Spanish Intelligence in the Early Days of Late-Francoism: Fault Lines and Continuity

Abstract

Conflicting factions within the late-Francoist regime, starting around 1968, prompted a slow-paced decline of the regime’s internal power structures, with an uncertain expiry date. Clandestine groups within universities and workers’ organizations pressed for regime change at different levels, and voices also emerged from within the Catholic Church and the army, often with the aim of restoring Spain’s international relations with its European neighbors and ending isolation. Increasingly rattled by the violence and the organized terrorist activity of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, the repressive apparatus of the regime was determined not to relinquish control. It retaliated with large doses of information, disinformation, propaganda, and outright violence. Late-Francoist Spain thus presents a case study of practices and dynamics initiated during a nondemocratic period, whose legacy survived over the years and influenced the intelligence apparatus of the democratic country in which the Spanish now live.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 General Franco took over Spain after his victory in Spain’s Civil War. He enjoyed the support of the Roman Catholic Church elites and the National Movement (Movimiento Nacional)—which included the only accepted political party, Falange Española—and capitalized on the armed forces, the Nacional Police, and the Civil Guard to stay in power. Florina Cristiana Matei, Andrés de Castro García, and Carolyn C. Halladay, “On Balance: Intelligence Democratization in Post-Franco Spain,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 31, No. 4 (2018), pp. 769–804.

2 Gaizka Fernández Soldevilla and Raúl López Romo, Sangre, Votos, Manifestaciones: ETA y El Nacionalismo Vasco Radical (1958–2011), Semilla y Surco. Ciencia Política (Madrid: Tecnos, 2012).

3 Thirteen interviews with political elites were held in Madrid between 19 July 2001 and 4 June 2002.

4 Manuel Ballbé, “Security Forces and Agencies in Spain,” Revista Internacional de Sociología, Vol. 43, No. 2 (1985), pp. 373–378.

5 Law 154/1963, of 2 December, regarding the establishment of the Court and Tribunals of Public Order.

6 Guidelines against Subversion and Counter-Subversion; cf. Antonio M. Díaz-Fernández, Los Servicios de Inteligencia Españoles: Desde La Guerra Civil Hasta El 11-M: Historia de Una Transición (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2005).

7 From the establishment of OCN onward, the dual leadership structure comprising the presidency and either the Ministry of Education or the Ministry of Defence has been a consistent characteristic of the Spanish intelligence system, including its successor agencies CESID and CNI.

8 José Ignacio San Martín, Servicio Especial: A Las Órdenes de Carrero Blanco, de Castellana a El Aaiún, 1st ed., Espejo de España, 91. Serie Biografías y Memorias (Barcelona: Planeta, 1983).

9 Ibid.

10 The same dynamic of having police, military, and civilians was reproduced, in 2002, when CESID was transformed into the CNI, although some politicians have alleged that a civilian intelligence agency should be formed exclusively by civilians.

11 Interviews with Coronel San Martín were held in Cádiz on 24 July 2001 and 13 August 2002.

12 Juan María de Peñaranda, Desde El Corazón Del CESID (Barcelona: Espasa, 2012).

13 Interview with Andrés Cassinello was held in Madrid on 11 March 2002.

14 Manuel Cerdán, Lobo: Un Topo En Las Entrañas de ETA, 1st ed. (Barcelona: Plaza Janés, 2003).

15 Ibid.

16 Interviews with SECED agents and directives, several locations, between 1999 and 2001.

17 Díaz-Fernández, Los Servicios de Inteligencia Españoles.

18 Joaquín Bardavío, Pilar Cernuda, and Fernando Jáuregui, Servicios Secretos, 1st ed. (Barcelona: Plaza & Janés Editores, 2000).

19 Interviews with SECED agents and directives were held at several locations in Madrid from 1999 to 2001.

20 In 1969, Francisco Franco appointed Juan Carlos as his successor to the head of state and bestowed on him the title of prince of Spain. This political maneuver facilitated the historical continuity of the monarchy and mitigated the risk of movements arising after Franco’s death that would call for the reinstatement of the Republic. As a result, Prince Juan Carlos received significant political capital and support from both the general population and the regime’s elites.

21 On 23 February 1981, a group of civil guards stormed the Spanish Congress of Deputies during a plenary session, taking the entire assembly and members of the government hostage. The plot was rooted in the discontent of part of the military due to the accelerated process of decentralization of the state, as well as the high activity of ETA terrorists who had killed 93 people the previous year, showing, in their opinion, the deep weaknesses of the government. However, after a televised statement by King Juan Carlos, in which he appeared in his military uniform, supporting the Constitution and proclaiming that no attacks against democracy would be tolerated, the rebels surrendered. See: José Antonio Olmeda, “Process from Authoritarianism to Democracy in Spain: The Impact of the 1981 Failed Coup” (Working Papers 7, Ciencia Política y de la Administración. Estudios, 2003).

22 Fernando Puell de la Villa, Gutiérrez Mellado: Un militar del siglo XX (1912–1995) (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 1997).

23 Interview with President Calvo Sotelo was held in Madrid on 26 February 2002.

24 The deep political weaknesses of Franco’s regime, whose health was extremely precarious, were detected by the Moroccan rulers, who took the opportunity to push their political agenda. This agenda has an expansionist character, partially explained by the economic interest in taking over the mineral resources and fisheries of Western Sahara, and to gain weight in front of their large neighbor, Algeria. The claims by Morocco over the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla, which have been Spanish territories since the mid-seventeenth century—before Morocco was created in 1956—were part of the strategy employed by autocracies to find an external enemy to rally people around a foreign threat and not paying attention to the domestic problems.

25 Andrea Giménez-Salinas, “The Spanish Intelligence Services,” in Democracy, Law and Security: Internal Security Services in Contemporary Europe, edited by Jean-Paul Brodeur, Peter Gill, and Dennis Tollborg (London: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 63–80.

26 Paddy Woodworth, Guerra sucia, manos limpias: ETA, el GAL y la democracia española, Crítica contrastes (Barcelona: Ed. Crítica, 2002).

27 Javier García, Los GAL al Descubierto: La Trauma de La “Guerra Sucia” Contra ETA (Madrid: El País: Aguilar, 1988).

28 Díaz-Fernández, Los Servicios de Inteligencia Españoles.

29 García, Los GAL al Descubierto.

30 Antonio M. Díaz Fernández, “The Spanish Intelligence Community: A Diffuse Reality,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2010), pp. 223–244. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2010.489278

31 Antonio M. Díaz-Fernández, “Halfway Down the Road to Supervision of the Spanish Intelligence Services,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (2006), pp. 440–456. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520600750687; Antonio M. Díaz-Fernández, “El papel de la comunidad de inteligencia en la toma de decisiones de la política exterior y de seguridad de España,” Documento de Trabajo, 3 (Madrid, Fundación Alternativas, 2010).

32 Díaz-Fernández, Los Servicios de Inteligencia Españoles, pp. 253–260.

33 Royal Decree 2632/1985, of 27 December, which regulates the internal structure and relationships of the Higher Center for Defense Information.

34 Díaz-Fernández, Los Servicios de Inteligencia Españoles, pp. 236–245.

35 Organic Law 2/1986 of 13 March, on Security Forces and Corps.

36 Díaz-Fernández, Los Servicios de Inteligencia Españoles.

37 Interviews with Vice-President Narcís Serra were held in Madrid on 23 April 2002 and in Barcelona in 2006.

38 Interviews with political leaders of different political parties held in Madrid from 2002 to 2003.

39 Matei, de Castro García, and Halladay, “On Balance.”

40 Cristina Del-Real and Antonio M Díaz-Fernández, “Understanding the Plural Landscape of Cybersecurity Governance in Spain: A Matter of Capital Exchange,” International Cybersecurity Law Review, Vol 3. (2022), pp. 313–343. https://doi.org/10.1365/s43439-022-00069-4

41 Organic Law 2/2002 of 6 May, on the Preliminary Judicial Review Act.

42 Royal Decree 873/2014 of 10 October, which modifies Royal Decree 400/2012 of 17 February, which develops the basic organizational structure of the Ministry of Interior.

43 Since 2002, one politician, one general of the Army, and two civilian former general secretaries of CNI have occupied the steering gear of the Spanish intelligence service. It is difficult to attribute to any of them a special impact on the service beyond managing it following the rule of law, and the guidelines provided by the government.

44 Díaz-Fernández, Los Servicios de Inteligencia Españoles.

45 On democratization of intelligence, see: Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas Bruneau, “Intelligence Reform in New Democracies: Factors Supporting or Arresting Progress,” Democratization, Vol. 18, No. 3 (2011), pp. 602–630. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.586257

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Antonio M. Díaz-Fernández

Antonio M. Díaz-Fernández is an Associate Professor of Criminology and Security at the University of Cadiz, Spain. He holds a degree in Law, and in Politics and Government from the University of Barcelona where he obtained his Ph.D. in Political Science, and a Master’s in Peace, Security, and Defence from the Instituto Universitario “General Gutiérrez Mellado” (Madrid). He is member of the Forum against Disinformation and National Security at the National Security Department of the Spanish Presidency of the Government. The author can be contacted at [email protected].