How Officials Use Intelligence Analysis: A Working Model

Abstract

How do officials use intelligence analysis? This article proposes a working model based on insights from psychological research into information processing and persuasion. It suggests that officials use analysis adaptively across four stages and four types of use. It advances intelligence studies by clarifying “use,” accounting for mixed evidence, and improving explanations of variation between officials and in the same official over time. The working model opens new opportunities for intelligence research and practice.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The author reported no potential conflict of interest.

Notes

1 Ohad Leslau, “The Effect of Intelligence on the Decisionmaking Process,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1080/08850601003772687; Alexander Mark Halman, “What’s With the Attitude? Policymaker Attitudes towards Intelligence and National Security” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 2020).

2 Hughes and Kovacs weave together elements of each approach. Thomas Hughes, The Fate of Facts in a World of Men (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1976); Amos Kovacs, “The Nonuse of Intelligence,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1080/08850609708435357

3 See, for example, Ray Cline, “Policy Without Intelligence,” Foreign Policy, Vol. 17 (1974–1975); Robert Gates, “An Opportunity Unfulfilled: The Use and Perceptions of Intelligence at the White House,” Studies in Intelligence (1980) [FOIA CIA-RDP90D01390R000200310035-6]; Walter Laqueur, “Intelligence and Its Customers,” A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence (New York: Basic Books, 1985); Arthur Hulnick, “The Intelligence Producer–Policy Consumer Linkage: A Theoretical Approach,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684528608431850; Richard Betts, “Policy-Makers and Intelligence Analysts: Love, Hate, or Indifference?” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684528808431934; Mark Lowenthal, “Tribal Tongues: Intelligence Consumers, Intelligence Producers,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1080/01636609209550084

4 Nathan Caplan, “The Two-Communities Theory and Knowledge Utilization,” American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 22, No. 3 (1979). https://doi.org/10.1177/000276427902200308

5 While institutional approaches were particularly influential during this time, several writers explored different explanations, such as the character, leadership qualities, and prior commitments of officials. Hans Heymann, “Intelligence/Policy Relationships,” in Intelligence: Policy and Process, edited by Alfred Maurer, Marion Tunstall, and James Keagle (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985); Michael Handel, “Leaders and Intelligence,” in Leaders and Intelligence, edited by Michael Handel (London: Frank Cass, 1989); Michael Handel, “The Politics of Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 2, No. 4 (1987), https://doi.org/10.1080/02684528708431914

6 See, for example, Richard Immerman, “Intelligence and Strategy: Historicizing Psychology, Policy, and Politics,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 32, No. 1 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2007.00675.x; Robert Jervis, “Why Intelligence and Policymakers Clash,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 125, No. 2 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-165X.2010.tb00672.x; Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose McDermott, Intelligence Success & Failure (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017); Uri Bar-Joseph and Arie Kruglanski, “Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur Surprise,” Political Psychology, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00317; Keren Yarhi-Milo, Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014); Joshua Rovner, Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011); Stephen Marrin, “Intelligence Analysis and Decision-Making,” in Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates, edited by Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, and Mark Phythian (New York: Routledge, 2009).

7 Stephen Marrin, “Why Strategic Intelligence Analysis Has Limited Influence on American Foreign Policy,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 32, No. 6 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2016.1275139

8 Amos Kovacs, “Using Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1997), https://doi.org/10.1080/02684529708432452

9 Erik Dahl, “Why Won’t They Listen? Comparing Receptivity Toward Intelligence at Pearl Harbor and Midway,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.749061; Halman, “What’s With the Attitude?”

10 Paul Pillar, “Great Decisions and the Irrelevance of Intelligence,” Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Raymond Garthoff, Soviet Leaders and Intelligence: Assessing the American Adversary During the Cold War (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015); Harold Deutsch, “Commanding Generals and the Uses of Intelligence,” in Leaders and Intelligence, edited by Michael Handel (London: Frank Cass, 1989); Marrin, “Why Strategic Intelligence Analysis Has Limited Influence on American Foreign Policy,” pp. 731–736; Handel, “Leaders and Intelligence.”

11 Dahl, “Why Won’t They Listen,” p. 70; Kovacs, “Using Intelligence,” pp. 147–149; Betts, “Policy-Makers and Intelligence Analysts: Love, Hate, or Indifference?” p. 187.

12 Michael Herman, “Intelligence and National Action,” Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 143–144; Christoph Meyer, Chiara De Franco, and Florian Otto, Warning about War: Conflict, Persuasion, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), pp. 29–32. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108644006. In the separate field of knowledge utilization, Rich describes an extended, cognitive-behavioral process rather than a discrete, externally visible outcome in reflecting on how officials use policy studies. Robert Rich, “Measuring Knowledge Utilization: Processes and Outcomes,” Knowledge and Policy, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02912504

13 Arthur Hulnick and Deborah Brammer, “The Impact of Intelligence on the Policy Review and Decision Process,” Center for the Study of Intelligence, January 1980 [Gage U.S. Declassified Documents Online].

14 James Barry, Jack Davis, David Gries, and Joseph Sullivan, “Bridging the Intelligence-Policy Divide,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 37, No. 3 (1993).

15 Adrian Wolfberg, “When Generals Consume Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 32, No. 4 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2016.1268359

16 Elizabeth Leyne and Yvette Nonté, “Is the Intelligence Community Staying Ahead of the Digital Curve? A Survey of its Highest-Level Customers and Leaders on the Challenges and Opportunities Ahead,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, August 2021.

17 Intelligence Producers Council, “Intelligence Consumer Survey,” September 1982. [FOIA CIA-RDP85T00153R000200030010-6].

18 Redacted, “Surveying Intelligence Consumers,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 33, No 3 (1989). [FOIA C00621334].

19 Paul Avey and Michael Desch, “What Do Policymakers Want From Us? Results of a Survey of Current and Former Senior National Security Decision Makers,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 2 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12111

20 Paul Avey, Michael Desch, Eric Parajon, Susan Peterson, Ryan Powers, and Michael Tierney, “Does Social Science Inform Foreign Policy? Evidence from a Survey of US National Security, Trade, and Development Officials,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 66, No. 1 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqab057; Paul Avey, Michael Desch, Ana Petrova, and Steven Wilson, “Narrowing the Academic-Policy Divide: Will New Media Bridge the Gap?” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 136, No. 4 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.13243

21 Reinstein’s account is a wonderful model of a careful case study. Thomas Reinstein, “The Way a Drunk Uses a Lamp Post: Intelligence Analysis and Policy during the Vietnam War, 1962–1968” (Ph.D. dissertation, Temple University, 2018); Harold Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes, 1962–1968 (Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1998). Pillar, “Great Decisions and the Irrelevance of Intelligence,” pp. 100–107.

22 Joe Wood, “Persuading a President: Jimmy Carter and American Troops in Korea,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 40, No. 4 (1996).

23 Gerald Hopple and Cynthia Gilley, “Policy Without Intelligence,” in American Intervention in Grenada: The Implications of Operation “Urgent Fury,” edited by Peter Dunn and Bruce Watson (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985). Hooker describes decisionmaking based on rapid evaluation, poor information, and little-to-no systematic consideration of alternative views. Richard Hooker, “Presidential Decisionmaking and the Use of Force: Case Study Grenada,” Parameters, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1991).

24 Gregory Treverton and Renanah Miles, “Unheeded Warning of War: Why Policymakers Ignored the 1990 Yugoslavia Estimate,” Center for the Study of Intelligence, July 2016; Thomas Shreeve, “The Intelligence Community Case Method Program: A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia,” Intelligence and the National Security Strategist, edited by Roger George and Robert Kline (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006).

25 The scale of use is unclear in available secondary sources. “Moderate–High” is a rough estimate based on limited accounts of the DIA’s activities, the CIA’s performance, and leadership decisions. On one hand, officials seem to have welcomed analysis generally and sought insights in particular into sanctions’ consequences and Iraq’s military capabilities and options. On the other, they did not embrace the IC’s late warnings of limited war and seemed to enter the crisis without forethought. Additionally, the IC clashed loudly enough on battle damage assessments that the White House had to step in, adding to its burdens rather than lightening them. Henry Brands, “George Bush and the Gulf War of 1991,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2004). https://www.jstor.org/stable/27552567; Christopher Andrews, “George Bush (1989–1993),” For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York: Harper Collins, 1995). Russell interprets the Gulf War as largely a success for the CIA. I am slightly more cautious because his account of the CIA’s contribution to the 3 August National Security Council meeting seems to clash with Brands’ account. Richard Russell, “CIA’s Strategic Intelligence in Iraq,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 117, No. 2 (2002). https://doi.org/10.2307/798180. Elsewhere, Russell also describes military leaders’ dissatisfaction with CIA analysis and subsequent CIA reforms undertaken to address their complaints—factors that, in the absence of a more comprehensive case study, make it difficult to describe the scale of use as “high.” Richard Russell, “Tug of War: The CIA’s Uneasy Relationship with the Military,” SAIS Review, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2002), pp. 7–12. Marrin takes the opposite stance, interpreting the Gulf War as a time of limited influence for the Intelligence Community. I am more bullish because his case study relies on an interview with claims that clash with those in other interviews cited by Brands. Marrin, “Why Strategic Intelligence Analysis Has Limited Influence on American Foreign Policy,” p. 732. See also Brian Shellum, “A Chronology of Defense Intelligence in the Gulf War: A Research Aid for Analysts,” DIA History Office, July 1997.

26 Stephen Burg, “Analytical Intelligence and Bosnia Policy Making in the Clinton Administration,” in The Role of Intelligence in Ending the War in Bosnia in 1995, edited by Timothy Walton (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014); Jonathan Smith, “Intelligence and Uncertainty: The Impact of Intelligence on DOD Perceptions of the Bosnian Conflict, 1995,” in The Role of Intelligence in Ending the War in Bosnia in 1995, edited by Timothy Walton (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014).

27 Pillar, “Great Decisions and the Irrelevance of Intelligence,” pp. 13–95. James Pfiffner, “Decisionmaking, Intelligence, and the Iraq War,” in Intelligence and National Security Policymaking on Iraq: British and American Perspectives, edited by James Pfiffner, Mark Phythian, et al. (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008).

28 In a memorable quote, one of Robert McNamara’s aides reflected on what is missing from the paper trail. “The written record more and more, and even in those days, tends to be defensive and it provides rationalizations rather than reasons…” When asked what was missing, he said “probably everything. Almost everything.” Aurelie Basha i Novosejt, “I Made Mistakes”: Robert McNamara’s Vietnam War Policy, 1960–1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), p. 11. Interestingly, McGeorge Bundy also saw the documentary record from that time as incomplete. Gordon Goldstein, Lessons In Disaster: McGeorge Bundy and the Path to War in Vietnam (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2008), p. 28.

29 Marrin, “Why Strategic Intelligence Analysis Has Limited Influence on American Foreign Policy,” p. 727; Halman, “What’s With the Attitude?” Meyer, De Franco, and Otto, Warning about War, p. 297.

30 Yaacov Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 21, 342; Meyer, De Franco, and Otto, Warning about War.

31 Researchers view these theories as compatible, albeit with notable differences of interpretation. Taber and Lodge emphasize intuitive, automatic processing, for example, while Kahan identifies a significant role for analytic, controlled processing. Charles Taber and Milton Lodge, “The Illusion of Choice in Democratic Politics: The Unconscious Impact of Motivated Political Reasoning,” Political Psychology, Vol. 37, No. S1 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12321; Dan Kahan, “Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection,” Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 8, No. 4 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1017/S1930297500005271

32 Ziva Kunda, “The Case for Motivated Reasoning,” Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 108, No. 3 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480. Nicholas Epley and Thomas Gilovich, “The Mechanics of Motivated Reasoning,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.30.3.133. Taber and Lodge underscore the role of affect. Taber and Lodge, “The Illusion of Choice in Democratic Politics.”

33 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011).

34 “Motivated reasoning” and “motivation” are distinct. Motivated reasoning is goal- or desirability-influenced reasoning. Motivation is a sense of purpose enabling effortful activity.

35 Andrew Luttrell, “Dual Process Models of Persuasion,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Psychology (2018), https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.319; Gregory Maio, Geoffrey Haddock, and Bas Verplanken, The Psychology of Attitudes and Attitude Change, 3rd ed. (Los Angeles: Sage, 2019), pp. 116–139; Joel Cooper, Shane Blackman, and Kyle Keller, The Science of Attitudes (New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 114–144. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315717319

36 Stella Vosniadou, “Capturing and Modeling the Process of Conceptual Change,” Learning and Instruction, Vol. 4 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1016/0959-4752(94)90018-3; George Posner, Kenneth Strike, Peter Hewson, and Wiliam Gertzog, “Accommodation of a Scientific Conception: Toward a Theory of Conceptual Change,” Science Education, Vol. 66, No. 2 (1982), https://doi.org/10.1002/sce.3730660207; Michele Gregoire, “Is it a Challenge or a Threat? A Dual-Process Model of Teachers’ Cognition and Appraisal Processes During Conceptual Change,” Educational Psychology Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023477131081; Lucia Mason, “Conceptual Change,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Education (2020), https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190264093.013.870. Most work on conceptual change focuses on mental models of scientific subjects. We should be cautious applying it to other subjects. Cecelia Lundholm and Peter Davies, “Conceptual Change in the Social Sciences,” in International Handbook of Research on Conceptual Change, edited by Stella Vosniadou (New York: Routledge, 2013).

37 Karen Bogenschneider, Elizabeth Day, and Emily Parrott, “Revisiting Theory on Research Use: Turning to Policymakers for Fresh Insights,” American Psychologist, Vol. 74, No. 7 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1037/amp0000460. Some work proposes alternative taxonomies that nonetheless overlap with these categories. Falk Daviter, “The Political Use of Knowledge in the Policy Process,” Policy Sciences, Vol. 48 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-015-9232-y; Carol Weiss, “The Many Meanings of Research Utilization,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 39, No. 5 (1979). https://doi.org/10.2307/3109916; William Dunn, “Measuring Knowledge Use,” Knowledge, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1177/107554708300500107.

38 Researchers across a range of fields use multistage models. In the warning literature, Meyer, De Franco, and Otto discuss “degrees of persuasiveness” that can be understood as stages: attention, acceptance, prioritization, and motivation to act. Meyer, De Franco, and Otto, Warning about War, pp. 29–30. In psychology, Maio, Haddock, and Verplanken discuss stages of attention, interpretation, and recollection as broadly accepted. Maio, Haddock, and Verplanken, The Psychology of Attitudes and Attitude Change, pp. 60, 116–120. Connors and Halligan propose a five-stage account of belief formation: precursor, search for meaning, candidate belief evaluation, belief acceptance, and effects of belief. Michael Connors and Peter Halligan, “A Cognitive Account of Belief: A Tentative Road Map,” Frontiers in Psychology, Vol. 5 (2015), https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01588. In knowledge utilization studies, Knott and Wildavsky identify reception, cognition, reference, effort, adoption, implementation, and impact. Jack Knott and Aaron Wildavsky, “If Dissemination is the Solution, What is the Problem?” Knowledge, Vol. 1, No. 4 (1980). https://doi.org/10.1177/107554708000100404. In the same field, Rich proposes a simplified model of three stages: pick-up, processing, and application. Rich, “Measuring Knowledge Utilization,” pp. 20–21.

39 Peter Suedfeld and Philip Tetlock, “Individual Differences in Information Processing,” in Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Intraindividual Processes, edited by Abraham Tesser and Norbert Schwartz (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001).

40 Jannica Heinstrom, “Fast Surfing, Broad Scanning, and Deep Diving: The Influence of Personality and Study Approach on Students’ Information-Seeking Behavior,” Journal of Documentation, Vol. 61, No. 2 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1108/00220410510585205; Jannica Heinstrom, “Five Personality Dimensions and Their Influence on Information Behavior,” Information Research, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2003); Santoshi Halder, Anjali Roy, and P.K. Chakraborty, “The Influence of Personality Traits on Information Seeking Behavior of Students,” Malaysian Journal of Library & Information Science, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2010).

41 Richard Petty, Pablo Briñol, Chris Loersch, and Michael McCaslin, “The Need for Cognition,” in Handbook of Individual Differences in Social Behavior, edited by Mark Leary and Rick Hoyle (New York: Guilford Press, 2009).

42 Receptivity to opposing views is better seen as a durable mindset than a trait. Julia Minson and Frances Chen, “Receptiveness to Opposing Views: Conceptualization and Integrative Review,” Personality and Social Psychology Review, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1177/10888683211061037; Julia Minson, Frances Chen, and Catherine Tinsley, “Why Won’t You Listen to Me? Measuring Receptiveness to Opposing Views,” Management Science, Vol. 66, No. 7 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3362

43 See also Shauna Bowes, Thomas Costello, Caroline Lee, Stacey McElroy-Heltzel, Don Davis, and Scott Lilienfeld, “Stepping Outside the Echo Chamber: Is Intellectual Humility Associated with Less Political Myside Bias?” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 48, No. 1 (2022), https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167221997619.

44 Philip Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); Timo Meynhardt, Carolin Hermann, and Stefan Anderer, “Making Sense of a Most Popular Metaphor in Management: Towards a HedgeFox Scale for Cognitive Styles,” Administrative Sciences, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2017). https://doi.org/10.3390/admsci7030033

45 Bar-Joseph and McDermott, Intelligence Success & Failure, pp. 45–49, 235–244.

46 Bar-Joseph and Kruglanski, “Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure”; Bar-Joseph and McDermott, Intelligence Success & Failure, pp. 44–45, 235–244.

47 Dan Kahan, Ellen Peters, Erica Cantrell Dawson, and Paul Slovic, “Motivated Numeracy and Enlightened Self-Government,” Behavioral Public Policy, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1017/bpp.2016.2. Kahan, “Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection.”

48 Barry et al., “Bridging the Intelligence-Policy Divide.”

49 David Bawden and Lyn Robinson, “Information Overload: An Overview,” Oxford Encyclopedia of Political Decision Making (2020), https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1360; Stefaan Walgrave and Yves Dejaeghere, “Surviving Information Overload: How Elite Politicians Select Information,” Governance, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12209; Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds, pp. 86–101.

50 Luttrell underscores the importance of personal relevance in leading models of persuasion. Luttrell, “Dual Process Models of Persuasion.”

51 A review of studies on (mostly healthcare) officials’ use of evidence underscores the importance of relationships. Kathryn Oliver, Simon Innvar, Theo Lorenc, Jenny Woodman, and James Thomas, “A Systematic Review of Barriers to And Facilitators of the Use of Evidence by Policymakers,” BMC Health Services Research, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1186/1472-6963-14-2

52 Hulnick and Brammer, “The Impact of Intelligence on the Policy Review and Decision Process” Adam Seth Levine, “Single Conversations Expand Practitioners’ Use of Research: Evidence from a Field Experiment,” PS: Political Science & Politics, Vol. 54, No. 3 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096520002000; Adam Seth Levine, “Research Impact Through Matchmaking (RITM): Why and How to Connect Researchers and Practitioners,” PS: Political Science & Politics, Vol. 53, No. 2 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096519001720; Michael Huberman, “Research Utilization: The State of the Art,” Knowledge and Policy, Vol. 7, No. 4 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02696290

53 Rich and Oh find that officials use “internal” information more frequently than “external” information. Robert Rich and Cheol Oh, “Rationality and Use of Information in Policy Decisions: A Search for Alternatives,” Science Communication, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1177/1075547000022002004; Cheol Oh and Robert Rich, “Explaining Use of Information in Public Policymaking,” Knowledge and Policy, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02832231

54 Hulnick and Brammer, “The Impact of Intelligence on the Policy Review and Decision Process.”

55 Daniel Maliniak, Susan Peterson, Ryan Powers, and Michael Tierney, eds., Bridging the Theory Practice Divide in International Relations (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2020).

56 Adrian Wolfberg, “Communication Patterns between the Briefer and the Policymaker,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 27, No. 3 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2014.872534”; Adrian Wolfberg, “The President’s Daily Brief: Managing the Relationship between Intelligence and the Policymaker,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 132, No. 2 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12616

57 Redacted, “Surveying Intelligence Consumers.”

58 This is similar to what, in the context of crisis warning, Meyer, De Franco, and Otto call “peer-to-peer” credibility. The authors highlight the importance of personal access, relationships, trust, and shared identification and values on warning success. Meyer, De Franco, and Otto, Warning about War, pp. 42–43, 67–73, 269. For more on trust and informal competitors to the IC, see Mary Manjikian, “‘Those Clowns Out at Langley’: A Theory of Trust Between the Intelligence Community and the President,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 33, No. 4 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2020.1780084.

59 This account of appraisal is an adaptation of a compelling three-motive theory of information seeking and avoidance. I add fluency to capture dynamics of presentation that are prominent in intelligence studies, but absent from the theory and its tests. Also, I reinterpret seeking/avoiding as appraisal in the context of national security officials’ work, where analysis is often provided by a briefer rather than sought by senior officials themselves. Tali Sharot and Cass Sunstein, “How People Decide What They Want to Know,” Nature Human Behavior, Vol. 4 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-019-0793-1; Christopher Kelly and Tali Sharot, “Individual Differences in Information-Seeking,” Nature Communications, Vol. 12 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-27046-5

60 Daniel Oppenheimer, “The Secret Life of Fluency,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 12, No. 6 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2008.02.014; Heather Claypool, Diane Mackie, and Teresa Garcia-Marques, “Fluency and Attitudes,” Social and Personality Psychology Compass, Vol. 9, No. 7 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12179; Adam Alter and Daniel Oppenheimer, “Uniting the Tribes of Fluency to Form a Metacognitive Nation,” Personality and Social Psychology Review, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2009), https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868309341564.

61 William Hart, Dolores Albarracín, Alice Eagly, Inge Brechan, Matthew Lindberg, and Lisa Merrill, “Feeling Validated versus Being Correct: A Meta-Analysis of Selective Exposure to Information,” Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 135, No. 4 (2009), p. 18. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0015701

62 Kunda, “The Case for Motivated Reasoning”; Epley and Gilovich, “The Mechanics of Motivated Reasoning”; Taber and Lodge, “The Illusion of Choice in Democratic Politics.”

63 Sharot and Sunstein, “How People Decide What They Want to Know”; Kelly and Sharot, “Individual Differences in Information-Seeking.” See also Wojtowicz, Chater, and Loewenstein, who suggest three objectives shape a drive for sense-making: instrumental, hedonic, and computational (cognitive efficiency). Zachary Wojtowicz, Nick Chater, and George Loewenstein, “The Motivational Processes of Sense-Making,” in The Drive For Knowledge: The Science of Human Information Seeking, edited by Irene Cogliati Dezza, Eric Schulz, and Charley Wu (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2022).

64 This is a partial and simplified adaptation of selective exposure to the three-motive theory. It is broadly consistent with explanations of congeniality bias that appeal to defensive motivations, which would facilitate selective avoidance by lowering appraisals of practical and emotional values, and accuracy motivations, which would facilitate selective seeking by raising appraisals of practical and cognitive values. Hart et al., “Feeling Validated versus Being Correct”; Natalie Jomini Stroud, “Selective Exposure Theories,” Oxford Handbook of Political Communication (2018). https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199793471.013.009_update_001

65 Raymond Firehock, John Gentry, Julia Rogers, and James Simon, Jr., “Negotiating the Review Process: A CIA Guide to Intelligence Analysis, 1970,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 33, No. 5 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2018.1470072; David Lonsdale and Maria dos Santos Lonsdale, “Handling and Communicating Intelligence Information: A Conceptual, Historical, and Information Design Analysis,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 34, No. 5 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2019.1592841. See also tradecraft standards six (clarity) and nine (visualization). Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “ICD 203: Analytic Standards,” 2 January 2015.

66 Wolfberg, “The President’s Daily Brief”; Loch K. Johnson, “Glimpses into the Gems of American Intelligence: The President’s Daily Brief and the National Intelligence Estimate,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520802121257

67 Philip Johnson-Laird, “Mental Models and Cognitive Change,” Journal of Cognitive Psychology, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2013), https://doi.org/10.1080/20445911.2012.759935; Natalie Jones, Helen Ross, Timothy Lynam, Pascal Perez, and Anne Leitch, “Mental Models: An Interdisciplinary Synthesis of Theory and Methods,” Ecology and Society, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2011).

68 Kunda, “The Case for Motivated Reasoning”; Epley and Gilovich, “The Mechanics of Motivated Reasoning”; Kahan, “Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection,”

69 This can also be an unmotivated process. Aileen Oebert and Roland Imhoff, “Toward Parsimony in Bias Research: A Proposed Common Framework of Belief-Consistent Information Processing for a Set of Biases,” Perspectives of Psychological Science, Vol. 18, No. 6 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1177/17456916221148147

70 McRaney provides a clear and engaging summary of this process. David McRaney, How Minds Change: The Surprising Science of Belief, Opinion, and Persuasion (New York: Portfolio, 2022), pp. 89–122. See also Alan Jacobs, “How Do Ideas Matter?: Mental Models and Attention in German Pension Politics,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414008325283

71 The Elaboration Likelihood Model and Heuristic Systematic Model give motivation and related concepts like effort important roles shaping evaluation processes. Luttrell, “Dual Process Models of Persuasion”; Maio, Haddock, and Verplanken, The Psychology of Attitudes and Attitude Change, pp. 116–139; Cooper, Blackman, and Keller, The Science of Attitudes, pp. 114–144.

72 Norbert Schwarz, Eryn Newman, and William Leach illustrate how people can apply five criteria used to evaluate truth—social consensus, evidence, consistency, coherence, and source credibility—differently in analytic and intuitive reasoning. Schwarz, Newman, and Leach, “Making the Truth Stick & the Myths Fade: Lessons from Cognitive Psychology,” Behavioral Science and Policy, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1177/237946151600200110

73 Vosniadou, “Capturing and Modeling the Process of Conceptual Change”; Posner et al., “Accommodation of a Scientific Conception”; Gregoire, “Is it a Challenge or a Threat?”; Mason, “Conceptual Change.”

74 Kobe Desender, Annika Boldt, and Nick Yeung, “Subjective Confidence Predicts Information Seeking in Decision Making,” Psychological Science, Vol. 29, No. 5 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797617744771

75 Madalina Vlasceanu, Michael Morais, and Alin Coman, “The Effect of Prediction Error on Belief Update across the Political Spectrum,” Psychological Science, Vol. 32, No. 6 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797621995208; David Redlawsk, Andrew Civettini, and Karen Emmerson, “The Affective Tipping Point: Do Motivated Reasoners Ever ‘Get it’?” Political Psychology, Vol. 31, No. 4 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2010.00772.x

76 Marieke Fransen, Edith Smit, and Peeter Verlegh, “Strategies and Motives for Resistance to Persuasion: An Integrative Framework,” Frontiers in Psychology, Vol. 6, No. 1201 (2015). https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01201. Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds, pp. 137–143.

77 April McGrath, “Dealing with Dissonance: A Review of Cognitive Dissonance Reduction,” Social and Personality Psychology Compass, Vol. 11, No. 12 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12362; Dolores Albarracín and Alexander Karan, “Resistance to Persuasion,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Psychology (2022). https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.813

78 McGrath, “Dealing with Dissonance”; Albarracín and Karan, “Resistance to Persuasion.”

79 Ibid.

80 Benjamin Rosenberg and Jason Siegel, “A 50-Year Review of Psychological Reactance Theory: Do Not Read This Article,” Motivation Science, Vol. 4, No. 4 (2018). https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/mot0000091; Stephen Rains, “The Nature of Psychological Reactance Revisited: A Meta-Analytic Review,” Human Communication Research, Vol. 39, No. 1 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2958.2012.01443.x; Chelsea Ratcliff, “Characterizing Reactance in Communication Research: A Review of Conceptual and Operational Approaches,” Communication Research, Vol. 48, No. 7 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650219872126

81 Redacted, “Surveying Intelligence Consumers.”

82 Avey et al., “Does Social Science Inform Foreign Policy?”; Avey and Desch, “What Do Policymakers Want From Us?”

83 Intelligence Producers Council, “Intelligence Consumer Survey,”

84 Redacted, “Surveying Intelligence Consumers.”

85 This adapts a distinction between instrumental use and symbolic or tactical use that is common in studies of research utilization. Bogenschneider, Day, and Parrott, “Revisiting Theory on Research Use.”

86 Maio, Haddock, and Verplanken, The Psychology of Attitudes and Attitude Change, pp. 87–111; Cooper, Blackman, and Keller, The Science of Attitudes, pp. 145–168; Laura Glasman and Dolores Albarracín, “Forming Attitudes That Predict Future Behavior: A Meta-Analysis of the Attitude-Behavior Relation,” Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 132, No. 5 (2006). https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/0033-2909.132.5.778

87 Arie Kruglanski, Katarzyna Jasko, Marina Chernikova, Maxim Milyavsky, Maxim Babush, Conrad Baldner, and Antonio Pierro, “The Rocky Road From Attitudes to Behaviors: Charting the Goal Systematic Course of Actions,” Psychological Review, Vol. 122, No. 4 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1037/a0039541

88 Paschal Sheeran and Thomas Webb, “The Intention-Behavior Gap,” Social and Personality Psychology Compass, Vol. 10, No. 9 (2016), p. 511. https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12265

89 Effective intentions tend to reflect personal beliefs (not norms), focus on actions (not consequences), seek change (not prevention), seem promising (not unlikely to work), and be specific (not intangible). Sheeran and Webb, “The Intention-Behavior Gap,” pp. 504–506.

90 Ibid., pp. 506–508.

91 Alexander Coppock, Persuasion in Parallel: How Information Changes Minds About Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2022).

92 Tali Sharot, Max Rollwage, Cass Sunstein, and Stephen Fleming, “Why and When Beliefs Change,” Perspectives on Psychological Science, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1177/17456916221082967; Sharot and Sunstein, “How People Decide What They Want to Know”; Kelly and Sharot, “Individual Differences in Information-Seeking.”

93 Patricia Moy, David Tewksbury, and Eike Mark Rinke, “Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing,” in International Encyclopedia of Communication Theory and Philosophy, edited by Klaus Bruhn Jensen and Robert Craig (Boston: John Wiley & Sons, 2016).

94 Mandel calls for greater rigor in testing best practices, including through expanded experimental research. David Mandel, “Intelligence, Science, and the Ignorance Hypothesis,” in The Academic-Practitioner Divide in Intelligence Studies, edited by Ruben Arcos, Nicole Drummhiller, and Mark Phythian (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2022).

95 Herman Aguinis and Kyle Bradley, “Best Practice Recommendations for Designing and Implementing Experimental Vignette Methodology Studies,” Organizational Research Methods, Vol. 17, No. 4 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1177/1094428114547952; M. Rungtusanatham, Cynthia Wallin, and Stephanie Eckerd, “The Vignette in a Scenario-Based Role-Playing Experiment,” Journal of Supply Chain Management, Vol. 47, No. 3 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-493X.2011.03232.x; Erik Lin-Greenberg, Reid Pauly, and Jacquelyn Schneider, “Wargaming for International Relations Research,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661211064090

96 This is a reference to “cognitive tuning,” which researchers have explored with regard to both mindsets and emotions. Peter Gollwitzer, “Mindset Theory of Action Phases,” in Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology: Volume 1, edited by Paul van Lange, Arie Kruglanski, and E. Tory Higgins (London: Sage, 2011). https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446249215; Norbert Schwarz, “Situated Cognition and the Wisdom of Feelings: Cognitive Tuning,” in The Wisdom in Feeling, edited by Lisa Feldman Barrett and Peter Salovey (New York: Guilford Press, 2002).

97 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “ICD 203.”

98 J. Eli Margolis, “Rethinking Analytic Disciplines, Reordering the Profession,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 64, No. 4 (2020).

99 Politicization is a contested concept, but most texts cast it as a threat to the objectivity or independence of the analysis. Robert Gates, “Guarding Against Politicization,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 36, No. 1 (1992); Glenn Hastedt, “The Politics of Intelligence and the Politicization of Intelligence: The American Experience,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.749062. For an alternative view, see Stephen Marrin, “Rethinking Analytic Politicization,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.749064

100 Rovner identifies eight varieties of politicization that, in addition to meddling, encompass what in the working model would be symbolic use to advance a career, an agency, or a political party. Rovner, Fixing the Facts, pp. 29–34, 207–209.

101 Julian Christensen and Donald Moynihan, “Motivated Reasoning and Policy Information: Politicians Are More Resistant to Debiasing Interventions Than the General Public,” Behavioural Public Policy (2020). https://doi.org/10.1017/bpp.2020.50; Martin Baekgaard, Julian Christensen, Casper Mondrup Dahlmann, Asbjørn Mathiasen, and Niels Bjørn Grund Petersen, “The Role of Evidence in Politics: Motivated Reasoning and Persuasion among Politicians,” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, No. 3 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123417000084

102 Evaluating intelligence is notoriously difficult. Here, I use “quality” to represent a wide range of commonly identified attributes, such as accuracy and adherence to defined tradecraft standards. Glenn Hastedt, “Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: How to Measure Success?” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1080/08850609108435169; Stephen Marrin, “Evaluating the Quality of Intelligence Analysis: By What (Mis) Measure?” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 27, No. 6 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.699290; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “ICD 203.”

103 Richard Betts, “Surprise Despite Warning: Why Sudden Attacks Succeed,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 95, No. 4 (1980–1981), https://doi.org/10.2307/2150604

Additional information

Funding

The author conducted this research during a fellowship at the National Intelligence University. He is grateful for the support.

Notes on contributors

J. Eli Margolis

J. Eli Margolis is a Senior Analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency. Previously, he served on the National Intelligence Council and at a combatant command overseas. He earned an M.A. from Georgetown University and two B.A.s from Penn State University. The author can be contacted at [email protected].