506
Views
0
CrossRef citations to date
0
Altmetric
Article

Persuasion’s Physique: Revisiting Sign-Inference in Aristotle’s Rhetoric

 

ABSTRACT

A concept in Aristotle’s thought that is both politically and rhetorically significant for all life forms is a sign (sêmeion). Yet, scholarship has historically left underexplored how Aristotle positions the utility of a sign across human and nonhuman animal domains. Rereading his presentation of signs in the Rhetoric in light of his statements on the use of sign-inference through physiognomy in Prior Analytics elucidates how rhetoric’s interest in persuasive things makes use of a sign’s physicality. In so doing, Aristotle demonstrates how rhetoric enables political communities to grapple with an inescapable nonhuman status.

Notes

1. I use the term “animal” because of recent work in rhetorical studies and other disciplines that veer toward lessening the distance between “us” (humans) and “them” (animals) (for example, rhetorical studies, Critical Animal Studies [CAS], and Human Animal Studies [HAS]). I use the labels “human animal” and “nonhuman animal” without quotations from this point forward.

2. The author thanks editor Elise Hurley for her editorial guidance during these unprecedented times, as well as the generous and invaluable feedback of RR reviewers Jordan Loveridge and Shawn Ramsey. Tom Conley, too, deserves credit for providing insightful reviews of this project. Finally, thanks to Ned O’Gorman, for his enduring belief. Any errors found herein are mine alone.

3. Throughout the essay I generally refer to a “sign” in the accusative singular (sêmeion) rather than to the plural “signs” (sêmeia). Aristotle’s explanations of sign-inference tend to refer to a “sign” instead of “signs,” which suggests that he prefers isolating a “sign” (sêmeion) to illustrate the general nature and use of “signs.” Thus, I will, for the most part, refer to a “sign” in the singular (sêmeion) and avoid using the plural form. Incidentally, this will also avoid confusing “signs” (sêmeia) with “military standard” (sêmeia).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

José G. Izaguirre III

José G. Izaguirre III is an assistant professor in the Department of Rhetoric and Writing at the University of Texas at Austin. He completed his PhD in Communication at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, and his general research interests span rhetorical history, rhetorical theory, and public rhetorics. In particular, his work is situated within the fields of Latinx rhetorics, premodern rhetorics, and classical rhetorics. His work probes the relationships between politics, rhetoric, and power, and the historical ramifications of their intersections.

Reprints and Corporate Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

To request a reprint or corporate permissions for this article, please click on the relevant link below:

Academic Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

Obtain permissions instantly via Rightslink by clicking on the button below:

If you are unable to obtain permissions via Rightslink, please complete and submit this Permissions form. For more information, please visit our Permissions help page.