Chapter Four: Regionalism and Regional Security

Abstract

In Southeast Asia, China's growing economic and political strength has been accompanied by adept diplomacy and active promotion of regional cooperation, institutions and integration. Southeast Asian states and China engage in ‘strategic regionalism’: they seek regional membership for regime legitimation and collective bargaining; and regional integration to enhance economic development, regarded as essential for ensuring national and regime security. Sino-Southeast Asian regionalism is exemplified by the development plans for the Mekong River basin, where ambitious projects for building regional infrastructural linkages and trade contribute to mediating the security concerns of the Mekong countries. However, Mekong regionalism also generates new insecurities. Developing the resources of the Mekong has led to serious challenges in terms of governance, distribution and economic ‘externalities’. Resource-allocation and exploitation conflicts occur most obviously within the realm of water projects, especially hydropower development programmes. While such disputes are not likely to erupt into armed conflict because of the power asymmetry between China and the lower Mekong states, they exacerbate Southeast Asian concerns about China's rise and undermine Chinese rhetoric about peaceful development. But the negative security consequences of developing the Mekong are also due to the shared economic imperative, and the Southeast Asian states' own difficulties with collective action due to existing intramural conflicts.

Notes

¹For a survey and analysis of these three cases, see Nurit Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East (London: Routledge, 1994).

²‘Sustainability’ is a much-contested concept, but at its most basic it refers to the capacity for future self-perpetuation of a system at a desired level of efficacy and efficiency. For a concise discussion, see Andrew D. Basiago, ‘Methods of Defining “Sustainability”’, Sustainable Development, vol. 3, 1995, pp. 109–19.

³‘“Water is Our Gold” – The Battle of Words Begins’, Phnom Penh Post, 8–21 March 1996.

⁴Tian Fang, Lin Fatang and Bi Daolin (eds), Lancang Jiang – Xiao Taiyang (Kunming: Yunnan People's Press, 1989). The original plan was for a 14-dam cascade, but this was subsequently revised down to eight dams.

⁵For maps, see H. Hori, The Mekong: Environment and Development (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2000), pp. 202–203.

⁶John Dore and Yu Xiaogang, ‘Yunnan Hydropower Expansion: Update on China's Energy Industry Reforms and the Nu, Lancang and Jinsha Hydropower Dams’, working paper, Unit for Social and Environmental Research, Chiang Mai University, Thailand, and Green Watershed, Kunming, China, March 2004, p. 19.

⁷‘500,000 People to Be Affected by Yunnan's Hydropower Development in the Coming 15 Years’, Chuncheng Wanbao (Kunming), 23 May 2006.

⁸Mekong Development Research Network (MDRN), Investigation and Study of the Current Status of the Lancang River–Mekong River in Yunnan, People's Republic of China (Kunming: MDRN, 1993).

⁹‘China: Confronting an Unwieldy Future’, The Nation, 5 December 1993; ‘Mekong Committee Sheds its Shackles’, The Nation, 26 January 1995.

¹⁰Chomchai, ‘Transboundary Protection of the Environment: A Mekong Perspective’, paper presented to the conference ‘International Boundaries and Environmental Security’, Singapore, 14–17 June 1995.

¹¹E.C. Chapman and He Daming, ‘Downstream Implications of China's Dams on the Lancang Jiang (Upper Mekong) and their Potential Significance for Greater Regional Cooperation Basin-wide’, mimeo, 2000, p. 14.

¹²‘Friends in the Upper Reaches’, The Nation, 10 November 1995; ‘Mekong Commission: In Search of a Purpose’, The Nation, 17 February 1995; ‘Vietnam, Laos Want to See Master Plan for Management of Lower Mekong Basin’, The Nation, 17 February 1995; ‘Indochina Poised to Sign Away River Safeguards’, The Nation, 27 March 1995; ‘China: Hydro Plant Not Damaging Environment’, Bangkok Post, 5 November 1995.

¹³‘Chinese Dams Blamed for Mekong's Bizarre Flow’, New Scientist, 25 March 2004; John Vidal, ‘Dammed and Dying: The Mekong and its Communities Face a Bleak Future’, Guardian, 25 March 2004.

¹⁴‘Droughts, Not Dams, Behind Low River Levels – Experts’, Inter-Press Service, 2004, http://ipsnews.net/Mekong/IPSWire/drought.html; ‘China Not to Blame for Mekong Drought’, The Nation, 18 November 2004.

¹⁵Chapman and He, ‘Downstream Implications of China's Dams’, p. 14; Roberts and I.G. Baird, ‘Traditional Fisheries and Fish Ecology on the Mekong River at Khone Waterfalls in Southern Laos’, Natural History Bulletin of the Siam Society, vol. 43, 1995.

¹⁶Satoru Matsumoto and Madoko Onizuka (eds), Transboundary Environmental Issues in the Mekong River Basin: Perspectives from Civil Society and Recommendations for MeREM, Mekong River Ecosystem Monitoring Report (Tokyo: Mekong Watch, February 2005), p. 12.

¹⁷‘China Accused of Obstructing Flow of Mekong River’, The Nation, 31 January 2006; ‘Thai Exports to China Plunge with Mekong's Falling Water Level’, The Nation, 13 February 2006; ‘Imperative to Negotiate with China on Mekong Water Use’, The Nation, 18 March 2005.

¹⁸Under the Mekong Agreement, only inter-basin water transfers require the agreement of all members.

¹⁹But note the underlying problem with the ‘minimum flow’ concept: guaranteed uniform water levels, or blanket releases, cannot sustain ecosystems and human systems which have adapted to natural flood cycles. See Thayer Scudder, The African Experience with River Basin Development: Achievements to Date, the Role of Institutions and Strategies for the Future (New York: Clark University, 1988).

²⁰‘Academic: China Will Not Join Mekong Body’, Bangkok Post, 24 April 1996; ‘Mekong Committee Sheds Its Shackles’.

²¹‘General Assembly Adopts Convention on Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses’, UN press release, GA/9248, 21 May 1997.

²²Feng Yan and He, ‘Lancang jiang meigonghe liuyu shuiziyuan gongping liyong zhong de guoji falv fagui wenti tantao’, Ziyuan kexue, vol. 22, no. 5, September 2000, p. 58; Chen Lihui, Zeng Zungu and He, ‘Guoji heliu liuyu kafa zhong de liyi chongtu ji qi guanxi xietiao’, Shijie Dili Yanjiu, vol. 12, no. 1, March 2003, p. 76.

²³‘Vietnam Not Affecting Water Quality – Minister’, Cambodia Daily, 11 April 2006; Matsumoto and Onizuka, Transboundary Environmental Issues in the Mekong River Basin, pp. 14–17.

²⁴See Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 132; Joyce Starr, ‘Water Wars’, Foreign Policy, no. 82, Spring 1991, pp. 17–36; Norman Myers, Ultimate Security: The Environmental Basis of Political Stability (New York: Norton, 1993).

²⁵See Thomas Homer-Dixon, ‘Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases’, International Security, vol. 19, no. 1, Summer 1994, pp. 20–31; Peter Stoett, Human Security and Global Security: An Exploration of Terms (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).

²⁶Michael Renner, Fighting for Survival: Environmental Decline, Social Conflict, and the New Age of Insecurity (London: Earthscan, 1997), pp. 135–53; Jon Barnett, ‘Destabilizing the Environment-Conflict Thesis’, Review of International Studies, vol. 26, no. 2, April 2000, pp. 280–84. See also Goh, ‘The Hydro-Politics of the Mekong River Basin: Regional Cooperation and Environmental Security’, in Ramesh Thakur and Edward Newman (eds), Broadening Asia's Security Discourse and Agenda (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2004), pp. 228–30; IRN, ‘The Legacy of Hydro in Laos’, undated, available at http://www.irn.org.

²⁷See IRN, The Struggle for the Mun River (Berkeley, CA: IRN, 1999).

²⁸See, for instance, research papers from the Asian International Rivers Center at Yunnan University: Zhao Wenjuan and He, Guoji guanzhu Lancangjiang kaifa kuajing yingxiang de zhuyao yanlu; He, Gou Junhua and Gan Shu, Zhongguo-Dongmeng ziyoumaoyiqu jianshegongcheng zhong de lujiang kuojing shengtaianquan wenti; and Feng Yan and He, Yingxiang Lancangjiang kaifa de guoji falü fagui wenti fenxi, all published in April 2003, and available at http://www.lancang-mekong.org.

²⁹Matsumoto and Onizuka, Transboundary Environmental Issues in the Mekong River Basin, pp. 15, 10; Roberts, ‘Downstream Ecological Implications of China's Lancang Hydropower and Mekong Navigation Projects’, IRN paper, 2001, p. 4.

³⁰Roberts, ‘Downstream Ecological Implications’, p. 8.

³¹‘The Sweet Serpent of Southeast Asia’, The Economist, 1 March 2004.

³² Ibid., p. 8; Roberts, ‘An Independent Assessment of the Nam Theun 2 Hydropower Project in Laos, with Particular Reference to Aquatic Biology and Fisheries’, mimeo, 1997. An example of the controversy over this issue can be seen in the exchange between Chinese and Australian geographers in Mekong Update and Dialogue, vol. 5, no. 3, July–September 2002.

³³Matsumoto and Onizuka, Transboundary Environmental Issues in the Mekong River Basin, p. 10; ‘In Life on the Mekong, China's Dams Dominate’; ‘Fish Catch in Mekong River Tributary Plummets 50%’, Associated Press, 1 April 2004.

³⁴D. Blake, ‘Proposed Mekong Dam Scheme in China Threatens Millions in Downstream Countries’, World Rivers Review, June 2001, p. 5; Roberts, ‘Downstream Ecological Implications’, p. 5.

³⁵Conservationists in the region have complained that China's dams are holding back up to half of the fertile silt that is usually deposited in downstream floodplains. See, for instance, ‘In Life on the Mekong, China's Dams Dominate’.

³⁶Roberts, ‘Downstream Ecological Implications’, pp. 6–7.

³⁷On watershed environmental protection in Yunnan, see Zhou Bo and Yang Weimin, ‘Priorities of the Greater Mekong Subregion: Issues, Strategies and Realities: Views of China's Yunnan Province’, in Kao Kim Hourn and Jeffrey A. Kaplan (eds), The Greater Mekong Subregion and ASEAN: From Backwaters to Headwaters (Phnom Penh: Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace, 2000); ‘China Invests Heavily To Protect Ecosystem in Fountainhead Areas of 3 Rivers’, Xinhua News Agency, 22 February 2005.

³⁸Chapman and He, ‘Downstream Implications of China's Dams on the Lancang Jiang’, p. 7.

³⁹Roberts, ‘Downstream Ecological Implications’, p. 14.

⁴⁰Chuong Phanrajsavong and D.L. Nguyen, ‘The Lower Mekong Basin: Hydropower Potential and Development Opportunities’, MRCS Hydropower Unit paper presented to the conference ‘Hydropower into the Next Century’, Barcelona, 5–8 June 1995, p. 13. Thailand has 1,000 mW, Vietnam 2,000 mW and Cambodia 2,200 mW. The top-end figure is from an interview with an official at the Laos National Committee for Energy (LNCE), August 2006.

⁴¹See Jonathan Rigg, ‘Managing Dependency in a Reforming Economy: The Lao PDR’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 17, no. 2, 1996, pp. 147–72.

⁴²See, for instance, this typical remark, made by the vice-minister of industry and handicrafts, that hydropower ‘is the priority sector in the Lao programme of socio-economic development … we have a lot of water … let's make use of it’, quoted in ‘Flute Playing Aside, Dam Plan Forges On’, Bangkok Post, 12 May 1997.

⁴³Maunsell Ltd and Lahmeyer, Power Sector Development Plan for Lao PDR (Auckland: Maunsell, for Lao Ministry of Industry and Handicrafts, Department of Energy and the World Bank, August 2006), p. 196; World Bank, Lao PDR Economic Monitor (Vientiane: World Bank Office, November 2006), p. 18.

⁴⁴LNCE, ‘Power Development Plan in Laos’, September 2006, http://www.poweringprogress.org/energy_sector/pdf_files/Electric_Power_Plants_in_Laos_as_of_September_2006.pdf.

⁴⁵Chairman of the LNCE, quoted in The Nation, 29 May 1995.

⁴⁶Ryder, ‘The Rise and Fall of EGAT: From Monopoly to Marketplace?’, Watershed, vol. 2, no. 2, November 1996–February 1997, pp. 13–25; LNCE, ‘Power Development Plan in Laos’, p. 53.

⁴⁷‘Laos Discovers True Cost of Power’, The Nation, 20 September 1996.

⁴⁸‘Egat To Postpone Power Buys’, The Nation, 1 May 1998; ‘Viability of Four Export Projects in Question: Funding Plus Reduced Thai Demand Cited’, Bangkok Post, 18 June 1998.

⁴⁹See Thai presentations at the annual meetings of the ADB GMS Electric Power Forum since 1997, at http://www.adb.org/gms/epf5.asp; LNCE, ‘Power Development Plan in Laos’, pp. 50–51.

⁵⁰He and Hsiang-te Kung, ‘Facilitating Regional Sustainable Development through Integrated Multi-Objective Utilization, Management of Water Resources in the Lancang–Mekong River Basin’, The Journal of Chinese Geography, vol. 7, no. 4, 1997, pp. 3–16.

⁵¹Ryder, ‘The Greater Mekong Subregion Hydro Grid’; Aviva Imhof, ‘Laos’ Rivers: Open to the Highest Bidder’, Watershed, vol. 11, no. 2, November 2005–June 2006, pp. 33–39.

⁵²Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand, ‘The Official Visit of Lao PM to Thailand’, 19 December 2006, http://www.mfa.go.th/web/162.php?id=18323.

⁵³‘Vietnam to Invest in Laos’, International Water Power and Dam Construction, 8 December 2005.

⁵⁴See table of proposed dam developments in LNCE, ‘Power Development Plan in Laos’.

⁵⁵High rates of siltation are a common problem with Laotian dams: Laos contributes a quarter of the Mekong's total sediment load.

⁵⁶Ryder and Steve Rothbert, ‘Rent-a-River, Build a Dam’, International Rivers Review, vol. 9, no. 4, 1994, pp. 8–9. See also IRN, Power Struggle: The Impacts of Hydro-Development in Laos (Berkeley, CA: IRN, 1999), chapter 4.

⁵⁷For an excellent analysis of how conflicts over water resources occur, not between states, but rather between sub-national or non-national groups, with state entities and other beneficiaries of large development projects being pitted against affected communities and NGOs, see Ken Conca, Governing Water: Contentious Transnational Politics and Global Institution Building (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), Chapters 6 and 7.

⁵⁸Estimates vary; the data used here is from Dore and Yu, ‘Yunnan Hydropower Expansion’; Magee, ‘Powershed Politics’, p. 32.

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Evelyn Goh

Dr Evelyn Goh is University Lecturer in International Relations and Fellow of St Anne's College, University of Oxford. Her research interests are Asian security, US–China relations, US foreign policy, and international relations theory. She has a long-standing academic interest in environment and development issues, and has studied the geopolitics of the Mekong region for ten years.