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ABSTRACT
This article considers the impact of the 2008–10 financial crisis and the UK’s 2016 Brexit decision as a ‘dual crisis’ which impacted significantly on Irish foreign policy over the past decade. It argues that though Ireland’s foreign policy has remained remarkably consistent over time, the ‘dual crisis’ placed considerable pressure on state capacity and institutional resources. Ireland’s financial implosion carried with it potentially catastrophic consequences for the Eurozone and thus successive governments placed a particular priority on restoring Ireland’s tarnished reputation within the European Union. At the same time, Irish foreign policy was ‘rebooted’ to take on a more muscular promotion of Irish economic interests across the globe. Brexit constituted an existential threat to the island of Ireland, and, in particular the peace process marked by the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. The Brexit crisis set in train a determined effort by Irish policy-makers to both confirm the EU as Ireland’s ‘geopolitical centre of gravity’ and re-position the country within the Union, as the need for new allies and coalition partners became evident following the United Kingdom’s planned departure.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributors
Nicholas Rees is Professor of International Relations and Dean of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Buckingham. His research focuses on Ireland and the European Union, as well as more broadly on Ireland's role in International Affairs. He has published widely on Ireland and the EU and on the UN and regional cooperation, including ASEAN.
John O'Brennan is Jean Monnet Professor of European integration and Director of the Centre for European and Eurasian Studies at Maynooth University. His recent research focuses on Ireland's relationship with the European Union, Brexit and UK-Irish relations. He has published widely on these themes and on EU enlargement policy. He is a member of the Irish government's Brexit Stakeholder Group.
Notes
1 Keatinge makes an important distinction between interests and values, which are often seen as in conflict in Irish foreign policy. He argues that values reflect where we want to be, whereas interests are about where we need to be, hence the challenge is attempting to reconcile values and interests in the prevailing circumstances. (Citation2017, p. 7).
2 The second vote on the Lisbon Treaty took place on 2 October 2009. The Treaty was approved by 67.1 percent to 32.87 percent, on a turnout of 59 percent. The result represented a more than 20 per cent swing to the pro-Treaty side from the 12 June 2008 referendum. The Irish government had sought – and received – assurances from the EU that the Treaty would not compromise Ireland’s capacity to decide for itself on matters of security (neutrality), the right to life (abortion) and taxation. The Irish government also asked the EU to re-visit the issue of the number and appointment procedure for members of the European Commission. It was decided to amend this procedure so that every member state would retain the right to have one member of the Commission (See O’Brennan, Citation2009).
3 Ireland formally entered the ‘Troika’ arrangement in December 2010 and exited the EU/IMF bailout in December 2013.
4 Interviews with Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade officials, May 2019.
5 Tonra (Citation2015) highlights how little interaction there was between the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the EU’s External Action Service (EEAS).
6 It should be noted that the overall responsibility for trade policy falls to the Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation.
7 The original decision to close the Holy See Embassy had been controversial in Ireland, so it reopening was not a surprise. In a slightly different vein, the reopening of the Embassy in Kenya, was also a sign of Ireland’s aid commitments within the region.
8 The first White Paper on Challenges and Opportunities Abroad was published by the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1996.
9 Note for New Minister, 14 June 2017, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (accessed 8/12/2018).
10 The role of the ‘sherpa’ is to prepare heads of government for European Council summits.
11 See The Irish Times, ‘Ireland’s “Team Brexit”: intellectuals, drafters, workhorses, networkers’, 30 March 2018, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/ireland-s-team-brexit-intellectuals-drafters-workhorses-and-networkers-1.3444748
12 For more information see: All-Island Civic Dialogue on Brexit: Sectoral Dialogues https://merrionstreet.ie/en/EU-UK/Consultations/Civic_Dialogue_Summary_Report_FINAL.pdf (accessed 11/12/2018). It should be noted that the DUP refused to participate in the dialogue, which they opposed being set-up.
13 Full declaration: John O’ Brennan is a member of the Brexit Stakeholder Group.
14 An interesting literature has emerged focusing on the impact of Brexit on Northern Ireland, including on the Good Friday Agreement and the peace process, as well as all-island relations (Coulter & Shirlow, Citation2019; Gormley-Heenan & Aughey, Citation2017; Hayward, Citation2018; Murphy, Citation2018).
15 The Conservative party won 317 seats, 9 seats short of an overall majority. The DUP won 10 seats in Northern Ireland, and went on to conclude a ‘confidence and supply’ agreement with the Conservative party that ensured Theresa May a majority.
16 Fine Gael MEP Mairead McGuinness proved especially effective in this role due to her position as Vice President of the European Parliament and excellent communication skills).
17 The ‘mapping exercise’ was published in January 2019 by the European Commission (and, separately, the UK government). See The Irish Times, ‘EU’s mapping report stresses need for open Irish border’, 20 January 2019, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/eu-s-mapping-report-stresses-need-for-open-irish-border-1.3932480
18 Interviews with Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade officials, May 2019.
19 Interviews with Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade officials, May 2019.
20 See: European Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Coalition Explorer’, https://www.ecfr.eu/eucoalitionexplorer
21 Interviews, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade officials, May 2019.
22 See, for example, Euractiv, 6 March 2018, ‘Eight Northern EU states express caution about Eurozone reform’, https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/news/eight-northern-eu-states-urge-caution-in-eurozone-reforms/
23 See: Tánaiste announces 7 new Missions in next phase of Global Ireland, 11/6/18 https://www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/press-releases/press-release-archive/2018/june/tanaiste-announces-7-new-missions-to-open/ (accessed 07/12/2018).
24 PESCO is a framework that allows greater cooperation among EU member states on military missions around the world. It facilitates cooperation EU on defence projects, services, inter-operability, procurement and programmes.
25 This includes operating under a UN General Assembly or Security Council mandate, approved by the Irish government and by a vote of the Dáil.
26 https://www.defence.ie/press/publications/white-paper-defence-2015-irish (accessed 9/12/2018).
27 By 2019 Ireland had 675 defence forces troops participating in 13 peacekeeping missions around the world. In 2019 also Ireland became a member of the Peacebuilding Commission at the United Nations