Introduction: The (Re)Building of the Wall in International Relations

Abstract

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the emergence of a new international landscape ushered in an era of globalization in which states appeared irrevocably condemned to obsolescence, a world without borders. The advent of an international system in which the state was relegated to secondary importance in international relations, coupled with the disappearance of physical borders, left little reason to expect a return of the wall. However, borders, walls and barriers, symbols that were thought to have perished with decolonization and the disappearance of the bipolar world, made a comeback in the aftermath of 9/11. The wall as object embraces a heterogeneous range of structures built with diverse motivations on a variety of borders. Meanwhile, the wall as phenomenon has proliferated over the past 10 years, encircling both democratic and authoritarian states, failed states and healthy ones. This special issue investigates both the empirical and symbolic facets of the erection of structures designed to keep away (and keep away from) the Other, from the “near abroad.”

Introduction

From the building of the Great Wall of China, begun in the 3^rd century bce, the construction of Hadrian's Wall and the Antonine Wall in Scotland by the Romans in the 2^nd century ce as part of the Roman Limes, along with the less hermetic fossatum Africae to the south, built over a period extending from the 1^st to the 2^nd century ce, Offa's Dyke in Wales and King Gudfred of Denmark's Danevirke, both built in the 7^th century, the genko borui built by the Japanese in northern Kyushu Island to guard against Mongol invasions, and feudal fortifications such as the Götavirke in Sweden and the Silesia walls, up to more contemporary structures that have been developed into an art by experts in siege craft, such as Vauban and Séré de Rivières, the “wall” has been a mainstay of international relations.

Indeed, the international system of the second half of the 20^th century was defined by a border barrier and, when the Berlin Wall fell 20 years ago, observers thought the world had turned around. Today, it is clear that the world has only come full circle (Paasi 2009, 216). The end of the Cold War made a deep impression on the popular imagination: it seemed to mean the end of a world split into two camps, divided between opposing loyalties, racked by conflict and border disputes (Badie 1999; 2000). The fall of the Berlin Wall and the emergence of a new international landscape ushered in an era of globalization in which states appeared irrevocably condemned to obsolescence, a world without borders (Ohmae 1990; Galli 2001; Zolo 2004; Schroer 2006). Neo-liberal and critical scholars alike sought to go beyond a state-centric reading of international geopolitics (Paasi 1998: 70–1), now viewed as a “territorial trap” (Agnew 1994). The advent of an international system in which the state was relegated to secondary importance in international relations and mobility became a defining feature of the global environment (Balibar and Badie 2006), coupled with the waning of the principle of sovereignty (Badie 1999) and the concomitant disappearance of physical borders, left little reason to expect a return of the wall.

However, borders, walls and barriers, symbols that were thought to have perished with decolonization and the disappearance of the bipolar world (Lévy 2005, 40), made a comeback in the aftermath of 9/11 (Ballif and Rosière 2009, 194; Brown 2009; David and Vallet 2009; Vallet and David 2012). After 2001, a paradigm shift in the treatment of borders (Newman 2006) led to the (re)appearance of walls and barriers as key instruments for the protection of state sovereignty. But the continuing dominance of “borderless” discourse has led theoreticians to evade the issue of walls and wall-building during the past decade. Furthermore, the concept involves a couple of difficulties: the definition of a “border wall” is complicated and it is a fast-growing contemporary phenomenon that has not been subjected to general theoretical investigation beyond its function as a border marker.

The “Border Wall” Concept

A variety of terms are used to describe the concept. Depending on the speaker's political stance, ideology and universe of discourse, walled borders are variously referred to as security, separation, apartheid or anti-terror walls, obstacles, partitions, fences, barriers, barricades or borders (Sivan 2006, 98). The most striking illustration of the semantic range is the terminological quarrel over Israel's barrier/border/wall, noted by Belize's representative in his comments before the International Court of Justice in 2004.1 We will use the term “wall” to describe border barriers with fixed masonry foundations (Gheslin, in Sorel 2010).

Typically, however, those walls consist of much more than a barrier built on masonry foundations. They are flanked by boundary roads, topped by barbed wire, laden with sensors, dotted with guard posts, infrared cameras and spotlights, and accompanied by an arsenal of laws and regulations (right of asylum, right of residence, visas). We understand the word “wall” in the broadest sense, as a political divider that comprises complex technologies, control methods, legislative provisions and “securing the border” discourse.

In the post-modern period of international relations, walls constitute a specific border issue for states (David and Vallet 2009). They must be regarded not only as physical barriers but also as gateways, for they are punctured by official and unofficial openings through which people can cross from one side to the other (Zolberg 1989, 406; Andreas 2000, 2) and apparatus, such as checkpoints, by which states can control their movements (Ritaine 2009).

A wall is not necessarily synonymous with a border and a border is not necessarily hermetically sealed: it is a point of contact, an interface (Konrad and Nicol 2008, 8). In principle, a borderline is bilateral, its course defined by the bordering states and governed by agreements, while the location of a wall is—with few exceptions (Sajjad 2006)—a unilateral matter decided exclusively by one side. If we take it that a border wall marks a boundary that can also be regarded as a zone (Gottmann 1952, 123), then the wall must be understood not only in terms of its consequences for contemporary international relations but also its tangible impact on society, for the steadily growing trend to build border walls has implications for state sovereignty, international security and human security (Crépeau and Nakache 2007, 311).

The Growth of the Wall

A quantitative analysis suggests that walls are, indeed, a global phenomenon that merits further attention (see Figure 1). Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Cold War border structures, such as the wall in the demilitarized zone between the two Koreas and Morocco's wall around Western Sahara, have been joined by some 30 structures, built or announced. If all are completed, their length could total, according to different estimates, from 18,000 km (Foucher 2007) to more than 41,000 km (Rosière 2009), depending on the calculation method. As of 2010, there were nearly 45 border walls (soon to be 48) totaling more than 29,000 km.2

Figure 1. More Walls in a Globalizing International System (1945–2010). Data Compiled by the Authors.

Between 1945 and 1991, 19 walls and barriers were built. Those between East and West Berlin, the Inner German Border, in Bavaria between Czechoslovakia and Germany, in Panama around the US enclave, around the Gibraltar enclave, in Algeria (the Morice, Challe and Pedron lines) and between the two Vietnams have all been dismantled. The walls between South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, China and Hong Kong, China and Macao, Rhodesia, Mozambique and Zambia, Cuba and the Guantanamo zone, the first phase of the wall between India and Pakistan, the wall in the demilitarized zone between the two Koreas, the separation line on Cyprus, and Morocco's wall in Western Sahara have all survived the end of the Cold War.

It is telling that, between 1991 and 2001, only 7 walls were added to the 13 that survived the Cold War: the barriers between Kuwait and Iraq, the US and Mexico, Malaysia and Thailand, India and Pakistan (phase 1), Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan, and around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco. While walls have been an historic constant, particularly in the second half of the 20^th century, the end of the Cold War did mark the end of an era, the downgrading of the wall as a political institution. Conversely, the contemporary post-9/11 period has seen the return of the wall as object and political instrument. Contrary to what many expected during the immediate post-Cold War period, new strategies of separation have developed and borders have been renewed and transformed (Cuttitta 2007).

9/11 marked a watershed in international relations. One of the results has been the growing fortification of borders (see Figure 1), with the construction (completed or planned) of 28 walls: Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan; Israel/Palestine; Botswana/Zimbabwe; Pakistan/Afghanistan; China/North Korea; Saudi Arabia/Yemen; Saudi Arabia/Iraq; Saudi Arabia/Oman; Saudi Arabia/Qatar; Saudi Arabia/United Arab Emirates; India/Bangladesh; India/Pakistan (phase 2); Egypt/Gaza Strip; Kazakhstan/Uzbekistan; Israel/Lebanon; Israel/Jordan; Jordan/Iraq; India/Burma; Burma/Bangladesh; Thailand/Malaysia (phase 2); United Arab Emirates/Oman; Brunei/eastern Malaysia (Limbang); Russia (Abkhazia)/Georgia; Iran/Pakistan; Iran/Afghanistan; Greece/Turkey. We are, therefore, witnessing a veritable proliferation of built structures along borders (David and Vallet 2009).

Walled In or Walled Out?

September 2001 sparked not only a quantitative surge in wall-building but also a qualitative break. It is not just that 9/11 appears to have ratified the return of the wall as a physical object and political instrument (Jones 2010); it is also noteworthy that, since that date, wall-building has been undertaken (or stepped up) by democratic governments (Foucher 2007) in order to demonstrate their ability to regain control of their borders (Foucher 2009, 6). “Democratic” walls include everything from the fences around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco and the barrier India is currently building along its border with Bangladesh to what some have referred to as the “Schengen wall” (Sanguin 2007). A parallel is often drawn between two symbols of the resurgence of the wall, largely because of their semantic and chronological proximity (Clochard 2003; Le Boedec 2007). While the two cases are actually quite different, they do attest to the force of what has become a phenomenon in international relations. First, the US is extending the existing 930 km barrier on its border with Mexico, even though President Obama announced in March 2010 that the building of the expensive “virtual border” would be suspended. Meanwhile, Israel continues building its separation wall in the West Bank on both sides of the 1967 Green Line. It is now 500 km long and will eventually extend to over 800 km—and Israel has just announced that a barrier is to be built all along the Egyptian border. Like the US–Mexico wall, Israel's fence boasts sophisticated electronic detection equipment, purported to be highly effective by the Israeli defense ministry (Israel Ministry of Defence 2003). This list of “democratic” walls would not be complete without noting the announcements by Greece and then Bulgaria in 2011 that they intend to build a security barrier along their borders with Turkey, the former to stem the flow of illegal immigrants and the latter for sanitary reasons: countries are both walling themselves in and walling undesirables out.

Of the walls standing today, six were built to freeze a de facto border and maintain a fragile peace. The others were built to stem illegal immigration and/or, in the most recent cases, to fight terrorism. Since 2001 (Jones 2009), the purpose of new walls has been not so much to convert a front line into a de facto border as to address two threats: migrants and terrorists (the two sometimes overlap or blend together in the pro-wall discourse). Walls, therefore, serve a dual function, providing protection against the outside and enclosure for the inside (Novosseloff and Neisse 2007, 15).

The security barriers that shield the rich economies from the rest of the world have been described as a great wall of globalization (Davis 2007, 172). In this respect, they are not dissimilar to some internal walls.3 Societies that are no longer capable of recognizing the Other attempt to throw up impenetrable partitions (Chamoiseau 2007). This logic leads inexorably to the implementation of sophisticated control mechanisms and the building of physical barriers, walls and enclosures designed to create an absolutely watertight separation (Bennafla and Peraldi 2008). Ultimately, it destroys ecosystems and shatters social structures (Lasky, Jetz, and Keitt 2011). The fragmentation of space effected by walls creates protected sanctuaries (Rekacewicz 2009) and enshrines the opposition between soft borders, defined as open, porous and inclusive, and hard borders, which are closed, impermeable and exclusionary (DeBardeleben and Neuwalh 2005, 11 and 23; Zielonka 2002, 11–12.).

So borders are not disappearing but transmuting. The process of transformation is partial because while walls may seem sophisticated (we need only think of the Great Wall of China, the Maginot and Siegfried lines, the Roman Limes, the wall between Mexico and the US, the walls around Ceuta and Melilla), they are not truly impregnable (Lecumberri 2006, although this argument is disputed: Staniland 2005–2006, 31–4).

Walls serve to maintain both security and sense of identity (Ritaine 2009, 161). They are reassuring because they provide tangible evidence that governments are doing something; they “have turned out to be as much about public relations as anything else” (The Economist 2006). In the wake of 9/11, walls have assumed a cosmetic, ostentatious and decidedly political function (Foucher 2009: 3). Walls may also signal the precedence of domestic politics (and appearances) over foreign policy (and diplomatic necessities), the image of a fortified border being considered more important than its actual effectiveness. In this age of risk management, the wall, its various functions (protection, pacification, separation and even segregation) and accompanying security mechanisms (El Maslouhi 2009, 6; Beck 1999) are all regarded as devices that can serve that goal. The wall is emblematic of the interconnected surveillance processes, as the most visible component and most important functional element of the apparatus (Ritaine 2009).

The wall as object embraces a heterogeneous range of structures built with diverse motivations on a variety of borders. Meanwhile, the wall as phenomenon has proliferated over the past 10 years, encircling both democratic and authoritarian states, failed states and healthy ones. With a few exceptions (such as studies by the geographers Newman and Paasi (1998), Rosière and Ballif (2009) and Foucher (2007); the philosopher Brown (2009)), the scholarly literature on walls consists of case studies—i.e. analysis of “a” wall (e.g. Parizot and Latte Abadallah 2011; Kahan 2004; Su et al. 2003). There is, therefore, a gulf between the theoretical studies produced by disciplines such as geography, which have addressed walls directly or in passing, and other disciplines that have contributed ad hoc studies of specific cases, such as history (Martinez 2009; Sterling 2009), sociology (Medina 2007) and law (Araujo 2004). This special issue of JBS attempts to bridge that gulf.

The following articles investigate both the empirical and symbolic facets of the erection of structures designed to keep away (and keep away from) the Other, from the “near abroad.” Pusterla and Piccin discuss the wall's sovereignty-defining and preserving functions. They situate the wall in a broader context and analyze it through the lens of state utilization. Is the wall necessary? Is it virtually consubstantial with the state? They question the relevance of the wall in a post-Westphalian world and conclude that it is at once the ultimate mark of sovereignty for states under pressure from external stresses, and their swan song. Heather Nicol applies Ulrich Beck's theories to analyze the impact of real and virtual border walls on the wall-building state's neighbors. She suggests that, with growing attention to security in states that belong to larger groupings, such as North America, a “clique effect” is produced and the appearance of walls and tighter security helps fuel a resurgence of reflexive nationalism in the affected states. Similarly, in a case study of Sortavala, Izotov investigates the mental walls delineated by the border and shows that the wall metaphor goes to the core of the very definition of local identity, while at the same time noting the constant interplay between national identity and that of the border regime. Along the same lines, Falke's paper addresses the role of the separation fence as a metaphorical reflection of Israeli society and political history: the building of a physical demarcation/fence (re)generated a national unity deeply related to the origins of the state and the construction of its identity over the last century. Mattioli looks at some of the same issues in his case study of the new US embassy in Skopje, Macedonia, analyzing how local citizens use it as a performative device for positioning themselves in a personal and complex social landscape. Saddiki also discusses the Western Sahara wall with attention to issues of identity. Morocco's walls are vital to the affirmation of the Kingdom's sovereignty and the wall in the Western Sahara, which reflects random post-colonial borders, is embedded in the protagonists' identity-seeking aims. Removal of the wall, therefore, depends on a comprehensive resolution of the conflict in which the wall plays a symbolic function. Amilhat-Szary studies the artistic works surrounding the wall the US has erected along its border with Mexico and considers the ways in which artistic interpretation of the border landscape redefines geographic perceptions of the region and informs political decision making. Contemporary border art, viewed through the prism of the US–Mexico wall, therefore, exerts an influence not only within the artistic realm but also in the political domain and hence on the identity of the state enclosed within the borders.

Some walls are illusory, some are mental constructs. But it remains that these structures are enmeshed in social processes and the construction of border identities, often breeding their own cultural iconography, as shall be seen in the broad collection of articles in this issue of JBS, ranging from comprehensive analyses of borderland walls to case studies of the barriers on the US–Mexican border, the West Bank, Western Sahara, local walls and the mental walls that societies build around their perimeters or within themselves.

Notes

He observed that Israel uses the word “fence” and is opposed to the use of the word “wall” by the United Nations General Assembly among others. In his report, the Secretary General of the UN used the term “barrier” on the grounds that it is more generic. The International Court of Justice ultimately decided to use “wall” (IJC 2004, 15 and 20).

Our count includes not only completed walls but also those in the advanced planning stage. The numbers are based on the figures announced by governments (making it possible to include cases in which the border is not walled continuously along its entire length, such as the US–Mexican border).

Internal walls have been used to separate wealthy and poor neighborhoods. Padua was for several years an iconic example. Walls of this type, which exist today in locations ranging from Caldeira, Brazil to France (Dryef 2008), serve to quarantine the “lepers” outside the city gates (Foucault 1999, 229–64, 40–6).