The EU and the Syrian Crisis as Viewed from the Middle East

Abstract

Seen through the eyes of Syrian activists and other observers based in the Middle East, EU policy towards Syria could in some ways appear inconsistent and ambiguous. In Brussels, EU representatives remind us that the Syrian crisis is the most difficult one the European Union has had to face so far, for the unprecedented scope of the humanitarian catastrophe, its geographic proximity to the Union’s borders, and the difficulties in deciphering a fluid and multi-dimensional conflict. After more than three years since the eruption of violence, the EU is trying hard to play a pivotal role in the Syrian issue, despite the complexity of balancing its institutions, the different political sensibilities of its 28 member states, and the pressures exerted by influent external actors.

Keywords:

• EU
• Syria
• activism
• civil society

Notes

¹ European Union External Action, “Statement by the Spokesperson of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the decision of the General Assembly of the Syrian Opposition Coalition to attend the Geneva II Conference”, Brussels, 18 January 2014, http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140118_02_en.pdf.

² European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), “Syria”, Brussels, December 2012, http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard/2013/mena/59.

³ Among the most recent and relevant articles, see Fargues and Fandrich, European Response to Syrian Crisis; Fargues, Europe Must Take on its Share; Seeberg, “The Arab Uprisings”.

⁴ EU representative. Interview with the author, Beirut, February 2014.

⁵ UN, How Humanitarian Funds for the Syria Crisis were Spent, December 2013, http://www.unesco.org/science/syria/Syriacrisis-achievementsreportforKuwaitConference2.pdf.

⁶ Data contained in a document elaborated in March 2014 by the Development and Cooperation (DEV-CO) General Direction of the European Commission (European Commission, “Towards a comprehensive EU approach”, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-596_en.htm).

⁷ “Staff of ‘opposition Aid Coordination Unit’ strike against corruption and misconduct”, Zaman al Wasl, 29 November 2013, https://zamanalwsl.net/en/news/2681.html; “Despite corruption claims, Coalition keeps ACU chief”, Zaman al Wasl, 6 December 2013, https://zamanalwsl.net/en/news/2789.html.

⁸ K. Debeuf, “Not the Jihadists but we are the problem”, EU Observer, 28 April 2013, http://blogs.euobserver.com/debeuf/2013/04/28/not-the-jihadists-but-we-are-the-problem/.

⁹ Debeuf met with ACU representatives and FSA officers in Aleppo, Homs and Hama. Interview with the author, Beirut, February 2014. Since 2011, many Syrian activists have moved to Cairo and Debeuf has travelled extensively in the region, establishing and cultivating contacts related to the Syrian issue. Debeuf’s voice is one of the most critical of the international community’s approach to Syria (K. Debeuf, “Syria: the land of broken promises”, EU Observer, 28 October 2013, http://blogs.euobserver.com/debeuf/2013/10/28/syria-the-land-of-broken-promises/).

¹⁰ European Parliament, “Remarks by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the situation in Syria”, Strasbourg, 13 March 2013, http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/136084.pdf.

¹¹ Debeuf, interview with the author, Beirut, February 2014.

¹² Debeuf, interview with the author, Beirut, February 2014.

¹³ Orbie, Van Elsuwege and Bossuyt, “Humanitarian Aid”, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-5973.12054/full#jccm12054-note-0005.

¹⁴ “The EU acknowledges the importance of supporting local civilian structures throughout Syria.” (Council of the European Union, “Council Conclusions on Syria”, Brussels, 10 December 2012, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/d-tr/dv/0207_05/0207_05en.pdf).

¹⁵ Confidential meetings held in Istanbul, February 2014.

¹⁶ Interview with the author, Beirut, April 2014.

¹⁷ Interview with the author, Beirut, February 2014.

¹⁸ Phone interview with the author, Beirut-Brussels, February 2014.

¹⁹ Ibidem.

²⁰ France, Germany and the UK also wanted to impose a ban on imports of phosphates, contained in fertilisers and used in some industrial processes. But Greece, the first European importer of phosphates, opposed that measure, seeking wide-ranging exemptions to ensure that trade with Syria would continue.

²¹ M. Ostolani, “Siria: botta a regime Assad, UE vara embargo petrolio”, Ansa, 2 September 2011; T. Vogel, “Split over Syria sanctions”, European Voice, 23 February 2012, http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/split-over-syria-sanctions/.

²² The Finnish Foreign Minister, Erkki Tuomioja, criticised the decision to postpone the ban until November, saying: “If we were serious, we should follow up immediately with every decision we make.” (“Siria: Ministro Finlandia critica richiesta rinvio Italia”, Ansa, 2 September 2011). An EEAS official remarked that this kind of agreement is part of the common practice of compromise between member states and that the extension is a part of the negotiation process (phone interview with the author, Beirut-Brussels, April 2014).

²³ Council of the European Union, “Council eases sanctions”, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/136911.pdf.

²⁴ “EU eases Syria oil embargo to help opposition”, BBC News, 22 April 2013.

²⁵ Apparently, it is almost impossible to verify whether the SOC has reached an agreement on oil exports with one or more EU member states. EEAS official, phone interview with the author, Beirut-Brussels, April 2014.

²⁶ Phone interview with the author, Beirut-Brussels, February 2014.

²⁷ For an overview of the issue, see “EU arms embargo on Syria”, SIPRI, 13 November 2013, http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/syria_LAS/eu-embargo-on-Syria.

²⁸ “UK and France made the strategic mistake of raising the issue in the EU, while they could have acted independently as they had done in Libya. But they were looking for international legitimacy for their purposes”. Phone interview with the author, Beirut-Brussels, February 2014.

²⁹ D. Melvin and G. Moulson, “EU Ministers reject arming Syrian rebels”, Associated Press, 18 February 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/eu-foreign-ministers-discuss-ending-war-syria.

³⁰ Phone interview with the author, Beirut-Brussels, February 2014.

³¹ European Union External Action, “Arms Export Control”, http://eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/arms-export-control/index_en.htm. See also “Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment”, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmquad/419/41922.htm.

³² “There is quite a heated debate in these months about this issue: which weapons should be considered defensive, and which offensive?”. Phone interview with the author, Beirut-Brussels, February 2014.

³³ Phone interview with the author, Beirut-Brussels, February 2014. The source also stressed that to date there is no concrete evidence of any French or British decision to deliver weapons to Syrian armed opposition groups, for the very same reasons that pushed the other EU member states to oppose the UK proposal.

³⁴ Council Regulation No 442/2011, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/droi/dv/201/201105/20110526_603councilreg_en.pdf.

³⁵ Until May 2014, the list included 180 people and 54 entities. On 28 May, Brussels lifted sanctions on the Syria International Islamic Bank and on a businessman, Suleiman Maarouf (owner of pro-government Addouniya satellite TV with ties to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad), who lives in London. (The regulation also speaks of another person, Asef Shawkat, former chief of the Syrian military intelligence, who was however killed in an obscure attack perpetrated by “a terrorist group” in Damascus in July 2012. See “Martyrdom of the generals Imad Rajiha, Asef Shawkat, and Imad Turkmani in the explosion that targeted the National Security Office bureau in Damascus”, Sana, 18 July 2012, http://sana.sy/ara/336/2012/07/18/432148.htm). The moves came as part of a decision to extend the sanctions on nearly all targets for another year, until 1 June 2015. A European diplomat said the decision to lift sanctions against the bank was taken because of a lack of strong evidence linking it to the Syrian regime. See Council of the European Union, Council Implementing Regulation No 578/2014, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:JOL_2014_160_R_0005&from=EN.

³⁶ Trombetta, “Beyond the Party”. From the lists, the observer gets a glimpse of these formal and apparent powers and to some extent can see who does what in some key sectors of the security apparatus and financial echelons, at least during the timespan considered by the sanctions.

³⁷ Since January 2011, the EU INTCEN is part of the EEAS under the authority of the EU’s High Representative and is composed of two divisions: (1) the Analysis Division, responsible for providing strategic analysis based on input from the security and intelligence services of the member states; and (2) the General and External Relations Division, which deals with all legal and administrative questions, as well as open source analysis. See also A. Rettman, “EU should create own spy agency, Reding says”, EU Observer, 4 November 2013, http://euobserver.com/justice/121979.

³⁸ A listed individual or firm can appeal to the EU Court of Justice in Luxembourg. The judge is supposed to verify the sources and the reasons behind the listing, but the member states can reserve the right not to disclose their sources.

³⁹ Phone interview with the author, Beirut-Brussels, February 2014.

⁴⁰ See also Seeberg, “The EU and the Syrian Crisis”, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13629395.2014.896314#.U515Ik1H61s.

⁴¹ Phone interview with the author, Beirut-Brussels, April 2014.

⁴² Aljazeera TV, 9 May 2011. See also Moret, “Humanitarian impacts of economic sanctions”, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2014.893427#.U5150U1H61s.

⁴³ Belhadj, La Syrie de Bashar Al-Asad, 340 ff; Heydemann and Leenders, Middle East Authoritarianisms; Burgat and Paoli, Pas de printemps pour la Syrie; Hinnebusch, “Syria: from ‘authoritarian upgrading’”.

⁴⁴ Stretton, “The External Action Service”, http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2013/iss1/9/.

⁴⁵ Phone interview with the author, Beirut-Brussels, February 2014.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Lorenzo Trombetta

Lorenzo Trombetta is a Beirut-based scholar and journalist specialised in the contemporary history of Syria. Email: [email protected]