The standing president of the European Council: intergovernmental or supranational leadership?

Abstract

This contribution explores the leadership of the European Council’s first standing president, Herman van Rompuy. It questions whether van Rompuy primarily acted as a neutral broker among the member states, or whether he aspired to push forward integration beyond national preferences. In the first case, he would strengthen the intergovernmental dimension of the EU and perform as a transactional leader; in the second case, he might favour the Union’s supranational dynamics and exercise transforming leadership. Drawing on theoretical approaches regarding European Council presidencies, the analytical framework specifies the leadership demand and supply of presidents in intergovernmental negotiations. Empirically, the contribution analyses van Rompuy’s leadership in the negotiations on the multiannual financial framework 2014–2020. This analysis shows that van Rompuy primarily acted as a broker, while his leadership supply was rather weak. In conclusion, he largely strengthened the intergovernmental dimension of the EU and particularly acted in favour of the preferences of the powerful member states.

Keywords:

• Political leadership
• European Council presidency
• Herman van Rompuy
• multiannual financial framework 2014–2020

Introduction

The Lisbon Treaty has established a new leadership position in the EU, a standing president of the European Council. By creating this ‘permanent’ position, heads of state or government sought to improve decision-making in the European Council and, more broadly, their capacity to act through this body (Dinan 2013a). Obviously, they aspired at collectively exercising leadership in European affairs (Tömmel 2009).

However, the choice for a ‘permanent’ presidency of the European Council does not implicate that the expectations of national leaders would easily materialise. Of course such a president, by managing the agenda and brokering among the diverging national interests, could mitigate the collective action problems that the European Council usually faces (Tallberg 2006). Yet the incumbent could also push for decisions which exceed the median of national preferences, and thus act in line with the dynamism of the Commission or even the claims of the European Parliament (EP). As many studies inspired by neo-institutionalism prove, institutional actors tend to deviate from the goals initially linked to their office (see e.g. March and Olsen 1989; Pollack 1996; Tallberg 2002). In the EU, experience with permanent positions at the European level, even when clearly affiliated to the intergovernmental bodies, reveals that the incumbents often tend to enhance the supranational forces (see e.g. Beach 2008; Lewis 2012). Instead of just brokering among diverging national interests, the office holders pursue objectives of the Union as a whole, which clearly exceed what member states alone would aspire to achieve.

Other deviations from the goals initially linked to the office might arise as well. By brokering in intergovernmental negotiations, a ‘permanent’ president might not just be neutral. On the contrary, in case of major conflicts, he/she might favour the preferences of individual or smaller groups of member states, for example, those of the most powerful or the most integration-minded states, or even those of the veto-players. Thus, the incumbent might contribute to altering the power balance in the European Council and increase the divisions among national leaders.

Against this background, this contribution aims at exploring the leadership performance of the first standing president of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy. It questions whether van Rompuy primarily acted as a neutral broker in order to define the zone of common agreement, or whether he aspired to push forward integration beyond the median of national preferences. In the first case, the incumbent would strengthen the intergovernmental dimension of the EU, as he or she helps to improve the European Council’s capacity to act. By contrast in the second case, he or she might act in favour of the Union’s supranational dynamics, fuelled by the functional logic of European integration and deliberate cooperation with the European Commission and, depending on the issue at stake, the EP. In addition, the contribution questions whether the president of the European Council succeeds in matching the aspirations of this body as a whole or rather those of individual or smaller groups of member states. In sum, the contribution explores whether the new position of a ‘permanent’ president of the European Council tends to alter the power balance between the EU’s intergovernmental and supranational dimension and whether it supports the empowerment of certain member states at the expense of others.

The contribution is organised as follows. It first provides a brief overview of the theoretical insights into the role and importance of the presidents of the Council and the European Council and their scope for providing political leadership. Drawing on these insights, it elaborates an analytical framework for exploring the leadership performance of the European Council’s first standing president. The empirical part starts with a brief summary of the performance of Herman van Rompuy in office. It then analyses his leadership in a single case: the negotiations on the multiannual financial framework (MFF) for the period 2014–2020. The MFF is a highly contested issue in Council negotiations; at the same time, it is an issue where the Commission submits the proposal and the EP has to give its consent. This constellation makes it particularly suited to gauge the leadership capacities of the president in reaching an agreement either in favour of the intergovernmental or the supranational dimension of the EU. The analysis shows that van Rompuy largely strengthened the intergovernmental dimension of the EU and particularly acted in favour of the preferences of the powerful member states. On the basis of these findings, the conclusions provide tentative answers to the questions raised above and specify the issues and direction for further research.

Leadership of Council and European Council presidents: theoretical approaches

Already under the rotating presidencies of the Council and the European Council, various studies analysed the leadership performance of the incumbents (see e.g. Elgström 2003; Beach and Mazzucelli 2008a; Alexandrova and Timmermans 2013). These studies questioned whether the presidents ‘mattered’ in reaching decisions, that is, whether they successfully set the agenda, mediated diverging national interests, and forged the necessary compromises. Some analyses also focused on whether final decisions reflected the common denominator of the participating states or rather matched the president’s interests or those of his/her home country. The results of these analyses, based either on quantitative or qualitative research methods, were mixed. Generally, scholars agreed that the presidencies were of the utmost importance for the functioning of the Council and did matter in reaching decisions (e.g. Metcalfe 1998; Hayes-Renshaw 2007; Westlake 2007). Some authors concluded that the incumbents influenced decisions in favour of their own preferences or those of their country of origin (Tallberg 2006; Schalk et al. 2007, 2008; Thompson 2008; Leconte 2012). Others, however, did not confirm such a bias; according to their findings, most decisions reflected the collective interests of the Council as a whole (see e.g. Alexandrova and Timmermans 2013). Some observers saw the room for presidencies to pursue national interests shrinking, particularly since the reforms of the Lisbon Treaty (Leconte 2012).

Scholarly analyses also sought to specify the conditions which enable presidencies to exercise political leadership. Beach and Mazzucelli (2008b), referring to the Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC)¹ for Treaty reform, identified leadership resources, the impact of the negotiation context, and the choice of leadership strategies as crucial variables determining the success or failure of presidencies in the negotiation arena.

The theoretical insights summarised above mostly refer to the Council and the European Council alike, which both, before the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty, were subject to rotating presidencies. Yet there are significant differences between these two bodies. Such differences do not only follow from the nature of the respective decisions, but also the procedural rules which frame decision-making. In the case of the Council, the Commission with its exclusive right of initiative plays a crucial role in determining the agenda, as it submits the proposals for legislative acts and many other decisions. Hence, the Council presidents’ agenda-setting role is limited to selecting and prioritising issues from the spectrum proposed by the Commission. Furthermore, since decisions are in most cases taken by majority voting, the broker function is less demanding. This applies, however, only to brokering within the Council; externally, brokering has become more challenging because the ordinary legislative procedure requires a compromise with the EP.

The setting in the European Council is different. Although the Commission president participates in the meetings and is often prompted to prepare a proposal for finding common ground, other actors can also submit proposals: individual member states, groups of states, for example the German-French tandem, the General Affairs Council and, of course, the European Council as a whole and the rotating or ‘permanent’ presidency itself. There is more scope for the president to set the agenda, even though he/she shares this function with other actors, particularly the heads of powerful member states. Furthermore, the procedures of decision-making are far less formalised and thus more in the hands of the presidency. At the same time though, since unanimous voting or consensus is always required, common ground is more difficult to achieve and the broker function of the presidency gains much more salience. It is therefore not accidental that national governments chose for a ‘permanent’ president only in case of the European Council, the Foreign Affairs Council and the euro-group within these bodies, whereas all other Council formations continue to function under the rotating presidency of its members.

Tallberg (2006, see also 2008) has presented an elaborate theoretical approach to the study of the rotating presidency of the European Council. Departing from rational choice institutionalism, he conceptualised formal leadership in multilateral bargaining arenas by defining the demand as well as the supply for leadership. The demand for formal leadership implies the delegation of three functions to a presidency: agenda management, brokerage, and representational powers (Tallberg 2006, 21–29). Agenda management is further divided into three sub-functions: agenda setting, agenda structuring, and agenda exclusion (Tallberg 2006, 24). The supply of formal leadership refers to the power resources of presidents in multilateral bargains. According to Tallberg, the presidents command two sorts of powers: asymmetrical access to information and asymmetrical control over the negotiation procedure (Tallberg 2006, 29). The first set of powers includes: information about the intensity and distribution of state preferences; technical knowledge of the subject matter; unusual command of the formal negotiation procedure; and knowledge about the incumbent’s influence over outcomes (Tallberg 2006, 30). The second set of powers encompasses the general control of the negotiation process and control over specific negotiation sessions (Tallberg 2006, 31).

Tallberg also specifies the conditions that enable presidents to exploit their position for shifting negotiation outcomes beyond the preferences and interests of the negotiating parties. He assumes that the incumbents’ influence depends on formal institutional rules, that is, agenda-setting rules and decision-rules. Regarding agenda-setting rules, the president is more influential when he has the power to set the agenda, while sharing this function with other actors or being confronted with an external agenda-setter diminishes his influence. Decision rules may differ depending on whether they are taken by majority voting or by unanimity. Obviously, in case of unanimity the president has less influence on the outcomes of decisions.

Tallberg applied his theoretical approach to the rotating presidencies of the European Council; yet with minor adaptations, it also fits the analysis of a ‘permanent’ president’s leadership. The approach does not define all possible conditions determining the power and influence of presidents; it leaves ample room to analyse empirically their leadership and to identify the factors that determine their powers. In his own research on the European Council, Tallberg concluded that in particular the distributive impacts of decisions determine the presidents’ room for manoeuvre.

In sum, the presidencies of the Council and European Council ‘matter’ in reaching decisions and building consensus. However, successful political leadership depends on certain conditions. The institutional setting of the office and the functions delegated to it provide both resources and constraints for leadership performance. Resources for agenda management result from control on agenda-setting, agenda-structuring and agenda-exclusion. Resources for brokering depend on control of decision-procedures and favourable decision rules, such as majority voting. Constraints for agenda-management result from sharing agenda-setting with other institutional actors; constraints for brokerage result from limited control of decision-procedures and unanimity as decision rule. Situational constraints mainly result from highly conflicting issues on the agenda, in particular those with distributive impacts. A president then would be a successful leader if he or she is able to fully exploit the resources at his or her disposal and to transcend or overcome the constraints he/she faces.

However, successful leadership is also defined by its result: the decision achieved and the underlying consensus. The quality of such decisions might widely vary. In many cases, European Council decisions just represent the common denominator of national leaders’ preferences; in other cases, they clearly transcend the individual preferences and thus tend to advance the common good of the Union as a whole. In referring to Burns (see also Tömmel and Verdun 2017), achieving common denominator decisions would qualify a president as transactional leader, whereas decisions which transcend these preferences indicate transforming leadership. The consensus underlying a decision might also vary in quality. A consensus that encompasses all the preferences of the member states indicates a more successful leadership than a consensus which is biased toward the preferences of just a smaller group, for example, the most powerful states.

Analytical framework

When analysing the standing presidency of the European Council, it is important first to elaborate on the specifics of this office as compared to the former system of rotating presidencies. A president holding the office for a longer period of time has a supranational office, in contrast to the rotating presidents, who are heads of state or government and, as such, national actors. The Lisbon Treaty clearly stipulates: ‘The President of the European Council shall not hold a national office’ (Art. 15(6) TEU-L); this implies: ‘The President of the European Council, unlike the former rotating Presidency, has a European mandate, and not a national one’ (Borchardt 2010, 53). Thus instead of just improving intergovernmental decision-making, a ‘permanent’ president could, in principle, act in line with the supranational dynamics of integration. Furthermore, he or she hardly has an incentive to exploit the office for partisan interests of his home country. However, with a supranational mandate, the office holder might be less powerful and influential in his actions, since he or she misses the backing of his or her state of origin; in fact, as Dinan puts it, the president is ‘stateless’ (Dinan 2013b, 97, 2017).

A further important difference between a rotating and a ‘permanent’ presidency of the European Council results from the time horizon of the incumbents. Whereas the former is just for six months in office, the latter may preside for a maximum of five years. Such a long period provides ample room for exercising political leadership, for example, through developing a vision on long-term goals and structuring negotiations accordingly; through building stable alliances with other actors and institutions at European level; or through cumulating information about member states’ preferences and negotiation strategies. Hence, a long-term presidency enables the incumbent to pursue more far-reaching objectives of integration.

Defining the analytical framework, I depart from the functions that are usually delegated to presidencies: agenda-management, brokerage and representation. The tasks of the standing presidency of the European Council are specified in the Lisbon Treaty as follows (see also De Schoutheete 2012, 48): The president shall chair the meetings of the European Council and ‘drive forward its work, … ensure the preparation and continuity of its work, … endeavour to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council, … present a report to the European Parliament after each of the meetings, … ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy’ (Art. 15(6) TEU-L). Indeed, these Treaty stipulations clearly confirm that the president of the European Council has to perform the three functions, as defined by Tallberg (2006) and other scholars (Blavoukos, Bourantonis, and Pagulatos 2007). While agenda-management and brokerage are salient to achieve decisions, the third function refers mainly to the representation of the European Council in external settings. In this study, I will not consider this third function, but focus exclusively on agenda-management and brokerage.

The function of agenda-management is determined to a large extent by the institutional configuration of the EU; yet the respective rules widely differ with regard to the three sub-functions. While the president has considerable room for manoeuvre in agenda-structuring, he or she is rather constrained in agenda-setting and agenda exclusion. The president is not the exclusive agenda-setter in the European Council; in certain issue areas, he or she shares this function with the Commission. Furthermore, the heads of states or government, either individually or groups of them, might launch such proposals. Therefore, we may expect that the standing president, in both agenda-setting and agenda exclusion, either chooses to draw a common line with the Commission, or to align to the preferences of the member states in the European Council. Depending on these choices, he or she may exploit agenda-structuring for further pursuing either of these two options. In addition, the president might privilege certain member states or groups of them at the expense of others.

The function of brokerage is, to a large extent, determined by the decision-rules in the European Council. The respective regulations remained unchanged in the Lisbon Treaty; hence, unanimity or consensus continues to be the rule. Exceptions mostly refer to appointment or election procedures for high-profile positions in the EU; the president of the European Council him- or herself is elected by a qualified majority (Art. 15(5) TEU-L). This weakens the incumbent’s position as a neutral broker serving all members of the European Council alike, as he or she might be inclined to primarily support those states which proposed and elected him or her for the office. The unanimity rule implies that the brokerage function of the president is of utmost significance for achieving decisions. The brokerage function might even impinge on the agenda management function, as in certain cases, the president might avoid to push the agenda too far in the direction of supranational objectives and away from the preferences of the member states. Unanimity voting clearly limits the chances of the president to shape him- or herself the final outcome of a decision. This is particularly the case in issue area with highly diverging distributive impacts. In cases where the consent of the EP is required, as for example in enlargements of the Union or in decisions on the MFF, the president has to consider this body’s opinions and preferences as well. This might shift his brokering efforts towards a more supranational stance.

Regarding the supply of leadership by the standing president of the European Council, the question is whether the office holder is able to exploit the power resources that he/she commands. According to Tallberg (2006), presidents have two major power resources at their disposal: asymmetric access to information and asymmetric control over the negotiation procedure. Regarding access to information, two of Tallberg’s four categories are of major importance for successful brokerage: command of information about the intensity and distribution of state preferences and command of technical knowledge of the subject matter. The availability of technical knowledge might widely vary depending on the issue at stake.

Regarding the control over the negotiation procedures, the president will face difficulties in exercising both general control of the negotiation process and control over specific negotiation sessions. The general negotiation process is to a large degree determined by the institutional structure of the EU; there remains hardly room to configure it. The president may control specific negotiation sessions; yet his or her control is contingent upon his or her skills in defining the scope and objectives of the negotiations, in formulating the zone of common agreement, and in structuring and brokering a possible consensus. The president’s success, however, is also contingent upon the determination of national leaders to pursue partisan or group interests. This determination will be stronger when distributional issues are at stake.

In view of the institutional configuration of the European Council’s standing presidency and the incumbents’ opportunities to supply leadership in this office, I formulate three expectations for the empirical analysis of van Rompuy’s performance:

First, the president of the European Council is constrained in his agenda-setting and agenda-excluding role. Depending on the issue area, either the Commission or single or groups of member states, or both, will set the agenda. However, he can use his agenda-structuring powers as a resource for exercising leadership in European Council negotiations. Depending on the issue area and the involvement of co-agenda-setters, he might structure the agenda either nearer to the preferences of the Commission and the EP, or those of national leaders. Where highly diverging distributive impacts are at stake, he might use agenda-structuring in favour of particular member states.

Second, the exercise of the brokerage function depends on the skills of the president; yet it is also contingent upon the distribution of preferences in the European Council. In case of huge differences, the brokerage will most probably result in decisions further away from common European objectives and nearer to the preferences of the most powerful states. In issue areas where the EP’s consent is required, the final outcome might at least slightly shift towards its position.

Third, in light of the opportunities and constraints that the president faces, he will mainly perform as a transactional leader, particularly, when highly distributive issues are at stake. Only in cases where he displays extraordinary skills in structuring the agenda and controlling the negotiation process, he will be able to exercise transforming leadership.

The first standing president in office: Herman van Rompuy

Immediately after the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, heads of state or government elected the then Belgian Prime Minister Herman van Rompuy as the first standing president of the European Council by acclamation (Barber 2010; Dinan 2011, 2013a, 2017; Howorth 2011; Verdun 2013). This choice, however, contrary to its appearance was not unanimous. Other candidates were discussed as well – Tony Blair, Jean-Claude Juncker and Jan-Peter Balkenende – but failed to gain the support of a majority; either because they appeared as strong leaders or because they held explicit visions on European integration not shared by the European Council members. In fact, it was the German-French tandem, Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel, who proposed Herman van Rompuy for the office (Barber 2010, 61). Just as his proponents, this candidate was affiliated to the centre-right European People’s Party group; he was competent and experienced in European affairs, strongly committed to the European project, and above all had a conciliatory nature. National leaders preferred a candidate who would first of all serve as a broker in European Council negotiations and also perform the task of structuring the agenda and the meetings, without vigorously driving forward the Council’s work.

The performance of van Rompuy during five years in office seems to confirm these expectations (Howorth 2011; Dinan 2013a, 2017). He streamlined the procedures of the meetings and succeeded in increasing their efficiency. He convened more meetings and particularly more informal meetings than any president before him and thus created ample room for extensive consultations and negotiations among national leaders. He cared for more transparency of the proceedings by duly informing the EP and speaking to the public, and had frequent media appearances. He also carefully forged consensual inter-institutional relationships, in the first place with the Commission and particularly its president, but also with the EP and the successive rotating presidencies of the Council (Dinan 2013a, 1265, Dinan 2017). Van Rompuy successfully managed the conclusion of negotiations on extremely complex and contested issues, such as the establishment of the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability Mechanism, the agreement on the Fiscal Compact, and the agreement on the MFF for the period 2014–2020. Heads of state or government confirmed his largely successful incumbency, by re-electing him after two and a half years in office for a second term and, also, by assigning him the function of chair of the Euro Summit meetings.

However, van Rompuy did not particularly drive forward the work of the European Council; his leadership performance was primarily marked by promoting consensus-building behind the scenes. Luxembourg’s prime minister Jean-Claude Juncker blamed him for just summarising the views of national leaders, instead of expressing his own views (Dinan 2011, 107). Howorth saw his role ‘more secretarial than presidential’ and concluded: ‘Although van Rompuy succeeded relatively well in coordinating … the project for economic governance, he was never even remotely in the driving seat’ (Howorth 2011, 14, 16).

Yet an assessment of van Rompuy’s leadership supply has to regard the extremely unfavourable situational context of his incumbency. Over the whole period of his first and partly also his second term, the financial and sovereign debt crisis and the ensuing euro crisis dominated the agenda of the European Council (Howorth 2011; Dinan 2013a, 2017; Verdun 2017). Solutions to these crises were highly contested among national leaders; these circumstances severely constrained forward-pushing agenda-setting and even brokerage was difficult to perform.

In conclusion, van Rompuy’s leadership performance over his two terms can be considered as fairly successful in exercising the functions of agenda-structuring and brokerage (Howorth 2011; Dinan 2013a; Verdun 2013, 2017). He succeeded in managing the meetings of the European Council, improving their procedural efficiency, and in forging compromises among national leaders and also with the other institutions of the EU. Yet he did not show particular leadership skills transcending brokerage and made no attempts to push forward European integration beyond national preferences. His leadership in general terms can best be characterised as transactional.

The negotiations on the MFF 2014–2020

Decision-making of the European Council on the MFF, although they are only at large intervals on the agenda, can be characterised as routine business (Dinan 2013a, 1269). Nevertheless, these decisions are strongly contested among the member states because of their distributive impacts. Such impacts do not only follow from the overall ceiling of the EU budget, but also from the allocations to individual budget lines and policy areas. In fact, it is the allocations to policy areas that differently impact on the member states and their position as net payers or recipients. In the past, net payers like the UK, which could not benefit from EU distributive policies, received rebates on their budgetary contribution. Thus, overall, defending national interests and a mindset of ‘juste retour’ dominate the negotiations on the MFF.

Decision-making on the MFF is a joint endeavour of EU institutions. The Commission submits the proposal; the General Affairs Council prepares the decision and later adopts the respective regulations; the European Council decides on the basic parameters of the MFF and the EP gives its consent and co-decides on all connected legislative acts. This complex institutional setting implies both resources and constraints for the president of the European Council to exercise leadership. On the one hand, the incumbent may rely on the support of the Commission and the EP; on the other hand, he or she is confronted with an extremely divided negotiation arena in the European Council. Furthermore, the president has to share agenda-setting with the Commission and the rotating presidencies.

The negotiations on the MFF 2014–2020 were officially opened with the Commission submitting its proposal in July 2011 (European Commission 2011a). However, already in 2010, the Commission had set the scene by a Communication to the institutions on the review of the EU’s budget (European Commission 2010). In this Communication, it pleaded for the reorganisation of the system of own resources and for spending the budget ‘more intelligently’, that is, on policies that serve the Union as a whole. The funds would have to be spent on promoting economic growth and reducing unemployment, particularly through the Europe 2020 strategy. Hence the Commission pleaded for a fairly large budget and downplayed conflicts among the member states by emphasising common objectives.

The European Council correctly understood the message by responding himself with a brief statement in its Conclusions of October 2010:

… at the same time that fiscal discipline is reinforced in the European Union, it is essential that the … forthcoming Multi-annual Financial Framework reflect the consolidation efforts being made by Member States to bring deficit and debt onto a more sustainable path. (European Council 2010, 2)

Clearly, national leaders expressed their will to pare down the budget to a minimum.

Just before the Commission submitted its official proposal, the EP on 8 June 2011 adopted a resolution stating that ‘at least a 5% increase of the resources is needed for the next MFF’ (European Parliament 2011). This resolution gave the Commission the opportunity to present itself as more moderate and to argue in another Communication to the institutions, issued later in June 2011, that it ‘sought to strike the right balance between ambition and realism’ (European Commission 2011b, 5). The Commission proposal envisaged a slight reduction of the overall budget in terms of the percentage of the member states’ Gross National Income (GNI) from 108 to 105%. Since an estimated 85% of these resources are provided by the member states as direct payments, the Commission pleaded for a significant expansion of the Union’s own resources, based on a financial transaction tax and a new Value Added Tax resource (European Commission 2011b, 6). Obviously, this would make the Commission more independent and reduce conflicts among the member states on distributive issues.

Furthermore, the Commission proposed a slight reduction of the allocations to cohesion policy, yet emphasised its importance for stimulating economic growth and job creation (European Commission 2011b, 3). Throughout all budgetary items, the Commission identified as priorities ‘pan-European infrastructure, research and innovation, education and culture, securing the EU’s external borders and external relations policy priorities such as the EU’s neighbourhood’ (European Commission 2011b, 8–9). By arguing this way, the Commission set higher hurdles for national leaders to reduce the allocations to individual budgetary items.

The ensuing discussions on the Commission proposal in the Council under rotating presidencies brought the controversies among the member states to the fore (Council of the European Union 2011). Of course, all governments agreed that economic growth and job creation was of primary importance and that the Europe 2020 strategy was the appropriate tool to achieve these goals. However, the details of the MFF were highly contested and the Commission package was quickly unbundled into its individual budget items. As usual in MFF negotiations, a major cleavage emerged between net payers and net recipients. The latter fiercely opposed reductions regarding cohesion policy and pleaded for an increase of the overall budget above the ceiling of the Commission proposal. Additional cleavages emerged between states with rebates, and other states, which pleaded for removing all rebates but, in case that this was not feasible, claimed for themselves such privileges (Council of the European Union 2011, 12–13). Further contested issues were the allocations to the agricultural sector, the commitment to foster research and innovation and the Connecting Europe Facility – a new instrument proposed by the Commission for improving trans-European infrastructure networks. All these issues were intensely debated in the Council, first, under the Polish presidency (July until December 2011), then the Danish presidency (January until June 2012) and, finally, the Cypriot presidency (July until December 2012). The result was a detailed delineation of all conflicting issues, without however a consensus on any of them.

The European Council entered into the negotiations on the MFF in June 2012, at the end of the Danish presidency. President van Rompuy had prepared the meeting by posing national leaders two questions, namely, how the MFF could contribute to growth and job creation and how it could best serve the Europe 2020 strategy (European Council 2012a). With these questions, van Rompuy clearly attempted to channel the discussion into a non-controversial direction, since no member state had ever attempted – or dared – to query these topics. Yet these questions were extremely open; they implicitly suggested that the answers were not already given in the Commission proposal. Unsurprisingly, proceeding in this way did not diminish, but rather increased the controversies among the member states; the European Council in its conclusions could not communicate any concrete results (European Council 2012b).

The final negotiations on the MFF were scheduled to take place by the end of that year. In the meeting of November 2012, van Rompuy submitted a proposal that significantly reduced the overall budget and restructured the allocations to individual items. While he increased the allocations to growth and employment, he slightly reduced those to cohesion, agriculture and other distributive policies. Before the meeting, he held bilateral talks with all national leaders, which resulted in further reducing the proposed financial allocations. Alain Lamassoure, chairman of the EP committee on budget, heavily criticised van Rompuy’s bilateral talks as the ‘wrong approach’, one that lacks a ‘European spirit’ and exacerbates ‘the opposition of the net contributor countries … with the net beneficiary countries …’ (Der Brief Nr. 556, 20.11.12:2-3). Indeed, in spite of van Rompuy’s attempts to build consensus at a comparatively low level, the summit ended up in deep dissent (European Council 2012c).

The issue had to be re-discussed at another summit meeting in February 2013. Time was now pressing, since a decision of the European Council does not mark the end of the process. Indeed, after 24 h of negotiation, national leaders reached a consensus on the MFF 2014–2020 (see Table 1). Van Rompuy considered the agreement as a success; in his view, this budget allows ‘doing more with less money’ (European Council, the President 2013a, 2). However, for the first time in the history of European integration, the MFF was reduced in both real terms (with 3.5%) and as a percentage of member states’ GNI (from 1.08 to 1.00%). The reduction amounted to 6.3% of the Commission proposal and the Parliament’s claim for a 5% increase was completely ignored. Moreover, the allocations to cohesion policy, security and citizenship as well as global Europe were reduced by between 13 and 16%, while those for agriculture were by and large maintained. Whereas the poorer member states mainly benefit from cohesion policy, agriculture serves more the richer member states, particularly France. Thus overall, both the reduction of the budget and the shifts in the allocation to individual policy areas clearly reflect the dominance of the powerful states in the negotiation arena.

Table 1. Multiannual financial framework 2014–2020, commitment appropriations, Commission proposal and European Council decision (EUR million, 2011 prices).

Commitment appropriations	Commission proposal 2011		Final decision European Council		Change in per cent
	Absol. N.	%	Absol. N.	%
Smart and inclusive growth	490,908	47.8	450,763	47.0	−8.2
of which cohesion	376,020	36.7	325,149	33.9	−13.5
Sustainable growth	382,927	37.3	373,179	38.9	−0.8
of which agriculture, direct payments	281,825	27.5	277,851	28.9	−1.5
Security and citizenship	18,535	1.8	15,686	16.3	−15.4
Global Europe	70,000	6.8	58,704	6.1	−16.1
Administration	62,629	6.1	61,629	6.4	−1.6
Total	1025,000	100	959,988 (+27 for compensations)	100	−6.3

Sources: European Commission (2011a): Annex, European Council (2013), Annex I; percentages: calculated by author.

This assessment is further confirmed when looking at the rebates, as these were expanded, despite severe criticism. In addition to the UK, four other countries, i.e. Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and Austria, were able to secure such an extra benefit. Thus a group of rich EU states succeeded in reducing their contribution to the budget. The issue of own resources was put off the agenda, regardless of a feasible proposal of the Commission. Van Rompuy reported that this issue was one that ‘few member states had the appetite to consider’ (European Council, the President 2013b, 3); it seems he did little to whet their appetite.

In summary, the negotiations on the MFF 2014–2020 were clearly dominated by the net payers and their will to reduce the overall budget and the allocations to policy areas serving solidarity in the EU. Van Rompuy hardly acted in support of the Commission proposal, let alone the claims of the EP. Instead, he primarily aimed at forging a consensus among national leaders by successively lowering the ceiling of the budget and the allocations to policies that benefit the poorer states. The result is strongly biased towards the interests of the net payers and the most powerful EU states. Smaller rich states were appeased with side-payments in the form of rebates. Finally, van Rompuy refrained completely from promoting the own resources issue, that is, the long-term objective of the Union as a whole.

In conclusion, van Rompuy’s leadership supply in the negotiations on the MFF 2014–2020 was rather weak. He did not skilfully exploit his power resources of structuring the agenda and controlling the negotiation process during the meetings. With the open questions for the first European Council session and the bilateral talks before the second session, he rather intensified the divides among national leaders instead of reducing them. Furthermore, he refrained from defining a common denominator that would at least slightly transcend national egotism, and from promoting a reform of the EU budget. In sum, the president did not broker a consensus in the interest of all member states alike, let alone in the interest of the Union as a whole. However, we have to bear in mind that the situational context was extremely unfavourable for major achievements (Dinan 2017). The MFF negotiations as such are characterised by strong distributional conflicts, which generally constrain a president in brokering a compromise. In addition, the negotiations of the years 2012 and 2013 were heavily influenced by the euro-crisis and, hence, the declared will of the powerful states to reduce as much as possible public spending in the EU.

Conclusions: the leadership of the European Council president

In drawing conclusions regarding the leadership of Herman van Rompuy, we can first note that he pursued the two central functions of his office, agenda management and brokering, with different degrees of success. In fact, he mainly concentrated his efforts on brokering; this became particularly visible in the negotiations on the MFF 2014–2020. During these negotiations, van Rompuy had not much room in agenda-setting, as the Commission drafts the formal proposal; but he did also not much to exploit his powers in agenda-structuring. Successively, he lowered the level of the common denominator in the negotiations and adapted his proposals to the wishes of the powerful member states. Thus, he clearly subordinated agenda-structuring to achieving a compromise. The function of brokering was paramount to van Rompuy’s leadership performance. In the negotiations on the MFF, he managed to broker a compromise that was finally accepted by all member states and received the consent of the EP. However, this compromise primarily reflects the interests of the rich and powerful member states. These interests are also reflected in van Rompuy’s inactivity on the own resources issue.

In terms of leadership supply, van Rompuy’s performance was rather weak, particularly in the MFF negotiations. Instead of himself submitting strong proposals guided by common objectives of the Union, and by aligning his proposals with those of the Commission or the EP, he ascertained national preferences and thus allowed heads of state or government to dominate the negotiations. He performed as a successful broker in their interest, but not as a president who puts his footprint on the final outcome.

Regarding the basic question raised in the introduction, we can conclude that the first standing president of the European Council hardly acted as an agent promoting the supranational dynamics of integration. He did not attempt to forge an alliance with the Commission, let alone with the EP. Instead, he served to improve intergovernmental decision-making and to conclude an agreement in the interest of certain states at the expense of others. Thus at best, his leadership can be qualified as transactional; in the longer run, it might even contribute to exacerbating the divisions among the member states. However, the situational context of van Rompuy’s presidency was extremely unfavourable to shift the balance towards a more supranational dynamic. Particularly in the negotiations on the MFF, such ambitious goals were hard to achieve in face of the net payers’ search for austerity and the pressures of the euro-crisis. Under these circumstances, there was little room for exercising transforming leadership. Thus for the time being, the position of a ‘permanent’ president of the European Council tends to shift the power balance in the EU in favour of its intergovernmental dimension, and within this dimension, in favour of the powerful member states.

In light of these findings, further research on the standing presidency of the European Council is needed in order to assess whether this position contributes to structurally shift the power balance between the intergovernmental and the supranational dimension of the EU in favour of the former, or whether such shifts are primarily temporary effects of an unusually constraining situational context and, perhaps too, of a lack in leadership supply of the incumbent. Such an exercise would include comparing presidencies of different incumbents and their leadership performance in both highly contested and less controversial issue areas and, also, considering the power relations among EU institutions as well as among the member states.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Acknowledgement

The author would like to thank Sandra Eckert, George Ross, Amy Verdun and all the participants of the workshop on Political Leadership in the EU held in November 2015 in Osnabrück as well as the reviewers of JER for helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this contribution. Special thanks go to the European Commission Erasmus+ programme – Jean Monnet ‘Policy debate with academic world’ for funding the project.

Notes

1. The IGCs are in fact also European Council formations with a specific agenda.