International Anarchy and Military Cooperation

Abstract

Since its emergence in 1998, the concept of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) has become a central driver behind America's military transformation and seems to offer the possibility of true integration between multinational military formations. Even though NCW, or variations on its themes, has been adopted by many armed services, it is a concept in operational and doctrinal development. It is shaping not only how militaries operate, but, just as importantly, what they are operating with, and potentially altering the strategic landscape.

This paper examines how the current military dominance of the US over every other state means that only it has the capacity to sustain military activity on a global scale and that other states participating in US-led coalitions must be prepared to work in an interoperable fashion. It explores the application of computer networks to military operations in conjunction with the need to secure a network's information and to assure that it accurately represents situational reality. Drawing on an examination of how networks affected naval operations in the Persian Gulf during 2002 and 2003 as conducted by America's Australian and Canadian coalition partners, the paper warns that in seeking allies with the requisite technological capabilities, but also those that it can trust with its information resources, the US may be heading into a very secure digital corner.

Notes

¹ Frederick Kagan, ‘The Military's Manpower Crisis’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, no. 4, July–August 2006.

² The seven countries are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States.

³ The exception may be Sweden, which is implementing a mature network-centric system in its own armed forces. Still, Sweden has a long tradition of neutrality and coalition operations do not inform its operational ethos in the way that they do the operations of major NATO partners.

⁴ Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 17.

⁵ Ibid., p. 17.

⁶ Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond, When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina, 1990), p. 55.

⁷ Snyder, Alliance Politics, p. 170.

⁸ Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p. 43; Snyder, Alliance Politics, p. 171.

⁹ Kegley and Raymond, When Trust Breaks Down, pp. 266–7.

¹⁰ Steven Metz, ‘The Effect of Technological Asymmetry on Coalition Operations’, in Thomas J. Marshall, Phillip Kaiser and Jon Kessmeier (eds), Problems and Solutions in Future Coalition Operations (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, December 1997), p. 56.

¹¹ Kenneth Gause, ‘US Navy Interoperability with Its High-End Allies’, unpublished paper, p. 7.

¹² Peacetime alliances generally limit themselves to defensive pacts calling for mutual support in case of attack, non-aggression treaties or limited ententes. Kegley and Raymond, When Trust Breaks Down, p. 53.

¹³ Hans. J. Morgenthau, ‘Alliances’, in Julian R. Friedman, Christopher Bladen and Steven Rosen (eds), Alliance in International Politics (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon Inc., 1970), p. 84.

¹⁴ John Garnett, ‘Limited War’, in John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams (eds), Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies (Beckenham: Croom Helm, 1975), pp. 122–4.

¹⁵ Clausewitz, On War, p. 603.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 596.

¹⁷ Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), p. 5.

¹⁸ See especially Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly (Washington DC: Brookings, 2001).

¹⁹ Nineteen old Joint Operational Tactical System terminals were given to NATO command centres to support the maritime interdiction operation against the former Yugoslavia (Operation Sharp Guard), for example. See Eric Francis Germain, ‘The Coming Revolution in NATO Maritime Command and Control’, Mitre Technical Papers, http://www.mitre.org/support/papers/technet97/germain_technet.pdf.

²⁰ Paul T. Mitchell, ‘Small Navies and NCW: Is There a Role?’, Naval War College Review, vol. 61, no. 2, Spring 2003.

²¹ See Gary McKerow, ‘Multilevel Security Networks: An Explanation of the Problem’, SANS Information Security Reading Room, 5 February 2001, http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/standards/546.php, p. 2; S. C. Spring et al., ‘Information Sharing for Dynamic Coalitions’, unpublished paper, Pacific Sierra Research, Arlington, VA, December 2000, pp. 29–34; Colonel Robert Chekan, ‘The Future Of Warfare: Clueless Coalitions?’, course paper, Canadian Forces College, October 2001, pp. 9–23.

²² Chekan, ‘The Future Of Warfare’, p. 11.

²³ Henry S. Kenyon, ‘Alliance Forces Move Toward Unified Data Infrastructure’, Signal, vol. 56, no. 1, September 2001, p. 21.

²⁴ Quoted in Lieutenant-Commander Thomas Spierto, ‘Compromising the Principles of War: Technological Advancements Impact Multinational Military Operations’, course paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 5 February 1999, p. 3.

²⁵ See, for example, Robert W. Riscassi, ‘Principles for Coalition Warfare’, Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 1, Summer 1993.

²⁶ Chekan, ‘The Future Of Warfare’, p. 4.

²⁷ Lieutenant-Colonel William R. Pope, ‘US and Coalition Command and Control Interoperability for the Future’, thesis, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, April 2001, p. 6.

²⁸ ‘General Warns over Digitization Split’, International Defence Review, 1 January 2002; John Kiszely, ‘Achieving High Tempo: New Challenges’, RUSI Journal, Vol. 144, No.6, December 1999; Edward Smith, ‘Network Centric Warfare: What's the Point?’, Naval War College Review, vol. 54, no. 1, Winter 2001, p. 3; Elias Oxendine IV, ‘Managing Knowledge in the Battle Group Theatre Transition Process’, student thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 2000, p. 19.

²⁹ Commander James Carr, ‘Network Centric Coalitions: Pull, Pass, or Plug-in?’, course paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 15 May 1999, pp. 15–16.

Additional information

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Paul T. Mitchell

Paul T. Mitchell is an Associate Professor at the Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and the Canadian Forces College in Toronto, where he was Director of Academics between 2000 and 2004. His research interests are in US military policy and operations, especially in the area of transformation and emerging operational concepts. In 2003 he was awarded the United States Naval Institute's Literary Award for the best article on surface naval warfare for ‘Network Centric Warfare and Small Navies, is there a role?’ published in Naval War College Review. He has published in Journal of Strategic Studies, Armed Forces and Society, US Naval Institute Proceedings, US Naval War College Review and the Canadian Military Journal. In 1997 he co-edited Multinational Naval Cooperation and Foreign Policy in the 21st Century (Ashgate). He has taught at Queen's University, Ontario, Dalhousie University, the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Canada's Royal Military College and the SAFTI Military Institute, Singapore. He has a PhD from Queen's University in political studies and a masters from King's College London in war studies. This work is dedicated to his friend and mentor, Joel Sokolsky: J'espère que cela en valait la peine.