The European art of governing. The tension between collegiality and national interests in the Cabinets of the European Commissioners

ABSTRACT

To explore what we call the ‘European art of governing’, this article examines the Cabinets of the members of the European Commission. They function at the interface between levels and modes of governance, between the Commission and Member State governments, between national interests (of capitals) and sectoral interests (their portfolios). A new interpretation of the ‘denationalization’ process is given, focusing more on profiles than on practices. Cabinets have been remarkably stable since the end of the 1960s in their role as conduits of collegiality. However they also reflect a new form of ‘intergovernmentalization’ of the Commission. Using a historical and sociological approach, the article shows how collegiality at the Commission has been exercised since the Delors period of presidentialization and Juncker’s introduction of real Vice-Presidents, generating complex forms of competition between horizontal and vertical coordination processes.

KEYWORDS:

• European Commission
• cabinets
• methods of government
• collegiality
• coordination
• denationalization
• presidentialization
• intergovernmentalization

Acknowledgments

Thanks are due to the anonymous referees for their valuable comments and to Adam Ffoulkes Roberts for his translation of the original French text and additional editorial suggestions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Speech to the European Parliamentary Assembly on 20 March 1958.

2. Two members, a secretary and a shorthand typist in 1958.

3. In January 1973, the composition of Cabinets was determined as follows: each Commissioner’s Cabinet had five A-grade staff, two B-grade staff and six C-grade staff. The Cabinet of the President had an additional member of staff of each grade.

4. Walter Hallstein first convened ad hoc meetings of the Cabinets in 1965, in order to prepare for difficult discussions, but it was Jean Rey who institutionalized this practice.

5. His Heads of Cabinet were all from the major institutions of the French State. The first had been a member of the Council of State, the second had been at the Inspectorate-General of Finances and the third was from the French diplomatic corps.

6. Coreper (from the French ‘Comité des représentants permanents’) is the Committee of the Member States’ Permanent Representatives to the EU. It was established in 1958, and an additional second body, composed of the Deputy Permanent Representatives, was established in 1960. They are called Coreper II and Coreper I respectively.

7. Except between 1967 and 1973 when there were two centrists (Barre and Deniau) and then during the Delors I Commission (1985–1988) with Claude Cheysson also being a member of the French Socialist Party. From 1958 to 1962, one of the two French Commissioners, Robert Lemaignen, had no political affiliation.

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Notes on contributors

Michel Mangenot

Michel Mangenot is full Professor of Political Science at Paris 8 University, Director of the Institute for European Studies (IEE) and member of the Centre de Recherches Sociologiques et Politiques de Paris-Laboratoire Théorie du politique (CNRS UMR 7217), France.