Chapter three: The decision

Abstract

For over three decades, driven by the core motive of deterring external threats to its security, Libya sought to acquire nuclear weapons. Having attempted but failed to procure them ‘off the shelf’ from several states during the 1970s, by late 2003 it had succeeded in assembling much of the technology required to manufacture them. Nevertheless, following secret negotiations with the UK and US governments, in December 2003 Colonel Muammar Gadhafi resolved to abandon the pursuit of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This decision reflected the regime's radically altered security perceptions during the 1990s and early twenty-first century. The pursuit of nuclear weapons had come to be viewed as a strategic liability.

This Adelphi Paper examines the motives for Libya's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, from Gadhafi's rise to power in 1969 through to late 2003. It assesses the proliferation pathways that the regime followed, including early dependence on Soviet technology and assistance and, subsequently, its reliance on the A.Q. Khan network. It examines the decision to give up the quest for nuclear weapons, focusing on the main factors that influenced the regime's calculations, including the perceived need to re-engage with the international community and the United States in particular. The process of dismantling the nuclear programme is also addressed, as is the question of whether Libya constitutes a ‘model’ for addressing the challenges posed by other proliferators.

Notes

¹ ‘Libyan WMD: Tripoli's statement in full’, BBC News Online.

² ‘Security Council hails Libya's cooperation with UN on weapons verification’, UN News Service, 23 December 2003: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/libya/libya-031223-unnews01.htm.

³ Gadhafi quoted by John Bolton, ‘The NPT: A Crisis of Non-Compliance’, Statement to the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York City, 27 April 2004: http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/31848.htm.

⁴ ‘The New Gadhafi’, 60 Minutes, 10 March 2004, CBS News: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/03/09/60II/main604971.shtml.

⁵ Kerr, ‘IAEA praises Libya for disarmament efforts’.

⁶ Kathleen Knox, ‘EU–Libya: Ghaddafi visits Brussels in Tripoli's latest step coming in from the Cold’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 27 April 2004.

⁷ Patrick E. Tyler, ‘Blair may meet Qaddafi soon’, International Herald Tribune, 11 February 2004, p.3.

⁸ ‘Libyan WMD: Tripoli's statement in full’, BBC News Online; ‘Security Council hails Libya's cooperation with UN on weapons verification’, UN News Service.

⁹ Mary Dejevsky, ‘Libya decided 10 years ago against developing WMD without pressure, Foreign Minister says’, Independent, 11 February 2004, p.6; Anton La Guardia, ‘Blair talks with Gaddafi hinge on WPC progress’, Daily Telegraph, 11 February 2004, p.2.

¹⁰ Dejevsky, ‘Libya decided 10 years ago against developing WMD without pressure, Foreign Minister says’, p.6; Laurie Kassman, ‘Libya Wrap (L O)’, 20 December 2003, via GlobalSecurity. Org: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/libya/libya-031220-3ee73869.htm; ‘Libya meets with UN nuclear inspectors’, Reuters, 20 December 2003; ‘The New Gadhafi’, 60 Minutes.

¹¹ ‘Rid Africa of weapons of mass destruction’, Pretoria News, 1 March 2004, p.2, via Independent Online: http://www.int.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=68&art_id=vn20040301024056771C535508.

¹² Kassman, ‘Libya Wrap’.

¹³ Kerr, ‘IAEA praises Libya for disarmament efforts’.

¹⁴ ‘Statement by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair’, Durham, United Kingdom, 19 December 2003: http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page5077.asp.

¹⁵ Kerr, ‘IAEA praises Libya for disarmament efforts’.

¹⁶ Dejevsky, ‘Libya decided 10 years ago against developing WMD without pressure, Foreign Minister says’, p.6.

¹⁷ ‘President Bush: Libya Pledges to Dismantle WMD Programs’, The White House, 19 December 2003: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031219-9.html.

¹⁸ ‘The President's National Security Strategy to Combat WMD: Libya's Announcement’, Fact Sheet (Washington DC: The White House, 19 December 2003), via US State Department: http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/27462.htm.

¹⁹ DeSutter, Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights, Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives, 22 September 2004: http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/108/des092204.htm.

²⁰ Gertz, ‘Libyan sincerity on arms in doubt’.

²¹ St John, ‘Libya is Not Iraq: Preemptive Strikes, WMD and Diplomacy’, Middle East Journal, vol.58, no.3, Summer 2004, p.401.

²² Stephen D. Collins, ‘Dissuading State Support of Terrorism: Strikes or Sanctions? An Analysis of Dissuasion Measures Employed Against Libya’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol.27, no.1, January–February 2004, p.13.

²³ See Mark, ‘CRS Issue Brief for Congress: Libya’, p.3; Ray Takeyh, ‘Qadhafi and the Challenge of Militant Islam’, The Washington Quarterly, vol.21, no.3, Summer 1998, p.163; Collins, ‘Dissuading State Support of Terrorism’, p.12.

²⁴ James Wyllie, ‘Libya: regime stress’, Jane's Intelligence Review, vol.21, no.7, December 1995, pp.554–5.

²⁵ Katzman, Congressional Research Service, ‘CRS Report for Congress: The Iran–Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA)’, (Washington DC: The Library of Congress, 31 July 2003), p.2.

²⁶ Collins, ‘Dissuading State Support of Terrorism’, p.11.

²⁷ Mark, ‘CRS Issue Brief for Congress: Libya’, pp.5–7.

²⁸ Ibid., pp.3, 5–7.

²⁹ International Petroleum Monthly, Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy: http://www.eia.doe.gov/ipm/.

³⁰ St John, ‘Libyan Foreign Policy’, p.469.

³¹ ‘Report on United States Barriers to Trade And Investment 2004’ (Brussels: European Commission, December 2004), p.11: http://www.sice.oas.org/geograph/north/eureportonus.pdf.

³² At least two types of the following sanctions had to be imposed under ILSA (Section 6): (1) denial of export–import bank loans, credits or credit guarantees for US exports to the sanctioned firm; (2) denial of licences for the US export of military or militarily useful technology to the sanctioned firm; (3) denial of US bank loans exceeding US$10m in one year to the sanctioned firm; (4) if the sanctioned firm is a financial institution, a prohibition on that firm's service as a primary dealer in US government bonds and/or a prohibition on that firm's service as a repository for US government funds; (5) prohibition on US government procurement from the sanctioned firm; (6) a restriction on imports from the sanctioned firm, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. See Katzman, ‘CRS Report for Congress: The Iran–Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA)’, pp.2–3.

³³ Ibid., p.4.

³⁴ St John, ‘Libyan Foreign Policy’, p.469.

³⁵ Joffé, ‘Libya and Europe’, pp.75–92.

³⁶ St John, ‘Libyan Foreign Policy’, p.469.

³⁷ Ogunbadejo, ‘Qaddafi's North African Design’, p.155.

³⁸ Alison Pargeter, ‘Libya: All change for no change’, The World Today, August– September 2000, pp.29–31.

³⁹ See Collins, ‘Dissuading State Support of Terrorism’, p.11; Takeyh, ‘Qadhafi and the Challenge of Militant Islam’, p.163.

⁴⁰ Viorst, ‘The Colonel in His Labyrinth’, pp.71–2.

⁴¹ See Neil Ford, ‘Libya Springs a Surprise’, The Middle East, February 2004, pp.32–5; ‘Libya’, Country Analysis Briefs, Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy, January 2004: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/libya.html; ‘Beating Swords Into Oil Shares’, Economist, 30 December 2003.

⁴² ‘Beating Swords into Oil Shares’, Economist.

⁴³ ‘Libya WMD Pledge: Result of Iraq War or ‘Persistent Diplomacy’?’, Issue Focus, US Department of State International Information Programes, Office of Research, 24 December 2003, via GlobalSecurity.Org: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/libya/wwwh31225.htm.

⁴⁴ Binyon, ‘West beats path to forgive Libya its pariah status’, The Times, 18 January 2005; ‘Beating Swords into Oil Shares’, Economist.

⁴⁵ ‘Libya’, Country Analysis Briefs, US Department of Energy, July 2004; Ford, ‘Libya edges back into fold’, The Middle East, October 2003, pp.46–9.

⁴⁶ Binyon, ‘West beats path to forgive Libya its pariah status’; ‘Libya’, Country Analysis Briefs, US Department of Energy, January 2004.

⁴⁷ Pargeter, ‘Libya: All change for no change’, p.30; ‘Beating Swords into Oil Shares’, Economist. Beyond the general populous, the sanctions also undermined the capabilities and preparedness of Libya's armed forces, with the air force hit particularly hard by the aviation embargo. Collins, ‘Dissuading State Support of Terrorism’, p.11.

⁴⁸ Pargeter, ‘Libya: All change for no change’, pp.30–31; Binyon, ‘West beats path to forgive Libya its pariah status’.

⁴⁹ Takeyh, ‘Qadhafi and the Challenge of Militant Islam’, pp.167–8.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ St John, ‘Libyan Foreign Policy’, pp.473–4.

⁵² St John, ‘Libya is Not Iraq’, p.390.

⁵³ Sharon Squassoni, Congressional Research Service, ‘CRS Report for Congress: Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction: A Survey of Options’ (Washington DC: The Library of Congress, 15 April 2004), pp.8–9: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/32006.pdf.

⁵⁴ Alterman and Morrison, ‘Is it Time to Engage Libya?’

⁵⁵ St John, ‘Libyan Foreign Policy’, p.465.

⁵⁶ See Neumann, Speech to the Middle East Institute, 30 November 1999: http://www.fas.org/news/libya/991130-libya-usia1.htm.

⁵⁷ Joffé, ‘Libya and Europe’, p.87.

⁵⁸ St John, ‘Libyan Foreign Policy’, p.476.

⁵⁹ The ANO was created in 1974 when Abu Nidal broke away from the PLO after Yasser Arafat proposed establishing a national authority in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank ‘as a step toward Palestinian statehood’. See ‘Abu Nidal Organization’, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9153/#6; Kenneth Katzman, CRS Report for Congress, ‘Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors’.

⁶⁰ Neumann, Speech to the Middle East Institute, 30 November 1999.

⁶¹ ‘Neumann's Senate Testimony on US Policy Toward Libya’, 4 May 2000.

⁶² Neumann, Speech to the Middle East Institute, 30 November 1999.

⁶³ Ford, ‘Libya edges back into fold’, pp.46–9.

⁶⁴ ‘Qadhafi's helping hand’, Editorial, Middle East International, no.716, 8 January 2004.

⁶⁵ Joffé, ‘Libya and Europe’, p.87. See also Collins, ‘Dissuading State Support of Terrorism’, p.12; St John, ‘Libyan Foreign Policy’, pp.465–6.

⁶⁶ Collins, ‘Dissuading State Support of Terrorism’, p.12.

⁶⁷ Alterman and Morrison, ‘Is it Time to Engage Libya?’

⁶⁸ St John, ‘Libyan Foreign Policy’, p.464.

⁶⁹ Konstantinos Magliveras, ‘Quaddafi's Libya and the African Union’, Perihelion Articles, (Larnaca: European Rim Policy and Investment Council, March 2003): http://www.erpic.org/perihelion/articles2003/march/libya.htm.

⁷⁰ Collins, ‘Dissuading State Support of Terrorism’, p.14.

⁷¹ St John, ‘Libyan Foreign Policy’, pp.465– 8; Mark, ‘CRS Issue Brief for Congress: Libya’, pp.5–7

⁷² Pargeter, ‘Libya: All change for no change’, p.29; Mark, ‘CRS Issue Brief for Congress: Libya’, pp.5–7.

⁷³ Gadhafi kept tight control in the fields of foreign affairs, defence, justice, finance and security. Pargeter, ‘Libya: All change for no change’, p.29.

⁷⁴ James Badcock, ‘Coming in from the Cold’, Africa Today, February 2004, pp.10–11.

⁷⁵ ‘Libya’, Country Analysis Briefs, Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy, January 2004.

⁷⁶ Ford, ‘Libya edges back into fold’, pp.46–9.

⁷⁷ Dejevsky, ‘Libya decided 10 years ago against developing WMD without pressure, Foreign Minister says’, p.6.

⁷⁸ St John, ‘Libyan Foreign Policy’, p.464. A notable example of Libya seeking to engage the United States at this time involved Gary Hart, the former Colorado Senator and Democratic presidential candidate, who was contacted by a Libyan operative during a business trip to Greece in February 1992. Hart was asked to communicate a message to the Bush administration from Gadhafi, but was told by a State Department official that there would be ‘no discussions with the Libyans until they turn over the Pan Am bombers’. As St John notes, Hart was also told that the Libyans had made other similar approaches but none had been treated seriously. Despite Washington's response Hart travelled to Libya in March 1992 where he met Jalloud, Gadhafi's long-time friend and fellow revolutionary, and Musa Kusa, the Head of External Intelligence, who served as his permanent escort. During the visit Hart told his hosts that any discussion of exchanging the Lockerbie suspects for negotiations to suspend sanctions and normalise relations would also need to encompass a verifiable end to terrorist activities and the giving up of WMD. Jalloud reportedly replied saying that, ‘Everything will be on the table’ (See St John, ‘Libya is Not Iraq’, pp.388–9). In January 1992, Mohammed Bukhres, a Libyan-American with close ties to Gadhafi's sons, arranged for William Rogers, undersecretary of state for economic affairs during the Ford administration, to meet with Gadhafi in Libya. Rogers reportedly told the Libyan leader that he would need to turn over the Lockerbie suspects, demonstrate his renunciation of terrorism, stop interfering in other African countries and ‘offer full inspection of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons facilities’ (See Barbara Slavin, ‘Libya's rehabilitation in the works since early ‘90s’.

⁷⁹ Frantz and Meyer, ‘The Deal to Disarm Kadafi’, Los Angeles Times, 13 March 2005.

⁸⁰ Joffé, ‘Libya: Who Blinked and Why’, Current History, vol.103, no.673, May 2004, p.221.

⁸¹ St John, ‘Libyan Foreign Policy’, p.470.

⁸² Joffé, ‘Libya and Europe’, p.87.

⁸³ Viorst, ‘The Colonel in His Labyrinth’, p.73.

⁸⁴ St John, ‘Libya is Not Iraq’, p.398.

⁸⁵ Michele Dunne, ‘Libya: Security is Not Enough’, Policy Brief 32 (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2004) pp.1–7: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=15921&prog=zgp&proj=zdrl.

⁸⁶ Fidler, Huband and Roula Khalaf, ‘Return to the fold: how Gaddaffi was persuaded to give up his nuclear goals’, Financial Times, 27 July 2004, p.17.

⁸⁷ Martin S. Indyk, ‘The Iraq War did not Force Gadaffi's Hand’, Financial Times, 9 March 2004; Flynt L. Leverett, ‘Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb’, New York Times, 23 January 2004; St John, ‘Libya is Not Iraq’, pp.390–92; Kerr, ‘IAEA praises Libya for disarmament efforts’; Slavin, ‘Libya's rehabilitation in the works since early ‘90s’.

⁸⁸ Indyk, ‘The Iraq War did not force Gaddafi's Hand’; See also Joffé, ‘Why Gaddafi gave up WMD’, BBC News Online, 21 December 2003: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3338713.stm.

⁸⁹ Intelligence on Libya's involvement with the A.Q. Khan network began to emerge in 2000. ‘Report to the President of the United States’, The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the US Regarding WMD, p.257.

⁹⁰ Indyk, ‘The Iraq War did not Force Gadaffi's Hand’; Leverett, ‘Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb’; St John, ‘Libya is Not Iraq’, pp.390–92; Kerr, ‘IAEA praises Libya for disarmament efforts’.; Slavin, ‘Libya's rehabilitation in the works since early ‘90s’.

⁹¹ Slavin, ‘Libya's rehabilitation in the works since early ‘90s’.

⁹² St John, ‘Libyan Foreign Policy’, pp.472–3.

⁹³ Slavin, ‘Libya's rehabilitation in the works since early ‘90s’.

⁹⁴ St John, ‘Libyan Foreign Policy’, pp.473–4.

⁹⁵ Kerr, ‘IAEA praises Libya for disarmament efforts’.

⁹⁶ Leverett, ‘Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb’.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Mark, ‘CRS Issue Brief for Congress: Libya’, p.4. According to an article published in the Observer on 7 October 2001, Musa Kusa arrived in London for talks with members of the British Secret Intelligence Service and the CIA: Nick Pelham, ‘Libyan linked to Lockerbie welcome in UK War on Terrorism’, Observer, 7 October 2001.

⁹⁹ Statement by Mr Abdulrahman M. Shalgham, secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, New York, 13 November 2001.

¹⁰⁰ St John, ‘Libya is Not Iraq’, p.394.

¹⁰¹ Squassoni and Andrew Feickert, Congressional Research Service, ‘CRS Report for Congress: Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction’ (Washington DC: The Library of Congress, 22 April 2004), p.3: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/32007.pdf.

¹⁰² Joffé, ‘Libya: Who Blinked and Why’, p.223.

¹⁰³ Ibid.; Joffé, ‘Fear or Calculation?’, Middle East International, 9 January 2004, pp.9–10.

¹⁰⁴ Michael Smith, ‘Blair may take credit, but it was all down to an MI6 spy in a Bedouin tent’, Daily Telegraph, 22 December 2003, p.4.

¹⁰⁵ Dejevsky, ‘Libya decided 10 years ago against developing WMD without pressure, Foreign Minister says’, p.6.

¹⁰⁶ Joffé, ‘Fear or Calculation?’, pp.9– 10;‘Libya: Who Blinked and Why’, p.223.

¹⁰⁷ St John, ‘Libya is Not Iraq’, p.398.

¹⁰⁸ Fidler, Huband and Khalaf, ‘Return to the fold: how Gaddaffi was persuaded to give up his nuclear goals’.

¹⁰⁹ Michael Evans, ‘Libya knew game was up before Iraq war’, The Times, 13 March 2004, p.8; Frantz and Meyer, ‘The Deal to Disarm Kadafi’; Gertz, ‘Libyan sincerity on arms in doubt’.

¹¹⁰ ‘Saif Qadhafi’, GlobalSecurity.Org: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/libya/saif-qadhafi.htm; Golnaz Esfandiari, ‘Libya: Analysts Say Decision On WMD Inspired By Economics, Worries About Succession’, Radio Free Europe, 22 December 2003; Brian Whitaker, ‘US tests the air in reformed Libya’, Guardian, 26 January 2004, p.13.

¹¹¹ Seif al-Islam Qadhafi, ‘Libyan–American Relations’, Middle East Policy, vol.10, no.1, Spring 2003, pp.43–44.

¹¹² Evans, ‘Libya knew game was up before Iraq war’, p.8.

¹¹³ President George W. Bush, ‘State of the Union Address’, 20 January 2004: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html.

¹¹⁴ Robin Gedye, ‘UN should fight for rights, says Berlusconi’, Daily Telegraph, 4 September 2003; James Kirchich, ‘Democratic critics are delusional about implications of the Bush Doctrine’, Yale Daily News, 16 January 2004.

¹¹⁵ Evans, ‘Libya knew game was up before Iraq war’, p.8.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Leverett, ‘Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb’.

¹¹⁸ Michael Hirsh, ‘Bolton's British Problem: Fresh complaints of bullying dog an embattled nominee’, Newsweek, 2 May 2005.

¹¹⁹ Frantz and Meyer, ‘The Deal to Disarm Kadafi’; Gertz, ‘Libyan sincerity on arms in doubt’.

¹²⁰ ‘US will not oppose ending of UN sanctions on Libya’, Statement by the Press Secretary, 15 August 2003, The White House: http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2003/08/sec-030815-usia04.htm.

¹²¹ ‘The UN Security Council has voted 13–0 to lift sanctions against Libya that were imposed in response to the 1988 bombing of PanAm Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland’, CNN, 12 September 2003.

¹²² The White House, ‘US will not oppose ending of UN sanctions on Libya’; CNN, ‘The UN Security Council has voted 13–0 to lift sanctions against Libya that were imposed in response to the 1988 bombing of PanAm Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland’.

¹²³ St John, ‘Libya is Not Iraq’, pp.396–7.

¹²⁴ See interview on This Week with George Stephanopoulos, ABC News (US), 4 August 2003; ‘Libya ready for inspections’, News 24 (South Africa), 4 August 2003.

¹²⁵ Evans, ‘Libya knew game was up before Iraq war’, p.8.

¹²⁶ ‘Report to the President of the United States’, The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the US Regarding WMD, p.257.

¹²⁷ ‘Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors, House of Commons (London: The Stationery Office, 14 July 2004), p.18.

¹²⁸ According to a different school of thought, however, the Libyans themselves provided information on the BBC China as a gesture to demonstrate the country's commitment to giving up WMD. For example, a report in the Guardian attributed this line of argument to close followers of nuclear proliferation issues who are convinced that the BBC China was interdicted because of information provided by the Libyans. Traynor, ‘Libya's black market deals shock nuclear inspectors’, Guardian, 17 January 2004.

¹²⁹ Frantz and Meyer, ‘The Deal to Disarm Kadafi’.

¹³⁰ ‘Report to the President of the United States’, The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the US Regarding WMD, p.252.

¹³¹ Frantz and Meyer, ‘The Deal to Disarm Kadafi’; DeSutter, ‘US Government's Assistance to Libya in the Elimination of its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)’, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2004: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/congress/2004_h/DeSutterTestimony040226.pdf; Mahley, ‘Dismantling Libyan Weapons’; DeSutter, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2004; Frantz and Meyer, ‘The Deal to Disarm Kadafi’.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ ‘Report to the President of the United States’, The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the US Regarding WMD, p.254.

¹³⁵ Conoco-Phillips and Marathon each have 16.3% of the oil concessions. Amerada Hess has 8.2% while the remaining 59.2% is held by Libya's NOC. Greg Flakus, ‘US Oil Companies Re-Enter Libya’, Voice of America News, 2 January 2006.

¹³⁶ Viorst, ‘The Colonel in His Labyrinth’, p.72.

¹³⁷ Joffé, ‘Libya: Who Blinked and Why’, p.224.

¹³⁸ ‘Libya’, Country Analysis Briefs, Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy, January 2004.