Nuclear Deterrence

Abstract

In December 2003 the British government announced that within a few years it would need to take decisions about the future of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent. Exactly three years later, its plans were revealed in a White Paper. The existing Trident system is to be given a life extension, which includes building new submarines to carry the missiles, costing £15–20 billion. Britain has a substantial nuclear legacy, having owned nuclear weapons for over half a century. The strategic context for the deterrent has changed completely with the end of the Cold War, but nuclear weapons retain much of their salience. This Adelphi Paper argues that it makes sense to remain a nuclear power in an uncertain and nuclear-armed world.

Given that deterrence needs are now less acute, but more complex than in the past, the paper asserts that deterrence also needs to be aligned with non-proliferation policies, which seek to reduce the scale of threats that need to be deterred. Somewhat overlooked in current policy are appropriate measures of defence, which can raise the nuclear threshold and, if required, mitigate the effects of deterrence failure. It concludes that the government's decisions about the future form of the deterrent are very sensible, but cautions that they still need to be integrated into a broader policy that embraces diplomacy, deterrence and defence to counter the risks posed by nuclear proliferation.

Notes

This paper was funded by a grant from the Leverhulme Trust.

¹ Gray, Maintaining Effective Deterrence (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), p. 1.

² Remarks at IISS–Oxford University conference on Challenging Deterrence, Oxford, 14–16 December 2006.

³ Quinlan, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons, p. 12.

⁴ Remarks at IISS–Oxford University conference on Challenging Deterrence, Oxford, 14–16 December 2006.

⁵ Freedman conceptualises it a little differently. For him, deterrence and compellence are both coercive strategies, the former to prevent and the latter to force, certain actions. Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), pp. 26–7.

⁶ Wyn Bowen, ‘Deterrence and Asymmetry: Non-State Actors and Mass Casualty Terrorism’, in Ian Kenyon and John Simpson, eds, Deterrence and the New Global Security Environment (Abingdon: Taylor and Francis, 2006), p. 51.

⁷ Freedman, Deterrence, p. 29.

⁸ The best comprehensive history of nuclear deterrence theories is Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. See also Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983); Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Affairs, Adelphi Paper 318 (London: IISS–Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 20.

⁹ Gray, Maintaining Effective Deterrence, p. 11.

¹⁰ Payne, ‘The Nuclear Posture Review and Deterrence for a New Age’, Comparative Strategy, vol. 23, 2004, p. 411.

¹¹ Robert G. Joseph, ‘Nuclear Deterrence and Regional Proliferators’, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 3, Summer 1997, p. 169.

¹² Clarke, ‘Does My Bomb Look Big in This?’, p. 57; Hill et al., Does Britain Need Nuclear Weapons?, p. 58; Andrew J. Goodpaster, ‘Nuclear Roles in the Post-Cold War World’, reprint of second report of the Steering Committee for the Project on Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 3, Summer 1997, p. 164; Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, see Freedman, ‘Eliminators, Marginalists and the Politics of Disarmament’, in Baylis and O'Neill, p. 65.

¹³ Gray, Modern Strategy, p. 338.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 328; Quinlan, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons, pp. 18–19.

¹⁵ Payne, ‘The Nuclear Posture Review and Deterrence’, p. 415.

¹⁶ Cited in Payne ‘The Nuclear Posture Review: Setting the Record Straight’, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 3, Summer 2005, p. 135.

¹⁷ Cm 3999, p. 5–1.

¹⁸ Remark made at Wilton Park conference, ‘The Future of Nuclear Deterrence in the North Atlantic Alliance’, 12–15 October 2006.

¹⁹ Evidence submitted to the House of Commons Defence Committee, HC 986, Ev. 94.

²⁰ Chemical and biological weapons are prohibited by international treaties, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, respectively. See HC 407 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee Eighth Report, Session 1999–2000, Weapons of Mass Destruction (London: TSO, 25 July 2000), Annexes III and IV: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/407/40702.htm.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Lewis Dunn, Beyond the Cold War Nuclear Legacy: Offense–Defense and the Role of Nuclear Deterrence (Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 2001), p. 29.

²³ Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, pp. 84–5.

²⁴ Wing Commander D.A. Stamp (RAF), ‘Does the United Kingdom Require a Strategic Deterrent Capability Post-2030?’, Royal Air Force Air Power Review, vol. 9, no. 1, Spring 2006, p. 9.

²⁵ Cited in Tertrais, Nuclear Policies in Europe, p. 40.

²⁶ Yost, ‘New Approaches to Deterrence in Britain, France and the United States’, International Affairs, vol. 81, no. 1, January 2005, p. 85.

²⁷ HC 986 Ev.94.

²⁸ Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Affairs, p. 47.

²⁹ Hansard, 19 October 2005, Col.841.

³⁰ Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 456.

³¹ For a much more comprehensive examination of nuclear terrorism, see Robin M. Frost, Nuclear Terrorism After 9/11, Adelphi Paper 378 (London: IISS–Taylor & Francis, December 2005). Frost is sceptical about the likelihood of nuclear-armed terrorism; William C. Potter, Trends in U.S. Nuclear Policy (Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 2005), p. 13.

³² Daniel Whiteneck, ‘Deterring Terrorists: Thoughts on a Framework’, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 3, Summer 2005, p. 187.

³³ Anna M. Pluta and Peter D. Zimmerman, ‘Nuclear Terrorism: A Disheartening Dissent’, Survival, vol. 48, no. 2, Summer 2006, p. 65.

³⁴ HC 986, p. 24.

³⁵ HC 986, Ev. 43.

³⁶ Frost, Nuclear Terrorism After 9/11, p. 70.

³⁷ Cm 6994, p. 19; Hansard, 4 December 2006, Col.24.

³⁸ Quinlan, Evidence to House of Commons Defence Committee HC 986, Ev. 1.

³⁹ NATO, The Alliance's Strategic Concept (Washington DC: NATO, April 1999), p. 20.

⁴⁰ Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Affairs, p. 51.

⁴¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper 171 (London: IISS, 1981), p. 24.

⁴² Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, p. 136.

⁴³ Clarke, ‘Does My Bomb Look Big in This?’, p. 55.

⁴⁴ Quinlan, ‘The British Experience’, p. 274.

⁴⁵ Wirtz, ‘Beyond Bipolarity: Prospects for Nuclear Stability After the Cold War’, in Paul et al., The Absolute Weapon Revisited, p. 140.

⁴⁶ Freedman, Deterrence, p. 18.

⁴⁷ Quinlan, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons, p. 15.

⁴⁸ Payne, Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2001), p. 193.

⁴⁹ Gray, Modern Strategy, p. 315.

⁵⁰ Quinlan, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons, p. 16.

⁵¹ Lee Butler ‘At the End of the Journey: The Risks of Cold War Thinking in a New Era’, International Affairs, vol. 82, no. 4, July 2006, p. 769.

⁵² Lindberg, ‘Nuclear and Other Retaliation After Deterrence Fails’, p. 326.

⁵³ Payne, ‘The Nuclear Posture Review: Setting the Record Straight’, p. 144.

⁵⁴ Excerpts available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm. See also, David McDonough, Nuclear Superiority: The ‘New Triad’ and the Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Adelphi Paper 383 (London: IISS–Oxford University Press, 2006).

⁵⁵ For example, Drell et al., ‘A Strategic Choice: New Bunker Busters Versus Nonproliferation’, Arms Control Today, vol. 33, no. 2, March 2003, p. 9.

⁵⁶ Bryan L. Fearey et al. ‘An Analysis of Reduced Collateral Damage Nuclear Weapons’, Comparative Strategy, vol. 22, 2003, p. 313.

⁵⁷ HC 986, Ev. 26.

⁵⁸ Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Affairs, p. 39.

⁵⁹ Bowen, p. 47.

⁶⁰ Cited in Payne, Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence, p. 14.

⁶¹ Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, p. 131.

⁶² Freedman, Revolution in Strategic Affairs, p. 34.

⁶³ Payne, Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence, p. 91.

⁶⁴ Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, p. 34.

⁶⁵ O'Neill, ‘Weapons of the Underdog’, in Baylis and O'Neill, p. 191.

⁶⁶ Stephen J. Cimbala, ‘Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century: From Simplicity to Complexity’, Defense and Security Analysis, vol. 21, no. 3, September 2005, p. 270.

⁶⁷ Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History (London: Allen Lane, 2002), p. 218.

⁶⁸ Gray, Another Bloody Century, p. 289.

⁶⁹ Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, p. 17.

⁷⁰ Cm 6994, p. 18.

⁷¹ NATO, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, p. 20.

⁷² Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century, p. 49.

⁷³ Quinlan, ‘Deterrence and Deterability’, in Kenyon and Simpson, p. 5.

⁷⁴ Cm 6994, p. 18.

⁷⁵ Bundy et al., Reducing Nuclear Danger, p. 82; Milne et al., An End to UK Nuclear Weapons, p. 31.

⁷⁶ Tertrais, Nuclear Policies in Europe, p. 43.

⁷⁷ Rifkind, ‘The Role of Nuclear Weapons in UK Defence Strategy’, p. 24.

⁷⁸ Rogers, ‘Big Boats and Bigger Skimmers: Determining Britain's Role in the Long War’, International Affairs, vol. 82, no. 4, July 2006, p. 653.

⁷⁹ For a fuller dismissal of the attraction of a no-first-use policy, see Quinlan, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons, pp. 50–54.

⁸⁰ NATO's Nuclear Fact Sheets, p. 4.

⁸¹ Cm 3999, p. 5–11.

⁸² Remarks made at IISS–Oxford University conference Challenging Deterrence, Oxford, 14–16 December 2006.

⁸³ Cm 3999, p. 17; Cm 6994, p. 7.

⁸⁴ Henry S. Rowen, ‘Introduction’ in Sokolski, p. 8.

⁸⁵ Quinlan, ‘Aspiration, Realism and Practical Policy’, in Baylis and O'Neill, p. 53.

⁸⁶ Cm 6994, p. 18.

⁸⁷ Quinlan, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons, p. 78.

⁸⁸ Cm 6994, p. 14.

⁸⁹ NATO, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, p. 20.

⁹⁰ For a discussion of virtual deterrence, see Baylis ‘Nuclear Weapons, Prudence and Morality: The Search for a “Third Way”’, in Baylis and O'Neill, pp. 81–4.

⁹¹ Cm 6994, pp. 21, 27.

⁹² Yost, ‘New Approaches to Deterrence’, p. 99.

⁹³ David S. McDonough, Nuclear Superiority: The ‘New Triad’ and the Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Adelphi Paper 383 (London: IISS–Taylor & Francis, 2006), p. 10.

⁹⁴ Freedman, Deterrence, p. 39.

⁹⁵ Joseph, ‘Nuclear Deterrence and Regional Proliferators’, p. 170.

⁹⁶ For the full story of British attitudes and policies towards missile defences, see Stocker, Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence.

⁹⁷ Cm 6994, p. 21.

⁹⁸ Gray, The Second Nuclear Age, p. 98.

⁹⁹ Cimbala, ‘Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century’, p. 273.

¹⁰⁰ Aaron Karp, ‘The New Indeterminacy of Deterrence and Missile Defence’, in Kenyon and Simpson, p. 64.

¹⁰¹ Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, p. 685.

¹⁰² Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, p. 143.

¹⁰³ Tertrais, Nuclear Policies in Europe, p. 38.

¹⁰⁴ Yost, ‘New Approaches to Deterrence’, p. 105.

¹⁰⁵ Stocker, Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence, chapters 9 and 10. Little has changed since 2003 as attention has been on the future of the nuclear deterrent.

¹⁰⁶ For example, remarks by Jan Lodal, a former US defence official cited in Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, p. 41.

¹⁰⁷ Gray, Modern Strategy, p. 325.

¹⁰⁸ For extended discussions of the reliability of deterrence, see Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age and Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence; Gray, The Second Nuclear Age, pp. 88–91.

¹⁰⁹ Freedman, Deterrence, p. 29.

¹¹⁰ Payne, ‘The Nuclear Posture Review: Setting the Record Straight’, p. 139.

¹¹¹ Cm 6994, p. 17.

¹¹² Gray, ‘The Reformation of Deterrence: Moving On’, Comparative Strategy, vol. 22, 2003, p. 441.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Jeremy Stocker

Jeremy Stocker is a consulting Research Fellow at the IISS and a freelance defence analyst. He served as a Seaman Officer in the Royal Navy for 20 years, specialising in air defence, before transferring to the Royal Naval Reserve (RNR) in 1996. Commander Stocker has seen active service in the Persian Gulf and in Afghanistan. He is now responsible for staff training in the RNR, based part-time at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham. He has a BA from the University of Reading and a Masters and PhD from the University of Hull. His book Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence 1942–2002 was published in 2004 by Frank Cass. He is a regular conference speaker and contributes to academic and professional journals on both sides of the Atlantic.