Chapter Two: Historical Patterns in Ending Terrorism

Abstract

Like all other terrorist movements, al-Qaeda will end. While it has traits that exploit and reflect the current international context, it is not utterly without precedent: some aspects of al-Qaeda are unusual, but many are not. Terrorist groups end according to recognisable patterns that have persisted for centuries, and they reflect, among other factors, the counter-terrorist policies taken against them. It makes sense to formulate those policies with a specific image of an end in mind. Understanding how terrorism ends is the best way to avoid being manipulated by the tactic. There is vast historical experience with the decline and ending of terrorist campaigns, yet few policymakers are familiar with it. This paper first explains five typical strategies of terrorism and why Western thinkers fail to grasp them. It then describes historical patterns in ending terrorism to suggest how insights from that history can lay a foundation for more effective counter-strategies. Finally, it extracts policy prescriptions specifically relevant to ending the campaign of al-Qaeda and its associates, moving towards a post al-Qaeda world.

Notes

1. See Audrey Kurth Cronin, ‘How Al-Qaida Ends’, International Security, vol. 31, no. 1, Summer 2006, pp. 7–48.

2. The cases discussed here represent a sample of the full range examined in the course of the broader research project on how terrorism ends. In that more comprehensive study, every effort has been made to include all campaigns that meet the following four characteristics: they have a political objective, use symbolic violence, purposefully target non-combatants and are carried out by non-state actors. Campaigns that primarily target military actors are not included in this study. The use of state organs to inspire terror in the state's own citizens is also excluded.

3. Figure 1 shows the distribution of lifespans across 457 groups included in the MIPT database. Selection criteria included (1) elimination of any group indicated to have targeted only property or military targets, with no indicated associated civilian or non-combatant injuries or fatalities; and (2) elimination of any group that did not display sustained organisational capabilities, that is, those groups with only one attack or with only a single series of coordinated attacks within several days of one another and with no subsequent evidence of activity or communication. These criteria removed a large number of groups that might otherwise have been included, reducing the number from 873 to 457 (in December 2006). Thus, the lifespan estimate presented here is conservative and would be even shorter if the selection criteria were more liberal. See the forthcoming How Terrorism Ends, Appendix.

4. For example, David Rapoport argues that 90% of terrorist organisations have a lifespan of less than one year; of those that make it to a year, more than half disappear within a decade. David C. Rapoport, ‘Terrorism’, in Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan (eds), Routledge Encyclopedia of Government and Politics, vol. 2 (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 1,067.

5. For much more on this argument, see Martha Crenshaw, ‘The American Debate Over “New” Vs. “Old” Terrorism’ and Audrey Kurth Cronin, ‘Ending Al-Qaida: Insights from both “Old” and “New” Terrorism’, papers presented at the Women in International Security (WIIS) panel, APSA annual conference, Chicago, IL, 1 September 2007.

6. Authors who hold the view that the history of terrorism does not relate to the Islamist threat include Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War Against America (New York: Random House, 2003) and The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting It Right (New York: Owl Books, 2006); Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Ian O. Lesser et al., Countering the New Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1999); L. Paul Bremer, ‘A New Strategy for the New Face of Terrorism’, The National Interest, November 2001, pp. 23–30; and Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna (eds), The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends and Counter-Strategies (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 2002). The concept of ‘new terrorism’ was introduced at the end of the millennium but gained widespread purchase after 2001.

7. The author (whose identity is unknown) urges ‘jihadi fighters’ to duplicate the ability of the Red Brigades and the Baader-Meinhof to compartmentalise information in order to prevent the group from unravelling. See ‘Lessons Learned from the Armed Jihad Ordeal in Syria’, date unknown, Harmony Document AFGP 2002–600080, reproduced in the Harmony Database, Combatting Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy, West Point, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq_600080.asp.

8. Harakat al-Dawla al-Islamiyya in Algeria is one of 25 ‘paradigmatic jihad movements’ analysed by Abu Musa'b al-Suri in his 1,600-page book Da'wat al-muqawama al-Islamiyya al-'alamiyya (The Call for Global Islamic Resistance), posted on the Internet in January 2005. Four of them are reviewed in detail in David Cook, Paradigmatic Jihadi Movements, After Action Report series edited by Jarret Brachman and Chris Heffelfinger, Combatting Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy, West Point, 2006, http://www.ctc.usma.edu.

9. Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery, translated by William McCants (Cambridge, MA: John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006), p. 34.

10. For more on this argument, see Audrey Kurth Cronin, ‘Sources of Contemporary Terrorism’, in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (eds), Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), pp. 19–45.

11. To avoid endless debate and fuzzy-headed thinking about the terms ‘strategic’ and ‘tactical’ in this context, we will borrow the terms ‘process’ and ‘outcome’ from the economists. See Herbert A. Simon, ‘From Substantive to Procedural Rationality’, in Spiro J. Latsis (ed.), Method and Appraisal in Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 129–48. The meaning of ‘success’ (and the degree to which groups have historically enjoyed it) is explored in much greater length and depth in my forthcoming How Terrorism Ends.

12. Terrorist groups are typically much smaller than insurgencies, which operate as military units, hold territory (at least temporarily) and mainly target combatants. Those who rely on terrorism as a tactic normally target non-combatants and aspire to be guerrilla movements or insurgencies.

13. The vast majority of funding for the study of terrorism is provided by governments that are facing terrorist attacks, an important factor in the approaches taken and the research that results.

14. For example, see Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); IISS, Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks (London: IISS, 2 May 2007); and Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, The United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons (New York: Walker and Company, 2007).

15. Much more could be said about research design and case selection, but this is a policy paper. Political scientists who want a more thorough explanation of the major study from which these policy conclusions are drawn should read my How Terrorism Ends.

16. David Scott Palmer, ‘Conclusion: The View from the Windows’, in David Scott Palmer (ed.), Shining Path of Peru, 2nd ed. (New York: St Martin's Press, 1994), p. 261. The figures for Shining Path's decline can be verified at the MIPT database, http://www.tkb.org.

17. Notably, McKevitt's arrest was followed by the rounding up of 40 members of the Real IRA leadership.

18. The Japanese government claims that the cult currently has about 1,650 members. See Public Security Intelligence Agency, ‘Review and Prospect of Internal and External Situations – Threats from Terrorism and Nuclear Proliferation and Growing Complexity in Domestic and International Situations’, January 2006, pp. 51–4.

19. For published figures, see US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000, http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/pdf/2000pogt.pdf; and the MIPT database, http://www.tkb.org. Subsequent to Ocalan's capture, the group renamed itself KADEK and then KONGRA-GEL (KGK), and insisted that it would only engage in political activities.

20. See James Brandon, ‘Mount Qandil: A Safe Haven for Kurdish Militants – Part 1’, Terrorism Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation, vol. 4, no. 17, 8 September 2006, http://www.jamestown.org.

21. The number of Palestinians killed through targeted killings is tallied by B'Tselem at http://www.btselem.org/english/Statistics/Casualties_Data.asp?Category=19.

22. The rate began to drop off before the ‘fence’ was erected, and the targeted killing policy is widely considered to be a success in Israel. Cause and effect appears to be much more complicated, however. Edward Kaplan et al. present careful data indicating that the killing of terrorist suspects stimulated recruitment to the terror stock, arguing that preventive arrests, not targeted killings, were mainly responsible for the reduction in suicide bombings. Edward H. Kaplan, Alex Mintz, Shaul Mishal and Claudio Samban, ‘What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel?: Insights from a Terror Stock Model’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 28, no. 3, May-June 2005, pp. 225–35.

23. There is no agreement on the actual date of Khattab's death. Some report that he was allegedly killed during a clandestine Russian operation using biological toxins in March 2002. See Jim Nichol, Russia's Chechnya Conflict: An Update, CRS Report for Congress, no. RL31620, 16 April 2003, p. 20. On Yandarbiyev, see Peter Baker, ‘Russia Moving To Eliminate Chechen Rebel Leaders; Separatists Defiant after Series of Setbacks’, Washington Post, 20 April 2004, p. A13.

24. Ariel Cohen, ‘After Maskhadov: Islamist Terrorism Threatens North Caucasus and Russia’, Backgrounder, The Heritage Foundation, no. 1,838, 1 April 2005, www.heritage.org/research/russiaandeurasie/bg1838.cfm. Basayev was described in the media as ‘Putin's Osama bin Laden’.

25. ‘Attacks Reported in Ingushetia, Stavropol and North Ossetia’, Chechnya Weekly, vol. 8, no. 48, The Jamestown Foundation, 13 December 2007, http://jamestown.org/chechnya_weekly/article.php?articleid=2373851.

26. I am not implying that the conflict in Chechnya is strictly about terrorism. For the Chechens it involves a gradual transition from separatist insurgency to terrorism; for the Russian government, it involves a reversion to a familiar pattern of autocratic repression in responding to a threat from below. See Audrey Kurth Cronin, ‘Russia and Chechnya’, in Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson (eds), Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2007), pp. 383–424.

27. Kaplan et al., ‘What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel?’.

28. A 2007 New York Police Department report indicated greater emphasis on surveillance and prevention rather than a classical criminal approach to terrorism. The arrests of 14 suspected terrorists in Barcelona in January 2008 highlight the value of prevention. Even so, such measures stop well short of ending terrorism, which is the subject of this paper. See Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, New York City Police Department, 2007; and ‘Spanish Terror Cell Planned Subway Attack’, United Press International, 25 January 2008.

29. See Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ni Aoláin, Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

30. Some argue that Chechens may not have been responsible for the bombings, and charge the Federal Security Service (FSB) with carrying them out. See Michael Wines, ‘A Film Clip, and Charges of a Kremlin Plot’, New York Times, 6 March 2002, p. A8.

31. ‘Putin's Chechen Remark Causes Stir’, BBC News, 13 November 2002.

32. The 30,000 deaths involved PKK members, civilians and members of the security forces. See Henri J. Barkey, ‘Turkey and the PKK: A Pyrrhic Victory?’, in Art and Richardson (eds), Democracy and Counterterrorism, p. 344.

33. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, Volume 6, The Periods of Violence, p. 53.

34. The Peruvian police and military, who were mostly of Spanish descent, identified their peasant targets by their darker skin. Likewise, many Russians identify Chechens by their darker complexion.

35. Al-Jihad was responsible for the 1981 assassination of Anwar Sadat. In 2001, al-Jihad merged with al-Qaeda.

36. Many point to the Palestinians’ use of terrorism as an example of success; however, the argument that terrorism has advanced the cause of the Palestinian people beyond occasional tactical gains is unconvincing. See, for example, Alan M. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002).

37. Kydd and Walter, ‘The Strategies of Terrorism’; and Ivan Arreguin-Toft, ‘How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict’, International Security, vol. 26, no. 1, Summer 2001, pp. 93–128.

38. Mia Bloom, ‘Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share and Outbidding’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 119, no. 1, Summer 2004, pp. 61–88.

39. On this subject, see Gabriel Sheffer, ‘Ethno-National Diasporas and Security’, Survival, vol. 36, no. 1, Spring 1994, pp. 60–79.

40. Jerrold Post argues that a group must be ‘successful enough in its terrorist acts and rhetoric of legitimation to attract members and perpetuate itself, but it must not be so successful that it will succeed itself out of business’. Post, ‘Terrorist Psychologic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces’, in Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, 2nd ed. (Washington DC: The Wilson Center Press, 1998), pp. 25–40.

41. The stormtroopers in Italy and Germany engaged in organised street violence that is more reminiscent of an insurgency than classic terrorism. For an opposing viewpoint, see Mark Sedgwick, ‘Inspiration and the Origins of Global Waves of Terrorism’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 30, no. 2, February 2007, pp. 97–112. Sedgwick defines terrorism as ‘the use of violence for the sake of its indirect political and psychological consequences by a group aiming to take political power’ – a definition that omits the size and structure of the group as well as the targeting of non-combatants, and might refer as easily to insurgents and guerrillas.

42. This conclusion is drawn from careful study of 450 durable terrorist organisations listed by the MIPT's Terrorism Knowledge Base. Only organisations that met the requirement of sustained (repeated) attacks harming civilians through physical injury or death were included in this analysis. For thorough discussion of the data and methods, see How Terrorism Ends.

43. Howard Barrell has a more favourable view of MK's activities in the late 1960s, arguing that it created an ‘old guard’ of veterans with militant credentials who were able to assume political leadership in the 1980s – specifically Chris Hani, who both represented and pacified disgruntled MK cadres after the ANC renounced violence in 1990. Without the MK, Barrell argues that the ANC would have had even less control of events. See Howard Barrell, The ANC's Armed Struggle (London: Penguin Books, 1990).

44. For extensive discussion of the full range of cases, see How Terrorism Ends.

45. On the role of outside powers in insurgencies, see Jeffery Record, Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2007). As examples of groups that had strong outside protectors, Walter Laqueur includes the Palestinian Arab groups and the Croatian Ustasha; see Terrorism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), p. 118.

46. This section summarises the results of careful analysis of the negotiating behaviour of 457 groups included in the MIPT database.

47. This section deals only with negotiations over a group's fundamental goals or strategic aims that may lead to the end of a campaign. It does not analyse event-specific, tactical talks to resolve such things as hostage-takings or airline hijackings.

48. Roberts, ‘The “War on Terror” in Historical Perspective’, p. 109. See also John Mueller, ‘Six Rather Unusual Propositions about Terrorism’, and ‘Response’, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 17, no. 4, 2005, p. 526.

49. They may have been buying guns for a third party, as some elements of the IRA were already mutating into organised crime groups at this point, dealing with the FARC and ETA amongst others. Conversation with Colonel Christopher Langton, IISS, March 2008.

50. Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, ‘Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence’, International Organization, vol. 56, no. 2, Spring 2002, p. 264, using data from the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism database, the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya; and Barbara F. Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).

51. For more on this phenomenon, see David C. Rapoport, ‘The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism’, in Cronin and Ludes (eds), Attacking Terrorism, pp. 46–73.

52. Sedgwick, ‘Inspiration and the Origins of Global Waves of Terrorism’, pp. 97–112.

53. Cronin, ‘Behind the Curve’, pp. 30–58.

54. The Red Army Faction continued in a weakened form for some years and developed into what it called its ‘third generation’, with claims of attacks in the name of the RAF during the 1980s and early 1990s. The degree to which it truly was the same group is debatable, however.

55. Some fear that recent demographic shifts may enhance the viability of neo-Nazi groups in eastern Germany, with many more women than men going west for work, leaving a large proportion of frustrated, underemployed men reportedly ripe for recruitment. See Steffen Kroehnert, Franziska Medicus and Reiner Klingholz, ‘Shortage of Women in the East’, The Demographic State of the Nation (Berlin: Berlin-Institute for Population and Development, March 2006); and Foreign Policy magazine blog, http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/node/4971?fpsrc+ealert070605.

56. On the GIA, see Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria (London: Ithaca Press, 1996); on the Provisional IRA, see Sean O'Callaghan, The Informer: The Real Life Story of One Man's War against Terrorism (New York: Bantam Press, 1998); and on the RAF see Donatella della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

57. Although the April 19 Movement ended, some individuals broke away and continued to engage in violence.

58. The release of the letter spawned two new offspring, the Red Brigades/Communist Combatant Party (BR/PCC) and the Red Brigades/Union of Combatant Communists (BR/UCC).

59. Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Knopf, 2006), p. 258.

60. See Siobhan O'Neil, Terrorist Precursor Crimes: Issues and Options for Congress, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL34014, 24 May 2007.

61. James D. Fearon, ‘Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 41, no. 3, May 2004, pp. 275–301.

62. On criminality in Northern Ireland, see Marie Smyth, ‘The Process of Demilitarization and the Reversibility of the Peace Process in Northern Ireland’, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 16, no. 3, August 2004.

63. Here and in what follows, I have been influenced by Philip Bobbitt's excellent book The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History (London: Penguin Books, 2002).