Humanism and the death penalty, with special emphasis on the post-Furman experience

Despite the recent reversal in death penalty policy in the United States, debate over the constitutionality of the death penalty continues. In 1976, when the Court held that new “guided discretion statutes” did not violate the Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendments, the majority believed that the new statutes would eliminate the “humanistic concerns” about the death penalty which they found problematic in pre-Furman statutes. Evidence described in this study shows that the majority was wrong. Humanistic concerns, critical to the constitutionality of the death penalty, remain problematic under post-Furman statutes. This paper examines the humanistic concerns of the Supreme Court with special emphasis on the post-Furman experience and sketches a humanist justification for abolition of the death penalty.

I would like to thank Jack Bohm, Hal Pepinsky, and Mike Radelet for their helpful suggestions.

I would like to thank Jack Bohm, Hal Pepinsky, and Mike Radelet for their helpful suggestions.

Notes

I would like to thank Jack Bohm, Hal Pepinsky, and Mike Radelet for their helpful suggestions.