Failed Intelligence Reform, State Capture, and Authoritarian Turn in Serbia

Abstract

Two decades after the overthrow of the autocratic regime of Slobodan Milosevic, security intelligence agencies in Serbia are not only far from being reformed, but they play a central role in democracy decline and what many academics and policy officials describe as state capture. Intelligence agencies are among the first victims of state capture and among the major instruments in further capturing state institutions. This process has been a product of the agreed transition from autocracy to democracy that prevented bloodshed but maintained a clientelist relationship between (new) democratic leadership and the (old) security apparatus. Consequently, thorough intelligence reform never happened, resulting in the survival of agencies’ strongholds of power, which facilitated the return to old secret police practice. It is not uncommon today that among important tasks of security intelligence are regime protection through suppression of political opposition and critical voices, as well as making sure that suspicious deals of those close to the ruling party run smoothly. This article aims to map and analyze events and processes that have led to these outcomes and describe how security intelligence is being instrumentalized by the ruling political party and its leader, Aleksandar Vucic.

Notes

1 For example, see: Vanessa Boese and Staffan Lindberg (eds.), Democracy Report 2022: Autocratization Changing Nature? (Gothenburg: V-Dem Institute, 2022), p. 23; Sarah Repucci and Amy Slipowitz, Freedom in the World 2022: The Global Expansion of Authoritarian Rule (Washington: Freedom House, 2022), p. 16.

2 “Serbia,” Freedom in the World 2020, Freedom House, last modified 18 March 2021, https://freedomhouse.org/country/serbia/freedom-world/2020 (accessed 12 February 2023).

3 Zselyke Csaky, Nations in Transit 2020: Dropping the Democratic Facade (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2020).

4 Catrina Godinho and Lauren Hermanus, “(Re)conceptualising State Capture—With a Case Study of South African Power Company Eskom” (paper presented at the State Capture and Its Aftermath: Building Responsiveness Through State Reform, Public Affairs Research Institute, Johannesburg, 22–24 October 2018).

5 In this article, the term security intelligence agencies is used to denote the governmental organizations that are mandated to conduct security and intelligence activities. However, one should note that the term security services is used in the Serbian legal system and by many experts instead of or interchangeably with security intelligence agencies.

6 Predrag Petrović, “State Capture in Serbia—A Conceptual and Contextual Introduction,” in Security Sector Capture in Serbia: An Early Study, edited by Predrag Petrović and Jelena Pejić Nikić (Belgrade: Belgrade Center for Security Policy, 2020), p. 13.

7 Joel Hellman, formerly a leading expert at the World Bank, was the first to conceptualize state capture. Joel S. Hellman Geraint Jones, Daniel Kaufmann, and Mark Schankerman, Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture: How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies, Policy Research Working Paper 2312 (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2000), p. 4.

8 For more on this understanding of state capture, see: Vesna Pešić, State Capture and Widespread Corruption in Serbia (Belgrade: CEPS, 2007), pp. 5–7; Anna Grzymala-Busse, Rebuilding Leviathan: Party Competition and State Exploitation in Post-Communist Democracies (London: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

9 Godinho and Hermanus, “(Re)conceptualising State Capture—With a Case Study of South African Power Company Eskom,” p. 12.

10 Ibid., p. 11.

11 Gerhard Erasmus, When Corruption becomes State Capture (Western Cape, South Africa: Tralac, 2017).

12 Mark Swilling, “State Capture Is a Systemic Process, a Political Project,” interview by Karima Brown, The Aubrey Masango Show, Radio 702, 19 November 2018, 2018, https://ewn.co.za/2018/11/20/listen-state-capture-is-a-systemic-process-a-political-project (accessed 12 February 2023).

13 For more on the concept of state capture, see: Marion Kraske (ed.), Captured States in the Balkans, Perspectives South-Eastern Europe (Sarajevo: Heinrich Böll Foundation Southeastern Europe, 2017); Jochen Luckscheiter and Keren Ben-Zeev (eds.), Robbin’ the Hood: Inquiries into State Capture, Perspectives #01/19 (Cape Town: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, 2019).

14 Camelia Voinea, “State Capture and Political Clientelism in Central and Eastern Europe,” ANNUAL of IJPSR XXXIX, No. 4 (2015), p. 4.

15 Mancho Mitevski, Captured State: Understanding the Macedonian Case (Skopje: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2019).

16 Ivor Chipkin Mark Swilling, Hannah Friedenstein, Nicky Prins, Haroon Bhorat, Mzukisi Qobo, Sikhulekile Duma, Lumkile Mondi, Camaren Peter, and Mbongiseni Buthelezi, Shadow State: The Politics of State Capture (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2018), pp. ix–xiii.

17 Predrag Petrović, “State Capture in Serbia—A Conceptual and Contextual Introduction,” in Security Sector Capture in Serbia: An Early Study, edited by Predrag Petrović and Jelena Pejić Nikić (Belgrade: Belgrade Center for Security Policy, 2020), p. 13.

18 Tom Lodge, “State Capture: Conceptual Considerations,” in State Capture in Africa: Old Threats, New Packaging, edited by Melanie Meirotti and Grant Masterson (Johannesburg: EISA, 2018), p. 20.

19 In some research on state capture the focus is specifically on those grey areas. For example, see: Voinea, “State Capture and Political Clientelism in Central and Eastern Europe.”

20 Tanya Bagashka, “Unpacking Corruption: The Effect of Veto Players on State Capture and Bureaucratic Corruption.” Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 1 (2014), pp. 165–180.

21 A dominant party system exists when one political party wins several elections in a row and that its defeat at future elections is unlikely. Successive electoral victories are ensured, among other ways, through party patronage (i.e., the appointment of party loyalists to key government institutions). For example, see: Andrea Ostheimer, Challenges to Democracy by One-Party Dominance: A Comparative Assessment (Johannesburg: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2006).

22 Lodge, “State Capture,” p. 18.

23 Slobodan Milosevic was a politician who ruled Serbia from 1989 to 2000 in an autocratic way where the security apparatus played a central role. He also pursued Serbian nationalist policies contributing to the breakup of the socialist Yugoslav federation (1945 to 1992). For more on this see in: Nebojsa Vladisavljevic, Serbia's Antibureaucratic Revolution: Miloševic, the Fall of Communism and Nationalist Mobilization (Basingstoke and New York: Springer, 2008).

24 Predrag Petrovic, “Serbia: An Awkward Legacy,” in The Handbook of European Intelligence Cultures, edited by Bob Graaff and James Nyce (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), pp. 321–323.

25 The danger that the security intelligence agencies, police, and army would use force to protect the Milosevic regime was very real. Aleksandar Vasiljevic, the former head of the Military Security Agency, spoke publicly about a list of opposition leaders to be liquidated. Brankica Stanković, Insajder, 2 October 2008, https://insajder.net/english/series/secret/the-second-episode-bhgg37ll (accessed 13 December 2022).

26 According to Timothy Edmunds’ assessment, these agreements are a direct continuation of the old Yugoslav traditions of politicization and nurturing clientelist relations with the security intelligence agencies. Timothy Edmunds, “Intelligence Agencies and Democratisation: Continuity and Change in Serbia after Milosevic,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 60, No. 1 (2008), p. 34.

27 Predrag Petrovic and Bogoljub Milosavljevic, “Security-Intelligence Services in the Republic of Serbia,” in Yearbook on Security Sector Reform of Serbia 2008, edited by Miroslav Hadzic (Belgrade: Center for Civil-Military Relations, 2009), pp. 222–231.

28 Predrag Petrovic and Katarina Djokic, Slippery Slopes in the Reform of Serbian Security Services (Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, 2017).

29 For more on the adoption of the Law on the BIA, see: Bogoljub Milosavljević, “Novo zakonsko uređenje Službe državne bezbednosti Republike Srbije” [New Legal Framework for the State Security Service of the Republic of Serbia], CCMR, 7 July 2002, https://web.archive.org/web/20060825222304if_/http://www.ccmr-bg.org:80/analize/rec/rec2.htm (accessed 11 November 2022).

30 The assassin was a deputy commander of the Special Operation Unit (Jedinica za specijalne operacije), which served as an armed fist of the State Security Service during Milosević’s autocratic regime. The unit was detached from security intelligence and put under police command after it mutinied against the government and disbanded only after the assassination of the prime minister. Members of security intelligence, the judiciary, and the organized crime group “Zemun” clan were deeply involved in the planning and execution of the assassination as well. For more about the background of the assassination, see: Lenard J. Cohen, “Political Violence and Organized Crime in Serbia,” in Democratic Development & Political Terrorism: The Global Perspective, edited by William Crotty (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2005).

31 Stevan Dojcinović, “Konačna presuda za ubistvo Zorana Đinđića” [The Final Verdict for Djindjic's Assasination], CINS, 25 September 2009, https://www.cins.rs/konacna-presuda-za-ubistvo-zorana-djindjica/ (accessed 11 November 2022).

32 Ivana Pejcic, “Zaboravljeni nalazi Koraćeve komisije” [Forgotten Findings of the Korac's Commission], Danas, 27 November 2011.

33 For more on changes to the military security intelligence agencies, see: Zvonimir Horvat, “Reforma vojnih službi bezbednosti,” in Zbornik predavanja sa IX Škole reforme sektora bezbednosti [Collection of Papers from 9th Security Sector Reform School], edited by Pavle Janković (Beograd: ISAC Fund, 2007), pp. 121–135.

34 Edmunds, “Intelligence and Democratisation in Serbia after Milosevic,” p. 31.

35 Predrag Petrović, The Anatomy of Capturing Serbia's Security-Intelligence Sector (Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, 2020).

36 Petrovic, “Serbia: An Awkward Legacy,“p. 325.

37 For more on this, see: Miroslav Hadžić, Ustavna zamisao kontrole i nadzora poslenika bezbednosti Srbije [Constitutional Design of Security Actors' Control and Oversight in Serbia] (Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku, 2019), pp. 31–35.

38 In neighboring Croatia, which has a similar political system, the president and the prime minister jointly convene sessions and cosign decisions, and this balance of power also applies to the body tasked with operational coordination of the security intelligence agencies. Jelena Pejić, Bezbjednosno-obavještajni sistemi u državama članicama Evropske Unije: primjeri Holandije i Hrvatske [Security Intelligence Systems in the EU Member States: The Cases of the Netherlands and Croatia] (Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku, 2016), pp. 6–13.

39 According to Sasa Jankovic, who coordinated the working group that drafted the law, the initial legislative approaches proposed that the council secretary be a nonpolitical appointment conducted through a competitive call for candidates, but these provisions were rejected by the executive authorities of the day as they would leave an important lever of power over the security intelligence agencies beyond their control. Radmilo Marković, “Intervju Saša Janković: Pucanje režimskog kruga laži i obmana” [Interview with Sasa Jankovic: Breaking the Regime's Circle of Lies and Deception], Vreme, 9 September 2018.

40 Petrovic, “Serbia: An Awkward Legacy,” p. 326.

41 Veljko Lalić, “Tri godine od odlaska Mikija Rakića: Najveće tajne najvažnijeg čoveka u državi” [Three Years since the Departure of Miki Rakic: The Biggest Secrets of the Most Important Man in the Country], Nedeljnik, 3 November 2017, http://bit.ly/vucic_rakic (accessed 12 November 2022).

42 Ranko Savic, “Reagovanja na pobedu Nikolića,” RTS, 20 May 2012, http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/1950/izbori-2012/1106014/reagovanja-na-pobedu-nikolica.html (accessed 2 December 2022).

43 Preceding it were amendments to the Law on the Government and the Law on the Ministries. See the official web site of the National Assembly of Serbia: “Doneti zakoni” [Adopted Laws], National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, last modified 10 September 2022, http://www.parlament.gov.rs/akti/doneti-zakoni/u-sazivu-od-31-maja-2012.2194.html (accessed 2 December 2022).

44 Predrag Petrović, “Bezbednosno-obaveštajni sistem Srbije se kroji po diktatu Aleksandra Vucica” [The Security Intelligence System of Serbia Tailored According to Aleksandar Vucic's Wishes], BCBP, 23 July 2012, http://www.bezbednost.org/Bezbednost/4869/Bezbednosnoobavestajni-sistem-Srbije-se-kroji-po.shtml (accessed 23 October 2022).

45 Radmilo Marković, “Intervju—Siniša Janković, policijski inspektor u penziji: Sve boje prljavog novca” [Interview with Sinisa Jankovic, Retired Police Inspector: All Colors of Dirty Money], Vreme, 21 November 2019.

46 Petrovic and Djokic, Slippery Slopes in the Reform of Serbian Security Services, pp. 8–9.

47 Dušan Spasojević and Zoran Stojiljković, Između uverenja i interesa: Ideologija i organizacija stranaka u Srbiji [Between Beliefs and Interests—Ideologies and Organization of the Parties in Serbia] (Beograd: Fabrika knjiga, 2020), p. 23.

48 Dusan Spasojevic and Zoran Stojiljkovic, “Druga smena vlasti: da li je Hantington pogrešio?” [The Second Change of Power: Was Huntington Wrong?] Peščanik, 27 February 2020.

49 Ibid.

50 Ivica Petrović, “Vlast je tamo gde je Vucic” [Power is Where Vucic is], DW, 15 February 2017, https://www.dw.com/sr/vlast-je-tamo-gde-je-vu%C4%8Di%C4%87/a-37555453,20/ (accessed 14 October 2022).

51 Petrovic, The Anatomy of Capturing Serbia's Security-Intelligence Sector, p. 43.

52 Miloš Teodorović, “Ustavni sud oborio članove Zakona o BIA o prisluškivanju” [The Constitutional Court Overturned Articles of the BIA Law on Wiretapping], RSE, 29 December 2022, https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/25215611.html (accessed 13 November 2022).

53 According to some lawyers, Stepanovic had progressed from being a District Court judge to a Supreme Court of Cassation judge in just seven years precisely due to his friendship with the president of Serbia. Petrovic, The Anatomy of Capturing Serbia's Security-Intelligence Sector, p. 18.

54 “Rights, duties and responsibilities resulting from the employment status of the members of the Agency, shall be subject to regulations that apply to members of the Ministry competent for internal affairs.” Law on the BIA, Article 20, Paragraph 1.

55 Law on the BIA, Articles 7 and 20.

56 Maja Nikolić, “Prelević o BIA: Fokus će biti na unutrašnjem neprijatelju” [Prelevic about BIA: The Focus Will Be on the Internal Enemy], N1, 31 August 2017.

57 Mirjana Nikolić, “Bratislav Gašić,” Istinomer, 30 November 2022, https://www.istinomer.rs/akter/bratislav-gasic/ (accessed 4 December 2022).

58 Bratislav Gašić, “Obraćanje direktora Bezbednosno-informativne agencije za 118. Dan BIA” [BIA Director's Address on the Occasion of BIA anniversary], BIA, 17 October 2017, https://bia.gov.rs/sites/default/files/2018-11/govordirektora-17102017_0_0.pdf (accessed 24 November 2022).

59 Safeta Biševac, “Vucicev kolega” [Vucic's Colleague], Danas, 27 October 2013.

60 Predrag Petrovic, “Security Information Agency,” in Integrity Assessment in Security Sector in Serbia, edited by Predrag Petrovic (Belgrade: BCSP, 2014), p. 112.

61 The only contact the president of the Republic has with the appointment of security intelligence agencies’ directors is as a member of the SNB, because the Law on the Bases Regulating Security Services stipulates that the SNB provide the government with an opinion on appointments (Article 5, Paragraph 3). Dejan Anastasijević, “Vucic zatvara krug” [Vucic Closes the Circle], Vreme, 25 May 2017.

62 Press reports indicated that one of the main tasks of the new director would be to “tighten up” the BIA. Vera Novakovic, “Gašić u utorak ide na čelo BIA” [Gasic Heads the BIA as of Tuesday], B92, 22 May 2017.

63 Milenko Vasovic, “Vulin is Perfect Choice for Serbian President’s Dirty Work,” Balkan Insight, 16 December 2022, https://balkaninsight.com/2022/12/16/vulin-is-perfect-choice-for-serbian-presidents-dirty-work/ (accessed 12 February 2023).

64 “Serbian Minister Delivered Transcripts of Russian Opposition Meetings in Belgrade,” Euroactive, 13 January 2022, https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/serbian-minister-delivered-transcripts-of-russian-opposition-meetings-in-belgrade/ (accessed 12 February 2023).

65 According to the most recent publicly available data, some 2,000 people work at the BIA. Vuk Cvijić, “Situacioni centar za unutrašnjeg neprijatelja” [The Situation Center for the Internal Enemy], NIN, 18 October 2018.

66 Predrag Petrovic, “Security Information Agency,” p. 117.

67 The cases most familiar to the public include: Mico Rogovic, a deputy of the National Assembly; Dijana Hrkalovic, a councillor of the Belgrade City Assembly; and Simo Culic, the head of the ruling party’s web team. Petrovic, The Anatomy of Capturing Serbia's Security-Intelligence Sector, pp. 30–33.

68 Davor Lukač, “Za šta služi služba?” [What is the Service For?] Vreme, 7 November 2019.

69 Cvijić, “Situacioni centar za unutrašnjeg neprijatelja”

70 Vesna Rakić Vodinelić, “Pripreme za izbor javnih tužilaca—Institucionalne i vaninstitucionalne” [Preparations for the Selection of Public Prosecutors—Institutional and Non-Institutional], Peščanik, 1 December 2015, https://pescanik.net/pripreme-za-izbor-javnih-tuzilaca-institucionalne-i-vaninstitucionalne/ (accessed 11 November 2022).

71 Bojana Pavlović and Stevan Dojčinović, “Sve kontroverze izbora specijalnog tužioca” [All the Controversies of the Special Prosecutor's Election], Krik, 28 December 2015, https://www.krik.rs/sve-kontroverze-izbora-specijalnog-tuzioca/ (accessed 12 November 2022).

72 Goran Ilić, “Samo podobni ljudi se biraju za ključne funkcije u Tužilaštvu” [Only Loyalists are Selected for Key Positions in the Prosecutor's Office], UTS, 25 August 2016, https://www.uts.org.rs/osvrti/1240-intervju-goran-ilic-samo-podobni-ljudi-se-biraju-za-kljucne-funkcije-u-tuzilastvu (accessed 2 November 2022).

73 The directors of the VBA and VOA and their deputies must have completed General Staff Advanced Training and have at least nine years of experience in security and intelligence matters within the defense system. Law on VBA and VOA, Article 37, Paragraph 6.

74 Jelena Zorić, “Na koju stranu vuku promene u vrhu Vojske Srbije?” [What Will Bring Changes of the Serbian Armed Forces Leadership?], N1, 17 September 2018.

75 “Antić: Za malverzacije u trgovini oružjem odgovorno Ministarstvo odbrane,” N1 Info, 21 November 2019.

76 Vuk Cvijić, “Prikrivanje umesto istrage” [A Cover-up Instead of an Investigation], NIN, 2 July 2020.

77 Bojana Jovanović, “Period Dijane Hrkalović u MUP-u: Mafijaška ubistva, veze kriminala i policije i prijave protiv nje” [Dijana Hrkalović's Reign in the MUP: Mafia Murders, Links between Crime and the Police, and Reports against Her], Krik, 29 May 2019, https://www.krik.rs/rad-dijane-hrkalovic-u-mup-u-mafijaska-ubistva-veze-kriminala-i-policije-i-prijave-protiv-nje/ (accessed 5 October 2022).

78 For example, see: Mijat Lakićević, “Čvorovići u besnom galop” [Cvorovici in a Furious Gallop], Peščanik, 16 November 2014, https://pescanik.net/cvorovici-u-besnom-galopu/ (accessed 13 September 2022); Mijat Lakićević, “Poreznik Marko Marinković protiv građanina Željka Bodrožića” [The Taxman Marko Marinković against Citizen Zeljko Bodrozic], Peščanik, 13 December 2014, https://pescanik.net/poreznik-marko-marinkovic-protiv-gradjanina-zeljka-bodrozica/ (accessed 13 September 2022).

79 It has been discovered recently that Predator was planted on the phones of one of the top opposition leaders, as well as journalists in Greece and that Cytrox is registered in Hungary. Szabolcs Panyi, “Boosting of Spying Capabilities Stokes Fear Hungary is Building a Surveillance State,” Reporting Democracy, 13 October 2022, https://balkaninsight.com/2022/10/13/boosting-of-spying-capabilities-stokes-fear-hungary-is-building-a-surveillance-state/ (accessed 4 November 2022).

80 Aleksa Tešić, “Softveri za obradu ličnih podataka, potencijalna pretnja po privatnost građana” [Software for Personal Data Processing—A Potential Threat to Citizens' Privacy], BIRN, 3 June 2022, https://birn.rs/softveri-za-obradu-licnih-podataka-potencijalna-pretnja-po-privatnost-gradana/ (accessed 15 November 2022).

81 Ibid.

82 Gordana Ćosić and Predrag Urošević, “Demonstranti u Srbiji sumnjaju da su snimani Huawei opremom” [Demonstrators in Serbia Suspect that they were Filmed with Huawei Equipment], RSE, 8 December 2021, https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/p/4418.html (accessed 12 October 2022).

83 Aleksa Tešić, “Policija Srbije nabavila softver sa opcijom za prepoznavanje lica” [The Serbian Police has Acquired Software with the Option of Facial Recognition], BIRN, 17 November 2022, https://birn.rs/policija-srbije-nabavila-softver-za-prepoznavanje-lica/ (accessed 28 November 2022).

84 Morgane Fert-Malka, “East and West Battle for Serbia's Mass Surveillance Software Market,” Intelligence Online, 30 September 2022, https://www.intelligenceonline.com/surveillance–interception/2022/09/30/east-and-west-battle-for-serbia-s-mass-surveillance-software-market,109829381-art (accessed 13 November 2022).

85 Snežana Čongradin, “Nacionalističko i proevrpsko rušenje Vucica” [The Nationalist and Pro-European Overthrow of Vucic], Demostat, 21 July 2018.

86 Predrag Petrović, BIA u borbi protiv unutrašnjeg neprijatelja [BIA in the Fight against the Internal Enemy] (Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku, 2019), pp. 1–2.

87 “Conclusions of the Conference—Towards a Safer Serbia,” National Vanguard, last modified 2 October 2022, https://www.nacionalnaavangarda.rs/konbes/ (accessed 12 October 2022).

88 On 5 October 2000, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia coalition, which had defeated Slobodan Milocevic (autocratic ruler of Serbia) at the September polls, organized a mass demonstration after which Milosevic conceded his electoral defeat. Lenard J. Cohen, Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic (Boulder, CO: Westview Press Boulder, 2002).

89 Petrovic, The Anatomy of Capturing Serbia's Security Intelligence, pp. 3–6.

90 Predrag Petrović and Jelena Pejić Nikić (eds.), Security Sector in a Captured State: Act Two (Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, 2021), p. 34.

91 “Regular Annual Report of the Protector of Citizens for 2014,” Ref. no. 7919, Protector of Citizens, 14 March 2025.

92 Lana Gedošević, “Srpski Votergejt: Vojni špijuni prisluškuju sudije, opoziciju, sindikate…” [Serbian Watergate: Military Spies Eavesdrop on Judges, Opposition, Unions…], Blic, 16 January 2015.

93 Vojislav Milovančević, “Antić: VBA prisluškuje sindikalce” [Antić: VBA is Eavesdropping on Trade Union Members], Nova, 17 April 2021.

94 Vesna Radojević, “Lalić: Sada se shvata obim prisluškivanja” [Lalić: Now the Extent of Wiretapping is Clear], Krik, 17 February 2020, https://www.raskrikavanje.rs/page.php?id=570 (accessed 12 October 2022).

95 Petrovic, The Anatomy of Capturing Serbia's Security Intelligence.

96 As was the case for media from southeast Serbia, Južne Vesti. Vladimir Kostić, “Poreska kontrolisala Južne vesti, ali ne i televizije povezane sa Gašićem” [The Tax Office Controlled Juzne Vesti but not the Televisions Associated with Gasic], CINS, 14 March 2019.

97 Among these local media outlets are Novine Vranjske and Kikindske. For more on the misuse of the Tax Administration, see: Lakićević, “Poreznik Marko Marinković.”

98 Mirjana Stevanović, “Da li je država zloupotrebila ovlašćenja?” [Did the State Abuse its Powers?], Danas, 14 August 2020.

99 Filip Švarm and Stevan Ristić, “Država i kriminal-uspon i pad Veljka Belivuka” [The State and Crime—The Rise and Fall of Veljko Belivuk], Vreme, 11 February 2021.

100 Ivana Jeremic, “Foul Play: Serbia’s Football Hooligans Get Down to Business,” Balkan Insight, 22 July 2019, https://balkaninsight.com/2019/07/22/foul-play-serbias-football-hooligans-get-down-to-business/ (accessed 12 February 2022).

101 Vuk Cvijić, “Veza tajne službe i huligana: Janjičar iz BIA” [The Connection Between the Secret Service and Hooligans: Janissar from the BIA], NIN, 4 March 2021.

102 Vuk Cvijić, “Zametanje tragova odgovornosti” [Hiding Traces of Responsibility], NIN, 19 August 2021.

103 Stevan Dojčinović, “Koluvijin 'Savet za bezbednost': Kako su iz MUP-a, BIA-e i VOA-e štitili plantažu marihuane” [Koluvija's “Security Council”: How the MUP, BIA and VOA Protected the Marijuana Plantation], Krik, 26 January 2021, https://www.krik.rs/koluvijin-savet-za-bezbednost-kako-su-iz-mup-a-bia-e-i-voa-e-stitili-plantazu-marihuane/ (accessed 2 November 2022).

104 Mina Milanović, “Jovanjici za tri godine Agencija za finansiranje izvoza odobrila više miliona evra kredita” [The Agency for Export Financing Granted Jovanjica Several Million Euros in Loans], Insajder, 6 December 2019, https://insajder.net/arhiva/vesti/jovanjici-za-tri-godine-agencija-za-finansiranje-izvoza-odobrila-vise-miliona-evra-kredita (accessed 12 December 2022).

105 Dimitrije Djurić, “Vucic u odbrani Koluvije: Nije ubio nikoga, nije imao 10 tona kokaina ili nešto slično” [Vucic in Defense of Koluvija: He Didn't Kill Anyone; He Didn't Have 10 Tons of Cocaine or Anything Like That], 021, 2 October 2021.

106 Davor Lukač, “Prilozi za biografiju-Đuro Jovanić: Karijera na mlazni pogon” [Djuro Jovanic's Biography: A Jet-Powered Career], Vreme, 6 May 2021; Cvijić, “Zametanje tragova odgovornosti.”

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Predrag Petrović

Predrag Petrović is the Research Director of the Belgrade Center for Security Policy. Predrag obtained his Ph.D. at the Faculty of Political Sciences on intelligence reform in Serbia. His M.Phil. thesis, Privatization of Security in the Weak States: The Case of Serbia, was published as a monograph. The author can be contacted at [email protected].