Tribalism and the arms race trap

Abstract

Tribalism is used as an analogy for national competitiveness, and an outline is given of how enemy images are formed. The theory of social entrapment offers an explanation for military competitiveness. In particular, the sliding reinforcer trap helps us understand escalation, and externality traps like the Prisoner's Dilemma offer insights into the arms race. These approaches also show that when steps are taken to disarm, the disarmer apparently puts himself in a weaker position, and gives the other side less incentive to disarm. Escapes from social traps are difficult because most of them demand either immense self‐control or a strong outside authority able to put a stop to the contest. Neither of these seem possible at present. A variety of peace proposals are looked at critically in the light of these findings, and a tentative suggestion made for a possible long‐term solution.

Key Words:

• Nuclear arms race
• Conflict resolution
• International co‐operation

Notes

Based on the keynote address to the Symposium on the Causes and Effects of the Nuclear Arms Race, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, 18–21 July 1986.