Community-based natural resource management: The role of social capital in collaborative environmental management of tribal resources in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

ABSTRACT

Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) has become an important tool in promoting environmental and ecological sustainability as well as improving community access to eco-system services. However, CBNRM has been criticised as a programme that is largely driven by initiatives which are exogenous to local communities, promoting the agenda of external actors. In view of this, there is now increased attention given to CBNRM programmes that are co-management driven and which seek the participation of all community stakeholders. Using existing literature and field-based data, this article explores the role of social capital in promoting the management of common pool resources in tribal areas of KwaZulu-Natal. It is argued that social capital can be a vehicle through which the accumulation of different forms of capital can be achieved and contribute to sustainable environmental management.

KEYWORDS:

• Social capital
• collaborative environmental governance
• community-based conservation

1. Introduction

The last two decades have seen the re-emergence of numerous community-based natural resource management programmes aimed at addressing a plethora of environmental challenges that have resulted from unsustainable use of natural resources. The environmental governance discourse which initially started in the 1980s and 1990s has again become popular due to exacerbated poor governance of natural resources both on a local level and a global level (Reed et al., 2013; Spires et al., 2014). Although most of the analyses and studies of environmental governance have centred on the role and importance of communities in nature conservation, less attention has been paid to empirically examine the social networks that impact governance of environmental collaboratives.¹ In a quest to avert threats of environmental degradation, community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) initiatives have been identified as one of the strategies in which this can be achieved. This development explains recent trends towards decentralised, self-regulated and localised systems of environmental management which have been presented as being among the most appropriate and effective tools (Musavengane & Matikiti, 2015; Sessin-Dilascio et al., 2015).

Carley & Christie (2000) have identified some of the factors that limit environmental governance and emphasise tension between centralisation and decentralisation forces as well as policy fragmentation as key factors. Reed et al. (2013), on the contrary, are of the view that a lack of appropriate institutional frameworks and fragmentations in national development and planning policies contributes to challenges in managing communal natural resources. Simatele & Simatele (2014) argue that environmental governance in sub-Saharan Africa has developed as a top-down system of management, involving the elite bureaucrats and party royalists, far removed from the reality of rural life, continuing to dictate how rural residents should manage their natural resources. As a result, what rural people know and what they might need is of no concern (Simatele & Simatele, 2014). Central government authorities, as observed by Cheru (2002) and supported by Binns et al. (2012), naively believe that they are better placed to make key decisions on environmental management and rural development than illiterate rural residents. As a result, poor policies and institutional failures have undermined and continue to undermine the productivity of rural populations.

Despite the frequent exclusion of the rural population from participating in processes that have a direct influence on their lives, it has been observed that there is an urgent need to promote a strong and genuine grassroots-grown community participation in environmental management decision-making (Hove et al., 2013). This article therefore explores the role of community participation in natural resource management. The article is specifically interested in examining the extent to which social capital can be an instrument for promoting collaborative environmental governance in tribal communities of KwaZulu-Natal province in South Africa. In this article, CBNRM success is defined as a ‘positive effect of environmental activities on social capital dimensions, namely; groups and networks, trust, collective action, social inclusion and information and communication’.

2. Social capital and collaborative CBNRM – a meta-analysis

Muboko & Murindagomo (2014) define collaborative CBNRM as a group of people with the same goals who convene to police and manage a common pool of natural resources (Spires et al., 2014). Existing literature suggests that any effective CBNRM initiative requires the support and participation of local communities. Through community participation, trust and social networks (or social capital) are developed which then act as a significant resource in the day-to-day operations and lifecycle of a CBNRM initiative, particularly in rural contexts (Liu et al., 2014). Social capital² is centred on social networks and results in shared norms, values and understandings which then facilitate cooperation within and among groups of people (Baksh et al., 2013).

It can therefore be deduced that social capital consists of three main features: trust, reciprocity and cooperation – and when these elements are strong within a community, they are more likely to enhance collaborative governance of CBNRM programmes (Zahra & McGehee, 2013). CBNRM is anchored on social networking and has the potential of invigorating community social and economic aspirations that may trigger sustainable natural resource use (Moser & Felton, 2006; Moore et al., 2014). Moore et al. (2014), for example, are of the view that CBNRM, if properly instituted and managed, can result in the propagation of systems and processes that can lead to effective strategies for natural resource management; and the opposite is also true.

A good example for this assertion is the Communal Area Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe, which is regarded as the parent of all CBNRM initiatives in Africa, as well as the Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas (ADMADE), which was implemented in Zambia. ADMADE was also regarded as a successful scheme but later faced a number of administrative challenges which resulted in its abandonment. CAMPFIRE is one of a ‘breed’ of strategies designed to tackle environmental management at the grassroots (Kasere, 2002). The key aim of this initiative was to aid rural communities in the management of wildlife for sustainable development of communities. CAMPFIRE is one of the most celebrated CBNRM programmes of its genre due to the perceived success in taking its benefits and rewards to communal people (Songorwa, 1999).

Child (1996) attributes the success of CAMPFIRE to ‘twelve principles’, among which is included the need to consider the unit of production as the basis on which to develop management strategies and benefit distribution approaches which would ensure that local people managed and benefited from the resources within their locales. The other principle revolved around the need to ensure that producer communities were small enough to encourage the participation of individuals and households in resource management. This would help in establishing designing processes that are transparent, accountable, democratic and reflective of people’s aspirations. There was also an emphasis on the accountability of the community leaders to their constituency in terms of their functions and the rules governing their operations. A tenet of this principle emphasised the importance of the grassroots in carrying out key functions in the management of the natural resources. Connected to this principle was the need to devolve authority and develop community engagement capacity building processes in order to transfer the ownership of resources to communities themselves.

Taylor (2009) is of the view that in order to promote sustainable community resource management, specific legislation and policies must be developed in order to support the activities of grass-root communities. Long (2002), for example, argues that Namibia’s successful story of CBNRM can largely be attributed to an enabling policy and legislative environment as well as high levels of community participation. As opposed to Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE programme which devolved authority to established Rural District Councils, Namibia devolved authority to the community level. The Kunene Region in Namibia, for example, drawing on the policy and legislative frameworks, cultivated the participation of communities by using incentives such as community income and wildlife conservation (Murphree, 1997).

In the case of CAMPFIRE, rural district councils (to which ‘appropriate authority’ over wildlife had been granted) were holding on to revenue and management authority and were not following policy guidelines for devolving to the lower ward level. This is also replicated in Zambia’s ADMADE scheme. A major contributing factor to the failure of ADMADE was the institutional structure, which was largely centred on traditional authorities rather than local people as a hub of resource control (Virtanen, 2003; African College of CBNRM, 2012). Traditional rulers set-up Wildlife Management Committees/Sub-authorities to direct the sharing and use of revenue benefits derived from wildlife and to help guide households in resource management (Virtanen, 2003). The concentration of power in the hands of traditional rulers flawed ADMADE’s effectiveness in natural resource management and utilisation because vulnerable and poor households with little or no power had no influence on management strategies that were developed (see African College of CBNRM, 2012).

In her seminal work on ecotourism in Namibia, Susan Snyman (2012) observes that the conservancy has proved that CBNRM can work through the conservancy approach. Snyman (2012) outlined a number of possible reasons which have led to the success of the joint venture in the Torra Conservancy. The general concern to reduce environmental degradation, coupled with a shared community identity, has not only resulted in community self-organisation, but also in establishing and developing vital collaborations and partnerships with local government, the private sector and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that are interested in natural resource management. It is this collaboration and a sense of membership of all stakeholders that has played a significant role in the success of the Torra Conservancy (Snyman, 2012). Membership of a community-based natural resource management is an integral element in the management of common pool resources. Zulu (2008), Pienaar et al. (2013) and Dyer et al. (2014), for example, found that density of membership of CBNRM groups can significantly contribute to the success of a CBNRM scheme. However, Snyman (2012) on the contrary argues that membership density can either positively or negatively affect collective action and participation.

Although community participation and membership have been identified as important ingredients in the success of CBNRM schemes, other scholars argue that trust and solidarity are equally significant. Meer & Schnurr (2013), Katikiro et al. (2015) and Songorwa (1999) are of the view that when there is lack of trust in the common pool resource management schemes, there is a higher likelihood that community solidarity will be compromised. Bodin & Crona (2008) found similar results in a rural fishing community in Kenya. Community members with less or no trust in the management of the CBNRM schemes felt disenfranchised and were less likely to participate in any community-based initiatives (Ngubane & Brooks, 2013). In this sense, as observed by Snyman (2012) and supported by Pienaar et al. (2013) and Dyer et al. (2014), higher levels of trust can positively affect community members’ willingness to participate in CBNRM because this makes the decision less risky and reduces the chances of conflict. Resource allocation and accessibility also influences the participation of community members in CBNRM. Fritz-Vietta et al. (2009) and Mabuza et al. (2015) argue that fair distribution and accessibility of natural resources increases participation of community members in CBNRM schemes and brings about social cohesion and collective action.

It is important to note that social inclusion and cohesion are important attributes which can provide significant insight into explaining the decision of individuals and households to participate in CBNRM schemes. Fritz-Vietta et al. (2009) and Dyer et al. (2014) are of the view that community members who voluntarily participate in social events are normally those who are well integrated into a community structure. This position is supported by Snyman (2012), who observed in her work in Namibia that households who were well connected through social networks and integrated into the community were more involved in environmental conservation and protection. Katikiro et al. (2015) argue that exclusion of the underprivileged, voiceless or powerless often deters them from participating in community activities (see also Ngubane & Brooks, 2013).

3. Methodological consideration

This article is based on data collected through an extensive review of literature and a field-based study. The literature review was conducted between March 2015 and July 2015 and involved an appraisal of dissimilar pieces of literature. A systematic review on the role of participation in CBNRM was conducted, and this formed the basis for an in-depth meta-analysis of existing literature. Using meta-analysis as an analytical framework, it was important to systematically evaluate the literature in order to identify factors and processes that may have contributed to the success or failure of some of the existing or past CBNRM initiatives. Meta-analysis of the literature in this article was employed in order to facilitate the comprehension of how factors such as geographical positioning, political processes and community participation in CBNRM schemes influence or impact the effective management of common pool resources.

An Internet search was conducted using various academic search engines such as Scopus and Web of Science. Key words such as ‘environmental collaborative’, ‘environmental governance’ and ‘community based natural resource management’ were entered, and an estimated 150 peer-reviewed articles were generated. A rapid appraisal of these articles was conducted and resulted in the selection of 60 articles and eight reports. A further in-depth review of these articles resulted in the selection of 37 articles which focused on a number of issues such as participation and environmental management. Finally, 12 articles that focused on environmental governance in sub-Saharan Africa were identified and reviewed using different perspectives which included a meta-analysis of selected case studies.

The fieldwork was conducted in two geographical locations, namely Zululand and Umzinyathi (see Figure 1), between August 2015 and September 2015. Research participants were drawn from two communities: a Gumbi community located in Zululand, and a Zondi community located in Umzinyathi. The Gumbi and Zondi communities have approximately 312 and 415 households respectively.

Figure 1. Location of study sites: Umzinyathi and Zululand.

Source: Cartographic Unit, Geography Department, University of the Witwatersrand.

It was purposely decided to employ a confidence level of 95% to draw a sample population, and this resulted in a total of 30 households from Gumbi and 23 households from Zondi being selected respectively. A systematic random sampling procedure was then applied across the two study locations using the equation:where n is the sample size and N is the population size

The first households in both locations were purposely selected and then specific intervals were applied to select the actual households. In the case of Gumbi, every 10th household was selected, and in Zondi it was every 18th household that was selected for inclusion in the study. In addition to this, the snowball technique was applied to identify and engage with key actors such as policy-makers, who often function as leaders of environmental collaboratives; local government officials, project coordinators and managers, local community leaders and chiefs, and other NGOs operating within the study locations. Data collection tools included semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions and personal observations. The data were deductively coded using NVivo and Cronbach’s alpha was employed to measure the internal consistency and reliability of variables under considerations. Cronbach’s alpha was determined through the equation:

where N is the number of items, is the average inter-item covariance among the items and is the average variance. We devised a 23-question questionnaire (i.e. of ‘items’ indicated in Table 1) to measure how networking influenced the participation of community members in CBNRM. The questions were presented in a statement format; for example, the question in the ‘groups and networks’ social dimension in Table 1 ‘Do you belong to a particular conservation group in the community?’ was presented as ‘You belong to a particular conservation group in the community’. Each question was a five-point Likert item from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’. In order to understand whether the questions in this questionnaire all reliably measure the same latent variable (feeling of safety) (so a Likert scale could be constructed), Cronbach's alpha was run on a sample size of 15 respondents using SPSS version 20. The measured variables or ‘items’ are regarded as consistent because they exceed the recommended value of 0.70 (see Table 1), values substantially lower would indicate an unreliable scale (Field, 2005). The higher Cronbach scores on the measured items/variables therefore signify the validity and reliability of the questions used during the survey. For example, a score of 0.94 and 0.81 in the trust and solidarity and the collective action and cooperation dimensions respectively shows that the questions are highly reliable, valid and measure the specific social capital constructs highlighted in Table 1.

Table 1. Scale assessment for social capital dimensions in the Gumbi and Zondi communities.

Constructs/dimensions	Item (variables/questions)	Specific construct measured	Cronbach’s alpha
Groups and networks: (structural social capital)	a: Do you belong to a particular conservation group in the community? b: Do you have close ties with Traditional leaders (i.e. chief)? c: Do you work closely with family members in conserving the community natural resources?	a: Linking social capital b: Bridging social capital c: Bonding social capital	0.91
Trust and solidarity (cognitive social capital)	d: Is there fairness of rules in the community? e: Are there official procedures in the management of the reserve? f: Are there dispute resolution procedures in the game reserve? g: Is there fairness in resource allocation? h: Is there openness in managing the game reserve?	d: Trust e: Solidarity f: Solidarity g: Trust and solidarity h: Trust and solidarity	0.94
Collective action and cooperation	i: Do you share similar values? j. Do you discuss the goals of the reserve together and share them? k: Are there any community organised activities? l: Is there any public service provisions from the reserve you are benefiting from?	i: Collective action j: Cooperation k: Collective action and cooperation I: Collective action	0.81
Social cohesion and inclusion (inclusion, sociability, and conflict)	m: Do you have harmonious relationships among community members? n: Is the social unity within the community? o: Have you been consulted/included in making decisions for the game reserve?	m: Social cohesion n: Social cohesion o: Social inclusion	0.95
	p: Is there any conflict on what is acceptable in managing the game reserve? q: Is there violence in managing the community game reserve?	p: Conflict q: Conflict	0.95
Information and communication	r: Is there open dialogue in managing the game reserve? s: Are there any mediums of communication (e.g. meetings)? t: Do you sometimes share information to leaders? u: Do you receive feedback in time?	r: Communication s: Communication t: Information u: Communication and information	0.97
Economic empowerment	v: Where (are) you employed at the game reserve? w: Is there any formal training you received since creation of the game reserve? x: Is there any business you are operating closer to the reserve?	v: Economic empowerment w: economic empowerment x: Economic empowerment	0.81

Source: Fieldwork-based material, 2015.

In order to assess the changes of social capital from the inception of the project to the present, the survey was designed with two sets of identical questions. The first section asked questions which required the respondent to reflect about the initial networking that took place during the inception of the community project. The second section asked the respondent’s views on the current networking and the extent to which they felt integrated into the community project. Table 1, for example, shows a summary of questions which were selected to identify different social capital dimensions or constructs that are pivotal in collective community resource management in the two research sites. These questions, which were developed by Krishna & Shrader (2000) as part of a World Bank research initiative on social capital, were adapted and employed by the current study to measure social capital in the Gumbi and Zondi communities. It must be noted that social capital is here conceptualised, and embedded in the survey as well as operationalised in the study to ensure content validity and reliability of the findings. In order to achieve this, both historical and contemporary literature on social capital measures were extensively reviewed, evaluated and analysed (Krishna & Shrader, 2000; Onyx & Bullen, 2001). The output of the review process resulted in the identification of a number of constructs or dimensions of social capital which include, among others, trust and solidarity, collective action and cooperation, social cohesion and inclusion, information and communication, as well as economic empowerment (see Table 1).

4. Role of social capital in co-management of natural resources in KwaZulu-Natal

4.1. Case Study 1: Gumbi community – Somkhanda Game Reserve

The Gumbi community comprises most of the Gumbi clan who have strong connections to their culture. From the discussions during the interviews, it was clear that the research participants’ way of life and perceptions are heavily embedded and shaped by traditional norms and values. An estimated 60% of the respondents have strong ties with Traditional leaders and 87% do work closely with family members in conserving the resources (see Table 2). Their loyalty to the traditional system of governance as well as culture seems to form the basis on which their everyday lives. This is reflected in the inclusion of the chief in decision-making and operations of the community game reserve which was established as a CBNRM scheme. Discussions with research participants in Gumbi revealed that an estimated 98% of the responses suggested that they were happy with the involvement of the late chief in decision-making and the general operations of the game reserve.

Despite the loyalty of the Gumbi community to their Traditional leaders, there is a general sense and feeling among the research participants that the current decay in traditional systems of governance is rapidly resulting into high levels of corruption and unfair distribution of benefits of their natural resources. Only 30% of respondents reported fairness of rules in the community and 46% cited the presence of fairness in resource allocation (see Table 2). A former member of the Emvokweni Community Trust in Gumbi, for example, stated:

The passing away of our old chief has brought new dynamics in the power structure. The new chief wants to have the overall voice in decision making of the SGR [Somkhanda Game Reserve]. we now have a lot of tensions between the Trust members and the traditional authorities and this is having a multiplier effect on the extent to which local people can participate in managing the SGR. The current traditional authorities have sour working relationships with the existing Emvokweni Community Trust (ECT) and the community at large.

(Personal communication, 2015, with focus group members in Gumbi and Zondi communities in KwaZulu-Natal, March 2014–July 2015)

Table 3 suggests that 22% of Trust and Solidarity variables influence community participation in Somkhanda Game Reserve (SGR) initiatives. Nineteen per cent and 16% of community network and social inclusion and cohesion variables respectively determine community participation.

When asked on the flow of information and communication, 33% highlighted that they do have open dialogues and 55% of respondents do share information with the leaders. However, only 10% reported that they receive feedback from the current Emvokweni Community Trust regardless of the fact that 91% of respondents were involved in decision-making during the formation of the SGR and despite the presence of harmonious relationships among community members as reported by 90% of respondents. A Gumbi elderly man in his late 70s who has lived his entire life in this community lamented:

After the formation of Somkhanda Game Reserve, we never had meetings with the Trust. We just know that there is a Trust but we don’t know what it is and who is in it. No one provides us with information or reports on the use of financial benefits for the community. I am so angry about this because we should be allowed to participate in decision making.

(Personal communication, 2015, with focus group members in Gumbi and Zondi communities in KwaZulu-Natal, March 2014–July 2015)

These sentiments suggest that if any collaborative CBNRM scheme is to be successful, there is a need for fundamental social and political changes that must be accompanied by a positive alteration in power relations among all of the interested stakeholders. These alterations must be tailored towards cultivating increased participations in issues that affect individuals and households in a community. From the views already expressed by the respondents, we can thus speculate that a key precondition for achieving a successive CBNRM scheme, in the context of this case study, would be the presence of strong and effective enabling community structures which would respond effectively to the demands of different interest groups and stimulate their participation in the project. A starting point would be to identify factors that make it difficult (see Tables 2 and 3) for the local people to get involved in the scheme and address these issues.

Table 2. Assessment of social capital dimensions in the Gumbi and Zondi communities.

Social capital dimensions	Item	Yes (%)
		Gumbi community (N = 30)	Zondi community (N = 23)
Groups and networks: bonding and social capital, bridging capital and linking social capital	1: Do you belong to a particular conservation group in the community? 2: Do you have close ties with Traditional leaders (i.e. chief)? 3: Do you work closely with family members in conserving the community natural resources?	0 60 87	0 8 74
Trust and solidarity	1: Is there fairness of rules in the community? 2: Are you aware of official procedures in the management of the reserve? 3: Are you aware of any dispute resolution procedures in the game reserve? 4: Is there fairness in resource allocation? 5: Is there openness in managing the game reserve?	30 83 53 46 57	7 5 5 5 0
Collective action and cooperation	1: Do you share similar values? 2: Do you discuss the goals of the reserve together and share them? 3: Are there any community organised activities? 4: Is there any public service provisions you are benefiting from the reserve?	73 10 40 47	75 0 25 0
Social cohesion and inclusion	1: Do you have harmonious relationships among community members? 2: Is the social unity within the community? 3: Have you been consulted/included in making decisions for the game reserve? 4: Is there any conflict on what is acceptable in managing the game reserve? 5: Is there violence in managing the community game reserve?	90 93 91 20 0	92 83 0 96 100
Information and communication	1: Is there open dialogue in managing the game reserve? 2: Are there any mediums of communication (e.g. meetings)? 3: Do you sometimes share information to leaders? 4: Do you receive feedback in time?	33 50 55 10	0 0 5 0
Economic empowerment	1: Were (are) you employed at the game reserve? 2: Is there any formal training you received since creation of the game reserve? 3: Is there any business you are operating closer to the reserve?	62 30 0	44 0 0

Source: Fieldwork-based material, 2015.

Table 3. Listing and ranking of important social capital variables affecting participation in Gumbi and Zondi CBNRM schemes.

Types of social capital	Gumbi community (SGR)			Zondi community (NGR)
	Frequency of citations (N = 30)	%	Ranking	Frequency of citations (N = 23)	%	Ranking
Trust and solidarity	28	22	1	23	19	1
Community networking	25	19	2	20	17	3
Collective action and cooperation	20	16	4	18	15	4
Social inclusion and cohesion	21	16	3	23	19	2
Information and communication	17	14	6	23	19	2
Economic empowerment	18	14	5	13	11	5
Total	129	100		120	100

Source: Fieldwork-based material, 2015.

From this argument, it would appear that until the authorities within the SGR project develop a system that clearly filters the benefits of its resources to the local populace, the scheme is likely to cease. However, an official within the SGR pointed out that every effort had been instituted to ensure increased participation of the local people. He stated that every year a group of local youths are trained and certified to manage wildlife, and this process should soon facilitate a situation where these young people will own the project and start benefiting economically. It is clear from the Gumbi case study that if local initiatives are to succeed in the management of the SGR, there is a need to institute a clear and new power-sharing relationship among all of the interested groups. A socio-political space must be opened up to allow local people to establish new relationships between themselves and the traditional systems of governance.

4.2. Case Study 2: Zondi community – Ngome Game Reserve

The Ngome Game Reserve (NGR) was established in order to pursue conservation efforts by involving the participation of local people. The scheme was to first establish a consultation process through the Ngome Community Land Trust with all interested groups in order to capture the aspiration of all stakeholders. However, discussions with the research participants revealed that such a process was never implemented. None (0%) of the respondents reported their involvement in the formation of NGR, and hence 100% of respondents linked the violence against the Game Reserve to exclusion from decision-making (see Table 2). A male respondent aged between 50 and 60 years lamented:

They came here and removed us from our land without any consultation; we just saw the cars parked around with white farmers and Inkosi (Chief). We were informed that we had to move as the place was supposed to be turned into a game reserve …  when the game reserve was still functional we never get involved in any decision making. We were never consulted by the Community Trust and we don’t even know what a Community Trust is and how it came into being.

(Personal communication, 2015, with focus group members in Gumbi and Zondi communities in KwaZulu-Natal, March 2014–July 2015)

Furthermore, 7% of respondents said that there is fairness of rules in the community whereas 93% disagree with such sentiments. Only 5% were aware of the official procedures of managing NGR, and 95% reported on the unfairness of resource allocation and 0% of respondents reported on the lack of openness in managing the game reserve. This explains why again 0% of respondents reported that they do not discuss the goals of the game reserve (see Table 2). Trust and solidarity variables thus ranked highest (with 19%) in influencing participation of community members in NGR, followed by lack of information and communication cited at 19% on a par with social inclusion and cohesion variables.

A discussion with a conservation expert who was involved in the initial development and still working with the NGR stated:

At the beginning all seemed okay but our relationships with the Ngome Trust deteriorated as there was lack of respect and openness from all of us. We have tried to see how we can restart building the trust but we still have some challenges. All l can say for now is that a lot happened and we need to be open enough for us to make any progress. (Personal communication, 2014, with focus group members in Gumbi and Zondi Communities in KwaZulu-Natal, March 2014–July 2015)

Discussions with community members on economic empowerment revealed that 44% of respondents were employed by NGR but 0% reported on the formal training received during its existence and none operated any business closer to the reserve (Table 2). An elderly man in his 70s lamented that: ‘I worked at Ngome Game Reserve as a security guard and l didn’t even get a cent. I am so hurt by the way they treated me and other people’ (personal communication, 2015, with focus group members in Gumbi and Zondi Communities in KwaZulu-Natal, March 2014–July 2015).

It is evident in the NGR that power relationships are at the centre of the disenfranchisement of local people’s participation. There is thus, an urgent need to devolve the power structure and shift the locus of resource management to the people. In addition to this, there is therefore a need to develop strategies that encourage participation of local people in managing their natural resources. It is believed that the chances for any intervention measure to succeed is very minimal without involvement of local communities. There is a need to utilise the available social cohesion variables such as harmonious community relations (92%) and social unity (83%) and the shared values (75%) (see Table 2).

5. Discussion

The findings suggest that the co-management of commonly owned natural resources in tribal areas where land restitution took place encounters more challenges if the involvement and participation of communities is not fostered. To address these challenges, however, locally-driven and tailor-made solutions need to be identified, embraced and implemented. But these need to revolve around the idea of propagating increased participation from all stakeholders in the community. Through the involvement and participation of all stakeholders, one would speculate that the management of common pool resources can result in an effective and sustainable use of resources. This argument stems from the appreciation that environmental co-management challenges are not ‘obvious’ and their success is much derived through social learning and adaptive governance. A comprehensive social network, for example, helps to build social capital, which in turn facilitates the accumulation of other vital capitals. Because land restitution is inevitable in most parts of sub-Saharan Africa, it is important to derive lessons on the role of social capital in the co-management of environmental collaboratives so as to maximise and use the natural resources in a more sustainable and equitable manner.

These two case studies have highlighted the importance of community engagement and participation as being instrumental in building strong social capital in collaborative management of a common pool of natural resources. The importance of the collective effort is vividly articulated by a common statement cited by Simatele & Binns (2008:11): ‘whatever is done for us without us, is not ours’. Participation of the citizenry in any development project can thus be considered a useful tool in the identification of community challenges as well as in the articulation of community goals and designs that can contribute to the attainment of community methods in propagating change, and pooling their resources in the problem-solving process. Berkes et al. (1991), for example, argue that when managing communal natural resources it is important to engage all stakeholders because the success of a project is dependent on the participation of the community and the level to which people take ownership of the project. If participation is absent, particularly in the management of common pool resources, there is a high likelihood that people will tend to distance themselves from any development effort. This situation is clearly illustrated in both research sites considered in this article.

The Zondi community, for example, seems to be operating on a top-down system of resource management and this is increasingly causing tensions among all interested groups. The community members feel alienated from their own resources due to the lack of community engagement and participation in the management of the NGR. It is important to note that the participation of all interested stakeholders in resource management discussions and decision-making is an important process in enhancing and building new social networks. Chang (2013) is of the view that social networks, particularly horizontal networks, connect people of the same status and power, and this can create a situation of shared norms and aspirations. Wagner et al. (2009) identify ‘respect of view points’ and ‘equal consideration of input’ as essential pillars in the success of co-management of natural resources. They are of the view that at the onset of collaborative resource management initiatives there are bound to be differences of opinions and aspirations, which if not properly negotiated, embraced and managed can be a catalyst for failure and conflict (Wagner et al., 2009). Building on this argument, Simatele & Simatele (2015) observe that respect for interest groups can be a valuable resource for fostering shared agendas and community aspirations.

The development of social capital in tribal communities can be determined by three elements; commitment, transparency and dependability. Firstly, the commitment and increased participation of all interested stakeholders is of paramount significance in building trust and positive expectations of reciprocity. Commitment and participation, particularly in communities that experienced racial segregation and socio-economic exclusion in the past, can play a key role in building new norms of reciprocity and the two aspects can act as a form of continuity to guarantee future success of collaboratives. Secondly, transparency as an avenue of openness on goals, motives and actions can cultivate trust among interested stakeholders. Cohan & Prusak (2001:46) argue that ‘knowing who people are and what they are doing, builds social connections and trust, just as secrecy builds suspicion’. Thirdly, dependability enhances trust and reciprocity by facilitating positive trustworthy reputation. Ostrom (1998:12) is of the view that, ‘a reputation for being trustworthy, or for using retribution against those who do not keep their agreements or keep up their fair share, can either become a valuable asset or a liability’. It is important to note that building social capital is a vital process that can be enhanced by effective communication and interactions across and among interested parties and partnerships in the management of common pool resources. Cultivating social capital not only facilitates the efficient functionality of environmental collaborations, but can also be a useful tool in the accumulation of other productive capitals that the majority of poor and vulnerable individuals and households employ in obtaining livelihoods and other vital services such as education. It is thus important that every development intervention programme and initiatives seek avenues through which social capital can be cultivated and enhanced.

6. Conclusion

It has been revealed in this article that the key to successful collaborative environmental management projects revolves around issues of participation, transparency, reciprocity and effective communication. These elements are important ingredients in building strong social capital. Community social cohesion builds trust between internal and external actors, especially in communities that were once subjected to various forms of segregation and dishonest corrupt systems of governance. The presence of trust in managing common pool resources as argued by Baksh et al. (2013) ensures effective stakeholder participation as well as involvement in decision-making processes. If stakeholder participation is absent, community members often feel disenfranchised and will tend to disconnect from any development effort that may have implications on their well-being, the ecological system and the natural environment as a whole.

It is important that community leaders and project managers are aware of what is happening within their communities in order to make decisions that are inclusive of all interested parties. Local authorities must now evaluate the significance of collaborative environmental management in light of sustainable environmental management and sustainable development. It is vital that government institutions should work much more closely with local people, NGOs and community-based organisations to support community structures and systems that have a direct impact on common pool resources

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

ORCiD

Regis Musavengane http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5276-7911

Notes

1 An environmental collaborative is a form of agreement between two or more actors or partners to work together on a common goal in managing natural resources (Muller, 2012).

2 Social capital is defined as the networks of relationships that foster the development of resources and benefits which can be used for the good of the individual as well as the collective (Putnam, 2000; Floress et al., 2011).