![Sample our Humanities journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5939/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Humanities.jpg"})
Abstract
This article considers whether the Royal Navy’s 1913 manoeuvres gave the Navy any useful guidance on strategy or tactics for the forthcoming war. By looking at the reasoning behind earlier manoeuvres, the objectives of the 1913 manoeuvres, and comparing their conduct with wartime events, it is demonstrated that little was learned from these manoeuvres. Instead, their objective was political rather than military, intended to show the British Government that the Royal Navy should not be constrained to a defensive role protecting the coast from raids, a role that the Navy ascribed to the Army. Although the results confirmed that Britain was vulnerable to amphibious raids, the Navy would not change its stance, seeking to apply economic warfare against Germany and refusing to disperse the Fleet to cover the coastline. Splitting the fleet, the Admiralty believed, would have made it easier for the German Navy to destroy warships in local actions in their bid to achieve parity with the Royal Navy.
Disclosure statement
In accordance with Taylor & Francis policy and my ethical obligation as a researcher, I am reporting that I have no financial and/or business interests in any company that may be affected by the research reported in this enclosed article.
Notes
1 Matthew S Seligmann, ‘Failing to Prepare for the Great War? The Absence of Grand Strategy in British War Planning before 1914’, War In History, Vol. 24, No. 4, (2017): 414–437; Paul Haggie, ‘The Royal Navy and War Planning in the Fisher Era’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 8, No. 3, (1973): 113–131.
2 ‘War Plans 1907’, in P K Kemp (ed.), The Papers of Admiral Sir John Fisher, Vol 2 (London: NRS, 1964), 316–464; see also Andrew Lambert, The British Way of War: Julian Corbett and the Battle for a National Strategy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021) for Corbett’s role.
3 This section draws on the Introduction in M S Seligmann, F Nagler, and M Epkenhans, The Naval Route To The Abyss: The Anglo-German Naval Race 1895–1914, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), xxii–xxxv.
4 See Paul G Halpern, ‘The Naval War in Print: A Survey of Official Histories, Memoirs and other Publications’, in Der Erste Weltkrieg Zur See, ed. Michael Epkenhans and Stephen Huck (Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2017): 203–218.
5 E L Woodward, Great Britain and the German Navy, (Oxford: OUP, 1935); Arthur J Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A history of British naval policy in the pre-Dreadnought era, 1880–1905, (New York: F Cass, 1940).
6 This paper refers to all-big-gun battleships as Dreadnoughts or battlecruisers as appropriate, and pre-Dreadnought battleships simply as battleships.
7 Matthew S. Seligmann, The Royal Navy and the German Threat, 1901–1914: Admiralty Plans to Protect British Trade in a War Against Germany, (Oxford: OUP, 2012): 65.
8 Charles H. Fairbanks Jr., ‘The Origins of the Dreadnought Revolution: A Historiographical Essay’, The International History Review, Vol 13, No 2, (1991): 255.
9 Ruddock F Mackay, ‘The Admiralty, the German Navy, and the Redistribution of the British Fleet, 1904–1905’, Mariner’s Mirror, Vol. 56, No. 3, (1970): 341–6
10 David G. Morgan-Owen ‘“History is a Record of Exploded Ideas”: Sir John Fisher and Home Defence, 1904–10’, The International History Review, Vol. 36, No. 3, (2014): 566–567.
11 Jon Sumida, ‘Demythologizing the Fisher Era: the Role of Change in the Historical Method’, Militargeschichtliche Zeitschrifte, Vol. 5, Iss 1, (2000): 178.
12 Jon Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy: finance, technology and British naval policy, 1889–1914, (New York: Naval Institute Press, 2014): 51–55.
13 Morgan-Owen ‘Exploded Ideas’, 555–558.
14 Shawn T Grimes, Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887–1918, (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2012): 3.
15 Ibid., 45.
16 Julian S Corbett, ‘The Report on the Fleet Manoeuvres’, The Monthly Review, Dec. 1903, 85.
17 James Goldrick, ‘How it Worked: Understanding the interaction of some environmental and technological realities of naval operations in the opening years of the first World war, 1914–1916’ in Britain's War at Sea, 1914–1918: The war they thought and the war they fought, ed. Greg Kennedy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016): 127–131.
18 Grimes, Strategy and War Planning, 2012, 43.
19 Shawn T Grimes, Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887–1918, DPhil Dissertation, (2004): 80–83.
20 Grimes, Strategy and War Planning, 2012, 84–86.
21 Lambert, British Way of War, 108; Christopher Martin, ‘The 1907 Naval War Plans and the Second Hague Peace Conference: A Case of Propaganda’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, No. 5, 839
22 Kemp, Papers of Admiral Fisher, Vol 2, 338.
23 Ibid., 316; Grimes, Strategy and War Planning, 2012, 89.
24 Kemp, Papers of Admiral Fisher, Vol 2, 338.
25 Admiralty, ‘Great Britain: Naval Manoeuvres 1909’, 19.01.1910: ADM 144/31. The National Archive (hereafter TNA).
26 Grimes, Strategy and War Planning, 2012, 164.
27 ‘The Naval Manoeuvres’, The Times, 22.7.1912: 5. The Times Digital Archive; David G Morgan-Owen, The Fear of Invasion: Strategy, Politics, and British War Planning, 1880–1914. (Oxford: OUP, 2017), 206.
28 Marder, FDSF, Vol 1, 352.
29 Winston Churchill, ‘Notes on the Manoeuvres: Prepared for the Prime Minister By the First Lord’ 17.10.1912: ADM 116/3381. TNA, 10.
30 James Grierson, ‘Dispatch as to the appointment of a Military Attaché to the German Embassy in Berlin’, 14.05.1898: ADM 1/7387A. TNA.
31 Morgan-Owen, Fear of Invasion, 132–133.
32 Ibid., 134; Morgan-Owen ‘Exploded Ideas’ 559.
33 W. R. Robertson, ‘The Military Resources of Germany, and probable Method of their Employment in a War between Germany and England’, 07.02.1903: CAB 3/1/20A TNA, 6.
34 Morgan-Owen, Fear of Invasion, 135.
35 Ibid., 137–140.
36 Ibid., 144.
37 Ibid., 149; M P A Hankey, ‘Invasion’, 15.10.1914: CAB 38/28/48 TNA, 2.
38 Hankey, ‘Invasion’, 5–6.
39 Marder, FDSF, 345–6.
40 Ibid., 245.
41 J E Tyler, The British Army and The Continent 1904–1914, (London: Edward Arnold, 1938), 109–110; G P Gooch and Harold Temperley, British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914, (London: HMSO, 1928), Vol VII, Paper 640.
42 Alistair Wilson and Joseph F Callo (eds.), Who’s Who In Naval History: From 1550 to the present, (London: Routledge, 2004), s.v. ‘Wilson, Arthur’.
43 CID, ‘Minutes of the 114th Meeting’, 23.08.1911: CAB 38/19/49, TNA. 5.
44 Ibid., 2.
45 Lambert, British Way of War, 271
46 Nicholas A Lambert, ‘Admiral Sir Arthur Knyvett-Wilson, V.C. (1910–1911)’, in The First Sea Lords: From Fisher to Mountbatten, ed. Malcolm H Murfett, (Westport: Praeger, 1995), 48.
47 Quoted in Robertson, ‘The Military Resources of Germany’, 2.
48 Morgan-Owen, Fear of Invasion, 200.
49 David Gethin Morgan-Owen, ‘Cooked up in the Dinner Hour? Sir Arthur Wilson’s War Plan, Reconsidered’, The English Historical Review, Vol. 130, No. 545, 866.
50 Nicholas Black, The British Naval Staff In The First World War, (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2011), 57; Morgan-Owen, ‘Cooked up in the Dinner Hour?’, 866.
51 George Ballard, ‘Manoeuvres for 1913’, 29.01.1913: ADM 116/1214. TNA.
52 Much of the following information is drawn from: Admiralty, ‘Naval Manoeuvres, 1913’, June 1913: ADM 116/1214. TNA.
53 Marder, FDSF, Vol 1, Appendix.
54 Admiralty, ‘Naval Manoeuvres, 1913’, 8.
55 Admiralty, ‘Naval Manoeuvres, 1912’, June 1912: ADM 116/1176B, TNA, 6.
56 R.N. War College, Portsmouth, ‘Rules for Tactical Exercises, July 1913’, Backhouse Papers, Naval Historical Branch, Portsmouth.
57 Frederick Tudor, ‘Destroyer Exercises: Proposals for 1913 Practices’, 20.01.1913: ADM 1/8269, TNA, 3.
58 Most of the following is based upon W. H. May, ‘Naval Manoeuvres, 1913’, Aug. 1913: ADM 116/1169. TNA.
59 May, ‘Naval Manoeuvres, 1913’, 11.
60 Ibid., 14.
61 J. R. Jellicoe. ‘Naval Manoeuvres, 1913’, 06.08.1913: ADM 116/3381. TNA. 3.
62 A Temple Patterson, The Jellicoe Papers, Vol. 1 (London: NRS, 1966), 9, 29.
63 May, ‘Naval Manoeuvres, 1913’, 27.
64 W. H. May, ‘Manoeuvres 1913: Report by Umpire-in-Chief’, 18.08.1913: ADM 116/3381. TNA.
65 Ibid., 2.
66 Ibid., 4.
67 Ibid., 16.
68 Ibid., 24.
69 George A. Callaghan, ‘Naval Manoeuvres and the effect on North Sea strategy’. 28.08.1913: ADM 116/3130, 7. TNA
70 Jellicoe, ‘Naval Manoeuvres’, 1–2.
71 May, ‘Manoeuvres 1913: Report’, 31.
72 Jellicoe, ‘Naval Manoeuvres’, 2.
73 Callaghan, ‘Naval Manoeuvres’, 8.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., 11.
76 Jellicoe, ‘Naval Manoeuvres’, 3.
77 Ibid., 4.
78 May, ‘Manoeuvres 1913: Report’, 7.
79 Callaghan, ‘Naval Manoeuvres’, 18–20.
80 Jellicoe, ‘Naval Manoeuvres’, 4.
81 Callaghan, ‘Naval Manoeuvres’, 23.
82 Ibid., 9.
83 Jellicoe, ‘Naval Manoeuvres’, 5.
84 May, ‘Manoeuvres 1913: Report’, 31.
85 Conway's All The World's Fighting Ships 1906–1921, (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1985)
86 May, ‘Manoeuvres 1913: Report’, 22.
87 Ibid., 8.
88 Ibid., 27.
89 Jellicoe. ‘Naval Manoeuvres’, 5
90 Ibid., 7.
91 Callaghan, ‘Naval Manoeuvres’, 4–6.
92 For example Sir John Jellicoe, ‘Correspondence with Sir Henry Jackson’, 12.04.1916: Jellicoe Papers Vol XXIV 1. ff40–44. MS 49012, 1912–16. British Library (hereafter BL).
93 Sir Julian Corbett, Naval Operations: History of the Great War based on Official Documents, Vol 1 (Uckfield: Imperial War Museum and Naval & Military Press, 2009 [1938]), 250.
94 Ibid., 23.
95 Paul G, Halpern, A Naval History of World War 1, (London: UCL Press, 1994), 40.
96 Ibid.
97 Corbett, Naval Operations, Vol 2, Plan 2: The Raid on the Yorkshire Coast.
98 May, ‘Naval Manoeuvres, 1913’, 14.
99 Corbett, Naval Operations, Vol 1, 252.
100 Halpern, Naval History of World War 1, 33.
101 Ibid.; Corbett, Naval Operations, Vol 1, 174–176.
102 Noel F Busch, The Emperor’s Sword: Japan vs. Russia in the Battle of Tsushima, (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1969), 150.
103 Norman Friedman, Naval Weapons of World War One: Guns, Torpedoes, Mines and ASW Weapons of All Nations, (Barnsley: Seaforth, 2011), 19.
104 Sir John Jellicoe, ‘War Orders and Dispositions’, n.d.: Jellicoe Papers Vol XXIV. 1. ff1–16. MS 49012, 1912–16. BL.
105 Corbett, Naval Operations, Vol 3, 337.
106 Sir Roger Backhouse, Minute, 14.09.1916: Jellicoe Papers Vol XXIV. 1. ff94–97. MS 49012, 1912–16. BL.
107 Sir Frederick Dreyer, ‘A few notes on the determination of the most advantageous range at which the Grand Fleet should engage the High Sea Fleet’, n.d.: Jellicoe Papers Vol XXIV. 1. ff81–86. MS 49012, 1912–16. BL.
108 Jon Tetsuro Sumida, ‘The Quest for Reach: The Development of Long-Range Naval Gunnery in the Royal Navy, 1901–1912’ in Tooling for War: Military Transformation in the Industrial Age, ed. Stephen Chiabotti (Chicago: Imprint, 1996), pp. 49–96, and ‘Expectation, Adaptation, and Resignation: British Battle Fleet Tactical Planning, August 1914–April 1916’, Naval War College Revew, Vol. 60, No. 3, 2007, pp. 101–122; John Brooks, ‘“Dreadnought”: Blunder or Genius?’, War In History, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2007, pp 157–178, and ‘Preparing for Armageddon: Gunnery Practices and Exercises in the Grand Fleet Prior to Jutland’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 38:7, 2015, pp. 1006–1023.
109 Sumida, ‘Quest’, 70.
110 Jon Tetsuro Sumida, ‘A Matter of Timing: The Royal Navy and the Tactics of Decisive Battle, 1912–1916’, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 58, Iss. 1, 94.
111 Sumida, ‘Quest’, 52 for the older range finders; Sumida, ‘Timing’, 115–116 for the 1914 introductions.
112 Sumida, ‘Timing’, 117.
113 Corbett, Naval Operations, Vol 2, 89.
114 Ibid., Vol 3, 333, f.n. 2.
115 Brooks, ‘Armageddon’, 1012
116 Friedman, Naval Weapons. 51, 52 and 60.
117 Marder, FDSF, Vol 1, 347.
118 Halpern, Naval History of World War 1, 47.
119 Navy War Staff, ‘Remarks on Comments by the Commander-In-Chief on the 1913 Manoeuvres’, 29.09.1913: ADM 116/1214, TNA, 2.
120 Herbert Richmond, ‘Remarks by ADOD Re, CinC HF’s Letter on North Sea Strategy’, n.d.: ADM 116/1169, TNA. 4.
121 Sir John Jellicoe, ‘Report of a meeting on board H.M.S. ‘IRON DUKE’, on 13th September 1916’, 14.09.1916: Jellicoe Papers Vol XXIV 1. ff126–129. MS 49012, 1912–16. BL.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Peter Colbeck
Peter Colbeck, upon retiring from a forty-year career as an engineer in the British defence industry, obtained an MA in the History of War at King's College, London in 2021. In his retirement he is indulging a life-long interest in naval history, and particularly in the Royal Navy before and during the First World War.