Parental Bullying, Aggression, and Assertion: A Philosophical and Psychoanalytic Revisioning of Frank Summers' Case of Anna

Abstract

Historically, psychoanalysis has failed to differentiate adequately between aggression and assertion. It is uncontroversial to state that bullying is a form of aggression. However, if aggression and assertion are not adequately distinguished, bullying could also be viewed as a form of assertion. Some psychoanalysts have attempted to resolve this by using the terms aggression and assertion as synonyms but introducing the notion of nondestructive aggression. Bullying, then, is understood to be hostile aggression or hostile assertion. In this article, I aim to prepare psychoanalytic and philosophical groundwork for a meaningful differentiation between aggression and assertion, and, at the same time, to shed light on the nature of bullying, parental bullying in particular. To achieve these aims, I critique an aspect of the case material presented by Frank Summers in his (2005) book, Self Creation: Psychoanalytic Therapy and the Art of the Possible. I also critique Parens' (2008) notion of nondestructive aggression as used by him and by Summers. Additionally, I discuss some of the philosophical notions Summers introduces and discusses relevant to a critique of his notion of the analyst's vision of the patient's development in its relevance to his case of Anna.

Notes

¹Very little literature exists regarding the phenomenon of parental bullying. However, I believe that this is perhaps the most prevalent form of bullying, and deserves a great deal more attention from psychoanalysts, psychologists, researchers in the social sciences, and in the field of parenting. Of course, interdisciplinary work is vital in this.

²Throughout this article, except where it appears in a quotation, I have written assertion rather than self-assertion because the latter expression is redundant—assertion generally means assertion of oneself. Instances where this is not the case will be duly noted. Summers usually writes of self-assertion.

³This is the only time Summers refers to Anna's traits of kindness and generosity as altruistic. The notion of altruism in the context of ethics usually connotes selflessness, giving to others without regard for any benefit to oneself. But Anna's selflessness, her inability to take care of herself and her own interests was the problem that she wished to overcome.

⁴In his book, Summers references the original edition of Parens' book, which was published in 1979. My reference is to the revised edition of Parens' book, published in 2008. Summers' book was published in 2005, before the publication of the revised edition of Parens' book. However, the revised edition is a reprint of the original edition with the exception of a 49-page introduction to the revised edition.

⁵ Stechler and Horton (1987, p. 348) write, as noted in the beginning of this article, that, “While psychoanalytic theorists have begun to recognize that these self- generated outreaching activities cannot properly be seen as derivatives of hostile or destructive impulses, their desire to maintain the framework of the dual instinct theory lead them to postulate categories of nonhostile or nondestructive aggression (McDevitt, 1983); (Parens, 1979). This proliferation of ad hoc categories is not parsimonious and inevitably raises the issue whether it is not preferable to question the basic framework.”

⁶ Summers (2005, p. 79) goes on to say that “the psychoanalytic process cannot be equated with a Platonic dialogue. … Plato used dialogue for a purely intellectual purpose. The psychoanalytic process has a different aim—emotional understanding and the transformation of the psychological understanding.”

⁷In addition to Socrates and Plato, Summers (2005) discusses two other philosophers, Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, and Martin Heidegger. But Summers' remarks about Husserl do not jibe with his existentialist credo. He writes,

Here is another instance in which psychoanalysis can be aided by the findings of phenomenological philosophy. Husserl (1913) showed through his phenomenological descriptions that one cannot understand what something is only by looking at its immediate, concrete presentation because that represents only one appearance of its reality, that is to say, one of its possibilities. To understand the essence of a thing is to know what it can and cannot be, its system of possibilities. (Summers, 2005, p. 118).

This is an accurate rendition of the Husserlian phenomenological notion of essence. (Extensive discussions of psychoanalysis can be found in Nissim-Sabat, 2009, Neither Victim nor Survivor: Thinking toward a New Humanity.) However, the system of possibilities of anything is not for Husserl created ab novo; indeed, they preexist their manifestation in reality. Thus, essences are open in that they have an a priori mode of being; that is to say, the system of possibilities of a thing is the system for that thing and not for any other thing—the essence is open but nevertheless has a determinate character: beyond a certain point in its variability, a given entity ceases to be what it is. Summers (2005, p. 118) goes on to say that “Heidegger (1936) followed up on Husserl's insight by pointing out that we make the reality we find. … Being is created in the relationship between person and world.” Summers' example, drawn from Heidegger, is that trees are only potentially lumber until human beings realize that potentiality. This does bring out that Heidegger was not a follower of Husserl at all for Heidegger ontologized what in Husserl is always a phenomenon of meaning. For Husserl, we do not create being; rather, we are the creators and bestowers of meaning in the world. Just so, Husserlian phenomenology begins with the act of suspending all ontological commitments (the phenomenological reduction) and abjures taking any stand on the ultimate ontology of the world for that is unknown and unknowable. Heideggerians often maintain that the phenomenological reduction is implicit in Heidegger's writings. However, for Husserl an implicit phenomenological reduction or act of suspending ontological commitments is no reduction at all.

⁸The view of assertion and aggression as synonymous is widespread in both psychoanalysis and in the literature on bullying. Feminists have often pointed out that aggression and assertion are frequently identified in the context of the behavior of women, i.e., it's ok for men to be assertive—meaning masterful—but when women are assertive, then their assertiveness is aggressive—a masculine trait. This phenomenon is manifest, for example, in the following quotation from Twemlow (2000): “It is generally accepted that bullying is much more common among boys than girls, especially physical bullying. … However, as society moves toward increased acceptance of aggressiveness and assertiveness in women, there is already some evidence that this is changing and may change further “(755).

⁹My assertion that bullies are people who are unable to assert themselves does not at all conflict with findings of studies like those of Twemlow, which show bullies to have complex psychological and developmental problems. On the contrary, difficulty in self-assertion describes, but does not explain behavior.