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Abstract
As security continues to be a primary challenge in post-Qadhafi Libya, the availability of weapons to nearby opposition groups and armed insurgencies is a source of major concern for Libya’s neighbours and the international community. Uncontrolled weapons proliferation and the rise of new armed groups have gone hand in hand across various conflict fronts. While what is known about weapons acquisition dynamics does not make it possible to establish a strict causal relationship, by observing variations in the various contexts, critical factors can be identified, such as the emergence of a protection market, the multiplication of tactical options and splintering processes, which facilitate comprehension of how greater circulation of weapons is related to regional volatility and destabilisation.
Notes
1 M. Nichols, “Libya key source for illicit arms, fueling conflicts: U.N. envoy”, Reuters, 10 March 2014. The current UN arms embargo on Libya entered into force at the very beginning of the 2011 revolution, and was subsequently eased.
2 UNSC, Report of the Panel of Experts.
3 Greene and Marsh, Small Arms, Crime and Conflict; Marsh, “Role of Weapons Acquisition”.
4 Strazzari and Tholens, “Tesco for Terrorists Reconsidered”.
5 Duffield, Global Governance and New Wars.
6 Cole, “Stabilizing Libya’s Periphery”, 44.
7 The 2013 report of the UN Panel of Experts on Libya stated that, despite the UN embargo, arms were exported to Libyan revolutionary forces from, among others, Qatar, UAE, France, Albania and Sudan. Reportedly Qatar contributed more than 20 tonnes of weapons. See S. Dagher, C. Levinson and C. Coker, “Tiny Kingdom’s Huge Role in Libya Draws Concern”, Wall Street Journal, 17 October 2011.
8 Hilsum, Libya from Qadhafi to Revolution, 208-9.
9 For a comprehensive description of Libya’s militias, see Chivvis and Martini, Libya after Qaddafi, 13-34.
10 McQuinn, “Libya’s Evolving Armed Groups”, 54.
11 ICG, Libya’s Enduring Conflicts, 4.
12 I. Drury, “Don’t Turn Syria into a ‘Tesco for Terrorists’ like Libya, Generals Tell Cameron”, Daily Mail, 17 June 2013.
13 M. Michael, “Libya’s guns free-for-all fuels region’s turmoil”, The Associated Press, 22 March 2014; A. Housley, “Theft of US weapons in Libya involved hundreds of guns, sources say”, Fox News, 26 September 2013.
14 A. Kadlec, “Disarming Libya’s Militias”, Sada, 16 February 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2012/02/16/disarming-libya-s-militias/ei7f.
15 Militias that are not affiliated with the government have different backgrounds and objectives: they range from revolutionary groups that were not integrated in Military Councils (or the Supreme Security Committee) to tribal militias or Islamist groups, such as Ansar Al Sharia.
16 Jenzen-Jones, Small-calibre Ammunition in Libya.
17 Shaw and Mangan, Illicit Trafficking and Libya’s Transition, 10.
18 Chivvis and Martini, Libya after Qaddafi, 20.
19 UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa, 36–7.
20 E. Schmitt, “Libya’s Cache of Toxic Arms All Destroyed”, The New York Times, 2 February 2014. Nevertheless, in March 2014, the Israeli media reported that Libyan authorities intercepted a load of mustard gas heading for Syria (M. Miskin, “Libya: Mustard gas nearly reached Syrian rebels”, Arutz Sheva, 2 March 2014).
21 Cole, “Stabilizing Libya’s Periphery”, 36–7 and 46–7.
22 Scheele, “Circulations Marchandes Au Sahara”.
23 T. Tan Ha, “Terrorists supplied from Libya, Clinton Says”, The Globe and Mail, 23 January 2013; “Niger President Issoufou warns of Libya threat”, BBC World, 26 May 2013.
24 Pézard and Glatz, Arms in and around Mauritania, 22.
25 Shelley, Endgame in the Western Sahara.
26 Lacher, Organized Crime in the Sahel-Sahara, 76.
27 S. Hottuin, “Mali: MNLA’s Struggle for Azawad Continues”, Radio Netherlands Worldwide, 20 July 2020; and “Mali: Le Qatar accusé de soutenir financièrement les rebelles du Nord”, Slate Afrique, 7 June 2012.
28 “Somalia may be Impacted by Libyan Weapons Theft”, Zimbabwe Star, 8 September 2011.
29 M. Hookham, “MI6 warns Libyan arms dumps are ‘Tesco for world terrorists’”, The Sunday Times, 16 June 2013.
30 D. Wood, “Libyan Weapons Arming Al Qaeda Militias Across North Africa, Officials Say”, Huffington Post, 20 February 2013.
31 M. Ghanmi, “Tunisia targets army traffickers”, Magharebia, 27 November 2013.
32 M. Ghanmi, “Tunisia Uncovers Libya Arms Smugglers”, Magharebia, 9 February 2012.
33 Shaw and Mangan, Illicit Trafficking and Libya’s Transition, 25.
34 UNSC, Report of the Panel of Experts, 104.
35 Kartas, On the Edge?
36 I. Black, “West Overlooked Risk of Libya Weapons Reaching Mali, Says Expert”, The Guardian, 21 January 2013.
37 “Algeria, Libya Agree to Enforce Border Security, Prevent Arms Spread”, Kuwait News Agency (KUNA), 10 December 2012.
38 W. Ramzi, “Algeria thwarts Mali arms smuggling”, Magharebia, 16 April 2013.
39 A. Kharlef, “Libye: L’Algérie a commencé les opérations commando”, El Watan, 6 June 2014.
40 Filiu, “Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb”.
41 M. Aziz, “Un Repenti Raconte Belmokhtar”, El Watan Week-End, 25 October 2013.
42 R. Ould Idoumou, “Al-Qaeda splinter group reveals internal erosion”, Magharebia, 30 December 2011.
43 Al Ma’ali, Al-Qaeda and its Allies.
44 Florquin and Berman, Armed and Aimless.
45 Republic of Mali, Report on the Proliferation of Small Arms, 2.
46 S. Diffalah, “Mali: L’Arsenal Des Islamistes En Question”, Le Nouvel Observateur, 14 January 2013.
47 C. J. Chivers, “Looted Libyan Arms in Mali May Have Shifted Conflict’s Path”, The New York Times, 7 February 2013.
48 A. Lebovich, “The Sahel is awash with weapons, but whose?”, Open Society Initiative for West Africa online, 28 March 2013.
49 M. Ghanmi, “Tunisia Uncovers Libya Arms Smugglers”, Magharebia, 9 February 2012.
50 Ranieri and Strazzari, “Golpe a Bamako”.
51 D. Maylie and D. Hinshaw, “Alarm Over Smuggled Libyan Arms”, Wall Street Journal, 12 November 2011.
52 Lacher, Organized Crime in the Sahel-Sahara, 71.
53 A. Pfeffer, “Libyan Arms Expected to Continue Flowing into Sinai”, Haaretz, 23 August 2011.
54 Shaw and Mangan, Illicit Trafficking and Libya’s Transition, 33.
55 Moniquet, “Salafism-Wahhabism and Arms to Rebel Groups”.
56 R. Kirkpatrick, “Militants Down Egyptian Helicopter, Killing 5 Soldiers”, The New York Times, 26 January 2014.
57 Yugoslavia, which manufactured the M60 and M79, enjoyed close relations with Tripoli, as did independent Croatia. It is possible that the M60s, M79s, RPG-22s and RBG-6s that turned up in Dara’a province were all sold to Libya a long time ago, and that they have only now been emptied from warehouses by the new Libyan authorities. (M. Weiss, “Who Just Started Arming Syria Rebels?” Now News – Lebanon, 20 February 2013.) It is also possible that the entire operation was orchestrated by Saudi Arabia, transferring an undeclared surplus remaining in Croatia from the 1990s Balkan wars (C.J. Chivers and E. Schmitt, “Saudis Step Up Help for Rebels in Syria with Croatian Arms”, The New York Times, 25 February 2013).
58 D. McElroy, “CIA ‘running arms smuggling team in Benghazi when consulate was attacked’”, The Telegraph, 23 March 2014.
59 Hersh, “The Red Line and the Rat Line”.
60 J. Donati, G. Shennib and F. Bosalum, “The Adventures of a Libyan Weapons Dealer in Syria”, Reuters, 18 June 2013.
61 H. Global, “Libya: Weapons Proliferation and Regional Stability in the Sahel”, Fair Observer, 30 August 2013.
62 A. Kadlec, “Disarming Libya’s Militias”, Sada, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 16 February 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2012/02/16/disarming-libya-s-militias/9of5.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Francesco Strazzari
Francesco Strazzari is Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and Associate Professor of Political Science at the Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna in Pisa. Email: [email protected]