5. Conclusion

This paper examined the development of irrigation schemes and their impact on the socioeconomic status of rural communities in Malawi. Evidence from case studies of two of the schemes, Domasi and Likangala, showed that developing these schemes along ‘green revolution’ lines was problematic in several ways and thus they failed to yield the intended results in this African setting. Among other things, farmer response was poor and there was reluctance to pay back credit for inputs, and inadequate funding of the schemes meant that there were only limited financial gains for most farmers. Farmers complained about the socioeconomic disruptions the schemes caused, such as removal from their ancestral lands and exposure to water-related diseases. In part the problems can be attributed to the programme's overdependence on donor funding, failure to take cognisance of local knowledge and systems, over-politicisation of irrigation farming, top-down approaches, lack of measures for sustaining the projects, and lack of local ownership of resources. The structural adjustment policies which were adopted from the mid-1980s only helped to bring to an end the whole movement in Africa. From the mid-1990s, the government resorted to handing over the irrigation facilities to local farmers, with a view to improving their sustainability and minimising government expenditure. The development, however, is being affected by the lack of markets for farmers to sell their produce, corruption, theft of rehabilitation and maintenance materials, and conflicts between the local farmers and leaders on the one hand and the privileged farmers on the other. The former consider the development as one way of regaining their ancestral land and plots that have been accumulated by the privileged farmers. For these reasons the schemes have not yet been handed over to the farmers.

On the basis of these findings and conclusions, a number of recommendations can be made. The author strongly recommends the recognition of local structures and systems and minimal dependency on donor support, if the irrigation schemes are to achieve their intended goals and yield sustainable benefits. There should be a deliberate move towards controlling market prices so that farmers can enjoy the full benefits of cultivating in the schemes.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the individuals and organisations whose support made this research possible: BASIS investigators Professor Wapulumuka Mulwafu (University of Malawi), Professor Annie Ferguson (Michigan State University) and Professor Pauline Peters (Harvard University); and the BASIS CRISP and WARFSA Project, CODESRIA, Mzuzu University and the University of Malawi Centre for Social Research for financial support.

Notes

¹Malawi National Archives (MNA), Nyasaland Protectorate, Annual Report, Department of Agriculture, 1953.

²MNA, GRS (Government Repositories) 600/1/13 Settlement Schemes, 1983.

³MNA, GRS 600/1/13 Settlement Schemes, 1983.

⁴MNA, GRS 13/105/65 Settlement Schemes, 1969–73.

⁵MNA, GRS 600/1/13 Settlement Schemes, 1983.

⁶MNA, GRS 600/1/13 Settlement Schemes, 1983.

⁷MNA, GRS 13/105/65 Settlement Schemes, 1969–73.

⁸MNA, GRS 13/105/4 Monthly Reports, Settlement Branch, 1969–70.

⁹MNA, GRS 13/105/65 Settlement Schemes, 1969–73.

¹⁰MNA, GRS 13/105/4 Monthly Reports, Settlement Branch, 1969–70.

¹¹MNA, GRS 13/100/5 Control Order, Settlement Schemes, 1969.

¹²MNA, GRS 13/105/65 Settlement Schemes, 1969–73.

¹³MNA, GRS 13/105/65 Settlement Schemes, 1969–73.

¹⁴MNA, GRS 13/105/65 Settlement Schemes, 1969–73.