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Abstract
Amid growing animosity and security concerns in the Middle East, the Gulf region appears to be on the way to becoming the new centre of gravity of regional equilibria. The increasingly active foreign policy postures of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries is a key aspect of the new regional order in the making. Saudi Arabia and Oman are two examples of this trend. Their involvement in the Syrian and Yemeni conflicts reveals important differences regarding the aims, narratives, political and military postures, strategies and alliances pursued by Riyadh and Muscat and casts a shadow over the future of GCC cooperation and integration.
Notes
1 Hertog, “The Cost of the Counter Revolution”; Worrall, “Oman: The ‘Forgotten’ Corner”; and Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf, respectively.
2 Colombo, “The GCC and the Arab Spring”.
3 Hurrell, “Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order”.
4 To simplify, the ‘old’ regional order, dating back to the years immediately after the Second World War and subsequently consolidated during the Cold War, was based on a division of the region into spheres of influence: the Western sphere, which included moderate states such as Egypt, Jordan and the Arab Gulf states, and the Eastern sphere or so-called ‘non-aligned’ countries, which included states firmly opposed to US hegemony in the region, such as Algeria, Libya and Syria. See Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics.
5 Kausch, “Competitive Multipolarity in Middle East”.
6 Youngs, “Living with Old-New Security Paradigm”, 17.
7 Kamrava, Qatar: Small State, Big Politics; Peterson, “Qatar and the World”; Ulrichsen Small States with Big Role.
8 Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring, 4.
9 Ulrichsen, Insecure Gulf and The Gulf States. It should also be recalled here that the downward trend in oil prices since late 2014 has negatively affected the fiscal balance of most GCC countries and necessitated corrective measures. See Callen et al., Economic Diversification in the GCC.
10 Hey, Small States in World Politics; Rickli and Almezaini, “Theories of Small States’”, 8–30.
11 According to Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory, the GCC can effectively be interpreted as a balancing alignment “intended to limit potential pressure from both Iran and the Soviet Union”. See Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 270.
12 Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament.
13 Halliday, Middle East in International Relations; Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, “Foreign Policymaking in Middle East”; Wright, “Foreign Policy in GCC States”.
14 Barnett, “Institutions, Roles and Disorder”.
15 David, Choosing Sides; Nonneman, “Determinants of Saudi Foreign Policy” and Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policy.
16 Weber, Theory of Social Organization. Many years later, Holger Albrecht and Oliver Schlumberger argued that all regimes – whether democratic or authoritarian – depend on a combination of repression, cooptation and legitimacy. See Albrecht and Schlumberger, “Waiting for Godot”.
17 Hudson, Arab Politics, 2.
18 Lipset, Political Man, 77.
19 Gause, Kings for All Seasons.
20 Weber, Economy and Society, 953.
21 Albrecht and Schlumberger distinguish between allocative legitimacy, traditional-religious legitimacy, legitimacy through ideology, and external legitimacy. See “Waiting for Godot”, 376–7.
22 Niblock, Saudi Arabia. The fifth basis of legitimacy identified by the author, the democratic/structural one, is not discussed as it is not of relevance for GCC countries. See also Herb, All in the Family; and Kostiner, Middle East Monarchies.
23 Beblawi and Luciani, The Rentier State; Smith, “Oil Wealth and Regime Survival”.
24 Al-Dekhayel, Kuwait, 221.
25 Ibid., 28.
26 Davidson, After the Sheikhs.
27 Valeri, Oman, 71–118; Yom and Gause, “Resilient Royals”.
28 Holbig, “International Dimensions of Regime Legitimacy”.
29 Many studies assess the effectiveness of the external legitimation strategies used by authoritarian regimes; see for example Hoffmann, International Dimensions of Authoritarian Legitimation.
30 Kliman and Fontaine, Global Swing States; Kausch, Promise of Middle Eastern Swing States.
31 For instance, by actively siding with the United States in the struggle against terrorism after the 9/11 events, Saudi Arabia was able to weaken Al-Qaeda’s rhetoric and acts aimed at undermining the religious basis of the regime’s legitimacy. Furthermore, the Saudi official discourse used to consider “the Iranian conspiracy” as the main explanation for political unrest in many Gulf countries after the Iraq-Iran war (1980–88). This was aimed at achieving two goals: first, promoting the status of Saudi Arabia in the region as the protector of ‘Sunni Islam’ against ‘Shia Iran’ and, second, delegitimising the opposition groups led by Shiites that demanded political change in, for example, Bahrain and Kuwait as well as at home. See Cordesman, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, 78.
32 Kausch, Promise of Middle Eastern Swing States.
33 Colombo, “The GCC and the Arab Spring”.
34 Saudi-Iranian relations as well as the impact of the JCPOA at the regional level are discussed in another contribution to this Special Issue. See the article by Riham Bahi, p. 89.
35 Davidson, After the Sheikhs.
36 Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf.
37 Schanzer, “Saudi Arabia Arming Syrian Opposition”.
38 Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf.
39 Mazzetti and Hubbard, “Rise of Saudi Prince”.
40 Purple, “Why Saudi Arabia is Hammering”.
41 Stephens, “Mixed success for Saudi operation”.
42 Ibid.
43 Jones and Ridout, A History of Modern Iran; Echague, Oman: the outlier.
44 Allen and Rigsbee, Oman Under Qaboos.
45 Ibid.
46 Valeri, Oman, 71–118.
47 Valeri, “Identity Politics and Nation-Building”.
48 Jones and Ridout, Oman, Culture and Diplomacy.
49 Ibid.; Jones, Oman’s Quiet Diplomacy, Valeri, Oman, 71–118.
50 O’Reilly, “Omnibalancing”.
51 “Oman: Syria crisis must be resolved through peace plan”, Aharamonline, 28 January 2012, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/33024/World/Region/Oman-Syria-crisis-must-be-resolved-through-peace-p.aspx.
52 “Oman Says it will not Interfere in Syria's Internal Affairs”, Al-Monitor, 4 October 2012, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/politics/2012/10/oman-no-to-interference-in-syria.html#ixzz4EqJ5JNUX.
53 “Oman’s diplomatic bridge to Syria”, Al-Monitor, 17 August 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/08/oman-diplomatic-bridge-syria-moallem.html.
54 For Oman, “the enemy (Iran) of my friend (the United States) may still be my friend”; see Lefebvre, “Oman’s Foreign Policy”.
55 Rozen, “Inside the US-Iran diplomacy”.
56 “Oman ‘ready to help mediate’ in Yemen war”, Gulf News, 3 April 2015, http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/oman-ready-to-help-mediate-in-yemen-war-1.1485236v.
57 Baabood, “Oman’s Independent Foreign Policy”, 107–122.
58 Ibid.
59 Barrett, “Oman’s Balancing Act in Yemen”.
60 “Oman’s role as a negotiator in Yemen conflict important: UAE defence official”, Muscat Daily, 10 October 2015, http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Oman/Oman-s-role-as-a-negotiator-in-Yemen-conflict-important-UAE-defence-official-4cnw#ixzz4ErDKQKvY.
61 Jones and Ridout, A History of Modern Oman.
62 Echague, Oman: the outlier.
63 Baabood, “Oman’s Independent Foreign Policy”, 107–22.
64 Sipri Yearbook Citation2015, 394.
65 Calculli, “Sub-regions and Security”; Khalifa Isaac, “Resurgence in Arab Regional Institutions?”.
66 Calculli, Ibid., 62.
67 Gervais, “Changing Security Dynamics”.
68 Author’s interviews with Saudi scholars and GCC policymakers, Doha, October 2013, and Muscat, November 2013.