Regional actorness and interregional relations: ASEAN, the EU and Mercosur

Abstract

The European Union (EU) has a long tradition of interregional dialogue mechanisms with other regional organisations and is using these relations to project its own model of institutionalised actorness. This is partly motivated by the emerging actorness of the EU itself, which benefits from fostering capable regional counterparts in other parts of the world. This article advances the argument that actorness, which we conceptualise in terms of institutions, recognition and identity, is a relational concept, dependent on context and perception. Taking the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) and their relations with the EU as case studies, this article demonstrates that the actorness capabilities of all three organisations have been enhanced as result of ASEAN-EU and Mercosur-EU relations. However, there are clear limits to the development of the three components of regional actorness and to the interregional relations themselves. While there is evidence of institutional enhancement in ASEAN and Mercosur, these formal changes have been grafted on top of firmly entrenched normative underpinnings. The formation of different identities and institutional capacities has narrowed the scope of EU interregionalism despite the initial success of improved regional actorness.

Keywords:

• Actorness
• interregionalism
• regional organisations
• European Union
• ASEAN
• Mercosur

Notes

1. ‘Methodological nationalism’ refers to the notion that the state is the only relevant actor in international relations (Söderbaum 2016, 53).

2. The ASEAN Declaration of 1967 was signed by Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand.

3. GDP change at constant prices (IMF 2012).

4. In 2012, the Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action 2013–2017 was signed at the 19th AEMM, further deepening interregional relations and cooperation on economic but also political and security issues.

5. See also the work of Jetschke and Murray (2012).

6. See also ASEAN (1967, 1976).

7. See Gilson’s work on norm reinforcement (2005).

8. Between 2004 and 2010, the negotiations were suspended due to the unwillingness on both sides to revisit positions on trade. So far, a total of nine negotiations rounds have been held without reaching an agreement.

9. In 2012 for example, the diplomatic disputes between the EU and Argentina arose after the nationalisation of a Spanish oil subsidiary.

10. Paraguay was the first member to hold direct elections in 2008. The other states were scheduled to follow but the implementation has been postponed several times. Only Argentina held the first elections for the Mercosur Parliament simultaneously with general elections in October 2015.

11. The financing mainly goes to local infrastructure or social expenditures.

12. For 2013, Brazil contributed over 80% to the budget while almost 90% of the funds were intended to go to Paraguay and Uruguay (Mercosur 2012). However, the current domestic budget crisis could reduce the financial leverage of Brazil.

13. Uruguay is the country with the highest income per capita in the region and is therefore less in need of financial support to catch up with the region but it remains a major recipient. Brazil is bound to negotiate trade agreements within Mercosur and requires Uruguay’s endorsement for its global trade ambitions. Uruguayan perception of power asymmetries in favour of Brazil have led to discontent and threats to leave Mercosur for closer alignment with the US.