Turning to Rabat: Explaining the Elevation of Moroccan Relations with Caribbean Countries

ABSTRACT

Diplomatic relations between Caribbean and African countries are a driving force behind their respective contributions to the conduct of international politics, as the past decade-plus of little-known Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)-Moroccan relations attests. An analysis of the latter sheds new light on two, interlinked sets of dynamics. First, there is an interplay between those enhanced relations and OECS members’ status-seeking behaviour – through recognition as pro-Rabat, Western Sahara agenda influencers – in a hierarchical system of sovereign states. Second, having regard to the subsequent benefits, the OECS bloc is taking a hard-nosed approach to aligning itself with and diplomatically backing Rabat, which could conflict with some long-established foreign policy tenets of these states.

KEYWORDS:

• OECS-Moroccan relations
• Western Sahara
• small states
• status-seeking
• foreign policy-based transactionalism

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers and The International Spectator’s editors for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. The usual disclaimer applies for any remaining errors and omissions. The greatest thanks are due to Julie McIntyre-Bardouille, for her unwavering support during the research for and writing of this article.

Notes

1 For a detailed survey of the CARICOM regional system, see Bardouille (2018).

2 In some scholarly and practitioner circles, small states are deemed to be countries with a population of 1.5 million people or less. Having regard to the well-documented “imprecise” nature of the small state concept (Sutton 2011, 142), for our purposes, that threshold is increased to 3 million people, which accommodates Jamaica. Haiti, with a population of just over 11 million, is an outlier in the present conceptualisation of Caribbean qua CARICOM small states.

3 CARICOM’s leadership has long contended that third countries should “abide by the internationally recognised and accepted principles of non-interference and non-intervention in the affairs of states, respect for sovereignty, adherence to the rule of law, and respect for human rights and democracy” (CARICOM Secretariat 2019, par. 3). For an account of the foreign policy objectives of CARICOM member states, see Bardouille (2021, par. 23).

4 In 2019, the Barbadian Prime Minister led a high-level delegation on an official visit to Morocco in order to deepen ties between the two countries (Barbados Today 2019), following an agreement reached between Barbadian and Moroccan officials on technical cooperation in 2018 (Pilé 2018).

5 Suriname and Morocco also recently agreed on a roadmap for cooperation, with Paramaribo announcing the decision to open a consulate in Dakhla and its desire to establish an embassy in Rabat (Kasraoui 2021a).

6 The OECS is an intergovernmental organisation and the Commission is its secretariat, headquartered in Saint Lucia. Established in 1981, its sovereign members are Antigua and Barbuda, the Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, St. Christopher (Kitts) and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. This study is concerned with this subset of OECS members, not inclusive of the other full member state: Montserrat (a British Overseas Territory); nor does it consider the associate members of the OECS. For a detailed survey of the OECS regional system, see Bardouille (2018).

7 It comprises embassies of these six OECS states, which benefit from joint representation, including in relation to a shared Ambassador/Head of Mission.

8 This research, emphasising the primary effects of discourse, also draws on a body of official and journalistic sources.

9 OECS members’ tourism and agricultural sectors, among others, which are buckling under the strain of the Covid-19 crisis (Bardouille 2020), could benefit from a boost in terms of Moroccan investment and technical cooperation. This could stem from OECS representatives leveraging diplomatic ties and goodwill to attract Moroccan foreign investors and promote trade-related opportunities.

10 Driven more by the self-help behaviour of states, the foreign policy context in this regard limits cooperation outside of strategic partners, as statecraft frames interests in zero-sum terms.

11 Driven more by institutionalist forces, the foreign policy context in this regard influences cooperation preferences, as statecraft enhances cooperation across the board.

12 For an insightful review of the concept of small states, see Commonwealth Secretariat (2018).

13 See the illustrative table in the supplementary Online appendix of this article.

14 For an excellent international studies-oriented overview of SSS and theoretical frames, undertaken in the 2010s, see Thorhallsson (2018).

15 In IR, status refers to a range of shared beliefs in respect of a given state’s ranking, drawing on associated attributes inclusive of diplomatic influence (Larson and Shevchenko 2014). Unlike traditional status scholarship that ostensibly centres on great powers and other dominant countries, this study focuses on a group of countries that are anything but. 

16 The only three CARICOM states represented in the 2020 edition of the Elcano Global Presence Index – The Bahamas, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago – are ranked 126th, 121st and 130th, respectively. The Index is “an annual measurement of the projection in the world of 140 countries based on three dimensions […] economy, defence, and soft presence” (Elcano Royal Institute 2020, par. 1).

17 To some degree, the present study links with foreign policy analysis (FPA). However, it lies on the analytical boundaries of FPA: while drawing attention to elite-level foreign policy decision-making, it does not systematically focus on foreign policy elites – the ontological bedrock of FPA. Its unit-level focus is the state, placing this study in the scholarly domain of IR.

18 The collective foreign policy ethos identified at the outset of this article and the Baracara Principles are one in the same. Having come about in 1997, the Baracara Principles are quite an exhaustive list, also reflecting a commitment to peoples’ self-determination, human rights-related principles, the notion of the peaceful resolution of disputes and the non-acquisition of territory by force. Moreover, in 2017, COFCOR endorsed the development of a “New Strategy for CARICOM Diplomacy”, which is meant to align foreign policy tenets and associated approaches such that they are more responsive to 21st-century realities.

19 In practice, coordination constraints arise.

20 Morocco claims Western Sahara. Yet, it does not do so unopposed. The Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO) has since 1976 militated in favour of the independence of Western Sahara – a natural resource rich territory (Allan and Ojeda-García 2021) – as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Frente POLISARIO – which provides Sahrawi political representation – calls for the “independence of the Sahrawi people in Western Sahara” (Keeley 2021, par. 2 ), asserting their right to self-determination (New York City Bar Association 2012), upheld by an International Court of Justice opinion handed down in October 1975 and reaffirmed by the UN General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

21 In contrast, in Moroccan foreign policy, the first order of business is Western Sahara, which is a key dimension of Rabat’s Maghreb foreign policy. The Maghreb has been high on Rabat’s agenda “since the early years of [Morocco’s] independence” (Willis and Messari 2003, 152).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Nand C. Bardouille

Nand C. Bardouille is Manager of The Diplomatic Academy of the Caribbean in the Institute of International Relations (IIR), The University of the West Indies (The UWI), St. Augustine Campus, Trinidad and Tobago.