Setting Europe’s agenda: the Commission presidents and political leadership

Abstract

Since the presidents of the European Commission are not vested with direct decision-making power at the EU level, influencing and shaping Europe’s agenda through agenda-setting is one of the president’s primary political opportunities for exhibiting political leadership. Although scholars concluded that Jacques Delors was a ‘consistently effective policy strategist’ with a hands-on and coherent approach, his strategic agenda-setting has yet hardly been systematically analysed. This contribution seeks to close this gap by comparing when Commission presidents announced their agendas, which were their main political topics and how these issues were developed over time. In doing so, it coherently evaluates the agenda-setting strategies of three former incumbents Walter Hallstein, Jacques Delors and José Barroso, who presided over the Commission at least for two terms. By conceptualizing and examining the political leadership of Commission presidents, this analysis contributes to the understanding of leadership as a performance of individual actors at the supranational level throughout the process of European integration.

Keywords:

• EU Commission president
• agenda-setting
• political leadership
• Walter Hallstein
• Jacques Delors
• José Barroso

1. Political leadership in supranational governance

Although the Commission presidency is not explicitly expected to exercise political leadership due to limited political powers, the office cannot effectively be fulfilled without some demonstration of leadership due to its plethora of political functions (Kassim 2013, 1; Kassim et al. 2013, 156, 160, 178; Tömmel 2013, 789). First, the president is supposed to transcend the preferences and aspirations of individual member states, thereby acting as a policy entrepreneur (see Ross and Jenson in 2017). Second, s/he seeks to contribute managerial expertise to the work of the Commission’s bureaucracy, thus acting in a technocratic manner (see Cini and Šuplata 2017). In addition, the office is expected to mediate consensus in the European Council, and increasingly between the political groups of the European Parliament. Finally, since the Commission serves as promoter of the community interest, its president also needs to foster positive perceptions of European integration and its institutions in a broader European public sphere (Cini 1996, 36, 37; Endo 1999, 26, 63, 64; Kassim et al. 2013, 164; Tömmel 2013, 790; Wille 2013, 61, 64). In other words, active political leadership by Commission presidents means strategically transferring

political ambitions of a Pan-European scope into consensual agendas (agenda-setting leadership) […] [that] can be effectively mediated through the intra- and inter-institutional arenas of decision-making at a European level (mediative-institutional leadership) and gain support among European public spheres (public leadership). (Müller 2016, 69)

Since the European Commission is vested with the right of initiative in the process of European decision-making, shaping and influencing Europe’s agenda through strategic agenda-setting is the president’s primary political function to exhibit political leadership. Hence the focus of this analysis lies on the first of the three leadership demands, namely on the strategic timing and substance of presidential agendas. Agenda-setting is considered an affirmative action by which particular (public) political issues are selected to receive serious attention among decision-makers, and therefore move from the phase of deliberation to the phase of decision-making in the policy cycle (Cobb, Ross, and Ross 1976, 126; Birkland 2007, 63; Jann and Wegrich 2007, 45; Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl 2009, 101). Agenda-setting thus means both the procedural power to set the agenda and the power to shape its substance (Pollack 2003, 47). Applying this conceptualisation of agenda-setting to the Commission presidency, its success is not a priori determined by formal powers. ‘Rather, the key is the provision of an idea or a solution around which bargaining can converge and in the absence of which no equilibrium position could be found’ (Ibid., 50). A single agenda issue is understood as the conflict about which several political actors argue in terms of process and substance. Therefore, the central function of agenda-setting in the policy process is creating issue attention (Jann and Wegrich 2007, 46). Studies of public opinion conclude that public spheres hardly focus on more than five issues at one time. As such, for any issue to gain serious attention another topic needs to drop off the agenda (Jones and Baumgartner 2004, 2; Princen 2009, 20).

The European Commission presidents (1958–2014) represent three different groups of lengths of tenures, ranging from less-than-one-term (F. M. Malfatti, S. Mansholt, J. Santer, M. Marín), to one-term (J. Rey, F.-X. Ortoli, R. Jenkins, G. Thorn, R. Prodi) and two-term (multiple terms) presidencies, which include Walter Hallstein (1958–1967), Jacques Delors (1985–1995) and José Barroso (2004–2014). Different lengths of tenures do not a priori determine the political performance. Nonetheless, a threshold of at least four years (comparable to national legislative periods) should be the minimum for an analysis of political leadership, as time is a crucial factor in political performance. For a comparative study of strategic agenda-setting, group two and three would seem to be most promising. The presidents in the first group hardly presided over the Commission long enough to potentially provide, improve and maintain agenda-setting leadership. The same applies to the incumbents Rey and Ortoli (both second group), whose terms only lasted three years. However, although Jenkins, Thorn and Prodi may in general be considered for analysis, the presidents Hallstein, Delors and Barroso better suit the purpose of this study. In contrast to group two, they do not only form comparable cases concerning the length of their tenures. Their respective two (and more) terms also lend themselves to a more thorough within-case analysis and long-term evaluation, both of which allow for a more in-depth comparison of agenda-setting strategies.

2. European agenda-setting: presidential themes over time

This study analyses the strategic agenda-setting of Hallstein, Delors and Barroso by comparing the attention they gave to particular topics and general issues throughout the course of their incumbencies (Princen 2009, 47). As such, it examines the whole range of topics and issues the presidents were dealing with, evaluating not only the range of topics but also their characteristics in terms of main political agenda and general issues (precision vs. generalisation). In this regard, executive speeches are essential, since they provide a first-hand insight on how politicians seek to develop, frame and sell their political ideas (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2012, 167). The data-set of speeches, which consists of full speeches given at public or semi-public conferences and talks, opening speeches and keynote addresses, detailed or closing remarks and interventions, spans from 1958 until 2014 and therefore encompasses diverse archival material. The content analysis of speeches thus follows an exploratory approach, guided by a set of four higher-level categories.

The first category comprises the ‘main topics/political agenda’ of each president, which reflects his/her political agenda. For the analysis of political agenda-setting, this is the most important category, as it provides insight into what the incumbent’s central and most frequently addressed topics were and when they were delivered during the presidency. The second thematic category is ‘main political internal/external events’. The goal here is to elaborate to what extent each president referred to main political events occurring during his presidency, such as the accession of new countries to the EEC/EC/EU or historical events such as the fall of the Berlin wall. The third category comprises ‘EEC/EC/EU general issues’, which refer to all general political issues discussed by the president and are related to EEC, EC or EU politics respectively. The fourth thematic category refers to ‘EEC/EC/EU policies’, which comprises all concrete policies or policy initiatives addressed by the respective incumbent. The content analysis was conducted with the data analysis software MAXQDA. One speech may have addressed more than one topic, but each topic was coded only once in a speech. Put together, the coherent analysis of agenda items offers insight into the different agenda-setting strategies of Commission presidents throughout the process of European integration.

2.1. The distribution of speeches and themes

Starting with the first Commission president, Walter Hallstein delivered 328 speeches during his nearly ten-year incumbency. When analysing the overall distribution of Hallstein’s speeches and topics, a strong approach of outreach continuity and thematic consistency becomes apparent. Hallstein, especially during 1958–1965, maintained a high level of frequency, giving an average of 37 speeches per year.¹ Only during the last two years of his term (1966–1967) did the amount of his speeches decline. The sharp decrease in 1966 was most likely caused by the results of the Luxembourg Compromise in January/February 1966 and Hallstein’s subsequent long-term illness (March–May 1966) (Figure 1). Yet the four thematic categories (main topics, main internal/external events, EEC general issues and EEC policies) remained relatively stable. References to Hallstein’s main topics are found in 42% of the examined speeches, while he responded to main EEC political internal/external events in approximately 11%. It becomes apparent that political events such as the accession application of the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland (1961), the Empty Chair crisis (1965/1966), or the signing of the merger treaty of the European Communities (1965) did not substantially replace his main topics. This indicates that Hallstein did not let himself being overly detracted by EEC political events but rather embraced them in his political agenda.

Figure 1. Distribution of Hallstein’s, Delors’ and Barroso’s speeches over time.

In addition, Hallstein addressed EEC general issues in 27% of his speeches. The most frequently raised topic of this category features a strong focus on external relations (62% in the overall distribution of EEC general issues), such as EEC association agreements or the EEC-US relationship (Schönwald 1999, 31ff.). This indicates that Hallstein’s aim was to address and prevent isolationist tendencies both within and outside the EEC and to successfully embed the EEC in an international community. Focusing on the fourth category, Hallstein referred to concrete EEC policies in 20% of his speeches. He discussed nearly all policies that had already been agreed upon in the Treaty of Rome (1957), such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the EEC trade policy, its financial and monetary policies, as well as regional, transport and energy policies (Figure 2). While the percentage of main topics broadly resembles those of Delors and Barroso, the relatively even allocation of EEC general issues and EEC policies differs from their distribution. Clearly influenced by the Treaty of Rome, Hallstein discussed concrete policies to a substantially greater extent than his two successors.

Figure 2. Thematic distribution of Hallstein’s, Delors’ and Barroso’s speeches over time.

Turning to the eighth Commission president, Jacques Delors gave 265 speeches during his ten-year incumbency at an average of 26.5 speeches per year (Müller 2016, 74). However, in the politically decisive years of his presidency (1985, 1988, 1989, 1990/1991 and 1993), he strongly exceeded this average. The peaks of these years coincide with major internal/external events at the European level, in which Delors played a predominant role. Endo examined four of these events as special leadership cases, in which Delors’ leadership made a difference to the outcomes of European decision-making both in positive and negative terms: the Single European Act (1985/1986), the Delors Committee on Economic and Monetary Union (1988/1989), the Intergovernmental Conferences on the Treaty on European Union (1990/1991), and the White Paper on Growth, Competiveness and Employment (1993) (Endo 1999, 129ff.). Moreover, while 1989 was dominated by the political events in Eastern Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Delors was among the first European politicians to actively support a quick German reunification and integration of the former German Democratic Republic into the European Community (Ibid., 63). These five major political internal/external events in the realm of European integration clearly coincide with each peak of his speeches, thus indicating an affirmative and attentive approach vis-à-vis current political events and initiatives (Figure 1).

The thematic distribution reveals that in 40% of his speeches Delors directly referred to his main political agenda, while mentioning the main political internal/external events at European level, such as the Single European Act or German reunification, in 20% of his speeches. Moreover, he addressed EC/EU general issues and concrete EC/EU policies in 33 and 7% respectively. It becomes apparent that his speeches follow a systematic pattern. First, he introduced his political agenda with huge efforts of public outreach, most notably at the beginning of each term (compare 1985, 1988, 1989, 1990/1991 and 1993). Second, when these topics had made it to the formal agenda of the EC/EU to be decided upon among member states, the frequency of these main topics decreased until he identified a new project (Figure 2). Delors thus dropped one main political topic off the agenda if it had come to be negotiated at formal institutional level, e.g. in the Council (Ross 1995, 39). Delors consistently renewed this rather exhausting pattern at the beginning of each new term (1985, 1989, 1993).

Finally, focusing on the twelfth Commission president, José Barroso delivered 588 speeches between 2004 and 2014. The distribution of his speeches reveals a cyclic development of setting an agenda. While Barroso started with a lower number of speeches at the beginning of each term – at an average of 30.5 speeches p.a. in the first two years of each term (2004–2005 and 2009–2010) – he reached the highest frequency of speeches in the middle of each term at an average of 64 speeches per year. 2008 and 2011 marked the peak of the cyclic development for each term at 75 and 82 speeches respectively. Lower numbers of speeches, 40 and 45 respectively, then characterise the last years of each term again, namely 2009 and 2014 (Müller 2016, 73).² In contrast to Delors, Barroso thus delayed the largest number of speeches to the middle of each term. While a politician’s impact to be heard among a wide range of audiences is potentially greatest at the beginning of an incumbency, Barroso did not use this opportunity sufficiently and can hardly be said to have delivered his agenda progressively at the beginning of each term. Therefore a somewhat slow developing and delayed outreach strategy can be observed (Figure 1).

The thematic distribution of Barroso’s speeches indicates that in 51% of them he addressed the category of main topics, while he referred to main political internal/external events in 13% of his presidency. In this regard, the peaks of the latter category, such as 2005, 2009, 2010 and 2011, coincide with major political turning points at European level, most notably the negative referenda of the EU constitution in France and the Netherlands in 2005, the ratification and enactment of the Treaty of Lisbon, as well as his reappointment in 2009, the outbreak of the European financial and sovereign debt crisis in Greece in 2010, and the signing and ratification of the fiscal compact in 2011/2012. In this regard, Barroso seemed well in tune with the main EU political events, although none of said events (either in a positive or negative sense) can be directly traced back to his political initiatives or contributions.

In contrast, Barroso addressed topics of EU general issues on a continuous and frequent basis, making up 32% in the overall distribution of his speeches. In this category, Barroso delivered a wide range of topics, encompassing 15 clusters which mirrored the rapidly changing day-to-day political business at European level and which can therefore hardly be said to have followed a strategic agenda. Finally, Barroso referred in only 4% of his speeches to the thematic category of concrete EU policies. Comparing this to Hallstein’s speeches, it can be assumed that focusing on concrete EU policies has increasingly become the responsibility of EU commissioners and their respective portfolios, rather than the task of the Commission president him-/herself. Barroso referred, if at all, most often to EU regional policy among others.

Altogether, the distribution of speeches and thematic allocation from Walter Hallstein to Jacques Delors and José Barroso reveals three different strategies. On the one hand, the four categories are represented in each set of speeches with, in general, the same grading by which main topics were most important, followed by EEC/EC/EU general issues, then main internal/external events, and finally EEC/EC/EU policies. On the other, each incumbent set different priorities. Since the Treaty of Rome already provided a set of concrete policies for implementation, Hallstein’s strong balance between general issues and concrete policies comes as no surprise. Delors’ are instead best in tune with the EC/EU’s main internal/external events, thereby pointing to Delors’ success in shaping European political events (Endo 1999, 129ff.). In contrast to both, Barroso most strongly addressed his own political agenda, though remaining detached from both general internal/external events and concrete policies.

2.2. The political agenda

Hallstein’s political agenda is characterised by four topics, which remain relatively stable over the course of his presidency. These issues are: first, explaining the EEC institutions and their functioning (30%); second, explaining and promoting the completion of the single market/tariff union and the economic mechanisms underlying this process (30%); third, explaining the general process of European integration, its construction and European unity (26%); and finally, the EEC’s future economic and industrial development (14%).

These four topics suffuse most of his speeches and clearly remain at the centre of his political agenda. While the European Economic Community (EEC) was a new political entity in Europe, Hallstein’s agenda was to explain the EEC’s supranational institutions in order to increase their acceptance among the relevant political actors as well as their authority and influence in European decision-making. In Hallstein’s view, consistent interpretation and detailed explanation of the Treaty of Rome and the new institutions were fundamental for the establishment of political proceedings at the European level for both, the member states and its European and international partners (Kilian 2000, 48; Bajon 2012, 34, 66, 71, 77). At least in doing this, Hallstein, as a high-level politician in the early phase of European integration, did not leave any doubt about the long-term political impact and purpose of integration. Between 1958 and 1965, he strongly stressed the EEC’s political character in his speeches, and only after 1965 slowly dropped it, along with the topic of explaining the functioning of EEC institutions (Schönwald 2001, 161). This shift most likely coincided with the events of the Empty Chair crisis and de Gaulle’s negation of the EEC’s and especially the Commission’s political role.

In explaining the completion of the single market (main topic 2), Hallstein particularly focused on the technical side of European integration, especially on the different phases of establishing the tariff union and how the member states needed to apply Community law for that purpose (White 2003, 127). Closely related to this topic was the agreement on the acceleration of the completion of the single market in May 1960. The successful initiation of this process in March of said year can be regarded as one of Hallstein’s major political successes as Commission president. As for the third main topic (European integration, its construction and European unity more broadly), Hallstein offered a substantial focus on the political development of Europe, which he differentiated into a smaller (the six EEC member states) and a bigger Europe (the EFTA states), and embedded the EEC in the greater development of European unity. In his fourth main topic, the EEC’s economic and industrial development, which he mentioned less often, Hallstein mainly praised the EEC’s economic development and urged for further technical harmonisation and efforts to sustain its economic growth.

Turning to Jacques Delors, the category of his main topics encompasses seven thematic issues, developed over the course of his presidency and addressed with varying degrees of intensity (Müller 2016, 75). Whereas Hallstein’s agenda was very stable throughout his incumbency, Delors applied a more dynamic approach. In 1985, Delors announced four main topics (see Ross and Jenson 2017). These were, first, the completion of the single market (14%), which included aspects of greater economic cooperation and an improvement in industrial and economic competiveness together with the abolition of tax barriers, aspects of economic cohesion and harmonisation, as well as political incentives for sustainable economic growth. Second, Delors linked the completion of the single market to the topic of technological cooperation and innovation (10%), in which he referred to new technologies and research, as well as industrial modernisation, information technologies and communication networks. In addition, Delors also drew attention to aspects of closer financial and monetary cooperation (21%), including a strengthening of the European Monetary System (EMS) and the establishment of the ECU as an international reserve currency. Finally, Delors focused on the institutional functioning of the Community and its reform (16%), referring to topics such as decision-making reform in the Council, the legislative power of the European Parliament and institutional efficiency (Endo 1999, 136; Dinan 2004, 208, 209).

Altogether, these four main topics were constantly on Delors’ political agenda, especially in the preparation of the White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market (1985) and the signing of the Single European Act (SEA) (1986). Much of these issues, such as technological development, industrial growth and institutional reform had, however, already been provided by the European Round Table of Industrialists in 1983. Nonetheless, it was Delors’ strong linkage, framing and follow-up of these four topics that greatly helped to influence decision-making on the Single European Act (SEA) (Cowles 1995, 505, 509; Ross 1995, 39; Endo 1999, 137). Participants of the IGC on the SEA in 1985/1986 reckoned that ‘60 or 70% of the final document was based on the Commission’s initial draft contribution’ (Grant 1994, 75; Endo 1999, 148; see Ross and Jenson 2017). After the signing of the SEA in February 1986, Delors moved on to other topics except for his attention on financial and monetary cooperation. This topic decreased only in 1991 and disappeared from his agenda in 1992, after the official signing and ratification of the economic and monetary union in the framework of the Treaty on European Union (1992/1993).

As for the topic of financial and monetary cooperation, Delors’ step-by-step strategy to develop one topic out of the other, the so-called method of engrenage, becomes particularly apparent (Ross and Jenson 2017). Between 1985 and 1987, Delors did not openly speak about ideas of a common currency. Instead he framed it rather more broadly under the heading of closer financial and monetary cooperation. Delors had put himself in charge for the Commission’s portfolio of financial and monetary affairs. As such, he participated in the monthly meetings of the Committee of Central Bank Governors and frequently attended the Ecofin and General Affairs Council. Nonetheless, he practiced a low-key approach so as not to push this topic too forcefully during negotiations of the SEA (Endo 1999, 145, 146; Dinan 2004, 214). While ‘Delors had so far moderated his public statements on the subject’, he fought all the more openly for the creation of an economic and monetary union (EMU) after the SEA’s ratification and the member states’ budgetary agreement (Dinan 2004, 235). Between 1989 and 1990, especially in light of the Delors Committee (1988) and the publication of the Delors Report (1989), the issue became his principle topic and set the tone of his political agenda.

The fifth main topic of Delors’ agenda was social dimension and social cohesion (18%) including aspects of European social policy formation, European solidarity, cohesion policies as well as workers’ rights and working conditions. Delors was quick to revitalise the ‘Social Dialogue’ at the European level in January 1985 between the leaders of the European Union Trade Confederation (ETUC) and the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederation (UNICE). However, at this point of his presidency, he still sought to avoid further conflict on social policies among member states (Addison and Siebert 1991, 605). Thus, and despite Delors’ remarks on the social dimension in his inaugural speech to the European Parliament, the SEA did not grant social policy a particular role. Only after the signing of the SEA did Delors push the topic more strongly onto Europe’s agenda. As such, in 1988 the social dimension became Delors’ most important singular topic (37%). In this regard, the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights (proposed in September 1988 and ratified in December 1989) became the president’s imprint in establishing a more coherent social and cohesion policy at European level (Ibid., 597, 615).

Delors’ focus on the social dimension slowly decreased, especially in light of the political turbulences following the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992/1993. It was, however, triggered again as a central topic by the rapidly increasing unemployment rates across Europe in 1993. For Delors, the problem of unemployment ‘was not only structural but also of a peculiarly European nature’ (Endo 1999, 194). In presenting unemployment as a structural problem across Europe at the Copenhagen Council Summit in 1993, Delors received a new mandate from the member states to prepare and present the White Paper on Growth, Competiveness and Employment at the Brussels Council summit in December 1993. This White Paper can be regarded as Delors’ political legacy, thereby having achieved a final ‘modest success of exercising agenda-setting leadership’ (Ibid., 191).

Finally, Jacques Delors referred to two further main topics, though at a lower frequency and with less consistency than the former five issues. The first one was political cooperation (10%), referring to closer political collaboration among the member states and, at a later stage, the demand for political union. This issue became increasingly prominent on his agenda in 1989–1990. The increased attention coincided with the IGC on political union in December 1990 parallel to the IGC on the EMU. While ‘Delors linked the themes of reform in Central and Eastern Europe and reform in the EC’, the concept and his demand for political union was strongly influenced by the developments of German unification and the collapse of the former Soviet Union (Dinan 2004, 244). However, while the turn of events after the fall of the Berlin wall led to an ‘over-crowded and ill-defined agenda in the forthcoming IGC […], any leader would have found it difficult to prioritise the issues at stake’ (Endo 1999, 172). Therefore, and although Delors addressed closer political cooperation head on already in 1988/1989, the Commission was nonetheless unable to substantially influence the formal agenda on political union (Endo 1999, 176; Dinan 2004, 246).

Second, and closely related to the topic of stronger political cooperation, Delors also addressed an increased external cooperation of the Community (11%). This concept was increasingly important after 1989, including ideas for aligning EC’s external economic policy with the foreign policies of the member states, substantiating ideas of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) (Dinan 2004, 213). In light of the emerging Yugoslavian civil war and the Gulf crisis of 1990/1991, Delors strongly appealed to member states to speak with one voice in international affairs. However, his own direct (rhetorical) responses to both challenges remained rather meagre (Endo 1999, 172, 173).

Finally, focusing on José Barroso, the category of main political topics encompasses eight different issues, apparent over his two terms to varying frequencies and intensities (Müller 2016, 74). With the aim to foster economic growth, employment and technological innovation across Europe, the topic of growth, jobs, and innovation was Barroso’s single leading issue. It was one that remained of substantial significance throughout his incumbency (21%). In this topic, Barroso, most notably, referred to the relaunch of the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs in 2004/2005, and the strategy’s successor, the Europe 2020 strategy, during his second term, especially in light of the European sovereign debt crisis in 2010/2011 (Cini 2005, 5, 6). However, the Lisbon Strategy was not an invention by Barroso. In fact, it was an action plan based on a proposal of the Prodi Commission by the member states at the Lisbon Council on 23–24 March 2000. The strategy intended to advance the EU so that it would ‘become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth’.³ However, while most of the strategic goals were non-binding for member states, in 2010 the strategy’s success was rather limited (Blanke and Kinnock 2010, 15). Hence, Barroso’s strategy to foster economic growth was of intergovernmental cooperative character, with the aim to accommodate member states’ interests, and cannot be regarded as a strong or reformative initiative to foster further European integration – as was the case with Hallstein’s and Delors’ main topics.

In his second main issue, Barroso addressed Europe’s future and renewal, which made up 14% of his political agenda. Here Barroso emphasised the European Union after the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty (2007) and the challenges and opportunities to its further integration. Equally related to the future of the EU was, third, the topic of globalisation, through which Barroso examined questions of global economy and international governance. With 12% and continuous references to the topic of globalisation, it was one of Barroso’s central issues on his political agenda. Fourth, Barroso also focussed on the topic of European values, culture, citizens and civil society (14%). Here he aimed more generally at addressing Europe’s civil society and its impact on European integration (Cini 2005, 6). In particular during Europe’s sovereign debt crisis of 2010–2014, Barroso tried to appeal to Europe’s citizens for increased solidarity. Taken together, these four main topics made up 61% of Barroso’s political agenda, and remained central features of his speeches during his incumbency.

However, these themes were complemented by four further issues permeating Barroso’s speeches. These topics show greater fluctuations and changing intensities, and were substantially influenced by European political events (Müller 2016, 74). The first topic is the Euro area including the institutions of Ecofin, EFSF and ESM, in which Barroso focussed on the financial governance of the Eurozone. This topic reached the top of his agenda at the height of the European sovereign debt crisis (2009–2011). It was complemented by more general elaborations about the EU single market and economic governance. Here Barroso elaborated concepts for deeper European integration in the realm of economic and financial policies. Both topics were closely related to the events of the financial and sovereign debt crisis, and made up 11 and 9% of Barroso’s political agenda respectively.

The final two main topics reflected in Barroso’s speeches comprise, first, the EU’s external cooperation and its partnerships, and second, climate change, environment and sustainable development. Through the former, Barroso addressed again questions of globalisation and international economic governance. The office of the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was created in 2009; nonetheless, Barroso continued to address issues of EU’s external cooperation during his second term (though with a strong focus on external trade policy). Although the latter topic was in line with the main goals of the Lisbon Strategy, Barroso substantially reduced to address it after the UN climate summit in Copenhagen (2009) and the looming European sovereign debt crisis (2010–2014) (Schout and Buirma 2014, 3). In total, both topics were less important on Barroso’s agenda and therefore fluctuated over the course of his two terms. Nonetheless, EU external cooperation and climate change remained on Barroso’s thematic radar throughout his presidency, taking up 11 and 8% respectively of Barroso’s political agenda.

The distribution of Barroso’s main topics evidences three features in comparison to Hallstein and Delors. First, Barroso’s political agenda, with its eight broad topics being continuously addressed throughout the incumbency, indicates an information overload and thus thematic dilution as compared to his predecessors. In general, this may be attributed to the development of the EU into a far more complex and diverse community in terms of policy areas, member states, interest and lobby groups, as well as the challenges of globalisation. Thus, Barroso had to deal with many more political topics simultaneously than Hallstein or Delors ever did. The increase of political complexity is also reflected in the sharp increase in speeches given. Hallstein and Delors delivered 328 and 265 speeches respectively; Barroso’s total speeches amount to 588. However, although the challenge for incumbents to focus on a single issue has become stronger in today’s complex political environment, the clear identification of mid- and long-term political priorities remains not only essential for the success of any presidency but becomes even more important due to the increased complexity of European politics and the EU’s political system more broadly.

Second, Barroso applied a two-fold strategy to address his main topics. Characterised by strong generalisations and easily applicable to a broad range of audiences, Barroso’s first four main topics (economic growth, EU future, European values and globalisation) were delivered relatively detached from actual day-to-day politics. However, at the same time, Barroso’s speeches followed European political developments closely by discussing topics such as climate change, the EU single market, EU external cooperation and, most notably, the EU financial system. These topics were delivered in more concrete terms, entailing more detailed approaches and proposals. Yet due to the close tracking of political events, they also appear to have been addressed more reactively and thus spontaneously. In contrast to Hallstein and especially Delors, Barroso did not develop a strong thematic overlap or connection among the eight different themes he emphasised in his speeches. While, for example, Jacques Delors interlocked and strategically developed each topic out of the former one (engrenage), Barroso’s main political issues remained largely detached from each other without a clear strategic follow-up.

Third, Barroso’s two sets of detached main topics, one stable and the other one fluctuating, may have challenged the audiences’ ability to actually track his political priorities. For example, while Barroso had already focused on growth and jobs in the early phase of his first term, it was potentially more difficult to gain renewed attention for this issue during the height of the European sovereign debt crisis, when a focus on economic recovery and growth was considered crucial. Moreover, at least rhetorically, it also appeared as if no progress had been made on the topic of economic growth between 2005 and 2011 – though that might not have been the case. Although Barroso’s main topics were undoubtedly relevant and central to the EU’s political development at the time, Barroso can hardly be said to have developed an approach in which few central topics were strategically linked to each other (Hodson 2013, 311). Instead, his main topics remained too diffuse to create an impact at the European decision-making level, especially since Barroso gave most of his speeches when the term was already half-way over.

3. Conclusion: agenda-setting leadership in perspective

Commission presidents lack direct decision-making power at the EU level. This means strategically setting Europe’s agenda is their primary political opportunity to exhibit leadership. Several scholars have attributed to Jacques Delors strong political leadership, with Hallstein ranking second to him in terms of a successful leadership performance (Boucher 2006, 336; Kassim et al. 2013, 163; Tömmel 2013, 798; Brummer 2014, 340, 341). In contrast, José Barroso received a rather mixed leadership evaluation, especially concerning supranational agenda-setting (Hodson 2013, 303). Considering these prior evaluations, the analysis revealed two main results. First, the distribution of speeches during each presidency showed that supranational agenda-setting is more successful when there is a strong push and outreach strategy towards delivering the main topics of an agenda at the beginning of each term, when public attention is most likely highest for the incoming incumbent. For example, Walter Hallstein gave most of his speeches in the first phase of his presidency. Jacques Delors’ agenda-setting entailed greater fluctuations; nonetheless, he was particularly keen to address his agenda both as directly and frequently as possible at the beginning of each of his three terms. Barroso instead followed a cyclical development of speeches in which he addressed his political agenda more slowly and delayed his strong outreach until the middle of each term, which was, as a result, much less efficient in successfully setting the main goals of his incumbency.

Second, all three presidents incorporated a different number of topics into their agenda and followed different patterns of connecting them. Hallstein addressed no more than four main topics, with a strong focus on the EEC’s supranational character. Delors placed about seven central topics on his agenda, which he developed strategically via the method of engrenage, reaching from the completion of the single market to the establishment of the EMU. Barroso’s main political agenda featured no less than eight broad and general topics, encompassing economic growth and European values alongside financial coordination and climate change. Whereas Hallstein’s and Delors’ main topics provided strong thematic continuity, focus and consistency, Barroso’s agenda rather appeared overloaded and diluted. Unlike Delors, Barroso hardly delivered his topics with a clear strategic follow-up. Based on these results, successful supranational agenda-setting is not necessarily about inventing new issues, but carefully setting a small number of coherent topics with an integrationist impulse and strategic follow-up as was the case by Hallstein and, most notably, Delors.

In summary, taking into account the leadership evaluations by Brummer, Tömmel, Boucher, Kassim et al. and Hodson, Delors was able to fulfil almost perfectly the two demands of supranational agenda-setting. Thus, in many areas of his presidency, Delors did not only successfully set the agenda of the European Community. Concrete steps of European integration – from the White Paper on the Internal Market (1985), the Single European Act (1986), the Delors Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union (1988/1989), the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights (1989), to the White Paper on Growth, Competiveness and Employment (1993) – were directly associated with him. By contrast, Barroso hardly met these demands, and therefore had greater difficulties in substantially influencing the EU’s agenda, among other things. Although Hallstein’s agenda-setting, with its strong push for further supranational integration, represented a central contribution to the EEC’s early development, his singular focus on the realisation of the Treaty of Rome was less successful during the later stage of his incumbency. This also indicates that a successful agenda needs to match and be securely rooted in the situative context of each presidential term.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the European Commission Erasmus+ programme – ‘Policy debate with academic world’ (reference number: 565351-EPP-1-2015-1-CA-EPPJMO-Project) for generously funding a workshop on leadership in the European Union at the University of Osnabrück in November 2015, where an earlier draft of this contribution was presented. Special thanks also go to the workshop organisers, Ingeborg Tömmel and Amy Verdun, for their constructive feedback and comments, as well as the anonymous reviewers who offered helpful suggestions for improving my argument.

Notes

1. The low amount of speeches in 1964 is considered an outlier due to the unavailability of speeches for this year.

2. The low number of speeches in 2006 (22) can be interpreted as an outlier due to a low retrieval from the European Commission database for this year.

3. Presidency conclusions, Lisbon European Council, 23 and 24 March 2000.