Government intervention into Sámi Reindeer‐management in Norway: Has it prevented or provoked ‘tragedies of the commons'?¹

A draft version of this paper was presented at the session “Sustainable Development in the Circumpolar North” at the 5th Common Property Conference (“Reinventing the Commons”), 24–28 May 1995, Bodø, Norway. I am grateful for all comments ‐ oral and written ‐ made upon this first version; especially from Ivar Bjørklund, Ottar Brox, my colleagues at the Sámi Institute, and ‐ in particular ‐Lars Ivar Hansen. I am also grateful to Nicholas Tyler, who read through a late version, and gave me valuable linguistic ‐ and biological! ‐ comments.

Looking back into the history of Sámi reindeer pastoralism, the author wishes to consider the development of reindeer‐management in Norway ‐and the present difficulties in the pastures of interior Finnmark ‐ partly by applying Common Property Theory (CPT). His aim is to use CPT as a frame of reference when considering the overgrazing problems of this particular area, evaluating its potential practical value: Can it be used (a) to detect and explain important empirical differences, or (b) to construct viable solutions to real problems of a “commons"? The anwers to both questions are negative. The author demonstrates (1) that the Sámi reindeer‐pastures traditionally have not given free access to everyone. Internal Sámi jurisdiction has laid down how the pastures should be distributed and used; (2) that this, essentially, is the case in the present situation as well; (3) that the terms ‘tragedy’, ‘crisis’, and ‘catastrophe’ are inappropriate in order to describe the present environental conditions of interior Finnmark. There are, however, certain overgrazing problems in the area, due to runaway effects of the new governmental reindeer‐management policy introduced in the late 1970s. The author finally concludes that the allegory ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ is strongly misleading and dangerous when discussing problems of real Common Property Areas. This allegory has given common property a misplaced responsibility for resource degradation that properly belongs to a situation of open access, i.e. the nonproperty regime. Conclusions based upon this misunderstanding tend to support corporate or governmental interests as opposed to e.g. indigenous interests.

Notes

A draft version of this paper was presented at the session “Sustainable Development in the Circumpolar North” at the 5th Common Property Conference (“Reinventing the Commons”), 24–28 May 1995, Bodø, Norway. I am grateful for all comments ‐ oral and written ‐ made upon this first version; especially from Ivar Bjørklund, Ottar Brox, my colleagues at the Sámi Institute, and ‐ in particular ‐Lars Ivar Hansen. I am also grateful to Nicholas Tyler, who read through a late version, and gave me valuable linguistic ‐ and biological! ‐ comments.