Implementation of EU Social Policy Directives in Belgium: What Matters in Domestic Politics?

Abstract

This paper provides insight into the transposition in Belgium of six EU social policy directives adopted during the 1990s. Arguing that domestic politics matter for understanding transposition of EU policies in this country, it addresses the discordant findings concerning propositions about misfit, administrative inefficiencies and difficulties, as well as veto players. On the basis of an in‐depth country analysis, it shows how these concepts can be clarified by taking into account factors that have typically been omitted in quantitative research and by analysing more directly mechanisms that are not easily captured by quantifiable proxies. The paper concludes by describing the efforts that have been undertaken in Belgium to adjust specific features of the national political system so as to cope better with adaptation requirements, which again reinforces the relevance of domestic politics for implementation processes.

Key Words:

• Implementation
• EU social policy
• Belgium
• social partners
• veto players

Acknowledgement

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Seminar on ‘Europeanization of Social Policies’ held in Brussels on 8–9 February 2007. The author wishes to thank the participants, Günther Schmid and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.

Notes

1. See http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/eulaw/index_en.htm.

2. In order to maintain the anonymity of the experts, I refer to them as ‘Interview B (Belgium) 1’, etc.

3. Besides the ‘world of domestic politics’, we found a ‘world of law observance’ and a ‘world of neglect’. Recent research by Falkner et al. (2008) has revealed a fourth cluster, the ‘world of dead letters’.

4. If we were to seek to situate our approach in relation to one of the grand theoretical puzzles in implementation research, we might argue that it contributes to the explanation of both ‘intentional’ non‐transposition (as studies focusing on interest‐based explanations imply) and ‘unintentional’ non‐transposition (as the capacity school would argue). However, since this paper is in essence an empirical exercise, and since we expect the results to be mixed, we do not make this the entry point of our argument.

5. Even though Steunenberg’s analysis appears to refer to instrument‐specific players. Different actors are involved where transposition takes place via a political instrument (such as parliamentary laws) or via an administrative instrument (such as a ministerial order).

6. There are four types of coordination: type I, exclusive competence of the federal entity (e.g. economics and finance); type II, primary competence of the federal entity (e.g. transport and energy); type III, primary competence of the regions (e.g. research and industry); type IV, exclusive competence of the regions (e.g. culture and education).

7. In Belgium, responsibility for the implementation of an EU directive often remains in the hands of one and the same person from the negotiations right through to enforcement. This is not typically the case in all member states and should, in principle, be conducive to successful implementation (e.g. because this actor disposes of information as to how to interpret the contents of the directive).

8. Female blue‐collar workers and pregnant night workers employed outside manufacturing in the private sector already had a system of protection equivalent to that provided for by the directive. Only female non‐blue‐collar workers in the public sector were affected by this deficit in the system of protection.

9. However, this case also shows evidence that broad and cumbersome transposition processes might pay off when it comes to the application stage. The combined expertise of those responsible for enforcement and application (e.g. consultation of the conseil supérieur de sécurité, d’hygiène et d’embellissement des lieux de travail) led to a law with high practical applicability (interview B7). It comes as no surprise, then, that no application problems related to the directive were mentioned in the interviews.

10. At the subnational levels, specific European units (cellules européennes) deal with this task (de Wilde d’Estmael 1996, 47–50).

11. But see Berglund, Gange, and Van Waarden (2006) for a sociological institutionalist argument stressing the importance of administrative routines.

12. Thus, preference‐based as well as other significant explanations (e.g. issue‐linkage) for understanding these conflicts are excluded here in order to increase analytical clarity.

13. See footnote 7.

14. This is not to say that taking the preferences of the social partners into account during EU negotiations will necessarily guarantee smooth adaptation, as has been seen in the case of the Part‐Time Directive.