Furthering Russian–US defence cooperation

Abstract

Russia and the United States are the most important countries for many vital security issues. They possess the world's largest nuclear weapons arsenals, are involved in the principal regional conflicts, and have lead roles in opposing international terrorism and weapons proliferation. Despite persistent differences on many questions, mutual interests consistently drive Russians and Americans to work together to overcome these impediments.

This Adelphi Paper argues that opportunities for further improving security cooperation between Russia and the United States exist but are limited. Near-term results in the areas of formal arms control or ballistic missile defences are unlikely. The two governments should focus on improving and expanding their joint threat-reduction and non-proliferation programmes, enhancing their military-to-military dialogue regarding Central Asia and defence industrial cooperation, and deepening their anti-terrorist cooperation, both bilaterally and through NATO. Using more market incentives, expanding reciprocity and equal treatment, and limiting the adverse repercussions from disputes over Iran would facilitate progress.

Russia and the United States will not soon become close allies, but they should be able to achieve better security ties given that, on many issues, their shared interests outweigh those that divide them.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Amira Ali, Nicole Aronzon, Hans Binnendijk, Stephen Blank, Caitlin Brand, Eric Brewer, Chris Brown, Sebastian Elischer, J. Charles Griggs, Adrianne Grunblatt, Edeanna Johnson, Ty Matsdorf, Caroline Patton, Klementina Sula, Noemi Szekely, Samir Tata, Brian Wender, Nick Wetzler, Krystal Wilson, Elizabeth Zolotukhina and several anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, run by Senior Fellow Clark Murdoch and Project Coordinator Kathleen McInnis, organised several conferences that allowed me to deliver presentations on Russian–American security issues. The Hudson Institute's Washington Office, directed by Ken Weinstein, and its Center for Future Security Strategies, directed by S. Enders Wimbush, provided an exceptionally favourable environment for conducting research and writing. Many Russian and US policymakers and experts shared their insights with me on an off-the-record basis. Finally, I benefited enormously from the seminars, presentations and discussions organised by the other think-tanks in the Washington area, whose participants are too numerous to list, but whose ideas continue to drive progress in this vital area.

Notes

¹ State Department, ‘Rice Calls United States, Russia Strategic Partners, Not Rivals; US–Russian Relations “Very Warm”’, 21 April 2005, at http://www.usembassy.it/file2005_04/alia/a5042105.htm.

² For a history of US efforts to pursue contacts with the Soviet, Russian and East European militaries, see Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1999), pp. 50–66.

³ Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Purpose, p. 322.

⁴ DOS Fact Sheet, ‘US Assistance to Russia – Fiscal Year 2005’, 1 June 2005, at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/48458.htm.

⁵ Interfax, ‘Russian–US Bases in Kyrgyzstan Don't Hinder Each Other – Ivanov’, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 6 April 2005. Ivanov elaborated by observing: ‘The American base in Manas was set up to support the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan and the Russian one in Kant to tighten security of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization’.

⁶ See for example the map in Central Asia in US Strategy and Operational Planning: Where Do We Go From Here? (Washington DC: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, February 2004), p. 66, at http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/S-R-Central-Asia-72dpi.pdf. For more on Russian and US activities in Central Asia, see Kim Murphy, ‘Rivalry Brews in Russia's Backyard’, Los Angeles Times, 4 December 2004; and Richard Weitz, ‘Storm Clouds Over Central Asia: Revival of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)?’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 27, no. 6, November–December 2004, pp. 465–89.

⁷ Nathan Hodge, ‘Amid Regional Uncertainty, Officials Review Caspian Guard Initiative’, Defense Daily, 4 August 2005; and Joshua Kucera, ‘US Helps Forces, Gains Foothold in Caspian Region’, Jane's Defence Weekly, 25 May 2005, p. 12.

⁸ For more on Russian policies regarding military contacts, see Kimberly Marten Zisk, ‘Contact Lenses: Transparency and US–Russian Military Ties’, PONARS Policy Memo, no. 7, October 1997, at http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/policymemos/pm_0007.pdf.

⁹ Overcoming Impediments to US–Russian Cooperation, pp. 93–94.

¹⁰ The transparency problem is discussed in Alexei G. Arbatov, ‘Military Reform: From Crisis to Stagnation’, in Miller and Trenin (eds), The Russian Military, pp. 97–98

¹¹ Frank Brown, ‘How To Handle Russia?’, Newsweek, 9 May 2005, p. 40.

¹² Felgenhauer, ‘New Détente To Die Young’; and ‘Russia Cites US Action For War Exercises’, International Herald Tribune, 11 February 2004.

¹³ Roger N. McDermott, ‘Putin's Military Priorities: The Modernization of the Armed Forces’, in Anne C. Aldis and Roger N. McDermott (eds), Russian Military Reform: 1992–2002 (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 268.

¹⁴ Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster, Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance, Adelphi Paper 365 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the IISS, 2004), p. 28.

¹⁵ An analysis of how Russia's defence complex coped with the challenges of the 1990s is presented in Julian Cooper, ‘The Future Role of the Russian Defence Industry’, in Roy Allison and Christopher Bluth (eds), Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998), pp. 94–117; and Richard F. Staar, The New Military in Russia: Ten Myths That Shape the Image (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), pp. 76–93.

¹⁶ Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration, ‘Warhead and Fissile Material Transparency (WFMT) Program’, at http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/na-20/wfmt.shtml.

¹⁷ Scott Peterson, ‘Old Weapons, New Terror Worries’, Christian Science Monitor, 15 April 2004; and Valery E. Yarynich, ‘The Ultimate Terrorism’, Washington Post, 30 April 2004. See also Valery E. Yarynich, C3: Nuclear Command, Control, and Cooperation (Washington DC: Center for Defense Information, May 2003); and Bruce G. Blair, ‘Hair Trigger Missiles Risk Catastrophic Terrorism’, 29 April 2003, at http://www.cdi.org/blair/hair-trigger-dangers.cfm.

¹⁸ Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress: Fiscal Year 2006, p. 53. The State Department BioIndustry Initiative has similar objectives.

¹⁹ Office of the White House Press Secretary, ‘Text of the Joint Declaration by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on the New Strategic Relationship Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation’, 24 May 2002.

²⁰ Overcoming Impediments to US–Russian Cooperation, pp. 9, 44, 63–64, 84–87, 91.

²¹ Mike Nartker, ‘US, Russian Scientists Exploring Collaboration on Floating Nuclear Power Plants’, Global Security Newswire, 27 August 2004. See also Aleksey Nikol'skiy, ‘S 2006 g. Rossiya nachneot stroit’ plavuvhie AES', Vedomosti, 18 August 2005.

²² State Department, ‘United States Initiatives to Prevent Proliferation’, 2 May 2005, at http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/other/45456.htm.

²³ Thornton, ‘The G8 Global Partnership’, pp. 139–141.

²⁴ Mike Nartker, ‘United States Supports Expansion of G-8 Nonproliferation Effort, Officials Say’, Global Security Newswire, 27 April 2004.

²⁵ G8 Senior Group, ‘G8 Global Partnership Annual Report’, June 2005, p. 8, at http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/PostG8_Gleneagles_GPWGAnnualReport2005.pdf.

²⁶ Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Energy Secretary Abraham at the GTRI Partners Conference Opening Keynote Address, 20 September 2004, at http://www.energy.gov/engine/content.do?PUBLIC_ID=16680&BT_CODE=PR_SPEECHES&TT_CODE=PRESSSPEECH.

²⁷ Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb, p. viii.

²⁸ GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Sealed Radioactive Sources; and ‘Q & A: Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources’, at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/RadSources/radsrc_faq.html.

²⁹ See for example Anna Badkhen, ‘Raid in Georgia Triggers “Dirty Bomb” Fears, Police Seize Radioactive Materials’, San Francisco Chronicle, 17 June 2003.

³⁰ Rob Edwards, ‘Risk of Radioactive “Dirty Bomb” Growing’, New Scientist, 4 June 2004.

³¹ Previous joint Russian–US HEU removal efforts are reviewed in Cristina Chuen, ‘Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism: Decreasing the Availability of HEU’, 6 May 2005, at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/050506.htm; Philipp C. Bleek, ‘Global Cleanout: An Emerging Approach to the Civil Nuclear Material Threat’, September 2004, at http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/bleekglobalcleanout.pdf; and ‘Working To Eliminate the Nuclear Threat: Past Successes in Removing HEU Stockpiles’, 24 March 2004, at http://www.fcnl.org/issues/arm/nuclear_HEUremoval.htm.

³² Philipp C. Bleek, ‘Global Cleanout of Civil Nuclear Material: Toward a Comprehensive, Threat-Driven Response’ SGP Issue Brief, no. 4, September 2005, pp. 2–3, at http://www.sgpproject.org/publications/SGPIssueBrief/SGP%20Issue%20Brief%20Bleek.pdf.

³³ ‘United States and Russian Federation Cooperate on Return of Russian-origin Research Reactor Fuel to Russia’, DOE News, 27 May 2004, at http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/PR_R-04-116_MOUbilateralUSRussiaAgreement(5-04).pdf; and ‘Environmental Analysis Completed for Uzbek Spent HEU Return Plan’, Nuclear Fuel, 18 July 2005, reprinted in ‘Strengthening the Global Partnership: Weekly News Roundup’, 30 July 2005, at http://www.sgpproject.org/SGP%20News/SGP%20Weekly%20News%20Roundup%20July%2030%20-%20August%205.pdf.

³⁴ A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (New York: United Nations, December 2004), p. 45.

³⁵ UN News Centre, ‘Signatories of UN Additional Nuclear Weapons Safeguard Now Number 100’, 19 July 2005, at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=5078&Cr=iraq&Cr1=.

³⁶ For a discussion of these and related initiatives, see Perkovich et al., Universal Compliance, pp. 37–41.

³⁷ Oleg Volkov, ‘ushli na sklad’, Vremya Novostey, 14 July 2005.

³⁸ RIA Novosti, 14 July 2005, reprinted in Yaderniy Kontrol′: Informatsiya, 13–20 July 2005, at http://www/pircenter.org/data/publications/yki20-2005.html.

³⁹ International Atomic Energy Agency, Annual Report for 2004 (2005), p. 1, at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2004/anrep2004_full.pdf.

⁴⁰ See for example Rumyantsev's comments, ITAR-TASS, 7 January 2004, reprinted in Yaderniy Kontrol′: Informatsiya, 29 December 2003–14 January 2004, at http://www/pircenter.org/data/publications/yki1-2004.html.

⁴¹ Kudrik et al., The Russian Nuclear Industry, p. 15.

⁴² Natal'ya Kornelyuk, ‘Rasshcheplenie Rinka’, Profil′, 1 November 2004; and Alena Kornisheva, ‘Amerika ne puskaet Rossiyu na rinok OYAT’, Kommersant, 10 November 2003.

⁴³ The issues raised by such proposals are assessed in Bunn, Wier and Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials, pp. 110–111; and Diaconu and Maloney, ‘Russian Commercial Nuclear Initiatives’, pp. 107–110. For a discussion of the opposition within Russia, see Julian Evans, ‘Alarm Over Radioactive Waste Site’, Moscow Times, 15 July 2005; and Andrew Osborn, ‘Siberia Could Become the World's Atomic Waste Dump, Warn Greens’, The Independent, 3 May 2005. See also Bellona Foundation, ‘Russian Nuclear Storage Facilities Almost Filled Up’, 22 June 2005, at http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/waste-mngment/38700.html.

⁴⁴ The expected growth in the worldwide use of civilian nuclear power is discussed in IAEA, Nuclear Technology Review – Update 2005, no. GC(49)/INF/3, 11 July 2005, at http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC49/Documents/gc49inf-3.pdf. For an optimistic discussion of Russian firms’ involvement in this process see Paul Starobin, ‘Springtime for Russia's Nuclear Industry?’, Business Week, 6 May 2003, p. 36. A more pessimistic assessment can be found in Diaconu and Maloney, ‘Russian Commercial Nuclear Initiatives’, pp. 97–112.

⁴⁵ ‘Russians Push IAEA as Vehicle for Multilateral Fuel Cycle Venture’, Nuclear Fuel, 18 July 2005, reprinted in ‘Strengthening the Global Partnership: Weekly News Roundup’, 30 July 2005, at http://www.sgpproject.org/SGP%20News/SGP%20Weekly%20News%20Roundup%20July%2030%20-%20August%205.pdf.

⁴⁶ Ambassador Linton Brooks, ‘Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Towards an Integrative Approach’, remarks delivered to the International Conference on Nuclear Security, London, 16 March 2005, at http://usembassymalaysia.org.my/wf/wf0321_nuclear_prevent.htm.

⁴⁷ See for example James E. Goodby et al., Cooperative Threat Reduction for a New Era (Washington DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, September 2004).

⁴⁸ The barriers to applying CTR-like programmes outside the former Soviet Union are discussed in Sharon Squassoni, Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction: A Survey of Options (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, July 2004).

⁴⁹ Vladimir Ivanov, ‘Sergey Ivanov dolozhil prezidentu o svoikh uspekhakh v protivoraketnoy oborone’, Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, 10 December 2004; and Ivan Safronov, ‘Rossiya zapustila raketu v nikuda’, Kommersant, 30 November 2004. Details of the system are available in Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, ‘Russian Nuclear Forces, 2004’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 60, no. 4, July–August 2004, p. 74; and Pavel Podvig (ed.), Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 413–418.

⁵⁰ For a review of Russian–US cooperation and disagreement regarding BMD during the Yeltsin period, see Stephen J. Cimbala, Russia and Armed Persuasion (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), pp. 94–96; Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Purpose, pp. 288–293; and Jennifer G. Mathers, The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 151–174.

⁵¹ Cited in Joseph Ferguson, ‘De facto Alliance or Temporary Rapprochement?’, Comparative Connections: An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, Autumn 2001, at http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0104Qus_rus.html.

⁵² Baker and Glasser, Kremlin Rising, pp. 134–136.

⁵³ Vladimir Shlapentokh, ‘Is the “Greatness Syndrome” Eroding?’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 1, Winter 2002, p. 139.

⁵⁴ Gottemoeller, ‘Nuclear Weapons in Current Russian Policy’, p. 205.

⁵⁵ Pavel Podvig, ‘A History of the ABM Treaty in Russia’, PONARS Policy Memo, no. 109, February 2000, pp. 3–4, at http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/policymemos/pm_0109.pdf.

⁵⁶ Office of the White House Press Secretary, ‘Text of the Joint Declaration by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on the New Strategic Relationship Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation’, 24 May 2002.

⁵⁷ Marc Selinger, Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, 13 May 2004, cited in ‘United States Looking at Russian Radars, Targets To Help Missile Defense Development’, Global Security Newswire, 14 May 2004.

⁵⁸ Rogov et al., Reducing Nuclear Tensions, p. 16.

⁵⁹ See for example the comments of Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Kislyak in Katerina Labetskaya, ‘Sobbitiya v Irake daleko ne uluchshili oshshushshenie bezopasnosti’, Vremya Novostei, 24 September 2003.

⁶⁰ Alexander Pikayev, ‘US–Russian Missile Defense Cooperation: Limits of the Possible’, PONARS Policy Memo, no. 315, pp. 2–3, available at http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/policymemos/pm_0315.pdf.

⁶¹ Morten Bremer Maerli, ‘US–Russian Naval Security Upgrades: Lessons Learned and the Way Ahead’, Naval War College Review, vol. 56, no. 4, Autumn 2003, p. 27.

⁶² Vladimir Dvorkin, The Russian Debate on the Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Delivery Vehicles, BCSIA Discussion Paper 2004-04 (Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, April 2004), pp. 21–23; and Sebastian Sprenger, ‘US, Russian Officials Restart Talks on Joint Data Exchange Center’, Inside the Pentagon, 31 March 2005.

⁶³ This dialogue is described in Sharon Weinberger, ‘Weldon Calls for Foreign Industry, Government To Work with Congress’, Defense Daily, 14 September 2004. See also Mike Nartker, ‘United States Should Maintain Involvement in Missile Defense, US Lawmaker Says’, Global Security Newswire, 18 June 2004.

⁶⁴ Jeremy Singer, ‘Weldon Presses Missile Defense Cooperation with Russia’, Space News, 7 March 2005, p. 6.

⁶⁵ Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Press Statement and Answers to Questions, Plesetsk’, 18 February 2004, reprinted by The Acronym Institute, Disarmament Documentation, at http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0402/doc30.htm.

⁶⁶ Cited in ITAR-TASS, 21 May 2003, reprinted in Yaderniy Kontrol′: Informatsiya, 15–22 May 2003, at http://www.pircenter.org/data/publications/yki17-2003.html.

⁶⁷ See for example Ivanov's remarks in ibid., and ITAR-TASS, 12 July 2003, reprinted in Yaderniy Kontrol′: Informatsiya, 12–19 June 2003, at http://www.pircenter.org/data/publications/yki21-2003.html.

⁶⁸ Cited in ‘Tsitata Nomera’, in Yaderniy Kontrol′: Informatsiya, 3–10 August 2005, at http://www.pircenter/org/data/publications/yki23-2005.html.

⁶⁹ Nicole C. Evans, ‘Missile Defense: Winning Minds, Not Hearts’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 60, no. 5, September–October 2004, p. 50.

⁷⁰ ‘Status Report Requested of RAMOS Program’, CDI Missile Defense Update, 8 July 2003.

⁷¹ ‘US–Russian Missile Defense Cooperation Should Start With Smaller Projects, Former MDA Chief Says’, Global Security Newswire, 13 July 2004. Russian attitudes towards RAMOS are examined in Pavel Podvig, ‘US–Russian Cooperation in Missile Defense: Is It Really Possible?’, PONARS Policy Memo, no. 316, November 2003, pp. 2, 4–5, available at http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/policymemos/pm_0316.pdf.

⁷² S.A. Popov, ‘Means and Methods of Overcoming Barriers in Cooperation’, in Strengthening US–Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation, p. 139.

⁷³ Associated Press, ‘Russia Issues Warning on Space-Based Weapons’, Baltimore Sun, 3 June 2005.

⁷⁴ See for example Peter Finn, ‘Putin: Russia To Deploy Missiles “Unlikely to Exist” Elsewhere’, Washington Post, 18 November 2004; and Yliya Petrovskaya et al., ‘Diplomatiya “Yadernogo nederzhaniya”’, Nizavisimaya Gazeta, 18 November 2004.

⁷⁵ See for example Kim Murphy, ‘Russia Tests Missile That Could Evade US Defense’, Los Angeles Times, 19 February 2004.

⁷⁶ These episodes are recounted in Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Purpose, pp. 158–166, 176–181, 299–304.

⁷⁷ For a history of Russian–Iranian nuclear cooperation, see Gleb Ivashentsov, ‘Rossiya-Iran: Gorizonti partnerstva’, Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn′, 22 October 2004; Victor Mizin, ‘The Russia–Iran Nuclear Connection and US Policy Options’, Middle East Review of International Affairs, vol. 8, no. 1, March 2004, at http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2004/issue1/jv8n1a7.html; and Vladimir A. Orlov and Alexander Vinnikov, ‘The Great Guessing Game: Russia and the Iranian Nuclear Issue’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 2, Spring 2005, pp. 49–66. According to Rose Gottemoeller, Russian officials have shown increasing concern about Iran's nuclear ambitions; see ‘The Unexpected Nonproliferation Partner’, Moscow Times, 16 February 2005. For an opposite view see Ray Takeyh and Nikolas K. Gvosdev, ‘Why Rice's Moscow Visit Failed’, Moscow Times, 20 August 2005.

⁷⁸ Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Roundtable Interview of the President by Foreign Print Media’, The White House, 5 May 2005. Rice also spoke approvingly of Russia's insistence on the return of its spent fuel from Iran during her visit to Moscow in April 2005.

⁷⁹ Katrin Bennhold, ‘Russia Backs Initiative from Europe on Iran’, International Herald Tribune, 22 January 2005.

⁸⁰ Cited in Alex Rodriguez, ‘Russia: Iran Softens Nuclear Stance’, Chicago Tribune, 22 June 2003. See also Simon Saradzhyan and Caroline McGregor, ‘Russia Hardens Stance Toward Iran’, Moscow Times, 22 September 2003.

⁸¹ Robert J. Einhorn and Gary Samore, ‘Ending Russian Assistance to Iran's Nuclear Bomb’, Survival, vol. 44, no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 61–62.

⁸² Valeria Korchagina, ‘Moscow Reaches Out To Tehran’, Moscow Times, 29 June 2005.

⁸³ Nikolas Gvosdev and Ray Takeyh, ‘Cooperating on Iran’, ibid., 8 April 2004.

⁸⁴ Rose Gottemoeller, ‘A Promising Direction for G8 Leadership’, ibid., 8 July 2005.

⁸⁵ State Department, Adherence and Compliance, p. 106.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 108.

⁸⁷ Anatoly Medetsky, ‘Defense Plant Hit With US Sanctions’, Moscow Times, 26 July 2005.

⁸⁸ Lyubov Pronina, ‘Russian Military's Combat Potential Unrealized’, Defense News, 13 December 2004.

⁸⁹ Cited in Sergey Babkin and Michael Timofeev, ITAR-TASS, 10 February 2005, reprinted in Yaderniy Kontrol′: Informatsiya, 11–18 February 2005, at http://www.pircenter/org/data/publications/yki3-2005.html.

⁹⁰ Aleksandr Kraswulin, ‘Vizit za okean dlya obmena opitom’, Parlamentskaya Gazeta, 31 May 2005. For GAO's assessment, see Defense Trade: Arms Export Control Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies in the Post-9/11 Security Environment, Washington DC, April 2005.

⁹¹ ‘Moscow Looks for New Arms Markets’, Russia Reform Monitor, 15 June 2005.

⁹² Vikto Litkovkin, ‘Between Scylla and Charybdis: The Russian Defence Industry's Chinese Dilemma’, Russia Profile, vol. 2, no. 2, March 2005, p. 34.

⁹³ Aleksey Khazbiev, ‘Voenno-promishlenniy’, Ekspert, 4 October 2004.

⁹⁴ For an assessment of Russian export procedures during the Yeltsin period, see Vladimir A. Orlov, ‘Export Controls in Russia: Policies and Practices’, Nonproliferation Review, vol. 6, no. 4, Autumn 1999, pp. 139–151; and Michael Beck, ‘Russia and Efforts To Establish Export Controls’, at http://www.uga.edu/cits/documents/html/nat_eval_russia.htm.

⁹⁵ Details of Russia's WMD-related export controls are discussed in Einhorn and Flournoy (eds), Protecting Against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons, vol. 4, pp. 91–105.

⁹⁶ Herbert J. Ellison, ‘Russian–American Relations’, in Stephen K. Wegren (ed.), Russia's Policy Challenges: Security, Stability, and Development (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), p. 89.

⁹⁷ Derek Averre, Kenneth N. Luongo and Maurizio Martellini (eds), Advancing Bio Threat Reduction: Findings From an International Conference (Washington DC: Russian–American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, 2004), p. 15.

⁹⁸ ‘Recent Developments in the NIS: 2004 Updates and Changes in NIS Export Control Systems and Legislation’, NIS Export Control Observer, April 2005, at http://cns.miis.edu/nis-excon, p. 3.

⁹⁹ ‘Ukaz ‘O Komissii po eksportnomu kontrolyu Rossiyskoy Federatsii”’, 26 April 2005, at http://kremlin.ru/text/docs/2005/04/87128.shtml. See also ‘President Putin Expands Functions and Modifies Membership of Russian Export Control Commission’, NIS Export Control Observer, April 2005, at http://cns.miis.edu/nis-excon; and Ivan Safronov, ‘President Delivers Export Control into the Good Hands of the Defense Minister’, Kommersant, 26 April 2005, at http://www.kommersant.com/page.asp?id=573695.

¹⁰⁰ Igor Khripunov, ‘Nuclear Security: Attitude Check’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 61, no 1, January–February 2005, p. 60.

¹⁰¹ Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb 2005, pp. 20–21, 44, 81–82, 108–113.

¹⁰² The Russian government's formal rationale for joining the PSI is explained at the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at http://www.mid.ru. Previous Russian concerns about the PSI are discussed in Alex Rodriguez, ‘Russian Hesitant To Sign Pledge To Inspect Planes, Ships for Trafficking’, Chicago Tribune, 3 February 2004; and Michael Roston, ‘Russia and the Proliferation Security Initiative’, Russian–American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, 16 March 2004, at http://www.ransac.org.

¹⁰³ Carla Anne Robbins, ‘Nuclear Nonproliferation Efforts Hit Snag’, Wall Street Journal, 27 January 2005.

¹⁰⁴ Sergei Ivanov, ‘The World in the 21st Century: Addressing New Threats and Challenges’, 13 January 2005, at http://www.cfr.org/pub7611/richard_n_haass_mikhail_fridman_sergey_ivanov/the_world_in_the_21st_century_addressing_new_threats_and_challenges.php#.

¹⁰⁵ US Central Intelligence Agency, Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, July 1 through December 31, 2003, November 2004, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/july_dec2003.htm.

¹⁰⁶ ITAR-TASS, 29 June 2005, reprinted in Yaderniy Kontrol′: Informatsiya, 22 June 2005, at http://www.pircenter/org/data/publications/ykil7-2005.html.

¹⁰⁷ Mike Nartker, ‘Putin Criticizes Nonproliferation Approaches’, Global Security Newswire, 5 December 2003.

¹⁰⁸ The effects of the law are assessed in Sharon Squassoni and Marcia S. Smith, The Iran Nonproliferation Act and the International Space Station: Issues and Options (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2 July 2004).