Democratization of Intelligence: Demilitarizing the Greek Intelligence Service after the Junta

Abstract

Military dictatorships critically rely on the armed forces and intelligence agencies for the maintenance of their regime. They strengthen these through the allocation of substantial staff and personal resources. We know little about the behavior of intelligence and security services in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. This article examines the Greek Intelligence Service (KYP) and, since 1986, the National Intelligence Service as its successor. A principal ingredient for the democratic embedment of the service was a break with this dictatorial past and, consequently, its demilitarization. This article shows that the de facto demilitarization of the service was a protracted process that was largely independent from the de jure formal demilitarization in 1986. It both preceded and lagged the legislative decision in 1986. This article particularly focusses on personnel policies aimed at distancing the service from its former ties to the junta regime (1967–1974), the “old KYP.” Its methodological contribution lies in its reliance on original, oral history interviews with former employees of the service and in its systematic analysis of newspaper publications for research on the KYP. I argue and show that internal organizational factors, most notably professionalization and shifting responsibilities, rather than external factors such as party politics or a prodemocratic ideological vision, are the key explanations for a change in the otherwise persistent military staffing of the intelligence service.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Natasha Ezrow and Erica Frantz, Dictators and Dictatorships: Understanding Authoritarian Regimes and their Leaders (London and New York: Continuum Books, 2011); Erica Frantz, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Joseph Wright, and Xu Xu, “Personalization of Power and Repression in Dictatorships,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 82, No. 1 (2020), pp. 372–377; Jennifer Gandhi, Political Institutions under Dictatorship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2014), pp. 313–331; Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University, 1996); Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (London and Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000); B. Bueno de Mesquita, A. Smith, R. M. Siverson, and J. D. Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005); Constantine P. Danopoulos (ed.), The Decline of Military Regimes: The Civilian Influence (London and New York: Routledge, 2019), in particular the introductory chapter by Constantine P. Danopoulos, “Military Dictatorships in Retreat: Problems and Perspectives,” in The Decline of Military Regimes: The Civilian Influence, edited by Constantine P. Danopoulos (London and New York: Routledge, 2019), pp. 1–24.

2 Florina Cristina Matei and Thomas Bruneau, “Intelligence Reform in New Democracies: Factors Supporting or Arresting Progress,” Democratization, Vol. 18, No. 3 (2011), pp. 602–630; Robert Jervis, “Intelligence, Civil-Intelligence Relations, and Democracy,” in Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, edited by Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), p. xix; Michael M. Andregg and Peter Gill, “Comparing the Democratization of Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2014), pp. 487–497, at p. 488. See the special issue on “Democratisation of Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2014). See also relevant chapters in the edited volumes on intelligence cultures: Bob de Graaff and James M. Nyce, with Chelsea Locke (eds.), Handbook of European Intelligence Cultures (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016); Ryan Shaffer (ed.), Handbook of African Intelligence Cultures (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2023); Ryan Shaffer (ed.), Handbook of Asian Intelligence Cultures (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2022).

3 Pavlos Apostolidis, Μυστική Δράση: Υπηρεσίες Πληροφοριών στην Ελλάδα [Secret Action: Intelligence Services in Greece] (Athens: Papazisi, 2014).

4 Sifis Fitsanakis, Εθνική Ασφάλεια και Σύγχρονες Υπηρεσίες Κατασκοπείας στην Ελλάδας [National Security and Contemporary Espionage Services in Greece] (Athens: Potamos, 2015).

5 Alexis Papahelas, Ο Bιασμός της Ελληνικής Δημοκρατίας: Ο Αμερικάνικος Παράγων, 1947–1967 [The Rape of Greek Democracy: The American Factor, 1947–1967] (Athens: Estia, 2021); Alexis Papahelas, Ένα σκοτεινό Δωμάτιο: Ο Ιωαννίδης και η Παγίδα της Κύπρου, τα Πετρέλαια στο Αιγαίο, ο Ρόλος των Αμερικανών [A Dark Room: Ioannidis and the Trap of Cyprus, Oil in the Aegean, the Role of the Americans] (Αthens: Metaichmio, 2021).

6 Eleni Braat, “Recurring Tensions between Secrecy and Democracy: Arguments on the Security Service in Dutch parliament, 1975–1995,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 31, No. 4 (2016), pp. 532–555; Eleni Braat, “Self-Reinforcing Secrecy: Cultures of Secrecy within Intelligence Agencies,” in Transparency and Secrecy in European Democracies: Contested Trade-Offs, edited by Dorota Mokrosinska (London and New York: Routledge, 2020), pp. 118–134.

7 Florina Cristiana Matei, Mimoza Xharo, and Eduart Bala, “Albania’s Intelligence after Hoxha: The Cat’s Grin and Hidden Claws,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2016), pp. 299–327; Florina Cristina Matei and Thomas Bruneau, “Intelligence Reform in New Democracies: Factors Supporting or Arresting Progress,” Democratization, Vol. 18, No. 3 (2011), pp. 602–630; Carlos S. Arturi and Julio C. Rodriguez, “Democratization and Intelligence and International Security Agencies: A Comparative Analysis of the Cases of Brazil and Portugal (1974–2014),” Brazilian Political Science Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2019), pp. 1–29, at pp. 2–3; Michael M. Andregg and Peter Gill, “Comparing the Democratization of Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2014), pp. 487–497.

8 Jennifer Ghandi, Political Institutions under Dictatorship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. xvii–xviii, 41, 168; Florina Cristiana Matei, “Romania’s Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 20, No. 4 (2007), p. 631; Michael M. Andregg and Peter Gill, “Comparing the Democratization of Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2014), pp. 487–497, at 489.

9 Both Papahelas and Fitsanakis portray the KYP as ineffective and of secondary importance in the major events of 1967–1974. Sifis Fitsanakis, Εθνική Ασφάλεια και Σύγχρονες Υπηρεσίες Κατασκοπείας στην Ελλάδας [National Security and Contemporary Espionage Services in Greece] (Athens: Potamos, 2015), pp. 119–120; Alexis Papahelas, Ένα σκοτεινό δωμάτιο, 1967–1974: Ο Ιωαννίδης και η παγίδα της Κύπρου, τα πετρέλαια στο Αιγαίο, ο ρόλος των Αμερικανών [A Dark Room: Ioannidis and the Trap of Cyprus, Oil in the Aegean, the Role of the Americans] (Αthens: Metaichmio, 2021).

10 In 2015, a historical overview on the official website of the KYP described the service during the dictatorship as “a reflection of the oppressive and violent nature of the regime” (cited in Sifis Fitsanakis, Εθνική Ασφάλεια και Σύγχρονες Υπηρεσίες Κατασκοπείας στην Ελλάδας [National Security and Contemporary Espionage Services in Greece] (Athens: Potamos, 2015), p. 119. In 2022, the same historical overview did not mention anything about the period between 1952 and 1974 (https://www.nis.gr/el/agency/historical-background/timeline, accessed 9 December 2022).

11 See also Timothy Edmunds, “Intelligence Agencies and Democratisation: Continuity and Change in Serbia after Milosevic,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 60, No. 1 (2008), pp. 25–48, 26–30.

12 Michael M. Andregg, and Peter Gill, “Comparing the Democratization of Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2014), pp. 487–497, at pp. 491–492; Joanisval Brito Goncalves, “The Spies Who Came in from the Tropics: Intelligence Services and Democracy in Brazil,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2014), pp. 518–599, at pp. 585–587; Helge Luras, “Democratic Oversight in Fragile States: the Case of Intelligence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2014), pp. 600–618.

13 Florina Cristiana Matei, “Romania’s Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 20, No. 4 (2007), pp. 629–660; Florina Cristiana Matei, Mimoza Xharo, and Eduart Bala, “Albania’s Intelligence after Hoxha: the Cat’s Grin and Hidden Claws,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2016), pp. 299–327.

14 Law 3649 from 2008 provides for the partial declassification of the archive of the KYP.

15 Anthony Seldon and Joanna Pappworth, By Word of Mouth: Elite Oral History (London: Methuen Publishing, 1983); O. Tansey, “Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-Probability Sampling,” PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2007), pp. 765–772; Patrick Biernacki and Dan Waldord, “Snowball Sampling: Problems and Techniques of Chain Referral Sampling,” Sociological Methods and Research, Vol. 10 (November 1981), pp. 141–163.

16 Of all interviewed former employees, the first employee joined the service in 1967 and the latest one in 2004.

17 One interview lasted 30 minutes.

18 Each interviewee gave informed consent for their recorded and transcribed interview. They have been given the opportunity to check their citations in the final draft of this article. Some of them preferred former head of service Pavlos Apostolidis to check their citations rather than doing it themselves. Interviewees were free to point out factual errors, while they agreed that the author of this article is responsible for the interpretation of their citations and other historical sources. At the start of this research, the Faculty of Humanities of Utrecht University did not yet have an Ethics Committee that could give formal approval for this research.

19 Tasos Panoutsopoulos, postdoctoral research fellow at the Seeger Center for Hellenic Studies at Princeton University at the time of writing, collected the empirical data in newspapers.

20 Konstantinos Kokkalis, “Greece: After the Seven Year Itch of Military Rule,” The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, edited by Florina Cristiana Matei, Carolyn Halladay, and Thomas C. Bruneau (London, New York: Routledge, 2021), pp. 226–237.

21 Papahelas, Ο Bιασμός της Ελληνικής Δημοκρατίας; Papahelas, Ένα σκοτεινό Δωμάτιο, pp. 51, 84.

22 Papahelas, Ένα σκοτεινό Δωμάτιο, pp. 181–182, 188, 221–222.

23 Ibid., pp. 84–85.

24 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, “The Ghost of Trials Past: Transitional Justice in Greece, 1974–1975,” Contemporary European History, Vol. 31 (2022), pp. 286–298.

25 Konstantinos Kokkalis, “Greece: After the Seven Year Itch of Military Rule,” The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, edited by Florina Cristiana Matei, Carolyn Halladay, and Thomas C. Bruneau (London, New York: Routledge, 2021), pp. 226–237.

26 Nikos Alivizatos, “Τα βαθύτερα αίτια της κακοδαιμονίας [The Deeper Causes of the Malaise],” Kathimerini, 20 November 2022; Eleni Braat, “Διαφάνεια για το παρελθόν της ΕΥΠ” [Transparency On the Past of the Greek Intelligence Service], Kathimerini, 13 September 2022; Katerina Papanikolaou, “Έλλειμμα διαφάνειας και λογοδοσίας” [Lack of Transparency and Accountability], Kathimerini, 14 August 2022; Giannis Valinakis, “Για μια αποτελεσματική ΕΥΠ” [For an Effective Greek Intelligence Service), Kathimerini, 20 November 2022.

27 Anonymous, “Το Σ.Ν. για τους δημοσίους υπαλλήλους” [The Draft Law for Civil Servants], Kathimerini, 14 August 1981, p. 2.

28 Anonymous, “Φιλόδοξο σχέδιο για την ΕΥΠ” [Ambitious Plan for the EYP], Kathimerini, 20 February 1999, p. 1.

29 Interview Korantis, 13 April 2022.

30 Irini Karanasopoulou, “Η επιτυχία στην Κένυα τον έφερε στην κορυφή της ΕΥΠ” [The Success in Kenya led him to the Top of the EYP], Ta Nea, 5 March 1999; Apostolidis, Μυστική Δράση. Pavlos Apostolidis also mentions, several times, his determination to further demilitarize the service. Archival material from the KYP is needed to corroborate whether he succeeded.

31 Interview with Korantis (13 April 2022).

32 Ibid.

33 Anonymous, “Επουσιώδεις οι Μεταβολές στην Κ.Υ.Π” [Inadequate Changes in the KYP], Ta Nea, 5 October 1974, pp. 1 and 9; interview no. 4, 2 October 2019.

34 Robert Jervis, “Intelligence, Civil-Intelligence Relations, and Democracy,” in Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, edited by Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), p. xi.

35 Interview no. 2, 1 October 2019.

36 Interview no. 4, 2 October 2019.

37 Since oral history interviews are not a suitable source for statistical data, this research had not prepared specific questions to this end. Nevertheless, interviewees mentioned several recruitment clusters since 1974. As these mentions led to conflicting information, this article will not refer to them. Archival material from the KYP promises to be a more reliable source.

38 Interview no. 2, 1 October 2019.

39 Interview no. 2, 1 October 2019 and no. 1, 2 October 2019.

40 Interview no. 2, 1 October 2019.

41 Interviews no. 4, 2 October 2019 and no. 1, 2 October 2019.

42 This was an important personal advantage, especially for those with families (interview no. 1, 2 October 2019). An exception to this principle was, until 1997, the annual move in the summer of about 100 civilian employees to remote areas of Greece for three years. Operationally, such short-term moves had little advantage. After 1997, such moves were restricted to employees who already had (e.g., family) ties to specific remote areas and were motivated to stay longer (interviewee no. 6 reacts to draft version of article, 10 January 2023).

43 Interview no. 6, 14 April 2022. Up until 2008, the labor union raised the issue of the low salaries. See also “K.A.” chairman, Labor Union EYP, in Κράτος-Ασφάλεια και ο Ρόλος των Υπηρεσιών Πληροφοριών: Η Περίπτωση της Ελλάδας: Αρμοδιότητες και Λειτουργία της Εθνικής Υπηρεσίας Πληροφοριών [Security State and the Role of the Intelligence Services: The Case of Greece: Responsibilities and Functioning of the National Intelligence Service] (Athens: Sakkoulas, 2009), pp. 4–5.

44 Eleni Braat, “Self-Reinforcing Secrecy: Cultures of Secrecy within Intelligence Agencies,” in Transparency and Secrecy in European Democracies: Contested Trade-Offs, edited by Dorota Mokrosinska (London and New York: Routledge), pp. 118–134.

45 Anonymous, “Επουσιώδεις οι Μεταβολές στην Κ.Υ.Π” [Inadequate Changes in the KYP]; interview no. 4, 2 October 2019.

46 Interviews no. 4, 2 October 2019, and no. 1, 2 October 2019. Other drawbacks consisted of mandatory blue aprons for women until the late 1970s, and the permission of the service that an employee was required to ask for to marry someone until the early 1980s (interviews no. 4, 2 October 2019, and interview no. 1, 2 October 2019).

47 Eleni Braat, Oude Jongens, de Dingen die Voorbij Gaan: Een Sociale Geschiedenis van de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, 1945–1998 [Of Old Boys, the Things that Pass: A Social History of the Dutch Security Service, 1945–1998] (Zoetermeer: General Dutch Intelligence and Security Service, 2010), pp. 11–21.

48 Interview no. 4, 2 October 2019.

49 The military and police workforce joined the service through administrative move.

50 In the run-up to formal demilitarization, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) government strengthened the civilian character of the service by adding 151 civilian employees to the existing 851 ones. Anonymous, “Άλλες 151 Θέσεις Εργασίας Προστίθενται στην Κ.Υ.Π.” [Another 151 Job Offers at the KYP], Kathimerini, 22 August 1985, p. 2.

51 Giannis Fatsis, “Νέος ρόλος στην ΚΥΠ: Αλλαγές Ηγεσίας και Νέα Δομή” [New Role for the KYP. Changing Management and New Structure], Ta Nea, 18 January 1984, p. 1 and last page.

52 Anonymous, “Με Νομοσχέδιο που Κατατέθηκε στη Bουλή η ΚΥΠ Μετονομάζεται και Αναδιοργανώνεται: ‘Μετεξελίσσεται’ σε πολιτική οργάνωση” [With Bill that was Presented at Parliament the KYP will be Renamed and Reformed: The KYP “Evolves” into a Civilian Organization], Kathimerini, 23 May 1986, p. 1.

53 For instance, see Giannis Fatsis and N. Kakaounaki, “Νυστέρι στην ΚΥΠ” [Cuts in the KYP], Ta Nea, 23 January 1984, p. 1.

54 Sifis Fitsanakis, Εθνική Ασφάλεια και Σύγχρονες Υπηρεσίες Κατασκοπείας στην Ελλάδας [National Security and Contemporary Espionage Services in Greece] (Athens: Potamos, 2015), pp. 127–129; Apostolidis, Μυστική Δράση [Secret Action], p. 265.

55 Anonymous, “Μετά την Ψήφιση του Νέου Νόμου: Πλήρης Κομματικοποίηση στην Ηγεσία της ΚΥΠ: Ως Υπαρχηγός Τοποθετείται ο κ. Κ. Τσίμας” [After the Vote of the New Law: Complete Party Political Politicization of KYP Leadership: K. Tsimas is Nominated as Head of Service],” Kathimerini, 3 June 1986, p. 1.

56 Anonymous, “Με το Νομοσχέδιο που Κατέθεσε η Κυβέρνηση σε Κομματικό Όργανο Μεταβάλλεται η ΚΥΠ: Καταγγελίες της Αντιπολίτευσης στη Bουλή” [The KYP Changes into a Party Political Alignment as a Result of the Bill that the Government Presented: Complaints of the Opposition in Parliament], Kathimerini, 31 July 1986, p. 1.

57 Anonymous, “‘Κατασκόπευε’ τους Φρουρούς του ο Α. Παπανδρέου μέσω ΕΥΠ—Έμπιστοι Υπάλληλοι Παρακολουθούσαν τις Συνομιλίες του Κων. Καραμανλή” [A. Papandreou Spied on his Guards by Means of the KYP—Trusted Employees Followed the Talks of Kon. Karamanlis], Kathimerini, 31 August 1989, p. 2.

58 We may assume that between the end of the 1980s and mid-1990s the service numbered about 2,000 employees, of whom about half were seconded from the armed forces or police. Between 1992 and 1996, the number of permanent civilian employees oscillated between 1,050 and 1,100. See Ilias Georgakis, “Τέλος για Δέκα Χιλιάδες Αποσπάσεις: Νομοθετική Ρύθμιση για να Μπει Τάξη [An End to 10.000 Transfers: Legislative Regulation to Get Things in Order],” Ta Nea, 2 December 1996, p. 18; Ilias Georgakis, “Από το ’97 σε Ισχύ! Σε Χρόνο Ρεκόρ Έτοιμο το Νέο Ενιαίο Μισθολόγιο” [From ’97 in Force! Ready in No Time the New Single Payroll], Ta Nea, 24 April 1996, p. 37, Fotini Kalliri, “Δεν Μειώθηκαν οι Δημόσιοι Υπάλληλοι: Έξι Χιλιάδες Επιπλέον σε ΕΛΑΣ, Νοσοκομεία, Σχολεία, Δικαστήρια” [Number of Civil Servants Not Reduced: An Additional Six Thousand in the Police, Hospitals, Schools, Courts], Kathimerini, 25 April 1997, p. 7.

59 In 1990, the EYP announced it had 200 civilian employees too many. Ilias Georgakis, “Το Πάνω Κάτω στο Δημόσιο” [Everything Upside Down at the Civil Service], Ta Nea, 13 December 1990, p. 12; Anonymous, “Στον Δημόσιο Τομέα Περισσεύουν Μόνον … Πράκτορες! Πλην ΕΥΠ, Όλες οι Υπηρεσίες Θέλουν Προσλήψεις” [In the Civil Service Are Redundant Only … Spies! Except for the EYP, All Civil Services Want New Hirings], To Vima, 4 February 1990, p. unknown; N. Hasapopoulou, “Απολύονται για να … Προσληφθούν” [They are Being Fired to … Be Hired Again], To Vima, 25 February 1990, p. unknown. In 1991, the EYP increased its military employees to 965, although we have no information on the number prior to the increase. Anonymous, “Ξαναντύνεται στο Χακί η ΕΥΠ” [The EYP Dresses Again in Khaki], Ta Nea, 12 July 1991, p. 26.

60 Interviewee no. 6 remembers about 2,400 civilian employees (written reaction to draft version of article on 10 January 2023).

61 Anonymous, “‘Κίνδυνοι για την Eθνική Ασφάλεια’” [“Dangers for National Security”], Ta Nea, 20 September 1991, p. 15; K. Bakatselos, “‘Όργιο Μετατάξεων’” [“Orgy of Transfers”], Ta Nea, 12 November 1991, p. 10. In an interview with the press, the Service’s labor union interpreted this move as “a threat to national security” because these employees’ names were published. Anonymous, “Με Μορφή Διωγμού οι Μετατάξεις στην ΕΥΠ” [Transfers in the EYP in the Form of Persecution], Ta Nea, 2 October 1991, p. 14; Anonymous, “Μήνυση για τις 400 Mετατάξεις στην ΕΥΠ” [Complaints Regarding the 400 Transfers in the EYP],” Ta Nea, 28 July 1992, p. 37.

62 Apostolidis, Μυστική Δράση, pp. 291–293; Dimitra Kroustalli, “Αλλάζει Πρόσωπο η ΕΥΠ (με Bάση Ξένα Πρότυπα) και Αποκτά Νέες Αρμοδιότητες” [The EYP Changes Its Personnel (Based on Foreign Examples) and Acquires New Responsibilities], To Vima, 21 September 2002, p. A16. The KYP is the only government agency that does not recruit its personnel through the Supreme Council for Civilian Personnel Selection. Rather, it has the possibility to recruit its personnel at its discretion. Interview with Apostolidis, 3 October 2019.

63 Ilias Georgakis, “Προσλήψεις στην ΕΥΠ” [Hirings at the EYP], Ta Nea, 25 November 1999, p. 57; interviewee no. 6 (written reaction to draft version of article on 10 January 2023) remembers 17,000 applications in response to these 141 vacancies.

64 “Announcement for 140 Vacancies at the EYP,” Ta Nea, 21 May 2001.

65 Interview no. 3, 1 October 2019.

66 Interview with Korantis, 13 April 2022.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 The military and police employees in the service are commonly called “uniformed” employees, to distinguish them from their civilian counterparts. However, these “uniformed” employees were not allowed to wear a uniform at the service. Their civilian dress did not prevent colleagues from “just knowing” who belonged to the military and police and what rank they had, which often was unrelated to their position within the service. Interview no. 4, 2 October 2019.

70 Interview no. 4, 2 October 2019; interview no. 1, 2 October 2019; interview with Apostolidis, 3 October 2019; interview no. 3, 1 October 2019.

71 Interview no. 2, 1 October 2019; interview no. 1, 2 October 2019; interview no. 3, 1 October 2019.

72 Interview no. 2, 1 October 2019.

73 Interview no. 5, 31 March 2022.

74 Interview no. 3, 1 October 2019.

75 Interview no. 4, 2 October 2019.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.; interview with Apostolidis, 3 October 2019; interview with Korantis, 13 April 2022.

78 Interview no. 1, 2 October 2019.

79 Apostolidis, Μυστική Δράση, p. 263.

80 Interview no. 1, 2 October 2019.

81 M. Papazoglou, “Συνταγματική η Ψήφιση” [The Vote is Constitutional], Ta Nea, 7 August 1986, p. 12.

82 Interview no. 1, 2 October 2019.

83 Anonymous, “Δεν Αντέχουν το ‘Στρατιωτικό Κλίμα’: Δεκάδες Υπάλληλοι Ζητούν να Φύγουν από την ΚΥΠ” [They Cannot Stand the “Military Atmosphere”: Dozens Employees Ask to Leave the KYP], To Vima, 23 March 1986, p. 9.

84 Anonymous, “Στρατιωτική να Μείνει η ΚΥΠ, Υποστηρίζει ο Τέως Διοικητής κ. Κ. Φέτσης” [The KYP Should Remain Military, Argues Former Head Mr. K. Fetsis], Kathimerini, 12 November 1985, p. 2.

85 “Οι Υπάλληλοι της ΚΥΠ” [The Employees of the KYP], To Vima, 16 February 1986, p. 16.

86 Only civilian employees were allowed to be members of the labor union and a great majority of them were. Until the 2000s, military employees were not allowed to be members of any labor union (interview no. 6, 14 April 2022).

87 Anonymous, “Εξαγγελία Απεργιών,” Kathimerini, 24 November 1987, p. 11.

88 Anonymous, “Καθιστική Διαμαρτυρία των Υπαλλήλων: ‘Έκλεισαν’ την ΕΥΠ,” Ta Nea, 15 April 1989, p. 19.

89 Newspapers regularly reported about oppositions between the labor union and EYP management. See, for example, Anonymous, “Επίθεση Κατά Συνδικαλιστών από τον κ. Τσίμα” [Tsimas Attacks Trade Unionists], Kathimerini, 20 April 1989, p. 3; Anonymous, “Οι Συνδικαλιστές της ΕΥΠ κατά Τσίμα” [The Trade Unionists of the EYP against Tsimas], Kathimerini, 10 May 1989, p. 3; Anonymous, “Ποινικοποιούν τη Δράση Συνδικαλιστών στην ΕΥΠ” [They Criminalize the Actions of Trade Unionists of the EYP], Ta Nea, 16 February 1990, p. 12; Anonymous, “ΑΔΕΔΥ: Παρανομεί η Διοίκηση της ΕΥΠ” [Civil Servants Confederation: Violations by EYP Management],” Ta Nea, 16 March 1990, p. 14; Anonymous, “Συνδικαλιστική η Διώξη Λένε οι ‘Τρεις’ της ΕΥΠ [The “Three” of the EYP Call the Prosecution Syndicalist],” Ta Nea, 4 April 1990, p. 12; Anonymous, “Διαφάνεια στην ΕΥΠ Ζητούν Εργαζόμενοι” [Employees Ask for Transparency at the EYP], Ta Nea, 16 July 1990, p. 28.

90 Anonymous, “Διαμαρτύρονται οι υπάλληλοι της ΚΥΠ” [The Employees of the KYP Protest], Ta Nea, 9 July 1986, p. 11.

91 Interview no. 6, 14 April 2022.

92 Interviews no. 5, 31 March 2022, and no. 3, 1 October 2019; Apostolidis, Μυστική Δράση, p. 291.

93 During this period, the EYP had two deputy heads. Deputy Head A was responsible for operations and Deputy Head B for administration and finances.

94 Interview with Apostolidis, 3 October 2019.

95 Alexis Papahelas, “Το Σχέδιο Αναδιάρθρωσης της ΕΥΠ” [The Planned Reform of the EYP], To Vima, 13 October 2002, p. A21.

Additional information

Funding

Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek.

Notes on contributors

Eleni Braat

Dr. Eleni Braat is Associate Professor in History of International Relations at Utrecht University. She obtained her Ph.D. from the European University Institute in Florence, Italy (2008). She has been the official historian of the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), and she is a member of the executive board of the Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association. The author can be contacted at [email protected].