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The International Spectator
Italian Journal of International Affairs
Volume 42, 2007 - Issue 4
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The Middle East between Transformation and Crisis

The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics

Pages 475-491 | Published online: 06 Dec 2007
 

Abstract

Hezbollah emerged in 1982 as a manifestation of Iran's influence and a response to Israel's massive invasion of Lebanon. Hezbollah (cooperating with Syria) won legitimacy by resisting Israel's occupation, but it also offered Shias a credible ideology and an array of institutions. The party is now deeply embedded in Lebanese politics. After Israel's unilateral withdrawal in 2000, Hezbollah continued to assert its “national resistance” role, but this claim has been openly challenged, especially after the 2006 war. Since then, the government and the opposition have been at a dangerous impasse, with compromise elusive and the dangers of new violence growing.

Notes

1 The most reliable sources on Hezbollah are: Alagha, Shifts in Hizbullah's Ideology; Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah; Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face; Norton, Hezbollah: Short History, and Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu'llah: Politics and Religion. There are a variety of spellings of “Hezbollah” as reflected in these book titles. While a standard spelling is used in the text, in referenced sources the original spelling is retained.

2 After challenging the regime in Jordan in 1970, the PLO lost its footing in that country and established itself as the dominant militia force in southern Lebanon where it found ready support, especially in the Palestinian refugee camps that stemmed from the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948–49. Brynen's Sanctuary and Survival provides rich and informed detail on the PLO's role in Lebanon.

3 The seminal account is by Schiff and Ya’ari, Israel's Lebanon War.

4 The primary reference on Amal is Norton, Amal and the Shi’a.

5 Rougier, Everyday Jihad.

6 See Norton, “(In)security Zones”.

7 Peraino, “Barak's View”.

8 Norton, “Hizballah and the Withdrawal from Lebanon”, 32–3.

9 See Karam, “Internal and External Determinants of a Crisis”, 63–4.

10 While Khamenei is the official legal authority for Hezbollah, most Lebanese Shias–including most of the rank-and-file Hezbollah members–follow either Ayatollah Ali Sistani in Iraq or Lebanon's Ayatollah Muhammad Husain Fadlallah.

11 Sobelman, New Rules of the Game, 67–82.

12 Norton, “Lebanon after Al-Ta"if”.

13 Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem, who like many Hezbollah members began his involvement in Lebanese politics as a member of Amal in the 1970s, offers the most detailed insider account of the “deep internal debate” that preceded the elections. Qassem, Hizbullah, 187–200.

14 Ghobeirre, the largest town in the suburbs, has been singled out by the UN Habitat “best practices” program, designed to highlight development success stories, for its low income housing. It is one of only three municipalities that have gained the same recognition in Lebanon.

15 Alagha, Shifts in Hizbullah's Ideology, 212; and Sankari, Fadlallah, 241–7.

16 In Lebanon's confessional political system, the top positions are allocated to the three largest sects, hence the president is always a Maronite Christian, the prime minister always a Sunni and the speaker of parliament a Shia Muslim. Hence, President Emile Lahoud is a Maronite, the late Rafic Hariri a Sunni and Nabih Berri a Shia. Under this system, members of Lebanon's remaining 15 sects, who account for less than 30 percent of the total population, may never fill the three top offices, so long as the confessional system persists.

17 The electoral law that had been imposed by Syria in 2000 was designed to fragment the Christian vote and to isolate and disadvantage opposition figures.

18 Despite the defective electoral law, Aoun won 21 seats (the total would have been substantially larger had it not been for the temporary alliance of convenience between the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and Hezbollah), but was pointedly excluded from the government to deny him a platform for winning the presidency in 2007. The Maronite militia leader and presidential aspirant Samir Geagea, whose Lebanese Forces militia had fought bloody battles with the Aoun-led army in the late 1980s, was particularly vehement in demanding Aoun's exclusion. Nevertheless, the attempt to ostracize Aoun backfired and he later became Hezbollah's partner in the opposition.

19 See Karam, “Internal and External Determinants of a Crisis”, 51–2.

20 A motorised Israeli patrol was ambushed in an unpopulated area of Israel bordering with Lebanon, three Israeli soldiers were killed on the spot, and two others were initially captured. By the afternoon five Israeli soldiers fell, and a top-of-the-line Merkava tank was destroyed on Lebanese soil as the IDF attempted to pursue the captors.

21 Amidst the furies of war, Hasan Nasrallah was interviewed on al-Jazeera television on 21 July and referred to Arab disapproval as a “surprise”. In addition to implying his failure to anticipate the immensity of the Israeli response, he said, “The Israeli reaction to the capture could have been harsh, but limited, if it were not for the international and Arab cover.”

22 Halutz is quoted as saying, “If the soldiers are not returned, we will turn Lebanon's clock back 20 years.” CNN.com (online) “ Israel Authorizes "Severe" Response to Abductions”, 12 July 2006 http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/07/12/mideast/

23 See Norton, “The Peacekeeping Challenge”; Norton, “Misión Complicada”; and Göksel, “Unifil–Peacekeeping in the Line of Fire”.

24An-Nahar, 16 July 2007.

25 Actually, hundreds of thousands of Aounists participated in the 14 March 2005 demonstrations, but when their leader General Aoun was shut out of the government after the elections in May, they moved to the opposition. Since doing so, Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement has shown considerable strength in university student elections, and in the important professional associations of lawyers, doctors and engineers.

26 The full translated text may be found at yalibnan.com/site/archives/2006/02/full_english_te.php

27 Syria is suspected of assassinating a number of leading Lebanese political figures, including two presidents–Bashir Gemayel in 1982 and Rene Mouawwad in 1989–as well as the father of Walid Jumblatt, Kamal Jumblatt, in 1977. See Petran, Struggle over Lebanon, 219–20.

28“Fatah al-Islam assassinated Lebanese minister Gemayel”, yaLibnan (online), 6 July 2007, http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2007/07/fatah_alislam_a.php

29An-Nahar, 16 July 2007.

31 Norton, Hezbollah: Short History, 158.

32 Three consensus candidates have been widely mentioned in Lebanon: Riyadh Salameh, the head of the Central Bank and a respected economist; Jean Ubaydh, a former foreign minister; and General Michel Sleiman, who has distinguished himself as the commander of the army. Sleiman is constitutionally disqualified because “Class A” public servants, which includes senior generals, are supposed to wait 24 months before running for public office. However, the parliament might waive that clause.

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