Chapter One: EU Crisis Management: Ambitions and Achievements

Abstract

International demand for military crisis-management missions continues to grow and demand for troops continues to outstrip supply. Like other Western democracies, European Union member states, because of their wealth, relative military competence and commitment to human rights, bear a particular responsibility to expand the international community's capacity for action. But while the EU has succeeded in defining a complex military-technical and political-strategic framework to boost its role and that of its member states in crisis management, its performance so far has fallen well short of its ambitions. This paper analyses what the EU wants to be able to do militarily – its level of ambition – and contrasts this aspiration with the current reality. To explain the gap between the two, the paper examines national ambitions and performance across the EU and analyses their domestic determinants using the examples of Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom. The paper concludes by suggesting that the EU might need to strike a new balance between the inclusiveness and the effectiveness of its activities in this area if it wants to increase its military crisis-management performance and live up to its declared ambitions.

Notes

Council of the European Union, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy’, p. 11.

Ibid., p. 14.

Ibid., p. 11.

Council of the European Union, ‘Presidency Conclusions’, Cologne European Council, 3–4 June 1999, p. 66, http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/57886.pdf.

‘Presidency conclusions’ are summaries of the proceedings of EU Council meetings, published by the holder of the EU presidency.

Council of the European Union, ‘Presidency Conclusions’, Helsinki European Council, 10–11 December 1999, http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm.

Council of the European Union, ‘Process for the Elaboration of the Headline and Capability Goals’, Doc. 6756/00, 14 March 2000.

External Relations Council, Council of the European Union, ‘Declaration on EU Military Capabilities’, 9379/03 (presse 138), 19–20 May 2003.

Council of the European Union, ‘Headline Goal 2010’, endorsed on 17 and 18 June 2004, p. 1, http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf.

Bernard Kouchner, opening speech to EU–NATO seminar, Paris, 7 July 2008.

Council of the European Union, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy’, p. 7.

Council of the European Union, ‘Civilian Headline Goal 2008’, Doc. 15863/04, 7 December 2004, p. 3.

Council of the European Union, ‘Civilian Headline Goal 2008: Questionnaire on Contributions from Non-EU States towards the EU Civilian Crisis Management Capability under ESDP’, Doc. 12208/06, 14 August 2006; Center on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008, p. 9.

See Council of the European Union, ‘Final Report on the Civilian Headline Goal 2008’, Doc. 14807/07, 9 November 2007; Council of the European Union, ‘New Civilian Headline Goal 2010’, Doc. 14823/07, 9 November 2007.

The Military Committee is made up of chiefs of defence and other military representatives of member states. The function of the committee is to provide direction to the EUMS and military advice to the Political and Security Committee, which also has a major role in crisis-management mission planning, and to make recommendations to the latter, either on its own initiative or at the committee's request. The EUMS – whose personnel is mostly seconded from the member states – performs three main functions: early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for the crisis-management tasks laid out in the TEU . Though the EUMS works under the direction of the Military Committee, it is organised as a department of the Council Secretariat.

For a rundown of these scenarios and an outline of the military planning process, see also ‘EU Military Capability Development’, presentation by Colonel L.F. Lunigiani, EUMS, http://www.baks.bundeswehr.de/portal/PA_1_0_P3/PortalFiles/02DB040000000001/W274QLLS742INFODE/eums130607+esdp+orientation+course.pdf?yw_repository=youatweb.

Interviews, Brussels, April and July 2008.

Council of the European Union, ‘EU Concept for Logistic Support for EU-led Military Operations’, Doc. 10963/08, 19 June 2008, pp. 10–11.

Substitution missions involve EU personnel assuming some executive roles in the crisis-afflicted region by taking on tasks, such as policing, that are usually undertaken by the state. In the stabilisation and reconstruction scenario that does not include a substitution mission, the role of EU personnel would be limited to mentoring and advising roles.

The CHG 2008 final report itself highlights this fact. See Council of the European Union, ‘Final Report on the Civilian Headline Goal 2008’, p. 19.

See note 15 for more information on these bodies.

See Dobbins et al., Europe's Role in Nation- Building: From the Balkans to the Congo, p. 215.

See ibid., p. 235.

See Council of the European Union, ‘Force Strength by Nations in AOO: 3247’, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Force_Stenght_by_Nations_in_AOO.pdf.

Interview, Brussels, July 2008.

Kees Homan, ‘Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, in European Commission, ‘Faster and More United? The Debate about Europe's Crisis Response Capacity’, 31 May 2007.

United Nations Security Council, ‘Deuxième rapport spécial du Secrétaire général sur la Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo’, S/2003/566, 27 May 2003.

The following paragraphs are based on Ståle Ulriksen, Catriona Gourlay and Catriona Mace, ‘Operation Artemis: The Shape of Things to Come?’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 11, no. 3, Autumn 2004.

The following account of EUFOR RD Congo is based on a report from the EU Operations Headquarters Potsdam, ‘Operation EUFOR RD Congo’, February 2007.

See also conclusions in Homan, ‘Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo’; Ulriksen, Gourlay and Mace, ‘Operation Artemis: The Shape of Things to Come?’; and Fritsch, ‘EUFOR RD Congo: A Misunderstood Operation?’.

Witney, ‘Re-Energising Europe's Security and Defence Policy’, p. 41.