The Primary Processes: A Preliminary Exploration of A-Rational Mentation from an Evolutionary Viewpoint

Abstract

In this article we investigate research on nonhuman animal cognition revealing the predominance of primary processes-like operations that are effective and adaptive from an evolutionary perspective. But first and from a different direction, we review a body of recently popular empirical work on human heuristics and biases that proposes System 1 and System 2 as a dual-process model of cognition and emotion; this without acknowledging Freud’s primary and secondary processes. Thus, we explore the parallels between primary process and System 1, as we evaluate the case for the evolutionary nature of primary process. We guide the reader through literature on animal cognition and that of System 1 biases and heuristics to provide the psychoanalytic reader with the opportunity to make important links to psychoanalytic concepts.

Notes

¹ This is view is in accord with Nesse and Williams (1994, p. 25): “Even when we cannot reconstruct the history of a trait, we can still be confident that it was shaped by natural selection. This can be supported by evidence for its function in other species.”

² For example two anthologies, both of which we find very useful, have the following titles: Rational Animals? and Rational Animals, Irrational Humans.

³ These terms appear in the same article as b-rationality in Kacelnik (2006).

⁴ Note that along with the instances listed in (a) through (e), primary process/a-rational categorizations can also be demonstrated in animals. In a preliminary study pitting attributional similarity (where the features of two items match)—the index of primary process versus relational similarity (where the features of two items are different but the relations among the features the same)—the index of secondary process; Garlick, Gant, Brakel, and Blaisdell (2011) found that pigeons based their performance on a match to sample categorization task on attributional properties but not on relational properties.

⁵ See Fernando et al. (2009) for a discussion of the possibility of conditioning in single celled organisms.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Susan E. Cutler

Dr. Cutler is Adjunct Faculty, Department of Psychiatry, University of Michigan; and Faculty Member, Michigan Psychoanalytic Institute

Linda A.W. Brakel

Dr. Brakel is Associate Professor (adj), Department of Psychiatry, University of Michigan; Research Associate, Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan; and Faculty Member, Michigan Psychoanalytic Institute.