Do votes matter? Voting weights and the success probability of member state requests in the Council of the European Union

Abstract

The impact of votes on Council decision-making is a widely studied subject. A large body of theory supports the contention that more votes, ceteris paribus, translate into more influence. Empirical studies have, however, shown a negative relationship between the voting power of a member state and its bargaining success. Based on a new data set, this study shows empirically that there is a robust positive relationship between the number of votes backing a member state request to change European legislation and its success probability. The analysis is based on all unique member state requests for exemptions, lower standards or longer transitional time periods in the field of environmental policy between the first wave of Eastern Enlargement in 2004 and the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty in 2009 (N = 216). It also shows that member state requests are often successful, contrary to the image of an unresponsive Brussels.

Keywords:

• Council of the European Union
• voting power
• blocking minority
• legislative decision-making
• member state interventions
• gridlock

Acknowledgements

A previous version was presented at the 45th Annual Conference, University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES), Bilbao, September 2015, and at a workshop at NIAS in December 2015. I am grateful for helpful comments by the participants, in particular to Bernard Steunenberg and Madeleine Hosli.

Notes

1. The data-set is available via Harvard’s Dataverse (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/ENLaEX). For more information, detailed examples and some analysis at the level of individual requests consult Warntjen (2017) and the web appendix provided in the supplementary material.

2. The web appendix presents the results of a series of model specifications and the complete set of regression diagnostics. The sum of votes of requesting countries has a robust positive effect on the probability of success. The appendix, the data-set and replication code is accessible at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/VDM.