EU Foreign Policy in the Italian Parliament: The Debates on China and Iran

Abstract

Governments have always been more reluctant to accept parliamentary oversight in foreign policy than in any other domestic policy field. This examination of the recent performance of the Italian Parliament in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) scrutiny and control in the two case studies of the EU's arms embargo against China and negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program shows that institutional arrangements concerning parliamentary control in this field have significant shortcomings. Although limited, the reforms under discussion in the new intergovernmental conference could contribute to improving the performance of parliaments and to creating a common awareness of the problem of democratic deficit in CFSP among the parliamentarians of EU member states.

Notes

¹ According to Wessels and Maurer, “the transfer of national parliamentary powers to the European level has not automatically entailed an immediate transfer of these original legislative powers to the European Parliament” (Maurer and Wessels, National Parliaments on their ways to Europe). Tapio Raunio says that “despite the strengthened position of member states’ legislatures and the European Parliament, the Union is still characterized by a low level of parliamentarisation” (Raunio, “Always one step behind?”, 180–202). For a wider examination of the existing literature on the so-called deparliamentarisation thesis, see Raunio and Hix, “Backbenchers learn to fight back”, 142–68.

² An interesting study on this subject has been conducted by Kietz, What accounts for national divergence.

³ Broad comparative studies have been carried out by Norton, National parliaments and the European Union; Laursen and Pappas, Changing role of Parliaments in European Union; Maurer and Wessels, National Parliaments on their ways to Europe; Kiiver, National Parliaments in European Union.

⁴ The only study comparing the activity of European national parliaments in CFSP is by Wessels, The Parliamentary dimension of CFSP/ESDP. ESDP activities are analysed by Born and Hänggi, “The Double Democratic deficit”. Finally, Viola, European Foreign Policy and the European Parliament, examines the activities of the European Parliament.

⁵ IGC 1/07 (article 1 point 12) and ICG 2/07 (Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union) of 23/7/2007. Currently, the European Parliament organises meetings of the Presidents of the Foreign Affairs Committees of national parliaments twice a year.

⁶ Initially, only the Communists opposed the integration process, but their position started to change in the 1960s and turned into support in the 1970s.

⁷ According to Bino Olivi, this was the case, for example, when the Italian government maintained an ambivalent position during the negotiations on the construction of a European defence policy prior to the Maastricht Treaty. See Olivi, L’Europa difficile, 370–3.

⁸ Comelli and Greco, Integrazione Europea e opinione pubblica italiana.

⁹ Bindi and Grassi, “The Parliament of Italy”, 269–71.

¹⁰ Guizzi, “ Italy: National Parliaments in the European Union”, 151–64; Furlong, “Italian Parliament and European integration,” 35–45.

¹¹ It is a “document based” system, as opposed to the “mandating” systems of some North European countries. For differences between the two systems, see COSAC, “Third bi-annual report”.

¹² In the British House of Commons, this function is reserved for the European Scrutiny Committee.

¹³ Italian Law 11/2005 of 4/2/2005, (here and elsewhere translated from the Italian) “General rules on the participation of Italy in the normative process of the European Union and procedures concerning the implementation of European law”.

¹⁴ Rule 127 of the House Rules of Procedure.

¹⁵ The formal questions presented in the plenary or the specialised committees can require either a written or an oral answer and have different urgency.

¹⁶ According to House rules of procedures, the agenda of the plenary and the standing Committees is decided by the Speaker together with the representatives of the various parliamentary groups. The government is informed and–if so decided–asked to participate.

¹⁷“Schroeder backs sales to China of EU weapons”, Wall Street Journal, 2 December 2003.

¹⁸ European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 12 December 2003.

¹⁹ The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports establishes criteria for EU arms sales to third countries. Currently the Code is not legally binding.

²⁰ For more details on the arguments for and against lifting the arms embargo, see Wezeman and Bromley, “Military Spending and Armaments”, 417–48; and Casarini, “International Politics of Chinese Arms Embargo Issue”.

²¹ Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 26 April 2004.

²² See “Reciprocal trust and sincere collaboration”, interview with Gianfranco Fini in The People's Daily, 6 December 2004. English version at www.esteri.it. At the time, some newspapers suggested that the Italian government's move was aimed at obtaining the PRC's support for the UN reform it was promoting and for Italy's entry into the UN Security Council, but this was denied by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

²³ President Ciampi's Declaration to the press following the meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao, 6 December 2004.

²⁴ European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 16–17 December 2004.

²⁵ Anti-Secession Law Adopted at the Third Session of the Tenth National People's Congress, 14 March 2005.

²⁶ Marco Del Corona, “Prodi: ‘armi a Pechino? Si, aboliamo l"embargo’”, Il Corriere della Sera, 19 September 2006.

²⁷ Federico Rampini interviews Massimo D’Alema, “In Cina la crescita porterà la democrazia”, La Repubblica, 15 November 2006. English version at www.esteri.it

²⁸“Cina, la visita di Ciampi e i diritti calpestati in Tibet”, Corriere della Sera, 7 December 2004; “Finita la missione di Prodi in Cina ‘Stop all"embargo sulle armi’”, La Repubblica online, 18 September 2006.

²⁹ In June and July 2003, for example, both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister appeared before the two chambers on the priorities of the Italian EU Presidency; in the following years, cabinet representatives intervened before the Camera Foreign Affairs Committee on the future of the Union and CFSP.

³⁰ House questions and answers (Interrogazioni e risposta in Commissione) (5–02599, 5–02875 and 5–03480).

³¹ See Annual Reports on arms exports from the government to Parliament for 2002 and 2003 Doc. LXVII n.2 and n.3. In 2005 the government implicitly admitted that the regime on the arms export towards China had been loosened following the improvement in bilateral relations. See questions (Interrogazioni) 3–03974 and 4–14023 (and the government's replies).

³² Parliamentary act No. 4811.

³³ Resolution of the Comitato interministeriale per la programmazione economica (CIPE) of 6 May 1998.

³⁴ Hearing of Foreign Minister Fini before the Foreign Affairs and European Affairs Committees of the House and the Senate, 14 December 2004.

³⁵ Three motions were proposed respectively by Lega Nord (1–00412), Alleanza Nazionale (1–00435) and the Greens (1–00411); a fourth was signed by Biondi, Nan (both Forza Italia) and Grillini (DS) (1–00430).

³⁶ See oral questions (Interrogazioni a risposta orale) 3–00259, 3–00258, and question in the Foreign Affairs Committee (Interrogazione a risposta in Commissione) 5–00238 (House).

³⁷ See Question time in Senate plenary session, 16 November 2006.

³⁸ House motions 1–00026 and 1–00027 (Alleanza Nazionale); 1–00033 (Forza Italia); 1–00052 (Christian Democrats, UDC) and 1–00059 (Lega Nord).

³⁹ House motions 1–00057 (Italian Communists) and 1–00054 (Greens).

⁴⁰ House motion 1–00053.

⁴¹ House Resolution 6–00009.

⁴² These two elements have always been the fundamental requirements of the EU and the international community for negotiation of a long-term agreement with Iran. On the contents of the Accord, see Harninsh and Linden, “Iran and Nuclear Proliferation”.

⁴³ The E3/EU also promised that, once suspension had been verified, negotiations with the EU on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement would resume and the E3/EU would actively support the opening of negotiations between Iran and the WTO.

⁴⁴ The UN5 met for the first time in London in January 2006; on 4 February, Iran was reported to the UN Security Council.

⁴⁵ UN Resolutions 1737 of 23 December 2006 and 1747 of 24 March 2007.

⁴⁶ Common Position 2007/140/CFSP of 27 February 2007, implemented by Council Regulations 423/2007 of 19 April 2007 amended by Commission Regulation 441/2007 of 20 April 2007 and implemented by Council Decision 2007/246/EC of 23 April 2007; Common Position 2007/246/CFSP amending Common Position 2007/140/CFSP, implemented by EC Regulations 618/2007 of 26 April 2007.

⁴⁷ GAERC, Presidency Conclusions, 12 February 2007 and 24 April 2007.

⁴⁸ See Cavanna, “Vademecum per i cacciatore d’affari”, 139–48.

⁴⁹ Pepe Escobar, “Iran knocks Europe out”, Asia Times, 7 September 2005.

⁵⁰Hearing of Massimo D’Alema before the House and Senate Foreign Affairs and European Affairs Committees, 27 June 2006.

⁵¹ In the House: in 2002, questions (interrogazioni) 5–01305 (Mantovani); in 2003 3–01577 (Intini), 3–01584 (Losurdo), 4–07774 (Ranieri); in 2004 5–02798 (Rivolta and Nichelini), 4–18319 (Perrotta); in 2005 5–04745, 4–17969; in 2006 (interpellanza) 2–001225 (Barbieri) and 4–18885 (Zacchera). In the Senate: in 2002, question 3–00648 (De Zulueta).

⁵²Resolution 7–00294 proposed by Landi di Chiavenna at the beginning of the debate.

⁵³Resolution 8–00055.

⁵⁴ Question (interrogazione) 5–02128 (House).

⁵⁵ Ahmadinejad's declarations on Israel received considerable attention: Senate motion 1–00070 (XV Legislature).

⁵⁶ Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 18 October 2006.

⁵⁷ GAERC, Presidency Conclusions, 21 January 2007.

⁵⁸ The EU foreign ministers politically endorsed a draft Common Position concerning restrictive measures against Iran in their meeting of 12 February 2007 (the text was finalised on 8 February by the Foreign Relations Counsellors Working Party and formally adopted on 27 February).

⁵⁹ Interviews with civil servants of the Senate and the Documentation on EU legislation (n. 44/3a and 35/3a) prepared by the Senate Bureau for Relations with the EU for the Foreign Affairs Committee.