ABSTRACT
The European Union (EU) is becoming increasingly dependent on cyberspace, exposing itself to new security risks. While the EU should seek to limit the proliferation of cyber weapons, the prospect of creating a cyber non-proliferation regime on the blueprint of previous arms control treaties presents several difficulties. By contrast, unilateral cyber ‘disarmament’ through government vulnerability disclosure processes would limit the proliferation of dangerous cyber weapons more effectively and increase deterrence. Few EU member states have taken active steps to establish such processes and little information is available about how they handle the knowledge of vulnerabilities in their possession.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Pacific Forum for providing the means to conduct this research as a resident research fellow, and Crystal Pryor for her valuable guidance, encouragement and continuous support.
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Eugenio Benincasa
Eugenio Benincasa is the WSD-Handa Resident Fellow at Pacific Forum in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA.