The Unintended Consequences of a European Neighbourhood Policy without Russia

ABSTRACT

After Russia’s retreat from the European Neighbourhood Policy, the EU’s policy towards its eastern neighbours was split up. The internal unintended consequence of the EU’s choice to leave its policy unaltered was a tension between the objective of privileged relations with ENP countries and a promise to recognise the interests of Russia as an equal partner. Externally, the unintended outcome was that this fostered two opposing strategic environments: a cooperative one for the EaP and a competitive one with Russia. In terms of the management of unintended consequences, the EU has actively sought to reinforce its normative hegemony towards EaP countries, while at the same time mitigating certain negative unintended effects.

KEYWORDS:

• EU-Russia relations
• European Neighbourhood Policy
• Eastern Partnership
• unintended consequences

Notes

1 Excluding the three Baltic states.

2 The term is taken from Wolczuk 2009.

3 Part of this article draws on earlier work, in particular Casier 2015 and Casier 2016b.

4 See also Reslow’s contribution to this Special Issue.

5 Post-factum management is referred to in the Introduction of the Special Issue as “reaction” rather than “anticipation”.

6 As this article focuses on post-factum management of unintended consequences, the term “avoidance”, suggested in the Introduction of this Special Issue, will not be used. Reinforcing and mitigating are considered the end points of a spectrum of options and not a dichotomous choice.

7 Barnett and Duvall (2005, 42) define power as “the production in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate”.

8 The EU formulated two core objectives for its neighbourhood policy (ENP): avoiding new dividing lines in wider Europe and creating stability in the neighbourhood (European Commission 2004). It sought to do so by establishing “privileged relations” with its Eastern and Southern neighbours. The Eastern Partnership (EaP) did not change these objectives in a fundamental way. It was launched in 2009 as one of the two ENP dimensions “to create the necessary conditions to accelerate political association and further economic integration between the European Union and interested partner countries” (Council of the European Union 2009).

9 Moreover, understanding the crisis in relations between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community also requires that other actors be taken into account, such as the US, NATO and Ukraine. This is however beyond the scope of this article.

10 The EU’s reason for not consulting with Russia during the negotiations on the Association Agreements, notwithstanding their potential impact on its trade, was mainly framed in terms of not giving Russia a veto right in the negotiations. Yet, it can be doubted whether consultation by definition implies granting a veto right. Interestingly, triangular negotiations were held between the EU, Ukraine and Russia about the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, after it was signed.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Tom Casier

Tom Casier is Reader in International Relations, with a Jean Monnet Chair, and Director of the Global Europe Centre at the Brussels School of International Studies, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK.