Margaret Archer’s theory of the human person: an assessment

ABSTRACT

Margaret Archer addresses the fundamental question: does society make the human person or does the person make society? This question has gripped all social theory since the beginning of modernity and gave rise to the well-known agency vs structure debate. Archer proposes to overcome this debate by reformulating the problem within an innovative scheme (that of morpho-stasis/morpho-genesis) in which the human person mediates between action and social structure through her own personal reflexivity (internal conversation). The evaluation of this theory highlights the importance of personal reflexivity, but claims the relational character of reflexivity. Overall, the author expresses some reservations about the entire Archerian approach to the human person. The definition of reflexivity, as an individual mental activity, underestimates the role of relationships and social networks, with the risk of providing an individualizing rather than a personalized vision of social agents/actors. This is demonstrated by the fact that in her latest works, Archer also grants personality to sophisticated AI robots. In short, the Archerian theory of the human person is a great contribution, but it should be inserted in a properly relational vision.

KEYWORDS:

• Margaret Archer
• person
• critical realism
• individualization
• personification
• relational sociology

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Taylor (1985) states that, where it is more than simply a synonym for ‘human being’, the ‘person’ figures primarily in moral and legal discourse. A person is a being with a certain moral status, or a bearer of rights. But certain capacities underlie, and are the condition for, moral status. A person is a being who has a sense of Self, has a notion of the future and the past, can hold values and make choices; in short, a person can adopt life plans. At least, a person must be the kind of being who is capable of all this in principle, however damaged these capacities may be in practice.

2 The characteristics of creativity and innovation vary depending on the added value of social relations which can be managed in one reflexive way or another (Donati, 2014).

3 The term ‘to exist’ derives from the Latin ex(s)istere, which is made up of ex (‘from, outside’) and sistere (‘place oneself, be, go out, stand up’ and therefore ‘appear’).

4 I think, however, that my addition is justified by what Archer et al. (2004, back cover) write, according to which the three pillars of critical realism – ontological intransitivity, epistemic relativity and judging rationality – can be applied to religion as to any other belief or theory.

5 Reflexivity is an activity of a subject who evaluates his own decision-making process (discernment, choice, dedication) taking into account its outcomes and how it is possible to modify them, while reflectivity is a non-intentional operation, as it consists in taking note that there is a reflection from what we observe in reality (a situation, the actions of others, etc.), as happens when we look at images reflected in the mirror. In short, reflexivity is intentional, reflectivity in unintentional (Donati, 2010).

6 For her ‘(emergent properties like social relations) are ‘instantiated’ by actors, which (…) means these properties are neither fully real nor examinable except in conjunction with the agents who instantiate them, and only then through an artificial bracketing exercise since the two are inseparable in reality’ (Archer, 1995, p. 63).

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Pierpaolo Donati

Pierpaolo Donati, Alma Mater Professor of Sociology and former President of the Italian Sociological Association, is internationally known as the founder of an original relational sociology or relational theory of society. Among his recent books are Transcending Modernity with Relational Thinking (London 2021) and Being Human in a Virtual Society. A Relational Approach (Berlin 2024).