Assessing the delimitation negotiations between Norway and the Soviet Union/Russia1

This article is based upon the Masters Thesis in Political Science by Kvalvik (2000): Asymmetriske maktrelasjoner i bilaterale forhandlinger. En studie av forhandlingene mellom Norge og Sovjetunionen/Russland om avgrensingen av kontinentalsokkelen og økonomiske soner i Barentshavet [Asymmetrical power relations in bilateral negotiations. A study of the negotiations between Norway and the Soviet Union/Russia on the boundary of the continental shelf and economic zones in the Barents Sea], Department of Political Science, University of Tromsø. Thank you to the participants of the International Politics Working Group at the Norwegian Political Science Conference in Trondheim, 8–10 January 2003 for the useful commentary on an earlier draft, to Alf Håkon Hoel, and to the participants of the World Politics Seminar at the University of Tromsø.

Abstract

The negotiations between Norway and Russia, formerly the Soviet Union, in the maritime delimitation in the Barents Sea have been going on for more than 30 years. Despite a declared will on both sides to reach an agreement, the prospect of an early settlement seems remote. Formally the delimitation problem concerns the distribution of the important economic resources in the area, i.e. petroleum and fish. In practice, however, the strategic importance of the area and the impact of the international context on the bilateral relationship have played an important role in the negotiations. As a result, the parties clearly have different preferences for a solution. Because there is no practical need for a solution and because the parties do not see the boundary dispute as a strain on their mutual relations, the prospect of an early settlement is dependent on the political will of both sides to bring this long-standing conflict to and end.

Notes

This article is based upon the Masters Thesis in Political Science by Kvalvik (2000): Asymmetriske maktrelasjoner i bilaterale forhandlinger. En studie av forhandlingene mellom Norge og Sovjetunionen/Russland om avgrensingen av kontinentalsokkelen og økonomiske soner i Barentshavet [Asymmetrical power relations in bilateral negotiations. A study of the negotiations between Norway and the Soviet Union/Russia on the boundary of the continental shelf and economic zones in the Barents Sea], Department of Political Science, University of Tromsø. Thank you to the participants of the International Politics Working Group at the Norwegian Political Science Conference in Trondheim, 8–10 January 2003 for the useful commentary on an earlier draft, to Alf Håkon Hoel, and to the participants of the World Politics Seminar at the University of Tromsø.

Foreign Affairs Minister Vollebæk in NTBtekst 26 May 1998.

Foreign Affairs Ministers Igor Ivanov and Knut Vollebæk in NTBtekst 3 December 1998 in connection with Ivanov's visit to Norway.

Joint statement issued after the visit and statements to the press in connection with the meeting (Atekst 13 November 2002).

Judicial practice in the area is ambiguous, but nevertheless indicates that the median line is a natural basis for the establishment of a boundary. The vast majority of boundary agreements between countries are based on the median line, with little modification, including with the Soviet Union/Russia. The median line is an important starting point, established on the basis of geographical conditions, according to precedence (Tresselt 1988).

This applies to mainland Norway, Svalbard, and Jan Mayen.

The median line establishes a boundary which is equally distant from either state's coastlines. The sector line establishes a boundary in a straight line from the mainland boundary up to the North Pole.

For an account of each party's legal grounds for their respective positions, including an analysis of the same, please see Churchill and Ulfstein (1992) and Elferink (1997).

Norway in 1996 and Russia in 1997.

Interview with Egil Bergsaker May 1998, member of the negotiating delegation 1970–1986.

This was particularly the experience in Svalbard. For an account of the Soviet Union's attempt to make Svalbard a Norwegian–Soviet concern see Røksund (1996) and Holtsmark (1995).

For the sake of simplicity, only the name “Russia” will be used instead of “Russia/Soviet Union” when speaking generally about the country.

The map was published in the newspaper Nordlys 20 December 1991, but had been known for quite some time among Norwegian experts who were familiar with the Soviet geologists’ evaluations (Bergsaker interview 1998).

Negotiations’ leader Flatla and Deputy Foreign Minister Kolololov to NTBtekst 4 June 1992 and 17 July 1992.

Norway had taken part in boundary agreements with its other neighbouring states, with the UK and Denmark in 1965 and with Sweden in 1968.

In theory it was possible to determine the boundary unilaterally, but this was restricted in practice. There would be considerable costs involved in trying to enforce Soviet jurisdiction all the way to the sector line. It was also known that the Russians were interested in avoiding any unnecessary tensions in the north.

Foreign Minister Frydenlund (1982) pointed out that it was usually in connection with summit meetings that the Soviet Union would engage itself in issues concerning Norway. Here any outstanding questions were taken up by the Soviet leadership, establishing the direction for further co-operation. It was also only after Prime Minster Brattelis's visit to Moscow in 1974 that the basis for formal negotiations was established.

In accordance with the laws of the sea, it is not legal to engage in test drilling in a contested area, but only to collect seismology data. Test drilling could nevertheless have been motivated exclusively by a desire to obtain the best picture of which resources existed within the disputed area, and due to the difficulties in defining the exact boundary, the test drilling could have taken place closer to the disputed area than actually planned.

Norway instituted the 200 mile exclusive economic zone. The Soviet Union was opposed to the establishment of the 200 mile zones, but nevertheless established a 200 mile fishery boundary as a countermeasure to the Norwegian expansion.

In 1976, Norway and the Soviet Union negotiated an agreement to secure each party's rights to fish within each other's zones after the establishment of the 200 mile zones. Two problems nevertheless remained: The question pertaining to law enforcement within the disputed area, and the quota allotment and monitoring of third party country fishers, in other words EC countries which fished under Norwegian licenses.

The agreement stipulated that the parties would refrain from enforcing their own fishery decisions upon the other party, while at the same time they would issue third party licenses and monitor third party fishing in the zone separately.

There is little benefit in evaluating the agreement exclusively on the basis of geographical distribution, or how many square kilometres of ocean one or the other won during the negotiations. Both fisheries and security policy must be taken into consideration as well. Both Norway and the Soviet Union competed for the same fish which roam between the Soviet and Norwegian zones, and as such it was probably wise in terms of resources that Norway consented to increased Soviet fishing in the Norwegian zone so that the younger fish, which tend to keep within the Soviet zone, would have the chance to increase in size (Eriksen 1979). Security policy considerations additionally set clear boundaries on each country's actions. The Soviet Union, with one of the world's largest military complexes housed on Kola, wanted at minimum a psychological sense that the boundary was as far west as possible. Norway was willing to take the areas west of the sector line, but due to its own defence measures the Norwegian delegation could only extend 30° east according to their mandate. The western boundary was established according to these limits. Despite the concessions made by both parties, it was nevertheless clear that the Norwegians tried to be as flexible as possible and as such made the greatest concessions.

NTBtekst 21 September 1987, 1 December 1987, 10 January 1988 and 17 January 1989.

Negotiating leader Tresselt to NTB 17 December 1986.

NTBtekst 1 October 1992.

NTBtekst 1 October 1992 and 1 November 1992.

Minister Ryzhkov to the press, NTBtekst 15 January 1988.

Prime Minister Brundtland to the press after meeting with Ryzhkov Aftenposten 15 January 1988.

The Soviet motivation to co-operate on petroleum extraction was two-fold. First, they needed the technology, expertise and capital. Second, co-operation was attractive from a military strategic perspective. The geological structures largely determined submarine trajectories. As drilling can only take place at locations of petroleum deposits, these installations could prove dangerous towards, and be “in the way” of, submarine activity. Co-operation would ensure that the Soviet government had at least some influence in determining the locations of the drilling installations (Bergesen et al. 1987).

This condition was, moreover, most recently expressed by Premier Kasianov during his visit to Norway in September 2000.

Prime Minister Brundtland to the press during Premier Ryzhkov's visit, NTBtekst 15 January 1988.

The Central Committee's evaluation and subsequent directive to the Soviet negotiating delegation is published in Holmelid (2001).

Negotiating leader Flatla to NTBtekst 4 April, 29 June and 17 July 1992.

The Central Committee's evaluation and subsequent directive to the Soviet negotiating delegation is published in Holmelid (2001).

Negotiating Leader Longva to NTBtekst 29 August 1996.

Atekst 13 March 1998, 27 May 1999 and 11 November 2002.

Atekst 13 November 2002.

Atekst 11 November 2002.

Atekst 11 November 2002. The Central Committee's evaluation and directive from 1990.

Between Nicaragua and Honduras, press release 2002/17, International Court of Justice.

Interfax 13 and 24 May 2002 and Asia Times Online 10 October 2002.

Atekst 22 January 1998.

Sovetskaya Rossiia 22 March 1991 in Elferink (1997: 25).