Eurosceptics in the Rotating Presidency’s Chair: Too Much Ado About Nothing?

Abstract

With the mainstreaming of Euroscepticism within established parties, the EU is facing a new challenge: that of soft Eurosceptic governments landing in the rotating presidency’s seat. Albeit not opposing the EU as such, these governments wish to put a brake on developments in further integration and challenge the EU informal norms of legitimacy and expected behaviour. On the basis of four case studies, this article illustrates the ability of the EU to adapt to this new situation — especially in the post-Lisbon era, where presidencies’ ability to influence the EU agenda and direction is increasingly limited. Indeed, on the whole, Eurosceptic governments live up to the role of the presidency as manager of the EU day-to-day business. However, in this context, there is a risk that EU partners might neglect potentially authoritarian developments in the country holding the chair, as the Hungarian presidency illustrated. Consequently, while the rotating presidency becomes less permeable to the turmoil of domestic politics, its role as a ‘magnifying glass’ of domestic democratic shortcomings becomes less relevant.

KEY WORDS:

• EU Council
• rotating presidency
• Euroscepticism
• (de-)politicization
• Europeanization.

Notes

1. Although the article uses the general term ‘Eurosceptic presidencies’ for practical purposes, it actually deals with presidencies containing Eurosceptic elements, be they discourses, actors (for instance, Eurosceptic factions within incumbent parties or Eurosceptic parties within government coalitions) or strategies.

2. According to Flood and Usherwood’s typology, a revisionist position consists of ‘wanting to return to an earlier state [of integration], usually before a treaty revision’ (2007, 6).

3. He was sketching one of four possible scenarios as to the future impact of European integration issues on the structure of national ideological cleavages.

4. Whereas the controversy on the media law officially ended in March 2011, once the Hungarian Parliament amended it in order to address the European Commission’s criticism (regarding the incompatibility of this law with the acquis communautaire in terms of fundamental rights and Internal Market legislation), several MEPs condemned the fact that the Hungarian government got away with a minima changes, without questioning the overall philosophy underlying this legislation (Euractiv 2011b). More importantly, there was no official EU-level reaction to the far-reaching constitutional reform adopted by the Hungarian parliament on 18 April 2011 and which should go into force on 1 January 2012.

5. It is the Council of Europe’s advisory organ on constitutional matters.