Conflicting International Policies and the Western Sahara Stalemate

Abstract

The Western Sahara conflict is a 32-year old case of decolonisation that has been on the UN Security Council's agenda since 1991. Despite the straightforwardness of the stalemate in terms of international legality, the UN has been unable to implement its own provisions on the issue. The UN's failure is due to the contradictions arising from the interaction throughout the conflict between international law and geopolitics. Morocco's supporters in the UNSC have not only allowed it to systematically violate international law but have encouraged Morocco to formalise its irredentism through its “Autonomy Initiative”. This behaviour is perilous not only for the stability of the Maghreb but for the UN system as well.

Notes

¹ Radu, “Struggle in the Sandbox”.

² For a historical analysis of the conflict, see Shelley, Endgame in the Western Sahara; Zoubir and Volman, International Dimensions of Western Sahara Conflict; Hodges, Western Sahara, and Damis, Conflict in Northwest Africa.

³ See Shelley, “Behind the Baker Plan for Western Sahara”; Ruiz-Miguel, “¿Estación de término?” According to Algerian and Sahrawi officials (personally interviewed) Algeria used acceptance of this proposal as a manoeuvre to prove Morocco's bad faith; based on past experience, Algerians were convinced that Morocco would reject it.

⁴ ICG, Western Sahara: Out of the Impasse, 3.

⁵ “Former US Secretary of State, and Former Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary General to Western Sahara, James A. Baker III discusses the protracted conflict in Western Sahara with host Mishal Husain” PBS TV, 19 August 2004. http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/shows/sahara/transcript.html

⁶ ICG, Western Sahara: Out of the Impasse, 6.

⁷ The full text of the proposal is available at : http://www.maec.gov.ma/Initiative/Docs/Initiative%20ang.pdf

⁸ Contribution of the Kingdom of Morocco, full text at http://www.arso.org/ProjetA2003.pdf

⁹ Theofilopoulou, The United Nations and Western Sahara.

¹⁰ A formulation that was to gain greater momentum since 2004 with the support of Socialist government in Spain. San Martín, P. “Briefing: Western Sahara: Road to Perdition?” 651-60.

¹¹ For a detailed analysis of these contradictions, see: Ruiz-Miguel, 2003 Moroccan Project for Western Sahara.

¹² John Bolton, former US ambassador to the UN, after the adoption of Resolution 1720 in October 2006, exhorted Morocco to present a global autonomy proposal that was credible for the territory and suggested the holding of direct talks, without preconditions, with the representatives of the whole Sahrawi population, including Polisario. His British counterpart reiterated the right to self-determination of the Sahrawis. For more details, see: http://www.un.org/News/fr-press/docs/2006/CS8860.doc.htm

¹³ Ruiz-Miguel. The 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan for Western Sahara.

¹⁴ See San Martín et al. Moroccan Autonomy for Western Sahara; Ruiz-Miguel, 2003 Moroccan Project for Western Sahara.

¹⁵ Ruiz-Miguel, Ibid.

¹⁶ ICG, Western Sahara: Out of the Impasse, 7.

¹⁷ Theofilopoulou, How to Create a Stalemate.

¹⁸ Proposal of the Frente Polisario, full text at http://www.arso.org/PropositionFP100407.htm

¹⁹ Le Monde, 26 November 2003.

²⁰ Reported in Jeune Afrique in 1993.

²¹ Tuquoi, Paris-Alger, couple infernal.

²² For more details, see Daguzan, “France and the Maghreb”.

²³ Confidential interviews with Algerian officials.

²⁴ Interviews with French officials and opinion-makers.

²⁵ Mundy, “Neutrality or Complicity?”; Benabdallah-Gambier, “Les États-Unis et la Question du Sahara Occidental” ; Zoubir and Volman, “United States and Conflict in the Maghreb”.

²⁶ US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Media Note, Western Sahara, 2006/274, 11 April 2007.

²⁷ Bolton, Surrender is Not an Option, 368-9.

²⁸ The islet's sovereignty is disputed by Morocco and Spain. On 11 July 2002, Moroccan soldiers set up a military outpost on the islet. Subsequently, Spain launched a successful military operation to take over the island. After mediation by the United States, the parties agreed to return to the status quo ante, leaving the rocky islet deserted.

²⁹ See Hernando de Larramendi, “Politique étrangère de l’Espagne envers le Maghreb ”, 27–43; as well as Amirah-Fernández, “Spain's Policy towards Morocco and Algeria”.

³⁰ See Stephan and Mundy, “A Battlefield Transformed”, 1–32.

³¹ http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78866.htm

³² http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/11/morocc14714.htm; http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/12/10/morocc12183.htm

³³ http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGMDE290032007; http://web.amnesty.org/library/eng-mar/index

³⁴ These points are similar to some of those recommended by John Bolton (Surrender is Not an Option).