European Integration, Democratic Consolidation, and Democratic Regression in CEE: An Institutional Assessment

Abstract

The European integration of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) was supposed to bring democratic consolidation in the region. Post-accession, however, we have been witnessing democratic regression in a number of cases. Thus, an interesting question has risen as a result of this puzzling outcome. This paper attempts to provide an institutional argument for the post-accession divergent patterns of CEE by tying post-accession performance to political competition during the pre-accession process. Using the effective number of parliamentary parties, this article argues that the pre-accession process of the Eastern enlargement was more conducive to democratic consolidation under those democracies with a higher number of effective parties. Additionally, the paper shows that more fragmented party systems exhibited higher levels of party-based euroskepticism. The dual nature of the argument suggests that the more fragmented and euroskeptic a party system during the pre-accession process, the higher the likelihood of democratic consolidation in the post-accession period.

Keywords:

• Central and Eastern Europe
• democratization
• democratic consolidation
• democratic regression
• euroskepticism
• European integration

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. This is not to suggest that the latter group of cases have not experienced democratic regression. In fact, nearly all new member states have experienced some degree of democratic regression post-accession. However, it is only a small group of cases (Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania) that have become disconcerting due to the lowest levels of democracy among the new member states (as measured by a number of democracy indices).

2. It should be pointed out that there were a number of different democracy indices the researcher could have chosen from. However, each of them posed some kind of limitation that warranted their exclusion. For example, the Democracy Index from the Economist Intelligence Unit was developed in 2006, which means data from 2004 (the year of EU accession for 8 out of 10 CEE cases) are missing. The Open Society Institute Catch-Up Index also developed in 2010, which means it too lacked data from 2004 to 2007 (dates of EU accession for the 10 cases). The Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) does provide an empirical scope which covers data from 2004 up to present; however, it does pose an apparent concern. For example, the first ever BTI edition (2003), despite using a maximalist definition of democracy, scored 6 out of 10 CEE cases, a perfect score of 10. This is concerning as it is highly unlikely that six transitioning democracies would have all scored a perfect score, without any variation among them, despite a 10-point scale measurement. Interestingly enough, the second edition of BTI (2006) had reduced the perfect score of all six democracies previously scored a perfect 10. The Freedom House Nations in Transit Report is therefore the only widely used and reliable index using a maximalist definition of democracy with an empirical scope covering the pre-accession and post-accession periods. For an assessment of the various democracy indices, see Munck and Verkuilen (2002).

On a final note, it should be pointed out that the measurement on the dependent variable can take different forms. For example, one can choose to categorize the cases through a dichotomous variable, that is consolidated or not; or on a continuous scale such as FHDS. Each approach has its merits. However, as this article is attempting to understand democratization levels across time and across cases, a continuous and objective measure of democracy is more appropriate than a dichotomous and subjective measure. As Högström (2013, 207) has recently argued on the choice between democracy measurements, ‘when a dichotomous measure is used, it is not possible to measure the variation in democracy.’ Thus, a continuous variable such as that from Freedom House corresponds more appropriately to the research question addressed by this article.

3. Epstein and Jacoby (2014, 7) have pointed out that almost every negotiation chapter of the acquis touches on economic policies, with two-thirds directly linked to economic policies.

4. Bivariate correlation showed that 2015 democracy levels correlated at r = 0.69 (p = .031) with the EU salience variable for all parliamentary parties and at r = 0.67 (p = .039) with the governing parties variable.