The Pillars of Iranian-Russian Security Convergence

ABSTRACT

Despite various analyses of the extent of Iranian-Russian rapprochement, questions still remain about its fundamental elements and its sustainability in the face of the conflicting interests of the two countries. Iran and Russia have pursued security convergence as a joint power maximisation policy, which can be better understood through Iran and Russia’s common feelings of ‘international misrecognition’ and ‘common threat perceptions’. These are the pillars of the nexus between them, explaining how the two countries have a shared understanding of their security environment and particularly how their mutual sense of insecurity has taken the lead in forging bilateral relations. As long as these pillars remain effective, existing limits to bilateral relations rooted in mistrust, disagreements and rivalries will not have significant effects on the convergence.

KEYWORDS:

• Iran security policy
• Russian Middle East strategy
• security convergence
• international misrecognition
• threat perceptions

Acknowledgements

Special thanks go to Anita Corona for her insightful review and Andrei Kurtanov, Kayhan Barzegar, Behzad Ahmadi and Mahdokht Zakeri for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this article.

Notes

¹ Kenneth Boulding (Herman et al. 1997) defines self-image as “the total cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure of the behavior unit, or its internal view of itself and its universe. …[I]mages which are important in an international system are those a nation has of itself and those of other bodies in the system which constitutes its international environment.”

² On how Persian civilization and its mythical elements exert influence on shaping current foreign policy in Iran, see Mahmodi 2014.

³ For policy options of civilizational effects on foreign policymaking in Iran, see Arjmand et al. 2014.

⁴ Katechon, a Greek word means ‘withholding’, which protects the world from the advent of the Antichrist, originated in the Byzantine Empire. In the Russian tradition, it refers to the well-known doctrine dating back to the 16^th century of Moscow as the third Rome (Engstrom 2014, 356).

⁵ A 2015 joint public opinion poll by the University of Tehran and the University of Maryland revealed that 60 percent of respondents supported the nuclear program because it shows that Iran will not surrender to Western governments and forego its rights (Mohseni et al. 2015).

⁶ As Saudi’s propaganda to deny Iran’s historical cultural power in the region is gaining more support in the Trump administration and tougher positions against Iran’s regional role are adopted by the US, Tehran’s discontent with the regional order is increasing. Continued disregard of Iran’s historical and cultural rights strengthens the feeling of misrecognition among policymakers in Tehran, which then contributes to intensifying threat perceptions.

⁷ Core constructs are defined as those by which individuals maintain their main sense of identity and existence (Kelly 1955).

⁸ In numerous public speeches by high ranking clerics, threats to Islamic-Iranian discourse caused by Western efforts for cultural transformation in the country are seen as the most dangerous menace to the country (Al Hashem 2017).

⁹ Regime change remained persistent US policy toward the Islamic Republic until the Obama presidency adopted a softer diplomatic stand. However, it seems the desire for forceful regime change has once again become official US policy during the Trump presidency with the nomination of hardline figures like John Bolton and Mike Pompeo. Even the more moderate ex-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, responding to a question from members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, stated that “our policy toward Iran is to push back…and to work toward support of those elements inside of Iran that would lead to a peaceful transition of that government” (Pelofsky 2017).

¹⁰ Iranians and Russians believe that regime change, even though it could be forceful and accompanied by political violence, has been accepted in the West as a legitimate way to construct the regional order, especially when it comes to governments that do not necessarily fit with Western standards and interests.

¹¹ Trump’s recent National Security Strategy reiterated the importance of deploying NATO missile defence to deter the Iranian threat. The decision will increase Tehran’s perceptions of threat from NATO.

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Abdolrasool Divsallar

Abdolrasool Divsallar is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies, Tehran, Iran.