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ABSTRACT
The theories of rational choice have been widely used in analysing suicide bombings. Such a use is here critically examined along three lines. First, the limits of this theoretical framework when applied to sacrificial violence are assessed and especially the internal contradictions which appear with the notion of ‘symbolic posthumous rewards’. Second, differences emerge in the use of rational choice theory when the focus is upon female suicide bombers. Indeed, deprivation theories come then to the fore, the idea of personal crisis and the impact of patriarchal social relationships. This switch in the analysis, which does not seem based on differences in the data, confirms gender studies which underline the specific difficulty to envisage female political violence. Finally, to go beyond both reductionisms, a compared analysis of suicide attacks in Chechnya, Iraq and Israel/Palestine is proposed. It aims at restituting the context of action and the narratives at work, making a clear distinction between two levels of analysis, the one of the organizations, which can largely be understood in terms of their strategic rationale, and that of the suicide bombers themselves, for whom it seems more heuristic to use the concepts of narratives and horizons of expectation.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Dr. habil. Pénélope Larzillière is a social scientist, senior research fellow at the Institute for Research on Development (Paris), and associate fellow at the School of Advanced Studies in Social Sciences (Paris). Her research focuses thematically on political commitment, activism, narratives and ideologies, including extreme forms of repertoires of violence and action. She has carried out extensive field research in the Middle East (Palestinian Territories, Jordan, Lebanon). Her books include Activism in Jordan (Zed Books 2016) and To Be Young in Palestine (Balland 2004). She has also co-edited the journal issues “Révolutions, contestations, indignations” (Socio 2013), and “Faut-il désoccidentaliser l’humanitaire” (Humanitaire 2010).
Notes
1. Hafez (Citation2007) uses the notion of ‘emotional narrative‘to describe how the jihadist biographies and videos in Iraq create an interpretative framework that emphasizes negative experiences and the feelings they engender, such as humiliation, and offers salvation through martyrdom. This notion appeared useful to us because it links interpretation and feelings.
2. The databases used are mainly American and Israeli: ICT Database (International Center for Counter Terrorism, Herzliya, Israel – www.ict.org.il); Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs; National Security Studies Center Dataset (Haifa University); Rand Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (Santa Monica, USA – www.rand.org); Foreign Broadcast Information Service/Open Source Center (US government – www.osc.org); the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (National Counterterrorism Center (US government – www.nctc.gov); the University of Maryland’s National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Global Terrorism Database.
3. The remarkable field study of Nasra Hassan (Citation2001) also comes up against this difficulty.
4. From my own field survey in a Jenin refugee camp in September 2001 (Larzillière Citation2004). Those two sides of grief are also described by Butler and Sarraj (Citation2002).
5. Max Weber expressly excluded it from the factors in instrumental rationality.
6. Between 1985 and 2006, according to data from Yoram Schweitzer (Citation2006, p. 8) or between 1980 and 2003, according to data from Robert Pape (Citation2005), the percentage is however increasing.
7. Between 2000 and 2005, according to data from Anne Speckhard and Khapta Akhmedova (Citation2006, p. 431).
8. In the video, the spokesman of the Iraqi security forces adds that the woman, Samira Ahmed Jassim, belonged to the Ansar al-Sunna (Helpers of Sunnah) group and was believed to have recruited dozens of women to carry out suicide bombings.
9. Minors, too, are targeted for recruitment, especially those that have lost close relatives (Al Jbouri Citation2010).
10. Darin Abu Eishe, a 21-year-old woman who blew herself up on 27 February 2002 in an operation claimed by the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, said in her personal statement: ‘the role of Palestinian women will no longer be confined to grieving the death of their husbands, brothers or fathers; we will turn our bodies into human bombs and demolish the Israeli people’s illusion of security’.
11. According to Arin Ahmed, for example, who decided not to detonate her bomb and was arrested in 2002: ‘I expected some training and questions about why I wanted to kill and die. Instead of which they told me I was going to join my fiancé in paradise. An idea that even at that time I found completely stupid’ (Bennet Citation2002).
12. Palestinian women who had been incarcerated, charged with suicide bombing planning, have refused the idea of personal crisis or external pressures, which they could have used as ‘justifications’, putting forward political concerns (Latte Abdallah Citation2013, p. 23).
13. The broad profile highlighted by the Israeli Defense Ministry spokesman Yarden Vatikai – a young man aged between 18 and 22 years, from a poor home, generally a refugee camp, who is unmarried and not an eldest son (Khaleej and Times, 30 January 2002) – has been called into question by subsequent bombings.
14. Take, for example, this extract from a text initially featured on the website www.qoqaz.com, which can also be found on www.terrorisme.net. It claims to be a transcript of a video entitled No Surrender presenting a discussion between two women preparing to commit a suicide bombing and their instructor: ‘Very many women are now taking part in the jihad … I hope that every man will join the jihad rather than taking on a woman’s role and staying at home [ … ] Muslim women are now being attacked and raped in front of those who call themselves men but who feel so little for the honour of their Muslim sisters that they just sit there drinking tea and listening to the “terrible news”.’
15. This insight should not, of course, be regarded as any form of justification whatsoever.
16. Drawing on some of the findings but not reproducing here the entire survey and analysis, which can be found in (Larzillière Citation2004, Citation2007).
17. According to Sheikh Abdallah Shami, a leader of the Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip, for example: ‘This is our only option. We don’t have bombs, tanks, missiles, planes or helicopters’ (interview published in the 21 August 2001 edition of the newspaper ABC) (Shami Citation2001).
18. According to polls by the Center for Palestine Research and Studies (Nablus), the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (Ramallah: www.pcpsr.org) and the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (www.jmcc.org).
19. According to surveys by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, support for suicide bombings plummeted in 2005 when Hamas underwent its change of strategy and then rose again in 2006 and 2008.
20. We are talking here about the sociological reception of these concepts as defined by Reinhart Koselleck, who, for his part, confined them to the semantics of historical time. See the analysis by Paul Ricœur, (Ricœur Citation1985, p. 375).
21. Imam Shamil, a member of the Naqshbandi order, founded an independent imamate uniting Chechnya and Dagestan which was dismantled by the Russians in 1859.