Networks in the Coalition Environment

Abstract

Since its emergence in 1998, the concept of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) has become a central driver behind America's military transformation and seems to offer the possibility of true integration between multinational military formations. Even though NCW, or variations on its themes, has been adopted by many armed services, it is a concept in operational and doctrinal development. It is shaping not only how militaries operate, but, just as importantly, what they are operating with, and potentially altering the strategic landscape.

This paper examines how the current military dominance of the US over every other state means that only it has the capacity to sustain military activity on a global scale and that other states participating in US-led coalitions must be prepared to work in an interoperable fashion. It explores the application of computer networks to military operations in conjunction with the need to secure a network's information and to assure that it accurately represents situational reality. Drawing on an examination of how networks affected naval operations in the Persian Gulf during 2002 and 2003 as conducted by America's Australian and Canadian coalition partners, the paper warns that in seeking allies with the requisite technological capabilities, but also those that it can trust with its information resources, the US may be heading into a very secure digital corner.

Notes

¹ Geraghty notes that a cautious co-existence between NCW and coalition operations might ultimately evolve, much like the issue of coalition command authorities that persistently bedevils multinational military operations. However, many are not so sanguine. Pope argues that the potential for failure in these types of operations is growing. Carr describes a ‘gaping mismatch’ between the demands of operational doctrine and the strategy of operating in coalitions. This mismatch is driving a ‘widening interoperability chasm’ threatening America's ability to operate within coalitions. Commander Barbara A. Geraghty (USN), ‘Will Network Centric Warfare be the Death Knell for Allied/Coalition Operations?’, course paper, Department of Joint Military Operations, US Naval War College, Newport, RI, 17 May 1999, p. 15; Lieutenant-Colonel William R. Pope, (USA), ‘US and Coalition Command and Control Interoperability for the Future’, thesis, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, April 2001, p. 19; Carr, ‘Network Centric Coalitions’, p. 19.

² Captain Robert M. Stuart (USN), ‘Network Centric Warfare in Operation Allied Force: Future Promise or Future Peril?’, course paper, Department of Joint Military Operations, US Naval War College, Newport, RI, 16 May 2000, p. 15.

³ Major Michael B. Black (USA), ‘Coalition Command, Control, Communications, Computer and Intelligence Systems Interoperability: A Necessity or Wishful Thinking?’, thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 June 2000, p. 66.

⁴ Major Robert L. Coloumbe (USMC), ‘Operational Art and NATO C4I: An Oxymoron?’, course paper, Department of Joint Military Operations, US Naval War College, Newport, RI, 5 February 2001, pp. 17–18.

⁵ Commander J. L. R. Foreman (RN), ‘Multinational Information Sharing (MNIS)’, unpublished briefing slides, pp. 3–4.

⁶ These terms are ‘classification markings’ – a ‘documentary form of classification guidance issued by an original classification authority that identifies the elements of information regarding a specific subject that must be classified and establishes the level and duration of classification for each such element’. See Susan Maret, On Their Own Terms: A Lexicon with an Emphasis on Information-Related Terms Produced by the US Federal Government, www.fas.org/sgp/library/maret.pdf, pp. 43–64.

⁷ For example, DCID1/7 suggests that material be produced in a ‘collateral uncaveated level to the greatest extent possible without diluting the meaning of the intelligence’. Where this is not possible, intelligence reports should use ‘tear lines’ identifying those items that could not be shared and those that could. See Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/7, ‘Security Controls on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information’, 15 June 1996, Sections 7 and 12, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/dcid17m.htm.

⁸ ‘General Warns over Digitisation Split,’; Kiszely, ‘Achieving High Tempo’; Smith, ‘Network-Centric Warfare, p. 3; Oxendine, ‘Managing Knowledge’, p. 19.

⁹ It is important to note, however, that where there is a ‘need to know’, the US will provide limited access to raw SIGINT data. Mark MacIntyre and Sherri Flemming, ‘Netcentric Warfare for Dynamic Coalitions: Implications for Secure Interoperability’, paper presented at the RTO IST Symposium on ‘Information Management Challenges in Achieving Coalition Interoperability’, Quebec, 28–30 May 2001, pp. 21–4.

¹⁰ McGovern, Information Security Requirements for a Coalition Wide Area Network, masters thesis, Naval Post-Graduate School, Monterrey, CA, June 2001, p. 38. McGovern goes on to note that, given this constraint, information is released at the ‘highest level of clearance common to all members’.

¹¹ At the time of writing, there are reports that the US is permitting access to the SIPRNET to its Australian, British and Canadian partners. It is not clear how extensive this access is. Furthermore, it appears that such access has not been extended to other American coalition partners. See David E. Kaplan and Kevin Whitelaw, ‘Remaking US Intelligence’, US News and World Report, 3 November 2006, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/061103/3dni.intro.htm.

¹² ‘The Combined Communications and Electronics Board (CCEB) is a five nation joint military communications-electronics (C-E) organisation whose mission is the coordination of any military C-E matter that is referred to it by a member nation. The member nations of the CCEB are Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The CCEB Board consists of a senior Command, Control, Communications and Computer (C4) representative from each of the member nations.’ ‘The Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) is a multinational, operator-led forum, to identify interoperability issues and articulate actions, which if nationally implemented, would contribute to more effective coalition operations. While initial work focused on resolving information interoperability problems, the scope of the MIC has expanded to cover other strategic and operational issues considered key to coalition operations. The MIC member nations are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States which are nations most likely to form, lead and/or support coalition operations. New Zealand and NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) have official observer status in the MIC. The MIC is composed of senior operations, doctrine, logistics, and C4 staff officers from each of the member nations as well as senior officials from observer nations and organizations.’ See http://www.jcs.mil/j6/cceb/ and http://www.jcs.mil/j3/mic. A number of other organisations are devoted to the problems of allied and coalition interoperability, such as ABCA and AUSCANUKUS; there are links to these bodies from these web pages.

¹³ CCEB, A Strategy for Improved Coalition Networking, June 2005, p. 1, http://www.jcs.mil/j6/cceb/cnsdatedjune05.pdf.

¹⁴ McGovern, Information Security Requirements, p. 21.

¹⁵ CCEB, A Strategy for Improved Coalition Networking, pp. 1–2.

¹⁶ MIC, Report of the Multinational Interoperability Council, 27–28 October 1999, 1 March, 2000, p. 10.

¹⁷ MIC, Report on MIC 2000, November 8–9, 2000, 19 January 2001, p. 10.

¹⁸ MIC, Report on MIC 2002, April 16–18, 2002, 7 June 2002, p. 9.

¹⁹ CCEB, A Strategy for Improved Coalition Networking, pp. 2–3.

²⁰ The MIC authorised the establishment of the first COWAN in October 1999 in its efforts to improve collaborative planning activities. The MIC noted: ‘The C[O]WAN when fully implemented, will provide an apparently seamless and robust network capability of exchanging and sharing information that is operationally relevant to all coalition partners involved in multinational operations’. CCEB, A Strategy for Improved Coalition Networking, p. 4.

²¹ Briefing note for Lieutenant-Colonel B. Green, (CF), ABCA, undated, p. 1.

²² Thomas MacIntyre, ‘CENTRIXS Improves Communication for RIMPAC 2004’, http://www.news.navy.mil, Story Number NNS040707-28, 8 July 2004.

²³ Griffin Key Attributes, 25 January 2005, http://www.jcs.mil/j6/cceb/griffinkeyattributes26jan05.pdf.

²⁴ The Australian Navy maintained frigates in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea throughout the 1990s, supporting the Maritime Interdiction Force enforcing various UN Security Council Resolutions under the rubric of Operation Damask. Canada also sent frigates for similar purposes throughout the 1990s under a variety of different operation code names. Starting in 1995, Canadian frigates began to be integrated into US carrier battle groups. Greg Nash and David Stevens, Australia's Navy in the Gulf (Silverwater: Topmill, 2006), pp. 36–43; Richard Gimblett, Operation Apollo (Ottawa: Magic Light, 2004), pp. 32–7; Mitchell, ‘Small Navies and NCW’.

²⁵ Nash and Stevens, Australia's Navy in the Gulf, pp. 36–43.

²⁶ Commodore Eric Lerhe (CF) and CPO2 Doug McLeod (CF), ‘Canadian Naval Task Groups in Op Apollo’, Maritime Tactical Warfare Bulletin, 2003, p. 1.

²⁷ James Goldrick notes: ‘The battlespace was measured in just a few miles and the time available was minutes rather than hours. We could not afford mistakes’. James Goldrick. ‘In Command in the Gulf’, US Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 128, no. 12, December 2002. Interview with Rear-Admiral James Goldrick (RAN), Canberra, 30 May 2006.

²⁸ Commander John Bycroft (CF), ‘Coalition C4ISTAR Capability AUSCANUKUS’, unpublished paper presented to the SMi conference ‘Naval C4ISTAR’, London, 21 April 2004, p. 4.

²⁹ Rear-Admiral Thomas E. Zelibor (USN), ‘FORCEnet is Navy's Future: Information Sharing from Seabed to Space’, Armed Forces Journal, December 2003, http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/.www.rhumblines/rhumblines170.doc.

³⁰ Captain Paul Maddison, (CF) ‘The Canadian Navy's Drive for Trust and Technology in Network Centric Coalitions: Riding Comfortably Alongside, or Losing Ground in a Stern Chase?’, course paper, Canadian Forces College, 2004, p. 17. Lerhe noted to the author: ‘In a large measure I believe his [Maddison's] view is that of an East coast ship that continued to lag the West coast fleets NCW progress. I suspect his ship was thrown in at the last minute into a confusing Operation Iraqi Freedom picture where the USN was necessarily rebuilding its networks. Moreover, they were concentrating on Iraq and thus the UK and Australia. During my watch COWAN was where the real battle during Operation Enduring Freedom was fought and there is no doubt whatsoever about that … my situational awareness was likely better than the USN's in this most critical of contact sets’. E-mail from Commodore Eric Lerhe (CF Retd) to the author, 10 August, 2006.

³¹ ‘Despite the CFLCC C-5 Planner's best efforts, he could not get through the restrictive administration required to become registered as a SIPRNET CENTRIXS – X user.’ Lieutenant–Colonel Chris Field (ADF), ‘An Australian Defence Force Liaison Officer's Observations and Insights from Operation Iraqi Freedom’, Australian Defence Force Journal, no. 163, November–December 2003, p. 5.

³² Interview with Commodore Peter Jones (RAN), Canberra, 2 June 2006; interview with Commodore Eric Lerhe (CF Retd), Halifax, NS, 30 September 2005.

³³ Interview at the Australian Air Power Development Centre, Tuggeranong, Australia, 31 May 2006; interview with Rear-Admiral Drew Robertson (CF), Ottawa, 28 September 2005.

³⁴ Interview with Rear-Admiral James Goldrick (RAN), 30 May 2006.

³⁵ Interview with Major-General Angus Watt (CF), Ottawa, 28 September 2005.

³⁶ Bycroft, ‘Coalition C4ISTAR Capability’, p. 4; interview with Major-General Angus Watt (CF), Ottawa, 28 September 2005; interview with Lieutenant-Commander Mark DeSmedt (CF), Ottawa, 28 September 2005.

³⁷ Interview with Major-General Angus Watt (CF), 28 September 2005.

³⁸ Interview with Air Commodore Mark Lax (RAAF), Canberra, 31 May 2006; interview with Major-General Angus Watt (CF), 28 September 2005.

³⁹ Interview with Captain Phillip Spedding (RAN), Canberra, 1 June 2006.

⁴⁰ Interview with Major-General Angus Watt (CF), 28 September 2005.

⁴¹ Interview with Captain Phillip Spedding (RAN), 1 June 2006.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Allan English, Richard Gimblett and Howard Coombs, Beware of Putting the Cart Before the Horse: Network Enabled Operations as a Canadian Approach to Transformation, DRDC Contract Report CR 2005-212, Toronto, 19 July 2005, p. 13, http://pubs.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/pubdocs/pcow1_e.html.

⁴⁴ Richard Gimblett, ‘Command of Coalition Operations in a Multicultural Environment: A Canadian Naval Niche? The Case Study of Operation Apollo’, unpublished paper prepared for the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, undated.

⁴⁵ Multiplexing a satellite channel allows several different communication streams to be run on the same channel. Thus, a multiplexed satellite channel might have 70% of its capacity devoted to a national secret-level network, and the remaining 30% devoted to a national unclassified administrative network.

⁴⁶ Interview with Commodore Eric Lerhe (CF Retd), 30 September 2005.

⁴⁷ Lieutenant Michael Parker (RAN), ‘RAN Exercises’, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, no. 115, Summer 2005, p. 30.

⁴⁸ Interview with Rear-Admiral James Goldrick (RAN), 30 May 2006.

⁴⁹ The number of satellite channels is dependent on the capacity of communication satellites already in geo-stationary orbit, a resource that cannot be expanded rapidly. Interview with Rear-Admiral James Goldrick (RAN), 30 May 2006; interview with Commodore Peter Jones (RAN), 2 June 2006.

⁵⁰ These included CENTRIXS, CENTRIXS GFE, CENTRIXS J, CENTRIXS C and CENTRIXS R. English, Gimblett and Coombs, Beware of Putting the Cart Before the Horse, p. 15.

⁵¹ Interview with Rear-Admiral Drew Robertson (CF), 28 September 2005.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Multilevel security would allow sharing of information on networks between individuals, organisations and nations, all cleared for differing levels of classification. Interview with Commodore Eric Lerhe (CF Retd), 30 September 2005.

⁵⁴ Interview with Rear-Admiral Drew Robertson (CF), 28 September 2005; interview with Commodore Peter Jones (RAN), 2 June 2006; Lieutenant-Commander Ivan Ingham (RAN), ‘Naval Gunfire Support for the Assault of the Al Faw Peninsular’, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, no. 109, Winter 2003, p. 36.

⁵⁵ Interview with Commodore Eric Lerhe (CF Retd), 30 September 2005.

⁵⁶ Interview with Rear-Admiral Drew Robertson (CF), 28 September 2005.

⁵⁷ Interview with Commodore Eric Lerhe (CF Retd), 30 September 2005.

⁵⁸ Interview with Rear-Admiral Drew Robertson (CF), 28 September 2005; interview with Commodore Eric Lerhe (CF Retd), 30 September 2005.

⁵⁹ Ingham, ‘Naval Gunfire Support for the Assault of the Al Faw Peninsular’, p. 34.

⁶⁰ Interview with Commodore Eric Lerhe (CF Retd), 30 September 2005.

⁶¹ Captain Jones sent his own chief of staff, somebody ‘ugly enough and strong enough to give honest answers to an Adm. and come back and tell me what I was doing was wrong’. Commodore Lerhe noted that ‘if it doesn't hurt [in terms of human resources] to send liaison officers, then you are sending either the wrong people, or not enough of them’. Interview with Commodore Peter Jones (RAN), 2 June 2006; interview with Commodore Eric Lerhe (CF Retd), 30 September 2005.

⁶² Field, ‘An Australian Defence Force Liaison Officer's Observations’, p. 11.

⁶³ Interview at the Air Power Development Centre, Tuggeranong, 31 May 2006; interview with Captain Phillip Spedding (RAN), 1 June 2006.

⁶⁴ Ibid.; Field, p. 11.

⁶⁵ Alan Ryan, ‘Australian Army Cooperation with the Land Forces of the United States: Problems of a Junior Partner’, Land Warfare Studies Centre Working Paper, no. 121, January 2003, p. 4.

⁶⁶ Gimblett, Operation Apollo, p. 108.

⁶⁷ Gimblett, ‘Command of Coalition Operations in a Multicultural Environment’, p. 13.

⁶⁸ Interview at the Air Power Development Centre, Tuggeranong, 31 May 2006. Commodore Steve Gilmore noted that, in the planning of coalition operations, knowledge of a nation's ROE was as important as understanding the capabilities of the type of kit and the professionalism of the crews they sent. Interview with Commodore Steve Gilmore (RAN), Canberra, 2 June 2006.

⁶⁹ Captain Phil Wisecup and Lieutenant Tom Williams (USN), ‘Enduring Freedom: Making Coalition Naval Warfare Work’, Proceedings, vol. 128, no. 9, September 2002, p. 55.

⁷⁰ Commodore Eric Lerhe (CF Retd), ‘Multilateralism and Interoperability: Impact on Maritime Capabilities’, paper presented to the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies conference ‘What Canadian Military and Security Forces in the Future World? A Maritime Perspective’, Halifax, NS, 10–12 June 2005, pp. 8–9, http://centreforforeignpolicystudies.dal.ca/pdf/msc2005/msc2005lerhe.pdf.

⁷¹ Interview with Commodore Eric Lerhe (CF Retd), 30 September 2006.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Interview with Rear-Admiral Drew Robertson (CF), 28 September 2005. Similar issues were raised by James Goldrick, Peter Jones and Steve Gilmore in their interviews.

⁷⁴ Inteview with Commodore Eric Lerhe (CF Retd), 30 September 2005.

⁷⁵ English, Gimblett and Coombs, Beware of Putting the Cart Before the Horse, p. 14.

⁷⁶ Interview with Commodore Peter Jones (RAN), 2 June 2006.

⁷⁷ Interview with Commodore Steve Gilmore (RAN), 2 June 2006; interview with Commodore Peter Jones (RAN), 2 June 2006; Zelibor, ‘FORCEnet is Navy's Future’.

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Paul T. Mitchell

Paul T. Mitchell is an Associate Professor at the Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and the Canadian Forces College in Toronto, where he was Director of Academics between 2000 and 2004. His research interests are in US military policy and operations, especially in the area of transformation and emerging operational concepts. In 2003 he was awarded the United States Naval Institute's Literary Award for the best article on surface naval warfare for ‘Network Centric Warfare and Small Navies, is there a role?’ published in Naval War College Review. He has published in Journal of Strategic Studies, Armed Forces and Society, US Naval Institute Proceedings, US Naval War College Review and the Canadian Military Journal. In 1997 he co-edited Multinational Naval Cooperation and Foreign Policy in the 21st Century (Ashgate). He has taught at Queen's University, Ontario, Dalhousie University, the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Canada's Royal Military College and the SAFTI Military Institute, Singapore. He has a PhD from Queen's University in political studies and a masters from King's College London in war studies. This work is dedicated to his friend and mentor, Joel Sokolsky: J'espère que cela en valait la peine.