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Abstract
The conventional wisdom among analysts and scholars is that at least since September 11, 2001, the United States has tended to neglect its relations with Latin America. As a result of that inattention, other countries from outside the region have been able to make inroads, and there has generally been a regional drift in the direction of election and policy outcomes that do not favor US interests. While this article assumes that conventional understanding of the outcomes in the region, the central argument here is that it is not neglect (or “sins of omission”) that best explains those developments. Rather, it is the actual US policies that have been pursued (“sins of commission”), as well as the effective strategies pursued by Latin American leaders and organizations, which are largely responsible for the situation that confronts President Obama in Latin America. The article focuses on Venezuela, Cuba, and Bolivia, the three countries that have sometimes been described as the Latin American “axis of evil.”
Notes
*An earlier version of this article was presented at the Southern Political Science Association meeting, New Orleans, LA, January 2009. Thanks to the editors of New Political Science and three anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments.
1 CBS News, “Bush Looks South of the Border,” August 25, 2000, available online at: < http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2000/08/25/politics/main227866.shtml> (accessed July 15, 2009).
2 George W. Bush, “Fact Sheet, President's Speech at the Summit of the Americas,” April 21, 2001, Press Release, available online at: < http://georgebush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/04/20010423-1.html> (accessed July 15, 2009).
3 Jorge Castañeda, “Morning in Latin America: The Chance for a New Beginning,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2008, p. 126.
4 Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the World, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 217.
5 Peter Hakim, “The Uneasy Americas,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2001, p. 46.
6 Heraldo Muñoz, A Solitary War: A Diplomat's Chronicle of the Iraq War and its Lessons (Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publishing, 2008), pp. 182–183.
7 Heraldo Muñoz, A Solitary War: A Diplomat's Chronicle of the Iraq War and its Lessons (Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publishing, 2008), p. 183
8 Jorge Castañeda, “The Forgotten Relationship,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2003, pp. 68, 70.
9 Robert A. Pastor, Whirlpool: US Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 35–36. Abraham Lowenthal made a similar argument in: Partners in Conflict: the United States and Latin America (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1987).
10 Howard J. Wiarda, American Foreign Policy Toward Latin America in the 80s and 90s (New York: New York University Press, 1992), p. 316. Another who saw that outcome as likely was Richard H. Ullman, “The United States, Latin America, and the World after the Cold War,” in Abraham Lowenthal and Gregory Treverton (eds.), Latin America in a New World (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 13.
11 Robert A. Pastor, Exiting the Whirlpool: US Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), p. ix.
12 Coletta Youngers, “The US and Latin America after 9-11 and Iraq,” Foreign Policy in Focus Report, June 2003, available online at: < http://www.fpif.org/papers/latam2003.html> (accessed July 15, 2009).
13 Jorge Castañeda, September/October 2008, p. 126.
14 While the focus of this article is on the Bush administration's attempt to exert influence in the region, it is important to explicitly acknowledge that the popular mobilization and the election of leftist leaders in Latin America over the last several years are rooted in events and policies that predate the Bush presidency by decades (or even centuries). The economic neoliberalism referred to in the text, including devastating “structural adjustment” policies, have been advocated by and associated with the US government since the early 1980s; and the “drug war” began even earlier. Beyond that, the collective memory of past US support of authoritarian governments, as well as various degrees of pressure put on left-of-center governments in the region during the Cold War, continues to play a role in Latin American politics. Since this article was submitted, NACLA: Report on the Americas has come out with an edition on “Revolutionary Legacies in the 21st Century” (March/April 2009). Sinclair Thomson's article (“Bull Horns and Dynamite: Echoes of Revolution in Bolivia”), for example, links the recent popular mobilization in Bolivia to that during the 1952 National Revolution.
15 Jorge Castañeda, “The Forgotten Relationship,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2003.
16 David Corn, “Elliott Abrams: It's Back!” The Nation, July 2, 2001.
17 Scott Shane, “Cables Show Central Negroponte Role in 80s Covert War Against Nicaragua,” New York Times, April 13, 2005.
18 While this article is focused on Venezuela, Cuba, and Bolivia, there are plenty of other examples of challenges to the US in the region. President Rafael Correa in Ecuador, for example, did not renew the US lease of a military base in Manta. He has also said that the country will default on “illegitimate” foreign debt, and more recently, Correa accused US officials of interfering in Ecuador's anti-narcotics efforts and then expelled them from the country. Ecuadorean voters have shown their approval by strongly supporting a constitutional referendum to increase Correa's powers in the fall of 2008, and then reelecting him to a second term on the first round of voting in April 2009. Elsewhere in the region, popular mobilization by landless workers in Brazil, teachers and peasants in Southern Mexico, and Argentine workers taking over factories, provide evidence of widespread grassroots resistance to neoliberal globalization championed by the United States.
19 Bart Jones, !Hugo! The Hugo Chávez Story from Mud Hut to Perpetual Revolution (Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2007), p. 251.
20 “US attacks Chávez' Iraq visit,” BBC News, August 8, 2000, < www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/870522.stm>
21 “The Next Shock,” The Economist, March 6, 1999, pp. 23–25.
22 Steve Ellner, Rethinking Venezuelan Politics: Class, Conflict, and the Chávez Phenomenon (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008), p. 197.
23 Greg Wilpert, Changing Venezuela By Taking Power (New York: Verso Press, 2007), p. 152 lists the five main objectives of the Chávez government's foreign policy that were laid out in a 2001–2007 National Development Plan: promote multi-polarity; promote Latin American integration; consolidate and diversify Venezuela's international relations; strengthen Venezuela's position in the international economy; promote a new regime of hemispheric security. Wilpert's website ( < www.venezuelanalysis.com>) is a valuable resource for Venezuelan news and analysis.
24 Daniel Flynn, “US ‘Deeply Disappointed’ by Venezuelan President Chávez's Speech on War,” Reuters, October 30, 2001.
25 Jones, op. cit., p. 309.
26 Wilpert, op. cit., pp. 169–171.
27 Ellner, op. cit., p. 199.
28 Christopher Marquis, “Bush Officials Met With Venezuelans Who Ousted Leader,” New York Times, April 16, 2002.
29 Interview with Eva Golinger in Caracas, Venezuela, March 11, 2006. This information is available in considerable detail in Golinger's book, The Chávez Code: Cracking US Intervention in Venezuela (Northampton, MA: Oliver Branch Press, 2006).
30 Sheila Collins, “Breaking the Mold? Venezuela's Defiance of the Neoliberal Agenda,” New Political Science, September 2005, p. 376.
31 Ellner, op. cit., p. 203.
32 “Chávez Says Venezuelan Aid to Latin America Surpasses US,” International Herald Tribune, March 15, 2007.
33 Frank Bajak, “Under Bush, US Influence in Latin America Wanes,” USA Today, October 11, 2008.
34 Rory Carroll, “Hugo Chávez Wins Referendum Allowing Indefinite Re-election,” The Guardian, February 16, 2009.
35 Following a steep hike in the number of Cubans leaving the island for the United States in 1994, the two governments reached an agreement that was intended to discourage that migration. The United States agreed to admit at least 20,000 Cuban immigrants a year, and the Cubans agreed to make it more difficult for potential migrants to take to the sea. The accord amended the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act which provided a special process for Cuban migrants to receive permanent residency status after they had been in the United States for one year. Under the new policy informally described as “wet-foot/dry-foot,” those Cuban migrants who are intercepted at sea (with “wet feet”) are returned to Cuba, whose government agrees not to take any action against them due to their attempt to leave the country. Any Cuban who reaches US land (with “dry feet”), whether on a Florida beach or by crossing the US–Mexico border, continues to qualify for the special immigration process that leads to permanent resident status and eventually US citizenship, if they choose.
36 Kevin A. Hill and Dario Moreno, “Battleground Florida,” in Rodolfo O. de la Garza and Louis DeSipio (eds.), Muted Voices: Latinos and the 2000 Elections (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), pp. 219–220.
37 Dexter Filkins and Dana Canedy, “Counting the Vote: Miami-Dade County; Protest Influenced Miami-Dade's Decision to Stop Recount,” New York Times, November 24, 2000.
38 “US: Cuba Developing Biological Weapons,” Associated Press, May 6, 2002, < www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,52049,00.html>
39 Nancy San Martin, “Most Latins Disapprove of Castro, Survey Says,” Miami Herald, November 21, 2001. While this poll's numbers have been disputed, many still see it as one indicator that Castro's regional reputation was at a relative low point at the beginning of the Bush presidency.
40 Cuba sent doctors, coaches, engineers, and other skilled personnel to Venezuela in exchange for subsidized oil. Both countries reaped benefits from what Max Azicri concludes is a “mutually beneficial exchange” (“The Castro-Chávez Alliance,” Latin American Perspectives 36:1 (January 2009), p. 100). While I certainly agree that it is a mutually beneficial relationship, my reference to “financial support” is to acknowledge that the strictly economic benefits were tilted toward Cuba and helped the Castro government through some difficult economic times.
41 See Muñoz, op. cit., pp. 159–194, for a section dealing with the cases of Mexico and Chile. From the perspective of the Chilean ambassador to the UN, it was a case of “alienation of allies.”
42 “Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba: Report to the President,” Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State, Chairman, May 2004, available at: < http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/32334.pdf>
43 “Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba: Report to the President,” Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State, Chairman, May 2004, available at: < www.state.gov/documents/organization/32334.pdf>, p. 203.
44 “Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba: Report to the President,” Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State, Chairman, May 2004, available at: < www.state.gov/documents/organization/32334.pdf>, Foreword, p. 1.
45 “Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba: Report to the President,” Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State, Chairman, May 2004, available at: < www.state.gov/documents/organization/32334.pdf>, pp. 1–2.
46 See < www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm>
47 “Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba”, op. cit., pp. 242–243.
48 “Caleb McCarry – Bush's Man for Cuba Author of the Haitian Disaster,” Granma, October 28, 2005, available online at: < http://www.granma.cu/ingles/2005/octubre/vier28/45mccarry-i.html> (accessed July 15, 2009).
49 Both Oswaldo Paya and Elizardo Sanchez, two of the most prominent Cuban opposition organizers in Cuba, were quoted criticizing the McCarry appointment. See Harry Mount, “America Seeks to Accelerate End of Castro's Regime with New Post,” The Telegraph (London), August 1, 2005.
50 “Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba: Report to the President,” Condoleezza Rice, Chair, Carlos Gutierrez, Co-Chair, July 2006, p. 83, available at: < http://www.cafc.gov/documents/organization/68166.pdf>
51 At the end of the first chapter on “Hastening Cuba's Transition,” the CAFC noted that given the physical deterioration (and “probably mental as well”) of Fidel, the plan was to pass leadership to Raul and keep the senior leadership in place, “Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba” (2006), op. cit. While they seem to have been right about the plan, they do not seem to have been successful at preventing it from being carried out.
52 While in Cuba during the summer of 2008, I noticed one billboard claiming that every day of the embargo cost the Cubans 139 buses. It was appropriately located directly across the street from one of the places where people were lined up hoping to be given a ride by drivers leaving Havana. The Cuban Five's arrests and convictions were the basis for a number of protest marches in Cuba, and they continue to merit quite a few signs and billboards around the country, as well as mention at major rallies in the country.
53 Duncan Campbell, “Bolivia's Leftwing Upstart Alarms US,” The Guardian, July 15, 2002.
54 For example, see the interview with Democracy Now on September 22, 2006: < www.democracynow.org/2006/9/22/bolivian_president_evo_morales_on_latin>
55 Greg Grandin, Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), p. 202.
56 Greg Grandin, Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), pp. 215–216.
57 Adolfo Gilly, “Bolivia: A 21st-Century Revolution,” Socialism and Democracy 19:3 (November 2005), p. 46.
58 Gabriela Prudencio and Shanti Salas, “Preemptive Strike: Open Season on Intervening in Bolivia's Domestic Affairs,” Memorandum to the Press, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, May 6, 2003: < www.coha.org/NEW_PRESS_RELEASES/New_Press_Releases_2003/03.19_Open_Season_on_Intervening_in_Bolivia.htm>
59 Juan Forero, “The Saturday Profile: From Llama Trails to the Corridors of Power,” New York Times, July 6, 2002.
60 George Gedda, “US Wary of Cuba's Support for Leftists,” Associated Press, January 5, 2004.
61 “Top Bush Administration Official Warns Castro,” Miami Herald, January 7, 2004.
62 Otto J. Reich, “Latin America's Terrible Two,” National Review, April 11, 2005.
63 David S. Cloud, “Like Old Times: US Warns Latin Americans Against Leftists,” New York Times, August 19, 2005.
64 In an election with eight candidates, Morales' 53% of the vote was particularly impressive. Morales received more that 1.5 million votes, and the candidate in second place took in just over 820,000 votes, see: < http://www.cne.org.bo/sirenacomp/index.aspx>
65 Fidel Castro and Ignacio Ramonet, Fidel Castro: My Life A Spoken Biography (New York: Scribner, 2007), p. 523.
66 Peter Hakim, “Is Washington Losing Latin America,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2006, p. 40.
67 “Castro's Comeback,” Newsweek, March 20, 2006: < www.newsweek.com/id/47038>
68 On the Daily Show with Jon Stewart, Evo Morales drew laughs with his request to the host: “Please don't consider me part of the axis of evil” (September 25, 2007).
69 “Bolivian President Censures United States,” CNN, September 24, 2008: < http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/09/23/bolivia.morales/index.html>
70 Democracy Now Interview with Evo Morales, September 22, 2006: < www.democracynow.org/2006/9/22/bolivian_president_evo_morales_on_latin>.
71 Eva Golinger, “USAID in Bolivia and Venezuela: The Silent Subversion,” September 12, 2007, see: < http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/2600>.
72 USAID Transition Initiatives, “USAID/OTI Bolivia Field Report,” April–June 2007, see < http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/country/bolivia/rpt0607.html>.
73 Jean Friedman-Rudovsky and Brian Ross, “Exclusive: Peace Corps, Fulbright Scholar Asked to ‘Spy’ on Cubans, Venezuelans,” ABC News, February 8, 2008, available online at: < http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id = 4262036&page = 1> (accessed July 15, 2009).
74 A good overview of the Bush administration's attempt to “bring down Evo Morales” as he puts it, is provided by Roger Burbach: “Orchestrating a Civic Coup in Bolivia,” Counterpunch, November 18, 2008: < http://www.counterpunch.org/burbach11182008.html>.
75 Mark Weisbrot, “Bolivia Gets the Change It Asked For,” The Nation, August 15, 2008.
76 Carlos Quiroga, “Bolivia Calls US Trade Move ‘Political Vengeance’,” Reuters, November 27, 2008.
77 Simon Romero, “Bolivians Ratify New Constitution,” New York Times, January 26, 2009.
78 Council on Foreign Relations, “US–Latin America Relations: A New Direction for a New Reality,” Independent Task Force Report No. 60, May 2008, p. 5.
79 Vinod Sreeharsha, “Al Jazeera Focuses on Latin America,” Miami Herald, November 5, 2008.
80 “Bolivia Asks US to Extradite Ex-president,” Miami Herald, November 12, 2008.
81 “President Hugo Chávez Delivers Remarks at the UN General Assembly,” Washington Post, September 20, 2006.
82 “Venezuelan President Asks Obama to Extradite Terrorist Posada Carriles,” Granma Internacional, December 15, 2008.
83 Barack Obama, “Remarks of Senator Barack Obama: Renewing U.S. Leadership in the Americas,” Miami, FL, May 23, 2008, available online at: < http://www.barackobama.com/2008/05/23/remarks_of_senator_barack_obam_68.php> (accessed July 15, 2009).