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Original Articles

On variational inequality approach to nash dynamic game of oil stockpilingFootnote

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Pages 627-649 | Published online: 03 Apr 2007
 

Abstract

Oil market disruption and strategic stockpiling are consideredin this work. A variational inequality approach is developed.The model treated here is more general than previous work.It is established that the Nash equilibrium is characterized by a system of inequalities. A sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is derived and an efficient iterative algorithm is proposed and analyzed

Research of this author was supported in part by SUNY College at Old Westbury under the Summer Research Grant

Research of this author was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant DMS-9224372, and in part by Wayne State University

Research of this author was supported in part by SUNY College at Old Westbury under the Summer Research Grant

Research of this author was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant DMS-9224372, and in part by Wayne State University

Notes

Research of this author was supported in part by SUNY College at Old Westbury under the Summer Research Grant

Research of this author was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant DMS-9224372, and in part by Wayne State University

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