From aldermanic patronage to aldermanic menus: racial exclusion and the reinvention of participatory democracy in neoliberal Chicago

Abstract

This paper applies a critical institutionalist analysis to the practice of participatory budgeting in Chicago, Illinois. Analyzing contemporary participatory democratic practices, such as participatory budgeting, in relation to longstanding race- and class-based social struggles highlights how elite actors can engage with participatory democratic interventions to manage the political exclusions of racial capitalism.

Keywords:

• Chicago
• critical institutionalism
• municipal politics
• participatory budgeting
• racial capitalism

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Dr. Dennis Pilon and participants at the workshop on Critical Institutionalism at York University, July 2020, for comments on an earlier draft.

Disclosure statement

There are no relevant financial or nonfinancial competing interests to report.

Notes

1 Fischer, “Participatory Governance,” 459.

2 For details, see Levac and Wiebe, “Creating Spaces”; Hoppe, “Institutional Constraints”; Lax and Phillips, “The Democratic Deficit.”

3 Davies et al., “Citizen Engagement” 351–7; Mueller et al., “Ella Baker,” 1926; O'Faircheallaigh, “Public Participation,” 25.

4 Brodie, “Reforming Social Justice,” 97; McCall and Percheski, “Income Inequality,” 332.

5 For a detailed discussion of racial capitalism and its conceptual limits, see Melamed, “Racial Capitalism” and Omi and Winant, “Racial Formation.”

6 Hoppe, “Institutional Constraints,” 180.

7 Polletta, “How Participatory Democracy,” 279–80.

8 Davies et al., “Citizen Engagement” 351–7; Mueller et al., “Ella Baker,” 1928–30.

9 For an example, see O'Faircheallaigh, “Public Participation.”

10 Gilman, “Participatory Budgeting,” 1–19; Marlowe and Portillo, “Citizen Engagement,” 185–89.

11 Mueller et al., “Ella Baker,” 1930–42; Polletta, “How Participatory Democracy,” 279–80.

12 Mueller et al., “Ella Baker,” 1930–42; Polletta, “How Participatory Democracy,” 279–80.

13 Hoppe, “Institutional Constraints,” 166.

14 Peck and Theodore, “Fast Policy”; Petite, “The Promise and Limitations,” 527.

15 Larner, “Neo-liberalism,” 6–7.

16 Gaventa, “Participatory Development,” 152; Gavanta and Barrett, “So What Difference,”

17 35–9.

Gutmann and Thompson, “Why Deliberative Democracy?,” 56.

18 Hansen et al., “Citizens, Values and Experts,” 120–2.

19 Michels and De Graaf, “Examining Citizen Participation,” 278; Pin, “Race, Citizenship and Participation,” 14–5.

20 Cattapan et al., “Power, Privilege, and Policy,” 227.

21 Cattapan et al., “Power, Privilege, and Policy,” 230–31.

22 Gibson, “From Deliberation,” 332.

23 Chen, “Public Engagement Exercises,” 2.

24 Chen, “Public Engagement Exercises,” 2.

25 Fuji-Johnson, “Revelatory Protest,” 25–7.

26 Cleaver, “Paradoxes of Participation,” 600–5; Cleaver and De Koning, “Furthering Critical Institutionalism,” 2.

27 See Pilon, “Critical Institutionalism” and “Beyond Codifying Common Sense.”

28 Cleaver and De Koning, “Furthering Critical Institutionalism,” 2.

29 Mackay et al., “New Institutionalism,” 580.

30 MacRae and Weiner, “Feminist Institutionalism,” np.

31 Pilon, “Beyond Codifying Common Sense,” 2–3.

32 Brenner, Peck, and Theodore, “Variegated Neoliberalism,” 183–4.

33 This research received IRB approval from both York University, Toronto and the University of Illinois, Chicago. All aldermen interviewed consented to being named in publications.

34 See discussions of Chicago’s mayoral structure in Fuchs, “Mayors and Money” and Simpson, “Rogues, Rebels, and Rubber Stamps.”

35 Simpson, “Rogues, Rebels, and Rubber Stamps,” 165–68.

36 Simpson, “Rogues, Rebels, and Rubber Stamps,” 165–68.

37 Stone, “Urban Political Machines,” 450–1.

38 Grimshaw, “Bitter Fruit.”

39 Stone, “Urban Political Machines,” 453–4.

40 Trounstine, “Political Monopolies,” 30–32.

41 Simpson, “Rogues, Rebels, and Rubber Stamps.”

42 Farmer, “Uneven Public Transportation,” 1154–6; Trounstine, “Political Monopolies,” 60–61.

43 Krebs, “The Political and Demographic,” 928.

44 Krebs, “The Political and Demographic,” 928.

45 Hamilton, “Patronage in Illinois.”

46 Grimshaw, “Bitter Fruit,” 59–60.

47 Chicago Board of Election Commissioners, “Library of Electoral Board Decisions,” 71–6.

48 For example, in the 2015 aldermanic race in Ward 28, all seven challengers to incumbent Alderman Jason Ervin, a strong supporter of Mayor Emanuel, were disqualified due to errors in their applications. Moreover, all seven candidate objections were filed by the same woman, who had also served as a paid consultant for Ervin’s campaign in the 2011 municipal election. See reporting by Lulay, “Alderman Ervin.”

49 Grimshaw, “Bitter Fruit,” 71; Marable, “Black Power,” 158.

50 Grimshaw, “Bitter Fruit,” 72.

51 Grimshaw, “Bitter Fruit,” 31.

52 Bowman, “We Don’t Want,” 65.

53 Grimshaw, “Bitter Fruit,” 89.

54 Marable, “Black Power,” 160–62.

55 Key differences in the reconstitution of power included more funding for neighbourhoods, and greater autonomy for aldermen—those these changes were short lived. See Grimshaw, “Bitter Fruit,” Marable, “Black Power,” and Bowman, “We Don’t Want.”

56 A series of court rulings in the 1970s and 1980s led to federal oversight of Chicago’s municipal hiring and firing practices and the passing of the Shakman Decrees, a series of federal court orders, declared political hiring (1972) and firing (1983) unconstitutional. For more details on the legal decisions, see Bowman “We Don’t Want” and Tolchin and Tolchin, “Pinstripe Patronage.”

57 Tolchin and Tolchin, “Pinstripe Patronage,” 31–36.

58 Hamilton, 2010; Freedman, 1988.

59 Simpson et al., 2004; Tolchin and Tolchin, 2011.

60 Tolchin and Tolchin, “Pinstripe Patronage,” 42–43.

61 Stewart et al., “Participatory Budgeting in the United States,” 195–97.

62 OIG, “Aldermanic Menu.”

63 Trounstine, ‘Political Monopolies,” 30–32; Bowman, “We Don’t Want,” 66.

64 Hamilton, “Patronage in Illinois,” 138.

65 Gilman, “Participatory Budgeting,” 2–3.

66 Bowman, “We Don’t Want,” 66, 80.

67 Table 1 is compiled from data from the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners, which is publicly available at: http://www.chicagoelections.com. A different version of this table is published in Pin, “Bridging the Gap.”

68 Pin, “Bridging the Gap,” 1–3.

69 Chicago Tribune Editorial Board, “Chicago ‘Menu’ Program,” np.

70 Pin, “Bridging the Gap,” 26.

71 Pin, “Race, Citizenship and Participation,” 1–3.

72 Table 2 is adapted from Crum et al., “Building a People’s Budget.” Data collected through exit surveys at neighbourhood assemblies and polling stations for the 2013–2014 participatory budgeting cycle, the most recent for which public data is available. Respondents were asked to select all categories that applied.

73 Omi and Winant, “Racial Formation,” 8–9.

74 Pin, “Race, Citizenship and Participation,” 5–6.

75 Sanders, “Against Deliberation,” 348–50.

76 Peck, “Pushing Austerity,” 18–20.

77 Moody’s Investor Services, “Rating Action,” np.

78 Chicago Tribune Editorial Board, “Aldermanic ‘Menu’ Program,” np.

79 Hwang and Sampson, “Divergent Pathways,” 727.

80 Bennett et al., “Neoliberal Chicago,” 5–6.

81 Chicago Infrastructure Trust, n.d.; Buyuker et al., 2014. The mandate of the Chicago Infrastructure Trust is to seek “alternative” financing for municipal infrastructure projects, alternative generally meaning private sector investors, private sector operators, or private–public partnerships. For more information about the infrastructure trust, see: http://chicagoinfrastructure.org/

82 Farmer and Noonan, “Post Neoliberalism,” 75–76.

83 Brown, “Sacrificial Citizenship,” 7–9.

84 Peck and Theodore, “Fast Policy,” 190.

85 Trounstine, “Political Monopolies,” 66. Marable, “Black Power,” 159.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Laura G. Pin

Laura G. Pin is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Wilfrid Laurier University in Waterloo, Ontario, Canada.