Moral Virtues for Journalists

Abstract

This essay outlines an account of virtue ethics applied to the profession of journalism. Virtue ethics emphasizes character before consequences, requires the “good” prior to the “right,” and allows for agent-relative as well as agent-neutral values. This essay offers an exploration of the internal characteristics of a good journalist by focusing on moral virtues crucial to journalism. First, the essay outlines the general tenets of Aristotelian virtue ethics. Second, it offers arguments touting virtue ethics in comparison with other popular normative theories such as Mill's utilitarianism and Kant's deontology. Finally, an original account of journalistic virtue ethics is offered, with an emphasis on the virtues of justice and integrity.

Acknowledgments

This article is drawn in part from The Rehabilitation of Professional Journalism, my 2006 doctoral thesis at Charles Sturt University in New South Wales, Australia and the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Canberra, Australia. Many thanks are due to those who assisted me in developing this paper. Thanks first to Dean Cocking, whose expertise in professional virtue ethics—and in moral philosophy generally—has greatly influenced my own positions. Thanks also to JMME editors and reviewers, especially Christopher Meyers, for their insightful criticisms and suggestions.

Notes

1. Although I argue above against the perils presented by utilitarianism's overreliance on predicting consequences as a means to assessing expected happiness, I do not mean to devalue the role of consequence prediction altogether. In many cases, the prediction of consequences is both reasonably reliable and necessary to making good decisions, such as in the aforementioned case of the inquiring murderer. However, unlike utilitarians, I believe these cases are limited, and even so, prone to a significant (but acceptable) degree of error.