The Google-China Dispute: The Chinese National Narrative and Rhetorical Legitimation of the Chinese Communist Party

Abstract

In 2010, during the Google-China dispute, the Chinese Communist Party deployed a rhetoric imbued with the strong pathos of the “century of humiliation” (guochi) that China suffered at the hands of imperialists and used the Google incident to reaffirm its guardianship of the Chinese nation = state. As a case study, this discursive analysis of the Google dispute illustrates the rhetorical techniques and processes the Chinese Communist Party utilized to cement its legitimacy. Relying on the resistance-to-imperialism narrative template, the Chinese Government has circulated discourse that resonates with a public who continue to fear foreign infringement of sovereignty.

Notes

¹This paper represents a portion of my dissertation. I'd like to thank my dissertation committee members—Russell Greer, Hugh Burns, Stephen Souris, and Harold Tanner—for their critique on my dissertation drafts. I want to thank Harold Tanner, Mao Luming, Carlton Clark, and the two Rhetoric Review peer reviewers—Xing (Lucy) Lu and Jan Schuetz—for their insightful revision suggestions.

²Database research yielded two academic articles addressing the Google image issue following the dispute. Communication scholar Shaorong Huang applies Ernest Bormann's symbolic convergence theory and the fantasy theme analysis to analyze why the Chinese netizens reached a rhetorical vision that Google was “actually doing evil in China” (40). (“To Stay or Not to Stay, That's Politics: Chinese Netizens’ Rhetorical Vision on Google's Leaving China.” China Media Research 81 [2012]: 40–47.) Sha Li and Po-Lin Pan applied snowball sampling to assess Chinese young adults’ perspectives on Google's leaving. According to their study, most Chinese believed that “Google's reputation would be degraded for the reason that it did not follow Chinese policy” (60). (“Comprehensive Dimensions of Chinese Young Adults’ Perspectives of Google's Leaving: An Empirical Approach.” The Journal of Development Communication 21.2 [2010]: 48–62).

³ (gun) is a profanity, meaning “get out.” The usage of the word shows anger and indignation.

⁴In 1900 forces from eight nations—Britain, Japan, Germany, Italy, Russia, France, the United States, and Austria-Hungary—invaded China during the Boxer Uprising. The allied forces wrought widespread destruction upon the areas they visited. The comment can be found at: http://news.163.com/10/0320/13/627LE22Q0001124J.html.

⁵As journalist Edward Wong observes, “Although urban, middle-class Chinese often support government policies on sovereignty issues such as Tibet or Taiwan, they generally deride media censorship. That feeling is especially pronounced among those who call themselves netizens” (“China Rebuffs Clinton on Internet Warning,” 22 Jan. 2012. The New York Times).

⁶Chinese Ministry of Information has been ironically dubbed the “Ministry of Truth” by Netizens (China Digital Time).

⁷For more information see Paul Cohen's “Remembering and Forgetting: National Humiliation in Twentieth-Century China.” Twentieth-Century China, 17.2 (2002):1–39; William Callahan's “National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and Chinese Nationalism.” Alternatives 29 (2004): 199–218; Dong Wang's “The Discourse of Unequal Treaties in Modern China.” Pacific Affairs 76.3 (2003): 399–425; Zheng Wang's “National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China.” International Studies Quarterly 52 (2008): 783–806; Peter Gries et al.’s “Patriotism, Nationalism and China's US Policy” The China Quarterly 205 (2011): 1–17.

⁸For more information see Paul Cohen's articles, “Remembering and Forgetting: National Humiliation in Twentieth-Century China,” Twentieth-Century China 27.2 (2002): 1–39 and “The Contested Past: The Boxers as History and Myth,” The Journal of Asian Studies 51.1 (1992): 82–113.

⁹I analyzed three high school history textbooks that were used in the 2010 entrance exam to universities and colleges. The textbooks, divided into ancient, premodern, modern, and contemporary eras, were approved by the National Education Department in 2002 and published by People's Education Publishing House.

¹⁰For example: Hua Chen. Shiji E'meng: Jindai Zhongguo Bupingdeng Tiaoyuexieshi (The Nightmare of The Century: A Record of Modern China's Unequal Treaties). Beijing: People's U.P. 1997; Shao, Rongchang and Jialin Wu. Wuwang Bainian Guochi (Never Forget One Hundred Years of National Shame). Beijing: People's UP. 1992; Jinhua Bolan Chongshu: Bainian Guochi Jiyao (A Record of One Hundred Years of National Humiliation), complied and published by Beijing Yanshan Publishing House, 1997.

¹¹Since the book's publication, “China Can Say No” has been become a catchphrase in anti-Western rhetoric. The Chinese full text can be found online at http://www.xiaoshuo.com/readindex/index_00118540.html (accessed 24 July, 2012).

¹²In January 2006 the Chinese government closed the provocative journal Freezing Point after it published an article written by historian Yuan Weishi who criticized the distortions of Chinese history textbooks. In the article Yuan charged that Chinese history textbooks soft-pedaled the mistakes by Qing Dynasty and whitewashed the brutality of the Boxer Uprising. In February 2006, bowing to domestic pressure for more freedom of speech, the propaganda officials reopened the journal sans two former outspoken editors.

¹³In 1914 Japan, Britain's ally in World War I, defeated Germany in China. In January 1915 Japan presented twenty-one demands that asked China to recognize Japan as successor to Germany's colonial privileges in Shangdong province and grant Japan strategic and economic privileges in other parts of China.

¹⁴A search on the China Daily website produced eighty-seven relevant results regarding the Google dispute between January 12–March 30 when the dispute had ebbed with Google routing its Mainland searches to its Hong Kong website. People's Daily Online published 105 articles; Global Times, twenty-nine. In contrast to China Daily and People's Daily, Global Times focuses on more mass entertainment news. This may explain its relative small number of articles on the dispute.

¹⁵The transcript of the press conference can be found at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t651747.htm, last accessed on 12 June, 2012.

¹⁶The article can be read at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90780/91344/6870403.html#liuyan.

¹⁷On 8 June 2010 Information Office of the State Council, or China's Cabinet, published a white paper, “The Internet in China.” It proclaims a national Internet sovereignty in Section V of the paper: “Within Chinese territory the Internet is under the jurisdiction of Chinese sovereignty. The Internet sovereignty of China should be respected and protected.”

¹⁸The article can be found at http://www.globaltimes.cn/opinion/editorial/2010-01/500324.html, last access on 12 June, 2012.

¹⁹The article can be found online at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90780/91343/6880568.html, last accessed on 12 June 2012.

²⁰To enhance its argumentative ethos and logos, the Chinese rhetoric quotes extensively from Chinese intellectuals and business people, foreign pundits, and even celebrities such as Bill Gates, whose words and writings support China's argument. In the People's Daily article, “On Google Case: Bill Gates Bats for China,” Gates was quoted saying during his ABC television interview that foreign companies need to obey local laws if they want to do business there and “The Chinese efforts to censor the Internet have been very limited. It's easy to go around it.”