China's Response to International Normative Pressure: The Case of Human Rights

Abstract

Over the past three decades, the People's Republic of China's response to international human rights pressure has been guided by its strong state identity, an identity that has prioritised the pursuit of economic productivity, material power and international prestige. The goal of a strong socialist state led Beijing to participate in the UN human rights regime for strategic and diplomatic gains, and later to endorse human rights norms that were perceived as consistent with them. Accordingly, the PRC sees colonialism, imperialism, hegemonism, and racism as key human rights violations, while opposing the universality of human rights and rejecting intrusive human rights monitoring, deemed as detrimental to its strong state goal. After the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, China faced unprecedented international pressure and responded by challenging aspects of the human rights system. During negotiations to replace the UN Commission on Human Rights with the Human Rights Council, China again sought to shield itself from human rights pressure, primarily by challenging country specific approaches. Thus, instead of the normative influence leading to norm-compliant behaviour, China has sought to diminish human rights pressure and shape international human rights institutions in ways that are advantageous to its state interests.

Keywords:

• China
• human rights
• United Nations
• international norms

Notes

¹ Nathan, “China and International Human Rights”, 210.

² The definition of state identity is taken from Jepperson et al. (Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security, 59–60), who define it as the normative-cognitive properties of statehood (distinctiveness and purposes of the state vis-à-vis others) that are enacted, upheld and reproduced collectively by state elites. State identity informs state interests and influences the nature and modalities of the state's relationship with other political entities and social groupings, both within and beyond the state borders.

³ To explain the impact of identity shift on China's human rights policy, the analytic framework of Abdelal et al. (Measuring Identity) is used, in which a collective identity consists of normative, purposive, relational and cognitive properties.

⁴ Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State, 22.

⁵ See, for instance, a statement by the Chinese foreign minister to the UN Secretary-General on 27 January 1972, regarding the Chinese government's support of national independence and anti-racism in Africa (UN, Letter dated 27 January 1972).

⁶ Nathan and Ross, Great Wall and Empty Fortress, 179–84; Kent, China, the United Nations, and Human Rights, 41–2.

⁷ Kim, “Thinking Globally in Post-Mao China”, 193. To put it in the framework of Kim's argument, China now adopted a “system maintaining” and “system-exploiting” posture.

⁸ The statist notion of human rights led Beijing not only to approve but even strongly justify in February 1985 the international intervention in Afghanistan during the 1980s because, so the Chinese argument went, “[t]he Afghan question is entirely the result of the invasion and occupation by foreign troops”. International support for Afghan resistance against the Soviet invasion and occupation was hence “justified and beyond reproach” (UN, Letter dated 19 February 1985).

⁹ Wu, Waijiao Anli [Case Studies in Diplomacy], 222.

¹⁰ China's involvement in the human rights regime also coincided with its modernisation drive. See Kent, China, the United Nations, and Human Rights, 42.

¹¹ Ibid., 43.

¹² Ma J. and Zhao L., “Shijie Renquan Xuanyan Sishi Zhounian” [40th Anniversary of UDHR], People's Daily, 10 December 1988, 6.

¹³ Kent, China, the United Nations, and Human Rights, 44.

¹⁴ Kim, “Human Rights in China's International Relations”, 132–4. See also Kent, Ibid.

¹⁵ Kent, China, the United Nations, and Human Rights, 45–6.

¹⁶ Ibid., 28.

¹⁷ Foot, Rights Beyond Borders, 98. The UN General Assembly debated and passed resolutions on Chinese violations in Tibet in 1959, 1961 and 1965 with General Assembly Resolutions 1353 (XIV), 1723 (XVI) and 2079 (XX), respectively. After China joined the UN in 1971, however, it did not receive much human rights scrutiny.

¹⁸ Foot, Rights Beyond Borders, 114–8.

¹⁹ Ibid, 119.

²⁰ The Duihua Foundation, “The Commission on Human Rights: Another Round in 2006?”. Resolutions on China were not offered in 1991, 1998, 2003 and 2005. China successfully used a no-action motion to prevent discussion of resolutions in 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2004. The no-action motion is a political manoeuvre that prevents the Commission from considering the resolution. China's no-action motion did not pass in 1995, but the resolution failed to pass when brought to the floor for a vote.

²¹ Seymour, “Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Relations”, 222. See also Nathan, “Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Policy”, 635. Nathan notes that “[t]he human rights issue did only modest damage to China's interests until 1989”.

²² Svensson, Debating Human Rights in China, 1.

²³ Kent, China, the United Nations, and Human Rights, 74–5. These changes included preventing the Sub-Commission from discussing a country already being considered by the UNCHR, and turning it into an advisory body.

²⁴ Duihua Foundation, “The Commission on Human Rights: Another Round in 2006?”. China continued to complain about politicisation and confrontation, criticise the lack of objectivity, credibility and impartiality, and call for “dialogue and cooperation” over confrontation. See for example, UN, Commission on Human Rights Opens Sixty-First Session.

²⁵ Kim, “China and the United Nations”. In 1996, China also called for geographic redistribution. See, for example, UNCHR, “Summary Record of the 33rd Meeting”, paras 1–6.

²⁶ 1995 was the only year that the no-action motion failed. However, the resolution was defeated by one vote, when Russia, which had voted against the no-action motion, failed to support the resolution. See Kent, China, the United Nations and Human Rights, 176–7; and Foot, Rights Beyond Borders, 183.

²⁷ UNCHR, “Summary of Record of the 44th Meeting”, paras 63–70, and Foot, Rights Beyond Borders, 205.

²⁸ The LMG included Algeria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Vietnam and Zimbabwe.

²⁹ Alston, “Reconceiving the UN Human Rights Regime”, 196, 204–5. For examples of the group's proposals, see UNCHR, “Rationalization of the Work of the Special Procedures System” and “Rationalization of the Work of the Commission”.

³⁰ Southeast Asian diplomat, interview, London, November 2011.

³¹ Interviews with Middle Eastern, Southeast Asian, and Latin American diplomats, and a Human Rights NGO Representative/Human Rights Scholar, Geneva, May–June 2011. The PRC was described as a “core country” of the LMG. Ambassador Sha Zukang, PRC Ambassador to the UN in Geneva, specifically notes his role as “coordinator” of the LMG from 2004–07 in his biography on the UN site, 2 September 2011, http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/SMG.asp?smgID=121. LMG members refer to country-specific action as “selectivity” or “naming and shaming” and prefer thematic approaches to human rights. Alston, “Reconceiving the UN Human Rights Regime,” 216, 204.

³² Foot, Rights Beyond Borders, 204–5.

³³ Ibid., 205.

³⁴ China signed the ICESCR on 27 October 1997 and ratified it on 27 March 2001. It signed the ICCPR on 5 October 1998, but has not yet ratified it.

³⁵ Baker, “Human Rights, Europe and China”, 57–9. China has limited its willingness to engage in bilateral human rights dialogues to those dialogue partner countries agreeing not to offer resolutions critical of China's human rights.

³⁶ Ibid., 55–6.

³⁷ Beijing perceived its efforts as successful to the extent that when discussions began in 2004 to replace the Commission, it was comfortable with the status quo and uninterested in reform.

³⁸ Duihua Foundation, “The Commission on Human Rights: Another Round in 2006?”.

³⁹ PRC positions taken from Abraham, Building the New Human Rights Council, 5, and documentation provided by the International Service for Human Rights’ “Publications on the Institution-Building of the Human Rights Council”, http://www.ishr.ch/council-monitor/institution-building?task=view.

⁴⁰ Bussard, “Night of Madness for Human Rights”, 70; and “China Deals Setback to the UN Human Rights Watchdog”, New York Times, 18 June 2007.

⁴¹ Eventually Ambassador Sha accepted face-saving language suggesting that states should seek to secure the broadest possible support for resolutions. China's position had the potential to jeopardise the gains made by some of its allies, such as Cuba and Belarus, which had already secured the elimination of the mandates assigned to their countries.

⁴² Ambassador Sha Zukang speaking on behalf of the Like-Minded Group at the meeting between the President of the General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights, 25 November 2005, http://www.china-un.ch/eng/rqrd/thsm/t223170.htm. On the size of the Council, PRC views taken from interviews with a Western European diplomat and a former US government official conducted in New York in June 2011, and in Washington DC in October 2010.

⁴³ Ambassador Zhang Yishan, Permanent Representative of China to the UN, speaking to the UN General Assembly after the adoption of the draft resolution on the Human Rights Council, 15 March 2006, http://www.china-un.org/eng/xw/t240623.htm.

⁴⁴ Chinese views also often overlapped with the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of Islamic Conference.

⁴⁵ Western European diplomats interviewed in Geneva and Oslo, June 2011.

⁴⁶ Western European diplomat, interviewed in June 2011 in New York, and North American diplomat, interviewed in 2011 in Washington DC. At the same time, Beijing did support a condemnatory resolution on Myanmar.

⁴⁷ Human Rights NGO Representative/Human Rights Scholar, interview conducted May 2011, Geneva, and Human Rights NGO representative, interview conducted June 2011, Geneva.

⁴⁸ Western European Diplomat, interview conducted May 2011. Some delegations also wrote statements for other countries to present during their UPR.

⁴⁹ UN GA, Human Rights Council, Universal Periodic Review, China, paragraph 46.

⁵⁰ As a South Asian diplomat noted, “China easily finds other countries with similar views.” Southeast Asian diplomat interviewed in June 2011, Geneva.